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Consequences of real earnings management and corporate governance
Title
Consequences of real earnings management and corporate governance: evidence from cash holdings.
Creator
Greiner, Adam J., College of Business, School of Accounting
Abstract/Description
I examine the impact of real earnings management (REM) and corporate governance on cash holdings. Extant research documents an increase in both cash holdings and REM activity in recent years and shows that agency conflicts influence both the levels and valuations of cash holdings. Motivated by agency problems of REM and Jensen's (1986) arguments concerning the free cash flow problem, I investigate whether opportunistic asset sales and reductions in discretionary expenditures are associated...
Show moreI examine the impact of real earnings management (REM) and corporate governance on cash holdings. Extant research documents an increase in both cash holdings and REM activity in recent years and shows that agency conflicts influence both the levels and valuations of cash holdings. Motivated by agency problems of REM and Jensen's (1986) arguments concerning the free cash flow problem, I investigate whether opportunistic asset sales and reductions in discretionary expenditures are associated with levels and valuations of cash holdings. Prior research also shows that strong corporate governance mitigates opportunistic earnings management behavior and enhances the valuation of cash holdings. Using empirical models from prior research, I document that REM is positively associated with cash holdings, investors discount cash holdings of high REM firms, and, among high REM firms, valuations of cash holdings of weak corporate governance firms are discounted significantly lower relative to those of strong corporate governance firms. My study unites two lines of research by incorporating agency problems concerning REM with levels and valuations of cash holdings.
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Date Issued
2013
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/fcla/dt/3360788
Subject Headings
Econometrics, Corporate governance, Corporations, Corrupt practices, Corporations, Finance, Accounting, Industrial management
Format
Document (PDF)
An Analysis of Securities Fraud Class Action Lawsuits: How Overvalued Equity and Related Factors Affect the Likelihood of Dismissals and the Magnitude of Settlements
Title
An Analysis of Securities Fraud Class Action Lawsuits: How Overvalued Equity and Related Factors Affect the Likelihood of Dismissals and the Magnitude of Settlements.
Creator
Houmes, Robert, Skantz, Terrance R., Florida Atlantic University
Abstract/Description
Under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, investors are provided a cause of action for losses resulting from management's intentionally deceptive disclosure or non-disclosure of information. Since lawsuits are costly, managers should be motivated to avoid a securities fraud class action. Prior research argues that managers attempt to mitigate the adverse effects of class actions by preempting negative eamings surprises (Skinner 1994 ). However, this study argues that when a...
Show moreUnder Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, investors are provided a cause of action for losses resulting from management's intentionally deceptive disclosure or non-disclosure of information. Since lawsuits are costly, managers should be motivated to avoid a securities fraud class action. Prior research argues that managers attempt to mitigate the adverse effects of class actions by preempting negative eamings surprises (Skinner 1994 ). However, this study argues that when a firm is overvalued, managers have incentives to avoid value reducing disclosure, which may lead to the violation of securities fraud laws. I investigate this assertion by testing associations between overvalued equity and the two outcomes of a securities fraud class action: dismissals and settlements. Other relevant factors related to overvalued equity are also tested and measured. These other factors include cases where the lead plaintiff is an institution, the length of the class period, the intrinsic value of exercisable CEO in-the-money stock option holdings, and corporate governance as measured by a corporate governance score and the occurrence of a GAAP violation. Findings show that the likelihood of a non-dismissal increases when an institution is the lead plaintiff and CEOs of overvalued firms hold higher amounts of in-the-money options. In addition, results suggest that for overvalued firms, stronger governance increases the probability of a non-dismissal.
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Date Issued
2007
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00000305
Subject Headings
Class actions (Civil procedure)--United States, Securities fraud--United States, Corporations--Corrupt practices--United States
Format
Document (PDF)
Target stock price runup prior to acquisitions
Title
Target stock price runup prior to acquisitions.
Creator
Brigida, Matthew David., College of Business, Department of Finance
Abstract/Description
Information leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition...
Show moreInformation leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition then information leakage is greater. Further if the acquirer is foreign, if the target is a high-tech firm, and if the target has options on its stock all increase information leakage. I find hostile deals are effective in reducing information leakage. Lastly, information leakage increases in the percentage of managerial ownership. I next hypothesize that the identity and intent of partial acquirers is known to market participants before the announcement of a partial acquisition. I find that the market can anticipate whether a partial acquirer intends to fully-acquire or take an active role in the management of the target. Also, the market anticipates whether the acquirer is a private investment find or a non-financial corporation. Further, the acquirer's identity or intent is fully reflected in the target's stock price before the announcement of the partial acquisition. These results help explain why there are few partial acquisitions as precursors to full acquisitions., I next hypothesize that macroeconomic factors affect information leakage, and may serve as a signal of when to speculate on acquisitions. I find that information leakage is positively related to shocks in both expected economic conditions and financing costs, the latter signaling to speculators that acquisitions are imminent. I also find information about an imminent full acquisition is leaked earlier when there are positive shocks to economic conditions and financing costs.
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Date Issued
2009
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/368613
Subject Headings
Consolidation and merger of corporations, Negotiation in business, Investment analysis, Stocks, Prices, Securities industry, Corrupt practices
Format
Document (PDF)