Current Search: Corporate governance -- United States (x)
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- Title
- Consequences of real earnings management and corporate governance: evidence from cash holdings.
- Creator
- Greiner, Adam J., College of Business, School of Accounting
- Abstract/Description
-
I examine the impact of real earnings management (REM) and corporate governance on cash holdings. Extant research documents an increase in both cash holdings and REM activity in recent years and shows that agency conflicts influence both the levels and valuations of cash holdings. Motivated by agency problems of REM and Jensen's (1986) arguments concerning the free cash flow problem, I investigate whether opportunistic asset sales and reductions in discretionary expenditures are associated...
Show moreI examine the impact of real earnings management (REM) and corporate governance on cash holdings. Extant research documents an increase in both cash holdings and REM activity in recent years and shows that agency conflicts influence both the levels and valuations of cash holdings. Motivated by agency problems of REM and Jensen's (1986) arguments concerning the free cash flow problem, I investigate whether opportunistic asset sales and reductions in discretionary expenditures are associated with levels and valuations of cash holdings. Prior research also shows that strong corporate governance mitigates opportunistic earnings management behavior and enhances the valuation of cash holdings. Using empirical models from prior research, I document that REM is positively associated with cash holdings, investors discount cash holdings of high REM firms, and, among high REM firms, valuations of cash holdings of weak corporate governance firms are discounted significantly lower relative to those of strong corporate governance firms. My study unites two lines of research by incorporating agency problems concerning REM with levels and valuations of cash holdings.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2013
- PURL
- http://purl.flvc.org/fcla/dt/3360788
- Subject Headings
- Econometrics, Corporate governance, Corporations, Corrupt practices, Corporations, Finance, Accounting, Industrial management
- Format
- Document (PDF)
- Title
- Essays on takeover defenses and cancellations.
- Creator
- Glegg, Charmaine A., Florida Atlantic University, Madura, Jeff
- Abstract/Description
-
This dissertation analyzes the impact of takeover defenses and cancellations in three essays: (1) The Impact of the Strength of Targets' Takeover Defense Mechanisms on Acquiring Firms; (2) The Impact of the Announcement of Shareholder-Friendly Poison Pill Provisions on Shareholder Wealth; and (3) The Relation between Short Interest Positions and Acquisition Withdrawal Announcements. The first essay examines the impact of the strength of target firms' takeover defenses on acquiring firms'...
Show moreThis dissertation analyzes the impact of takeover defenses and cancellations in three essays: (1) The Impact of the Strength of Targets' Takeover Defense Mechanisms on Acquiring Firms; (2) The Impact of the Announcement of Shareholder-Friendly Poison Pill Provisions on Shareholder Wealth; and (3) The Relation between Short Interest Positions and Acquisition Withdrawal Announcements. The first essay examines the impact of the strength of target firms' takeover defenses on acquiring firms' probability of successfully completing takeover deals, acquiring firms' takeover wealth effects, and their long-term performance. The evidence indicates that acquirers are more likely to complete takeovers if targets have weaker defenses. Additionally, acquisition announcement cumulative abnormal returns are lower for acquirers bidding on targets with stronger defenses. However, acquiring firms underperform in the long-run, which has limited relation with targets' takeover defense strengths. The second essay examines the market's reaction to announcements of the adoption of shareholder-friendly poison pills. The market's reaction is generally favorable to poison pill announcements. Cumulative abnormal returns surrounding friendly poison pill adoptions are positive and statistically significant. Additionally, adoptions of poison pills with sunset and TIDE provisions are positively and significantly related to poison pill announcement wealth effects. However, dead hand and fiduciary out provisions have significant inverse relation with poison pill announcement cumulative abnormal returns. Poison pills with chewable, no hand, and adverse persons clauses do not significantly explain cumulative abnormal returns. The cancellation study analyzes abnormal short selling interests in target firms in the month prior to the announcement of a cancelled takeover bid. Average short selling levels are 4 or 5 times higher than normal short selling levels in the month prior to the announcement of takeover bid cancellation, and are negatively related to announcement wealth effects. These initial findings imply that short sellers may be able to anticipate the negative wealth effects associated with deal failure, and hence increase short interests to benefit from target's (albeit brief) decline in value. However, further analyses point to short sellers using market-to-fundamentals strategies, and imply that increased abnormal short selling in the month prior to the announcement of cancelled takeover bids may be coincidental.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2006
- PURL
- http://purl.flvc.org/fcla/dt/12222
- Subject Headings
- Consolidation and merger of corporations--United States--Prevention, Corporate governance--United States, Tender offers (Securities)--United States, Actions and defenses--United States
- Format
- Document (PDF)
- Title
- Economic Consequences of Implementing the Engagement Partner Signature Requirement in the UK.
- Creator
- Liu, Min, Kohlbeck, Mark, Florida Atlantic University, College of Business, School of Accounting
- Abstract/Description
-
I investigate the effects of requiring the audit engagement partner (EP) signature and individual EP’s quality on information asymmetry, analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion. I predict and find that, ceteris paribus, there is a significant decline in information asymmetry, analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion from the pre- to post-EP signature period in the UK over both of short-term (e.g., 2008-2010) and long-term (e.g., 2004-2014). These findings hold when using a...
Show moreI investigate the effects of requiring the audit engagement partner (EP) signature and individual EP’s quality on information asymmetry, analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion. I predict and find that, ceteris paribus, there is a significant decline in information asymmetry, analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion from the pre- to post-EP signature period in the UK over both of short-term (e.g., 2008-2010) and long-term (e.g., 2004-2014). These findings hold when using a control sample approach and a different proxy for the information asymmetry, which indicate that my results are not likely due to the effect of concurrent events and correlated omitted variables. These findings provide timely and important empirical evidence to the ongoing debate about whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board should pass a similar requirement in the U.S.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2016
- PURL
- http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00004651, http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00004651
- Subject Headings
- Auditing -- Standards -- United States, Corporate governance, Corporations -- Auditing -- Standards -- United States, Disclosure in accounting, Financial risk management -- Forecasting, Financial services industry -- Management, International standard on auditing, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
- Format
- Document (PDF)
- Title
- Big 4 global networks: degree of homogeneity of audit quality among affiliates and relevance of PCAOB inspections.
- Creator
- Kassawat, Paulina M., Higgs, Julia, Florida Atlantic University, College of Business, School of Accounting
- Abstract/Description
-
The Big 4 global networks (Deloitte, Ernst & Young [E&Y], KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC]) market themselves as providers of worldwide seamless services and consistent audit quality through their members. Under the current environment in which these auditors operate, there are three types of global network members: inspected non-U.S. affiliates (inspected affiliates, hereafter), non-inspected non-U.S. affiliates (non-inspected affiliates, hereafter), and inspected U.S. offices (U.S....
Show moreThe Big 4 global networks (Deloitte, Ernst & Young [E&Y], KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC]) market themselves as providers of worldwide seamless services and consistent audit quality through their members. Under the current environment in which these auditors operate, there are three types of global network members: inspected non-U.S. affiliates (inspected affiliates, hereafter), non-inspected non-U.S. affiliates (non-inspected affiliates, hereafter), and inspected U.S. offices (U.S. offices, hereafter). The recent suspension of the China-based Big 4 affiliates from auditing U.S.-listed companies calls into question whether these global networks can deliver the same level of audit quality across all their members and whether those located in jurisdictions denying access to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board, hereafter) to conduct inspections may benefit from such inspections. This study examines the effect of being an affiliate and the effect of PCAOB inspections on perceived audit quality. I use earnings response coefficients (ERCs) as a proxy for perceived audit quality.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2015
- PURL
- http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00004385, http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00004385
- Subject Headings
- Auditing standards -- United States, Business enterprises -- Computer networks, Corporate governance, Disclosure in accounting -- United States, Financial services industry -- Management, Government accountability, Intternational standard on auditing, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
- Format
- Document (PDF)
- Title
- Are the regulatory reforms working?: evidence from audit committee members' selection of auditors.
- Creator
- Looknanan-Brown, Veena., College of Business, School of Accounting
- Abstract/Description
-
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act made audit committees directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and supervision of companies' auditors. Limited research in the auditor selection process and PCAOB inspections suggest that managers, not audit committees, may still be selecting the auditors, and that inspection reports are not useful. This study addresses both of these areas. This paper considers two theories of governance, Agency Theory and Institution Theory, to analyze the audit...
Show moreThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act made audit committees directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and supervision of companies' auditors. Limited research in the auditor selection process and PCAOB inspections suggest that managers, not audit committees, may still be selecting the auditors, and that inspection reports are not useful. This study addresses both of these areas. This paper considers two theories of governance, Agency Theory and Institution Theory, to analyze the audit committee members' auditor selection process. The study examines whether Audit Committee Members use two specific types of audit quality indicators, other than managers' recommendation, in evaluating auditors. In a setting where the manager recommends the auditor, the auditors' inspection results (favorable/unfavorable) and a prior manager/auditor affiliation (absent/present) are manipulated in a between-subject research design, using financially literate professionals as a proxy for audit committee members. The study finds that audit quality perception and auditor selection are jointly determined. Inspection results are positively associated with audit quality perception and auditor selection. The nature of a manager-auditor affiliation is directly associated with audit quality perception and inversely related to auditor selection. Further, controlling for perception, audit committee members are more likely to recommend auditors with unfavorable inspection results, if a prior affiliation with management is present than if an affiliation is absent. Overall, the results indicate that audit committee members are diligent in evaluating auditors, and PCAOB inspection results are useful. The results of this study contribute to the audit committee effectiveness and PCAOB literature.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2011
- PURL
- http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/3318671
- Subject Headings
- Financial services industry, Management, Financial institutions, Law and legislation, Corporate governance, Law and legislation, Auditing, Standards, Corporations, Auditing, Standards
- Format
- Document (PDF)