Current Search: Gonzalez, Madeline. (x)
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Title
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Cryptography in the presence of key-dependent messages.
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Creator
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Gonzalez, Madeline., Charles E. Schmidt College of Science, Department of Mathematical Sciences
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Abstract/Description
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The aim of this work is to investigate a security model in which we allow an adversary to have access to functions of the secret key. In recent years, significant progress has been made in understanding the security of encryption schemes in the presence of key-dependent plaintexts or messages (known as KDM). Here, we motivate and explore the security of a setting, where an adversary against a message authentication code (MAC) or signature scheme can access signatures on key-dependent messages...
Show moreThe aim of this work is to investigate a security model in which we allow an adversary to have access to functions of the secret key. In recent years, significant progress has been made in understanding the security of encryption schemes in the presence of key-dependent plaintexts or messages (known as KDM). Here, we motivate and explore the security of a setting, where an adversary against a message authentication code (MAC) or signature scheme can access signatures on key-dependent messages. We propose a way to formalize the security of message authentication schemes in the presence of key-dependent MACs (KD-EUF) and of signature schemes in the presence of key-dependent signatures (KDS). An attack on a message recognition protocol involving a MAC is presented. It turns out that the situation is quite different from key-dependent encryption: To achieve KD-EUF-security or KDS-security under non-adaptive chosen message attacks, the use of a stateful signing algorithm is inevitable even in the random oracle model. After discussing the connection between key-dependent signing and forward security, we describe a compiler which lifts any EUF-CMA secure one-time signature scheme to a forward secure signature scheme offering KDS-CMA security. Then, we discuss how aggregate signatures can be used to combine the signatures in the certificate chain used in the compiler. A natural question arises about how to combine the security definitions of KDM and KDS to come up with a signcryption scheme that is secure. We also offer a connection with Leakage-Resilient Signatures, which take into account side-channel attacks. Lastly, we present some open problems for future research.
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Date Issued
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2009
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PURL
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http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/2182087
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Subject Headings
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Cryptography, Data processing, Digital signatures, Computer security, Data encryption (Computer science), Software protection
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Format
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Document (PDF)
