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Presidential Success and the Policy Divide
Title
Presidential Success and the Policy Divide.
Creator
Hicks, William, Schwerin, Edward, Florida Atlantic University
Abstract/Description
This research evaluates presidential legislative success with an analysis of roll call votes on which the president expressed a preference, 1953-2006. The dependent variables reflect presidential success, presidential support, and opposition party support. The analysis finds that the independent variable responsible for the greatest variance of presidential success in both chambers is divided government. Presidents generally are more successful on foreign policy legislation than domestic...
Show moreThis research evaluates presidential legislative success with an analysis of roll call votes on which the president expressed a preference, 1953-2006. The dependent variables reflect presidential success, presidential support, and opposition party support. The analysis finds that the independent variable responsible for the greatest variance of presidential success in both chambers is divided government. Presidents generally are more successful on foreign policy legislation than domestic policy legislation in both chambers. However, the disparity between the two policy realms becomes less distinguishable during major foreign conflicts. Regression analysis indicates that the occurrence of major foreign conflicts is associated with increased presidential success and opposition party support on domestic policy in the House. Yet, the occurrence of foreign conflicts has a minimal effect on presidential success and opposition party support on foreign policy legislation in the House. In the Senate, the occurrence of foreign conflicts has a minimal impact on presidential success.
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Date Issued
2008
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00000928
Subject Headings
Political leadership--United States, Executive power--United States, United States--Congress--Powers and duties, United States--Politics and government--2001-
Format
Document (PDF)
Escalation - De-escalation: And Balance of Power
Title
Escalation - De-escalation: And Balance of Power.
Creator
Schwerin, Edward W., Vincent, Jack E., Florida Atlantic University, Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters, Department of Political Science
Abstract/Description
This experiment was an extension of the SMH, and Vincent-Tindell games. The major purpose was to investigate the effects of two different ratios of shock on escalation-de-escalation ancl other aspects of aggressive-cooperative behavior. In one condition (inequality) one player began game play with 6 shocks, the other player began with 18 shocks. In the other condition (equality) both players began game play with 13 shocks apiece. Players were allowed to purchase additional shocks or surrender...
Show moreThis experiment was an extension of the SMH, and Vincent-Tindell games. The major purpose was to investigate the effects of two different ratios of shock on escalation-de-escalation ancl other aspects of aggressive-cooperative behavior. In one condition (inequality) one player began game play with 6 shocks, the other player began with 18 shocks. In the other condition (equality) both players began game play with 13 shocks apiece. Players were allowed to purchase additional shocks or surrender any number of shocks. Forty-nine game play variables were generated, representing indices of aggressive or cooperative behavior. The relationships of these variables to additional independent variables such as game plan, grade point average, and attitudinal scores were also examined. The findings of this experiment indicate that the balanced (equality) conditions tend to generate more purchasing behavior and a higher overall level of aggression. The unbalanced (inequality) condition however, generated more extreme forms of behavior. Those with 18 shocks were generally more aggressive than all other players, and those with 6 shocks (inequality) were generally more cooperative than all other players. These findings conflicted with the results of the previous Tindell-Vincent game, but it seems that the addition of the purchasing option radically altered the effects of treatment condition. Sex was found to be a good predictor of game behavior. females were generally more cooperative and less active than males. Game plan and, to a lesser extent, attitude scores had predictive value for several responses, but grade point average, as expected, was a poor predictor of game behavior.
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Date Issued
1970
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00012598
Subject Headings
Political science--Research, Balance of power
Format
Document (PDF)