

THE INFLUENCE OF STATE PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING ON PUBLIC
HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES:
A CASE STUDY OF RACE AND POWER

by

Kayla C. Elliott

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
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
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
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
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
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

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ABSTRACT

Author: Kayla C. Elliott

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More than 30 states currently implement some form of outcomes or performance-based funding for public two-year and/or four-year institutions of higher education. Thirteen of these states have public Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). Every state's higher education governance and power relationships are a unique compilation of internal and external entities such as the governor, governing boards, policymakers, higher education staff and advisors, and the institution's administration, faculty, students, and alumni. Each entity holds power over the HBCU or its state policy context.

The purpose of this case study was to explore how performance-based funding influences power relationships inside a public four-year HBCU, understand how performance-based funding influences power relationships between an HBCU and its state, and examine how theory explains the changes taking place within an HBCU and

between an HBCU and its state. Power relationships are the associations or avenues where the ability to influence, change, overcome, or persuade can occur. The literature review revealed gaps in the research on power at HBCUs, and little research on the influence of performance-based funding at HBCUs. Literature and theory informed the study design, particularly the selection of three theories to frame the study: Principal Agent Theory; Resource Dependence Theory; and Critical Race Theory. The site selected was given the alias Warren Technical State University (Warren Tech), and is an 1890 land-grant university with approximately 10,000 students. Amongst HBCUs in states with active performance-based funding policies, Warren Tech is near the median percentages of full-time equivalent enrollment (91.3%), and Black students (87%).

Key trends emerged through comprehensive analysis of data gathered through interviews, document reviews, and observations. In general, performance-based funding upsets the balance of institutional autonomy and state accountability, fosters mistrust between the institution and the state, and strains communication between the related entities. Within the institution, performance-based funding increases volatility in campus budgeting and hampers student recruitment. The policy also exacerbates HBCU students' financial, academic, and personal hardships. The study revealed two novel concepts- power vacancies and power strongholds- and offers recommendations for studying these and other issues, as well as recommendations for state and institutional policy.

DEDICATION

This dissertation- the fruit of my intellectual labor- is dedicated to Black women across the diaspora. To Black women who labored in bondage to build this country and its economy. To Black women who birth physical, emotional, and intellectual fruit to feed our communities' creative, cultural, and civic legacies. To Black women on HBCU campuses that are not yet as safe for our womanhood as they are for our Blackness. To Black women who nurtured, scrubbed, toiled, or danced to provide for their families. To Black women who labored so future generations are no longer limited to moving for money, and can instead make money move to our communities and institutions.

From joy to sorrow to sickness to triumph, my doctoral journey was a microcosm of the Black woman's experience. Every grant, scholarship, and fellowship received was reparations for the sacrifice of those who marched before me. Every accolade was gratitude for the support of those who marched beside me. May every word of this dissertation be a beacon for the dreams of those who march behind me. We are glorious.

Only a Black woman can tell me when and where I enter, in the quiet, undisputed dignity of my womanhood, without violence and without suing or special patronage, then and

there the whole Negro race enters with me. - Anna Julia Cooper

De nigger woman is de mule uh de world so fur as Ah can see. - Zora Neale Hurston

Pay me what you owe me, don't act like you forgot. - Rihanna

Always stay gracious, best revenge is your paper. - Beyoncé

I don't gotta dance, I make money move. - Cardi B.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

Founded with the unique purpose of educating emancipated Black men and women, public Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) have a long history of underfunding compared to their predominantly white peers (M. C. Brown, 1999). After the Civil War, the federal government adopted a laissez-faire national stance on both race and education. Each state was permitted to set their own racial agendas and policies, and legislatures across the South set forth enacting laws enforcing de jure segregation (Minor, 2008b). In 1896, the *Plessy v. Ferguson* ruling legitimized the concept of “separate but equal”, providing a legal avenue for the marginalization of Black people and institutions (M. C. Brown, 1999). From that time to now, state governments have chronically underfunded HBCUs, a discrepancy that is amplified when compared to the funding of their predominantly white counterparts (Boland & Gasman, 2014; Minor, 2008a; Jones, 2014). A number of state finance policy trends discussed in Chapter 2 and outlined in Table 1 reveal longstanding practices of undervaluing and underfunding these important social institutions. Unfortunately, research shows these egregious trends have continued through new mechanisms. The most recent, increasingly popular change in state higher education finance is performance-based funding. Performance-based funding is a funding model which connects a public institution’s annual state allocation to the institution’s performance on predetermined student outcome metrics (Jones et al., 2017, Dougherty & Natow, 2015).

Oftentimes, performance-based funding models function as one-size-fits-all systems for all public institutions in a state, with little or no adjustment for institutional differences and diversity (Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014). This particularly disadvantages HBCUs, which overwhelmingly serve low-income, first generation, Black students (UNCF, 2017). When state policies impede these institutions' success, they have the potential to preclude students' access and attainment. At 15% of the current K-12 population, the success of Black students is vital to the prosperity of the nation (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2016).

Problem Statement

Performance-based funding policies use formulas to explicitly connect some or all of a campus's base funding to institutional performance metrics and student outcomes (Jones et al., 2017, Dougherty & Natow, 2015). As of 2018, 35 states have adopted performance-based funding for public two-year and/or four-year institutions of higher education (Hillman, Fryar, & Crespín-Trujillo, 2018). Thirteen of the 35 states have public two-year or four-year HBCUs: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Though some of these states have developed and approved performance-based funding models, they do not actively implement the policy. In addition to policymakers, many different stakeholders have a hand in the policies' design, including: state higher education leaders, officers, and policy advisors; intermediary organizations; foundations; and advocacy organizations. All too often, the resultant policies seem to favor predominantly white institutions (PWIs), particularly the public flagships. The formulas build both financial incentives and penalties into the design. The racial bias in the

policies and financial uncertainty about the allocations impact HBCUs' missions and the institutions' already tenuous finances. Under performance-based funding, state institutions' funding can fluctuate from one year to the next. Because of their heavy reliance on state funding, HBCUs are sensitive to funding fluctuations and state fiscal policy (Alfred, 2016; Griffin, 2013). To persist, HBCUs reallocate their already limited resources, sustaining the history of inequitable state funding (Jones et al., 2017). This works to maintain inequalities between institutions by rewarding those that are already well-resourced and, to an extent, more elite. Arguably, this reifies inter-institutional stratification and makes it so that the lower-performing institutions can never really catch up to their more elite peers.

The numerous internal and external entities involved in designing and implementing performance-based funding further complicate HBCUs' relationships within the state. Ultimately, policymakers sign performance-based funding policies into law, but it makes many stops before reaching a vote. State higher education staff and policy advisors often design the policies with the help of higher education experts and consultants, and intermediary organizations like foundations and advocacy organizations. In many states, public higher education is overseen by a board of political appointees. This includes governing boards: single corporate entities which legally control and provide public accountability for all institutions under their purview. This also includes coordinating boards: entities which plan for a system of multiple, distinct colleges and/or universities. A governing board may control policy, hiring, and budget at the institution(s) under its control, while a coordinating board is concerned with the system as a whole. For example, the Indiana Commission for Higher Education is a coordinating

board which oversees all of the public colleges and universities in the state, while the Indiana University Board of Trustees is a governing board which controls multiple Indiana University campuses. In addition to playing a role in executing or overseeing the performance-based funding model, some statewide boards also appoint the members of institutional governing boards. Institutional boards of trustees govern the universities, represent the interest of the state, and oversee the president. Though the president guides the institution's response to performance-based funding, the institutional Board of Trustees holds the president and the institution accountable to the demands of performance-based funding. Across states, all of these entities tend to be dominated by white men with little experience advancing racial equity or understanding HBCUs (Patton, 2016).

To start, there is little insight on the links between performance-based funding and state actors like coordinating boards and governing boards. Further, these relationships raise questions of racial equity when considering the HBCU and its state policy context, and the lack of diversity amongst state entities and decisionmakers. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of scholarship on the influence of performance-based funding on HBCUs. While some comparative or statewide studies include HBCUs in their analysis, these ignore the institutions' unique history and mission (Garrick, 1998; Titus, 2006; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014). There is some scholarship addressing the relationship between the mission of HBCUs and performance-based funding (Griffin, 2013; Jones 2013, 2014, 2015; Jones et al., 2017), but these studies do not focus on how performance-based funding has influenced the institution's external or internal relationships.

Study Purpose

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore how performance-based funding influences power relationships inside an HBCU, understand how performance-based funding influences power relationships between an HBCU and its state, and examine how theory explains the changes taking place within an HBCU, and between an HBCU and its state. This study focuses on an HBCU and its state policy context. The policy context includes entities which influence policy and power, including: state policymakers, advisors, and higher education staff; higher education experts and consultants; other universities in the state, and intermediaries like foundations and advocacy organizations. This study sought to fill gaps in the literature on performance-based funding and HBCUs, and on HBCUs and power. Despite the spread of performance-based funding across dozens of states, little empirical study has been conducted on the phenomenon's impact on HBCUs. Given their unique mission, HBCUs' student, faculty, and leadership demographics are unique. White men are the majority of higher education decision makers like governors, legislators, and state board members, whereas HBCU administrators, faculty, and students are predominantly Black (Patton, 2016; Association of Governing Boards, 2016a; Association of Governing Boards, 2016b). Broader studies or understandings of the relationships between the state and public universities do not account for the complex histories between HBCUs' and their states. Typically, studies on the governance and administration of higher education institutions employ organizational theories, which do not account for the intricate relationships between race, power, and property at HBCUs. In addition to organizational theories, this research used critical theory to consider social, historical, and cultural

aspects of the problem as well. Throughout the study, I relied on literature and theory to inform issues of race and power and to address, more generally, the dynamics many public institutions face regarding performance-based funding. This approach carries both scholarly and practical significance, and allows the study to benefit from different concepts of power and change.

Design of the Study

To study the influence of performance-based funding on HBCUs, I employ a qualitative case study appropriate for analysis of the relationships between a state and HBCU and within an HBCU. Hillman, Tandberg, and Sponsler (2015) caution researchers from limiting research on policy evaluation to studies on costs and effectiveness. They write, “‘evaluation’ occurs on a daily basis by the lived experiences of people involved or affected by a particular policy” (Hillman et al., 2015, p. 15). This aligns with Denzin and Lincoln’s (2000) characterization of qualitative research as “the studied use and collection of a variety of materials... that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individual’s lives.” (p. 3). This operationalizes Patton’s (2016) use of Critical Race Theory to disrupt “the ordinary, predictable, and taken for granted ways in which the academy functions as a bastion of racism/White supremacy” (p. 317). A qualitative case study design was chosen for this study as this research is concerned with how performance-based funding impacts the daily realities of power relationships and racism for HBCUs.

The case entails the HBCU and its state policy context. The HBCU includes internal stakeholders in but not limited to the campus setting. The policy context includes entities which have influence on policymaking and the performance-based funding

policy, including policymakers and their advisors, state higher education staff, higher education experts and consultants, other universities in the state, and intermediaries like foundations and advocacy organizations. The case study explores the internal and external power relationships of public, four-year HBCUs experiencing performance-based funding. My use of the term power relationships in this study operationalizes Pfeffer's (1992) definition of power as "the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do" (p. 30). Thus, a power relationship is an association or avenue where such influence, change, defeat, or persuasion can occur. In this study, this includes: relevant interactions and changes by actors within the institution; relevant interactions and changes between the state and the institution; and relevant actors, interactions, and changes of the state that influence the institution. The study is also informed by Patton's (2016) Critical Race Theory for higher education which holds that the American higher education system "functions as a bastion of racism/white supremacy" (p. 316). Relative to HBCUs, Patton notes that the institutions "have not benefitted from generations of wealth that elite colleges and universities have seen, and federal mandates have only provided cursory support for these institutions" (p. 331).

The case study method involves the collection of diverse data, including interviews, documents, and observations (Creswell, 2013). These holistic data address the following:

1. the nature of the case
2. the case's historical background
3. the physical setting

4. other contexts (e.g. economic, political, legal, and aesthetic)
5. other cases through which this case is recognized; and
6. those informants through whom the case can be known (Stake, 2000, p. 439).

In this design, the focus is on “complex, situated, problematic relationships” such as the power relationships between an HBCU and the state (Stake, 2000, p. 440).

Research Questions

The research questions which guide this study reflect the study’s purpose of understanding the influence of performance-based funding on the power relationships within the institution, the influence of performance-based funding on the power relationships between the institution and the state, and how theory explains the changes taking place within the HBCU and between the HBCU and the state. Stated formally, the research questions are:

1. How does performance-based funding influence power relationships between a public HBCU and its state?
2. How does performance-based funding influence power relationships within a public HBCU?
3. How does theory explain the influence of performance-based funding on power relationships in this context?

Limitations

The first limitation of this study is that it focuses on only one public, four-year institution in one state. As performance-based funding is implemented for public institutions, the results of this research are not germane to the more than 50 private HBCUs who are not beholden to state funding and oversight in the same ways. Since the

study focuses on a four-year institution, this research may not be applicable to the context of public two-year HBCUs, though many exist in states with performance-based funding policies. Each state's performance-based funding policy is different. Because it focuses only on one state, this research does not address the variations of performance-based funding policies. Another limitation of this study is the sample size. Though I collected data until reaching saturation, the group of stakeholders should not be generalized to represent the views of all HBCU or state stakeholders. Finally, participants' ability to self-select likely influences the characteristics of the sample.

Delimitations

The research is delimited to one public institution, which has been given the alias Warren Technical State University (Warren Tech). Focusing on a single site allows for in-depth probing of the context of the case (Yin, 2013). The case is the HBCU's internal and campus contexts and its external state policy context. As such, it is focused on the years since the policy's implementation (2012- present), but does not exclude how the current policy derives from or exacerbates the history between the state and the university. Participants include current and former stakeholders of the state and the university. They are described more fully in the methodology section.

Researcher Reflexivity

As a Black woman, I am aware of the role higher education plays in increasing the social standing, civic engagement, and economic potential of disenfranchised groups. My life and opportunities would be considerably different had my grandmother, Ethel Warren Elliott, not been able to secure a scholarship to her HBCU alma mater, Alabama State University, and become a lifelong educator. Her success placed my family solidly

in the middle class. The pseudonym for the HBCU at the center of this study, Warren Technical State University, is named in her honor. Her passing while I wrote this dissertation affirmed the impact she had on my family and her community.

Her children, my father and aunt, attended Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University and Tuskegee University, respectively. My mother and father were able to afford us academic privileges and experiences such as private schooling, annual vacations, and ample extracurricular activities. College was an expectation and an assumed next step for me. My older sister followed in our father's footsteps, and I am an alumna of Fisk University, a small liberal arts HBCU in Nashville, Tennessee. While a student at Fisk, I realized it was a privilege to have grown up with college educated parents, and to have done so in a state with a public HBCU that offered affordability and access.

While many of my classmates and friends were accumulating debt to have the HBCU experience, my education was fully funded by an endowed scholarship. I have been able to further my study without student loan debt thanks to endowed scholarships, fellowships, and assistantships at Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis and Florida Atlantic University. The freedom from debt has allowed me to make academic and professional choices others concerned with paying back loans could not. This support has also allowed me to complete my doctoral program as a full-time student, unencumbered by student loans. My dissertation research is supported in part by a generous scholarship from P.E.O. International and the inaugural Association for the Advancement of Colleges of Teacher Education Holmes Dissertation Funding Competition. While writing my dissertation, I was hired by The Education Trust, a

nonprofit advocacy organization which focuses on issues of education equity for low-income students and students of color. My disposition and productivity improved drastically after I was hired and the existential question of “What’s next?” was answered.

I have named my identities and lived experiences as part of processing my positionality and reflexivity as the researcher. As Ladson states, “All of my ‘selves’ are invested in this work... No technical-rational approach to this work would yield the deeply textured, multifaceted work I attempt to do.” (2000, p. 258). For example, being an HBCU alumna gave me unique insights during the data collection for this dissertation. Interview participants became more relaxed when I shared that I was an HBCU alumna. Most of the conversations with institutional stakeholders were friendly, with interviewees often interjecting Black American or HBCU colloquialisms. HBCUs are part of my life’s story. I approach them and this research with care and respect, while still separating my own experiences and perspectives from those reflected in the interviews. This concern and attention are not given to the institution in the dominant culture. In doing this work, I am centering HBCUs, race, and equity. As noted by Tyson (2003), “such a move provides the basis for research that unapologetically places discussions of race, gender, class, and sexuality as part of a larger political and epistemological struggle for a better future” (p. 24).

Significance

There is limited empirical research on the impact of performance-based funding on HBCUs, and no known studies which specifically examine the power relationships at the core of this phenomenon. This research contributes to the literature, and provides recommendations for future research, state policy, and institutional policy and practice.

This case study and its theoretical perspective and findings have implications for HBCUs, other Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs), and other institutions that serve marginalized populations. Additionally, as much of the research on performance-based funding is quantitative, it adds much needed qualitative findings to the literature. As demonstrated in the forthcoming literature review, much of the research on performance-based funding is quantitative. “Qualitative researchers believe that rich descriptions of the social world are valuable” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 10). For example, qualitative research provides an understanding of the strategic intent behind the policies that would be difficult to assay through quantitative analyses of numeric data. With the third research question, this study also constructs previously unexplored theoretical considerations. This study splits from conventional research on performance-based funding in its employment of the critical paradigm. This study advances the use of Critical Race Theory in research on higher education, specifically Patton’s (2016) three propositions on racism and White supremacy as endemic in higher education. This allows us to explore and explain the role of race, power, and property specific to HBCUs. At a time when racism, white supremacy, and capitalism are in the national spotlight, the findings and implications of this study are particularly germane to racial equity and opportune for systemic change.

Key Terms

- **Accountability**

- “The requirement to demonstrate responsible actions to external constituencies” (Berdahl, Altbach, & Gumport, 2011, p. 5). For example, a state coordinating board requirement for all public four-year institutions to submit strategic plans that align to the state’s goals.

- **Authority**
 - “Authority is when a distribution of power becomes legitimated over time” through formalized roles, responsibilities, or positions (Pfeffer, 1981 p. 4).
- **Academic Deference**
 - Legal recognition of universities’ expertise in matters of education by giving judicial deference to institutions in academic matters (Kaplin & Lee, 2014). For example, in *Edwards v. Cal University of Pennsylvania*, the court deferred to the university’s expertise on teaching and curriculum and ruled that public universities could control professors’ in-class speech and teaching without violating professors’ First Amendment rights.
- **Coordinating Board**
 - State sanctioned boards of appointed members designed to coordinate a public university system of multiple, distinct colleges and/or universities.
- **Governance**
 - Setting the purposes and goals of the institution/organization and identifying the structures and processes by which to pursue those purposes and goals (Hearn & McLendon, 2012).
- **Governing Board**
 - State sanctioned boards of appointed members which legally control and provide public accountability for one or more institutions under their purview; includes institutional boards of trustees or boards that govern a system of multiple campuses or institutions.

- **Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs)**
 - Institutions founded before 1964 with the express mission of educating Black students (United States Department of Education White House Initiative on HBCUs, n.d.).
- **Institutional Autonomy**
 - Some degree of an institution's ability to make decisions free from the state's "intervention and control" (McGuinness, 2011, p. 145); supported by the legal tenet of academic deference.
- **Organizational Culture**
 - Assumptions, beliefs, and values which underpin the interactions and rituals, as well as the formal structures and processes, in an organization.
- **Performance-based Funding**
 - A state higher education finance policy that uses a formula to calculate a portion or all of institutions' funding based on outcomes known as metrics; also known as performance funding and outcomes-based funding.
- **Power**
 - Power is a difficult term to define. I am relying on Pfeffer's definition: "the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do" (1992, p. 45). This definition is suitable for this study because it is a straightforward operationalization for the study of organizational relationships.
- **Power Relationships**

- Operationalizing Pfeffer's (1992) definition of power, power relationships are the association or avenues where the ability to influence, change, overcome, or persuade can occur. For example, the relationship between a student and a faculty member, or the relationship between a state higher education budget officer and a finance administrator at an institution.
- **Predominantly White Institution (PWI)**
 - An institution of higher education that has traditionally and disproportionately enrolled white students since its inception.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Historically Black Colleges and Universities

HBCU Origins

Before the passing of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, the few educational opportunities for African Americans were provided almost exclusively by white abolitionists and missionaries (M. C. Brown, 1999). Postsecondary opportunities were extremely limited; only four postsecondary institutions existed in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the District of Columbia (Gasman & Hilton, 2012; Cheyney University of Pennsylvania, 2019; Lincoln University, 2019; University of the District of Columbia, 2019; Wilberforce University, 2019). The earliest was the Institute for Colored Youth, now known as Cheyney University of Pennsylvania. Established as a vocational school by a Quaker minister in 1837, the institution is recognized as the first HBCU (Gasman & Hilton, 2012). Unlike Lincoln University in Pennsylvania and Wilberforce University in Ohio, Cheyney and the Miner Normal School (now the University of District of Columbia) did not confer postsecondary degrees until after the turn of the century (Cheyney University of Pennsylvania, 2019; Lincoln University, 2019; University of the District of Columbia, 2019; Wilberforce University, 2019). As of 1860, only 28 Black people had earned college degrees (Franklin, 1947). Catalyzed by the end of the Civil War, the 13th Amendment, and the establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau in 1865, dozens more

institutions dedicated to the education of African Americans were established before the turn of the century (Alfred, 2016; Anderson, 1988; M. C. Brown, 1999; Elliott, Warshaw, & deGregory, 2019; Franklin, 1947).

Though Cheyney is currently a public institution, it was not part of the state system until 1983 (Cheyney University of Pennsylvania, 2019). This is true for many of the other state HBCUs that trace their roots to the 19th century, such as Bowie State in Maryland, which was founded in 1865 and became public institution in 1908 (Bowie State University, 2019). Founded by Black Civil War veterans in 1866, Lincoln University of Missouri began receiving funding from the state of Missouri for the training of Black teachers in 1870. In 1879, the state deeded land to the institution and Lincoln officially became a public institution (Lincoln University of Missouri, 2019). In 1890, Congress passed the Second Morrill Land-Grant Act with a mandate that each state desegregate their designated land-grant institution, or establish a separate institution for Black students. (Lee & Keys, 2013b). In all, 19 public Land-Grant HBCUs, including Lincoln, were established across 18 states in the South and Midwest United States.

Wolanin (1998) points out that the 1890 Morrill Act was not born out of goodwill and opportunity for Black students, but a sign of federal kowtowing to the Jim Crow segregation in the South. Along with Black Codes designed to segregate and subjugate freedmen, states used the Morrill Act to enforce de facto and de jure segregation. These systematic policies successfully created a pattern of inequity for public HBCUs from their beginnings (Gasman & Hilton, 2012; Minor, 2008b). State legislatures and departments of education purposely limited the institutions to teaching industrial trades, rejecting any classical or liberal arts programs. Over 4,000 of the 7,500 students at the 23

Black land-grants and other state HBCUs were elementary students, and another 3,400 were secondary students (Anderson, 1982). For years, states underfunded the institutions with no federal oversight or admonition. For example, in 1920 both of Florida's land-grant institutions received a \$25,000 federal allocation. The state gave the HBCU \$25,937, while the flagship predominantly white four-year institution received \$146,000 (Johnson, Cobb-Roberts, & Shircliffe, 2007). By 1945, this discrepancy expanded exponentially with the PWI's state appropriation of \$1,035,000 and the HBCU's allocation of only \$201,097 (Johnson et al., 2007).

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund led a targeted litigation campaign against racial segregation in graduate and professional education programs in the 1930s, presuming this area would be easier to integrate than K-12 schools or undergraduate programs. As a result of the rulings, and in order to preclude Black students from enrolling at PWIs, states established graduate programs at HBCUs. Even after the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling in 1954, states continued to underfund and disenfranchise HBCUs. Outside of support for Howard University, a uniquely positioned neighbor and ward of the federal government in the District of Columbia, there was no federal support of HBCUs for almost 100 years from the 1870s to the 1960s (Wolanin, 1998). With the Higher Education Act of 1965, Congress defined Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) as accredited postsecondary institutions established prior to 1964 with the primary mission of educating Black Americans. Title III of the Higher Education Act of 1965 instituted grants to strengthen HBCUs' infrastructure, institutional capacity, and financial stability (Zamani-Gallaher, 2010). In 1986, the

addition of Part B of Title III of the Higher Education Act formally solidified support for HBCUs (Wolanin, 1998).

HBCU Performance and Effectiveness

As of 2016, 30.8% of Black Americans ages 25 to 64 years old hold at least an Associate degree; this figure drops to 21.8% for Black Americans ages 25 to 64 years old with at least a Bachelor's degree (Nichols & Schak, 2017). Though they represent just 3% of institutions in the United States, HBCUs confer 17% of all undergraduate degrees earned by Black Americans (UNCF, 2017). While traditional metrics and data sources tell one story of HBCU productivity and efficiency, scholars have helped to establish a counternarrative by using data and methods more suitable to HBCUs and their students. Studying public and private nonprofit four-year universities, UNCF researchers controlled for student SAT scores and Pell funding. This allowed them to compare outcomes of institutions that are serving similar populations. HBCUs' retention rates were 4% higher than the rates at other institutions (Richards & Awokoya, 2012). "In every case, the inferior performance of HBCUs to nonHBCUs was not only reduced or removed, but was in fact reversed" (Richards & Awokoya, 2012, p. 12). This applied to graduation as well. Controlling for Pell status and SAT scores, the graduation rate of HBCUs was 3% higher than other institutions. When narrowing the study specifically to Black students, the HBCUs' graduation rate was 14% higher than all other institutions. Narrowing even further by gender, HBCUs graduate Black females at a rate 15% higher than nonHBCUs.

Though the UNCF report relied on traditional six-year graduation rates, Espinosa, Turk, and Taylor's (2017) more recent study rejects the inaccuracies in the calculation of

this metric. Six-year graduation rates do not consider part-time or transfer students. Students at public HBCUs “enroll primarily through mixed enrollment, meaning they move between attending college both full-time and part-time, and not solely through one or the other” (Espinosa et al., 2017, p. v). While the federal graduation rate for four-year HBCUs is 34.1%, Espinosa et al. determined a 43% total completion rate using data from the National Student Clearinghouse. Using these same data and methods, the completion rate for full time students was nearly 62%.

Nichols and Evans-Bell (2017) also used alternative measures and found higher completion rates at HBCUs. Their study looks at HBCUs in their unique context of serving low-income students. Comparing HBCUs to other institutions with similar percentages of Pell-eligible students, they consistently found Black students at HBCUs outperformed their peers. For example, amongst institutions with 40%-75% Pell freshmen, Black students at HBCUs had a 37.8% completion rate, while Black students at nonHBCUs had a 32% completion rate. Narrowing to only institutions with 65%-75% Pell first-time, first-year, full-time undergraduates, Black students at HBCUs had a 34.4% completion rate, while Black students at nonHBCUs had a 30.3% completion rate.

On the whole, the literature suggests Black students at HBCUs have more educationally beneficial experiences than their Black peers at PWIs (Nelson Laird, Bridges, Morelon-Quainoo, Williams, & Holmes, 2007). Black students report significantly higher levels of gains and engagement than their counterparts at PWIs (Nelson Laird et al., 2007). Specifically, Black HBCU seniors were much more likely than Black PWI seniors to report “higher levels of active and collaborative learning, student–faculty interaction, and gains in overall development” (Nelson Laird et al., 2007,

p. 42). While these differences could be attributed to the self-selection of students into HBCUs, this advantage has been attributed to HBCUs' prioritization of Blackness in their missions through curriculum, pedagogy, and student activities (Nelson Laird et al., 2007).

In addition to positive academic outcomes, the literature also reveals positive student involvement trends for Black students at HBCUs. In a study of 443 Black students at seven HBCUs and 443 Black students at 114 PWIs, HBCU students had higher levels of involvement in extracurricular and academic activities (Outcalt & Skewes-Cox, 2002). Specific to participation in fraternal organizations, found Black students in Greek letter organizations at HBCUs are slightly more involved than Black students in fraternal organizations at PWIs (Patton, Bridges, & Flowers, 2011).

HBCUs' mission commitment to Blackness has an impact on students' racial identity development. Given this mission and its influence on HBCUs' curricular and co-curricular experiences, it is not surprising that HBCU graduates report these "environments affirm their racial/ethnic identity", and report higher scores of Black identity than Black graduates of PWIs (Strayhorn, 2015, p. 2). Cokley (1999, 2001, 2002) has provided robust quantitative analyses on HBCU students' Black identity development. In a 2002 study, HBCUs students had higher African self-consciousness and higher nationalist ideology than PWI students. Replicating a study on the correlation between racial identity and psychological stress in Black students at two PWIs, Gilbert, So, Russell, and Wessel (2006) surveyed Black students in an introductory psychology course at HBCU. In comparison to the Black students at the PWIs, HBCU students in the same phase of Black identity development had lower scores on the depression subscale, lower interpersonal sensitivity, and lower psychoticism scores. Thus, these findings

suggest the correlation between racial identity and stress is markedly less salient for Black students when they are not the minority on campus (Gilbert et al., 2006).

Outside of scholarly works, organizations in the private sector have also established alternative metrics for examining universities' impact. Using data on social mobility from the Equality of Opportunity Project, researchers at the Brookings Institute found that 85% of HBCUs had a higher mobility score than all other institutions (Reeves & Joo, 2017). The score calculates the movement of students from the lowest income quartile as children into the highest income quartile as adults. Similarly, CollegeNet, a private tech company created the Social Mobility Index (SMI) as an alternative ranking system. The SMI factors tuition, economic background, graduation rate, early career salary, and endowment (CollegeNet, 2017). At least one public four-year HBCU has been ranked in the top five institutions of the SMI since the system's start in 2014, with three earning a place in the top 10 in 2015.

HBCU Case Law, State Policy, and Finance

Given the focus of this research, it is important to delineate the financial and policy contexts of public HBCUs. The United States Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) identifies 102 HBCUs. Of these, 51 are public institutions; 10 of these are two-year colleges, and the remaining 41 are four-year colleges and universities. Case law provides a good illustration of how state policies indirectly and unfairly impact these institutions. For example, in 1992, *United States v. Fordice* established that duplication of programs already offered at HBCUs qualified as the operation of two separate systems of higher education (Griffin, 2013). The Fordice decision ruled states are not fulfilling their constitutional duty to desegregate

“until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continues to foster segregation” (United States v. Fordice, 1992). When the *Fordice* case was finally settled in 2002, all three HBCUs in Mississippi were awarded a sum of \$503 million dollars (Sum, Light, & King, 2004). Unfortunately, access to these funds is contingent on enrolling at least 10% white students; one of the institutions still has not received these funds 17 years later (Lee, 2010). In *Knight v. State of Alabama*, the state’s HBCUs were awarded more than \$200 million in a similar case (M.C. Brown, 1999). In *Geier v. Alexander*, Tennessee’s public HBCU was awarded \$75 million and given authority over the PWI’s Nashville campus and all associated programs (M. C. Brown, 1999). State HBCUs in Maryland are currently seeking remediation for the duplication of programs at nearby PWIs. Table 1 is adapted from Jones et al.’s (2017) book on equity in performance-based funding.

Table 1

Key National Legal and Policy Decisions on the Education of Black Americans

Key National Dates	
<u><i>First Morrill Land-Grant Act</i></u> . Federal government grants land to states to sell or use for the establishment of colleges focused on industrial and agricultural education	1862
<u><i>2nd Morrill Land-Grant Act</i></u> . Mandated states to admit students of all races or establish at least one land-grant college for students of color, establishing 19 public HBCUs	1890
<u><i>Plessy v. Ferguson</i></u> . Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) rules separate public facilities for the races do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause so long as they were equal	1896
<u><i>Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma</i></u> . SCOTUS rules states must provide education options for Black students as soon as it is provided to White students	1948
<u><i>State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida et al.</i></u> Virgil Hawkins files first of six petitions to attend University of Florida’s law school. In response, the state authorizes a law school at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College for Negroes	1949
<u><i>Sweatt v. Painter</i></u> . SCOTUS rules states must provide equal and comparable facilities for Black schools	1950

Table 1 (continued)

<u>MacLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents</u> . SCOTUS mandates White institutions provide the same treatment to Black students as white students	1950
<u>Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas</u> . SCOTUS rules that racial segregation in schools violates the 14th amendment, making “separate but equal” unconstitutional	1954
<u>Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control</u> The University of Florida College of Law is ordered to admit Virgil Hawkins. The first Black student does not enroll until 1958	1956
<u>Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964</u> gives the federal government authority to intervene in segregationist states by levying sanctions, withholding fines, or pursuing legal action	1964
<u>Adams v. Richardson</u> . SCOTUS orders the Department of Health, Education and Warfare to enforce the law of desegregation	1973
<u>Adams v. Califano</u> . SCOTUS finds that Florida and five other states have not achieved desegregation or submitted acceptable desegregation plan	1977
<u>United States v. Fordice</u> SCOTUS decision in Mississippi ruled race-neutral policies alone are not sufficient proof that a state has stopped perpetuating a segregated system of higher education	1992
<u>Knight v. Alabama</u> . U.S. District Court finds many state policies foster segregation in Alabama’s colleges and universities, orders policy changes, and supervises state for 10 years. HBCUs each eventually received more than \$200 million in new state funding	1995
<u>Geier v. Alexander</u> . Tennessee State University awarded \$75 million and authority over University of Tennessee’ Nashville campus and all associated programs	2001
Three HBCUs in Mississippi <u>Fordice</u> case awarded a sum of \$503 million dollars	2002
Congress cuts Pell Grant funding eligibility from 18 semesters of coverage to only 12, and the U.S. Department of Education redefines Parent PLUS loan standards.	2011
Court finds in favor of state HBCUs in Maryland, ruling against the duplication of programs at nearby PWIs	2013
Maryland governor proposes \$100 million settlement in segregation case. The appeals U.S. District Court order to spend millions of dollars for marketing, multicultural centers, scholarships and high demand programs at the state’s four public HBCUs	2018
Georgia legislature proposes merging the state’s three public HBCUs into one university system	2019

Recreated from Jones et al., 2017

In a longitudinal quantitative analysis, Brady (2001) explored whether the legacy of segregation and discrimination is present in recent state and federal funding trends. He asserts, “Undoubtedly, the impact of and significant and continual fiscal neglect in the form of gross underfunding to public HBCUs has negatively impaired the higher education at these institutions” (Brady, 2001, p. 149). Comparisons of spending and allocations reveal a number of discrepancies. For example, educational and general expenditures per FTE at public HBCUs between 1977 and 1994 increased only 4%, as compared to the 11% increase at all other public institutions during the same time period (Brady, 2001). During this time, educational and general expenditures per FTE at public HBCUs were 12% lower than all other public institutions (Brady, 2001). Brady (2001) recommends three legal responses: establishing a legal doctrine for “perpetuation of past discrimination”; the acceptance of historically based evidence in the courts; and the creation of “fiscally appropriate and relatively easy-to-use measures of fiscal adequacy in the U.S. higher education context” (p. 73). It would be interesting to build on Brady’s (2001) work and explore how or whether the results have changed over the last twenty years.

Recent changes to the economy and funding mechanisms indicate shifts both toward and away from funding equity. For example, using 2006 data and controlling for a number of differences, Sav (2010) found evidence of decreasing discriminatory treatment of HBCUs. Funding differences between HBCUs and nonHBCUs in 1995 were 16.7%, but only 12.5% in 2006. While a trend analysis would determine it will only take 30 years to achieve funding equity, Sav (2010) warns against projecting these results. Instead, he cautions that “both positive and negative funding effects work in opposing directions to

produce an overall disparity” (Sav, 2010, p. 306). It must be noted that Sav’s (2006) study came before a major economic downturn. In 2008, state educational appropriations were \$8,372 per FTE, on average (State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2017).

As of fiscal year 2016, state spending had yet to return to this level, and on average states spend 15% less than pre-recession allocations (State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2017). Gasman (2009) notes how HBCUs were particularly disadvantaged during the economic recession because of their smaller endowments, lower tuition, and their overall mission to serve lower-income students. As she notes, HBCUs keep tuition low to be accessible to students from low-income families, and “[l]ower tuition equals fewer operating dollars, which means less flexibility during tough times” (Gasman, 2009, p. 27). HBCUs’ small endowments took hard hits during the economic downturn that were only compounded by decreases in state funding. In Alfred’s (2016) multi-site case study on HBCU funding, neither of the institutions’ state allocations were fully reinstated to pre-recession levels. From 2010-2012, 61% of 1890 land-grant institutions did not receive full matching funds from their respective states (Lee & Keys, 2013b), for a combined loss of \$57 million in rightfully earned income (Lee & Keys, 2013b). Alfred (2016) found that inequitable funding contributed to complex, political environments at the two HBCUs studied. For example, every study participant at one institution believed that the funding shifts led to shifts in the way the university fulfilled its mission.

In addition to desegregation cases and funding inequities, recent discord between states and HBCUs is reflected in policymakers’ discussions of institutional mergers and closures. The only public Black institutions to close were 12 junior colleges in Florida

(Elliott et al., 2019). All but one was founded after the Supreme Court ruled Plessy's "separate but equal" unconstitutional. The *Brown v. Board* case mandated states to desegregate educational institutions with all deliberate speed. Rebuffing *Brown*, the Florida state board authorized a racially segregated community college system, where most campuses were designated for white students (Johnson et al., 2007). After Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed federal government to enforce segregation by levying sanctions, withholding funds, or pursuing legal action, the state of Florida closed all the Black junior colleges or consolidated them with nearby white junior college (Jones et al., 2017).

Though these institutions were closed decades ago, the threats of merger and closure are still real today. In 2015, the South Carolina state legislature suggested closing South Carolina State University for two years in exchange for the state assuming the institution's over \$10 million in debt. Ultimately, the legislation did not pass due to pushback by the institutional leaders and alumni. The same year in Georgia, Albany State University was merged with Dalton State College, a predominantly white, primarily two-year college only miles away. Though the consolidated institution kept Albany State University's name and president, students protested when the HBCU mission was not fully honored in the new iteration. So, despite student protests, states maintained the power to achieve their desired outcome.

HBCU Power Relationships

Much of the research on internal power relationships at HBCUs focuses on faculty governance. Just as the mission of HBCUs influences the institutions' curriculum and culture, the student-centered mission is also integral to power relationships within the

institution. Minor (2004) identifies important factors which impact HBCU decision making, governance, and leadership practices: faculty traditions; the paradox of mission; and the institutions' racialized climate. In one earlier study of shared governance at HBCUs, Phillips (2002) identified issues of faculty representation in decision-making groups responsible for institutional policy, and the faculty senate's decision-making and policy-making status and abilities. Phillips (2002) notes that "HBCU policy, including academic policy, is generally made by deans' councils and presidents' cabinets. In the wider higher education community, faculty senate leaders often have representation on such boards." (p. 53). Minor's (2005) survey of 88 four-year HBCUs included responses from each institution's chief academic officer/provost, leader of the faculty senate or other formal governing body, and department chairs from three different academic disciplines. Minor's (2005) findings support Phillips' assertion that faculty are excluded from policy making decisions; only 22% of respondents felt the faculty at their institution had substantial influence in decision making on strategic and budget priorities. The survey results refute Phillips' claims that HBCU faculty are excluded from decision-making on tenure and promotion and undergraduate curricula and programs, with 60% and 73% (respectively) of respondents believing faculty had substantial influence on these areas at their respective institutions. Moreover, more than 60% of faculty agreed that on their campus: shared governance is important (69%), the president and administration are committed to shared governance (69%); there is good or sufficient trust between the president and faculty (68%); there is good or sufficient communication (65%); and the faculty senate is important (64%) (Minor, 2005). Though overall responses were overwhelmingly positive, this changes when disaggregated by

respondents' position. Indeed, while 77% of provosts and 70% of senate leaders saw shared governance as important, only 24% of faculty said the same. There is some possibility this could change when faculty perceive governance as being threatened. While the majority of faculty may not participate in shared governance at the institution level, they become engaged when they perceive shared governance as being reduced or taken away. In any case, this disconnect between faculty and leadership is an important distinction in the conversation on governance. This disconnect makes the institution increasingly vulnerable to outside influence. In a reflection on her service in the faculty council at Spelman College, a private, women's HBCU, Guy-Sheftall (2006) recommends faculty senates ask key questions such as "How can we improve communication between the Board of Trustees and the faculty?" (p. 32).

There are a number of reports and briefs that provide similar recommendation to the advice provided by Guy-Sheftall (2006). These practical guides give applicable guidance on governance for HBCU boards and administrators (Davis, 2007; Gasman, 2010; Hector, 2014; Hopps, 2006). In an article for *Diverse Education*, the President of the Thurgood Marshall College Fund identified three imperatives for HBCU board members: hire the best leader/president; monitor organizational performance with special attention to accreditation, legal and financial matters; and make a large financial contribution and solicit major gifts (Taylor, 2012). Despite these important roles and the valuable guidance in the reports, there is limited scholarship on HBCU governing boards, particularly those of public institutions. The role of the institutional governing board at HBCUs is reflected in studies that focus on vision setting, leadership, and the role of the president (Abelman & Dalessandro, 2009; Hinton, 2013; M. C. Brown, 2010). However,

there is a paucity of scholarship that considers how HBCUs' racial mission and makeup influence the role of public HBCUs' institutional governing boards. Perhaps the only HBCU authorities and power relationships less present in the literature are student government associations. While there is some scholarship on student involvement or student engagement at HBCUs, these studies do not examine the role of student groups' authority and power relationships in the overall university. Indeed, the one observed case study on HBCU student government explored the impact of this involvement on the students, not on the institution (Laosebikan-Buggs, 2009).

Performance-based Funding

Performance-based funding is “a method of financing public education institutions based on outcomes such as retention, course and degree completion, and job placement, not on inputs such as enrollments” (Dougherty, Natow, Bork, Jones, & Vega, 2013, p. 2). The policy aims to hold institutions accountable for state funding and incentivize the achievement of certain metrics. Performance-based funding has had various iterations over the last forty years, and most scholars refer to the current wave of policies as performance-based funding 2.0 (Dougherty & Natow, 2015). This section addresses literature on the origins and outcomes of performance-based funding, as well as research specific to HBCUs and power relationships.

Performance-based Funding Origins and Motives

The literature on performance-based funding delineates two phases of performance-based funding, referred to as performance-based funding 1.0 and performance-based funding 2.0 (J. Burke, 1997; J. C. Burke, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2013; Dougherty, & Natow, 2015; Dougherty et al., 2014). The first wave began in 1979

when Tennessee piloted a performance process on 12 campuses over five years. Performance-based funding 1.0 models awarded performance-based funding as a bonus in addition to more traditional, enrollment-based funding (Alshehri, 2016). The longest standing performance-based funding policy, Tennessee's program was essentially the only performance-based funding policy throughout the 1980s. Performance-based funding quickly proliferated in the next decade, with 22 states adopting some version of the policy between 1993 and 2000 (Dougherty & Natow, 2015). Dougherty and Natow (2015) attribute this spread in part to states' desires to lower rising costs of higher education and increase efficiency in the face of decreasing revenues during the 1990s economic slowdown. The literature provides evidence for the origins and motives behind the adoption and spread of performance-based funding 1.0.

Much of the research points to the influence of powerful policy actors such as state governors and legislators. Many studies have identified a relationship between the adoption of performance-based funding policies and Republican-controlled state legislatures of the 1990s (Gorbunov, 2013; McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005). This is attributed to conservative policymakers' concerns with efficiency, bureaucracy, and accountability, which are signatures of red-state conservatism (J. C. Burke & Modarresi, 2001; Dougherty, & Natow, 2015; McLendon et al., 2006). While the presence of a Republican legislature is a predictor of performance-based funding adoption, studies have not shown that a Republican governor has the same effect. (Gorbunov, 2013; McLendon et al., 2005). This may be attributed to the fact that legislatures are responsible for adopting the policy into law. The literature offers interesting findings on the role of state boards in the adoption of performance-

based funding. The likelihood of performance-based funding adoption increased with the absence of a central, system-wide governing board (McLendon et al., 2006). In a different study, the presence of a state coordinating board increased the likelihood of performance-based funding adoption (Gorbunov, 2013). Without a consolidated board, it seems policymakers utilized performance-based funding policies as accountability mechanisms for decentralized power at the institutional level. Specifically, Dougherty & Natow (2015) found that together, higher education boards and individual institutions created a powerful coalition which influenced the implementation of performance-based funding. A second coalition of governors, legislators, and business leaders was also influential. More broadly, Dougherty and colleagues (Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty & Natow, 2015; Dougherty et al., 2013; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014) have identified additional political proponents responsible for the implementation of performance-based funding, including university administrators, private businesses, professional associations, and foundations. In sum, the research offers varying conclusions about the role of state boards and politicians in the adoption of performance-based funding policies.

With strong backing of prominent philanthropic organizations, such as the Lumina Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, performance-based funding 2.0 has spread rapidly over the last decade (Li, 2017). These organizations are each invested in drastically increasing the number of Americans who obtain degrees and holding institutions accountable for this increased performance. The second, current wave of performance-based funding began in 2007. Performance-based funding 2.0 is not a way to allocate bonus resources above and beyond the typical appropriations process, but an integral- and typically substantial- part of an institution's allotment from the state.

Analogous to its predecessor, performance-based funding 2.0 is correlated with states with Republican-controlled legislatures (Li, 2017). State boards were again proponents of the policy, but with different motives and through different engagement. In contrast to 1.0, the influence of national foundations and the role of governors were both considerably more influential in the adoption of performance-based funding 2.0. As the policy has evolved, so did research on and frameworks for the subject. Using policy diffusion theory, Li (2017) found that “having a greater proportion of bordering performance-based funding states diminishes the likelihood of policy adoption” (p. 746). Instead of policy diffusion, evidence points to policy learning, where policymakers seek ideas and examples from other states (Li, 2017; Dougherty, et al., 2014; Dougherty & Natow, 2015). Finally, research also shows that performance-based funding 2.0 was adopted because of workforce issues such as unemployment rates and private sector demands for more college graduates (Li, 2017; Dougherty, et al., 2014; Dougherty & Natow, 2015).

Of 38 states that had adopted some form of performance-based funding by 2015, 24 of the states discontinued their performance-based funding; 22 then reenacted it later. Eighteen of these policies lasted only four years or less. Building on the work of Burke and Modarressi (J. Burke, 1997; J. C. Burke, 2002; J. C. Burke & Modarressi, 2000; J. C. Burke & Modarressi, 2001), Dougherty, Natow, and Vega (2012) attributed the demise of performance-based funding 1.0 to opposition from higher education and the loss of key gubernatorial supporters. The newer study also ascribes the volatility of performance-based funding policies to state budget downturns, and the loss of key legislative supporters, as well as supporters from the private sector. These policies are not always

sustainable because they do not include meaningful engagement of leaders and experts from higher education institutions. The short-lived nature of these performance-based funding programs is one reason why performance-based funding 1.0 programs had little to no impact on student outcomes (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013). Thus, the fast adoption of performance-based funding 2.0 is peculiar given the limited research and evidence for the policy's effectiveness. Over the last six to seven years, studies on performance-based funding have shown mixed results.

Outcomes Associated with Performance-based Funding

There is little evidence to show performance-based funding directly impacts the outcomes they aim to improve, specifically retention and graduation rates (Shin & Toutkoushian, 2011; Jones, 2014). As early as 2009, researchers of performance-based funding 2.0 found the policy did not impact institutional outcomes from 1997 to 2007 (Shin, 2010). Using data on graduation rates and federal research funding for 467 research, masters, or liberal arts public institutions from 1997-2007, Shin (2010) saw no obvious increase in institutional performance related to performance-based funding. Another national study of 500 public institutions over 18 years showed no association between performance-based funding policies and better student outcomes (Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014). Research on individual state's policies produced similar results. A study on Tennessee, the earliest adopter of performance-based funding, showed that the policy had no impact on changes to six-year graduation rates or retention between 1995-2009 (Sanford & Hunter, 2011). The same study showed an increase in the amount of performance-based funding was also unrelated to any increase in retention rates (Sanford & Hunter, 2011). Hillman, Fryar, and Crespín-Trujillo's (2018) study on Tennessee and

Ohio yielded similar results. Compared to similar institutions in other states, the policy had no impact on degree completion at Pennsylvania's public HBCUs (Hillman, Tandberg, & Gross, 2014). However, Hillman et al. (2014) caution that completion rates "can easily be gamed and manipulated at the campus level... by admitting students who are most likely to graduate even if this means shrinking the size of the incoming freshman class" (p. 835). Hillman (2016) holds that performance-based funding is based on three flawed fundamental assumptions: that incentives encourage low-performing institutions to improve; that institutions have clear paths to achieve results; and that any effects or improvements can be sustained over time. Contrary to these assumptions, the complex pursuit of improvement is difficult to sustain, and is only further complicated when institutions lose funding (Hillman, 2016). These assertions are supported by other research.

Recent research on the impact of performance-based funding in Indiana found the policy had no impact on graduation rates, and the policy was associated with constraints on access and equity because it incentivized the institutions to become more selective (Umbricht, Fernandez, & Ortagus, 2015). After performance-based funding, the incoming class of freshmen at public Indiana institutions had approximately 19 fewer students than private Indiana institutions and 24 fewer students than public institutions in surrounding states (Umbricht et al., 2015). Such results lead the authors to conclude that performance-based funding "may be asking institutions to improve outcomes that are largely predicted by backgrounds and experiences that occur before students even set foot on college campuses" (Umbricht et al., 2015, p. 647). McKinney and Hagedorn (2015) sought to understand which students would garner "the most and least performance-based funding

for the community college during their time of enrollment” (p. 4). They found that Texas’s performance-based funding policy for two-year institutions awarded more funding to students who were “Asian, 19 or younger, have completed a high school diploma, attend full-time, receive Pell Grants, and were assigned to developmental coursework just below college-level” (p. 18). As another example of performance-based funding being associated with constraints on access and equity, institutions that enrolled more of these types of students received more generous funding under the state’s performance-based funding policy. McKinney and Hagedorn (2015) suggest that resource-dependent institutions under this performance-based funding system would increase recruitment of the aforementioned students and decrease recruitment of students who procured significantly less performance-based funding for the colleges that served students who were African American, adult learners, GED-holders, part-time, and assigned to remedial coursework. The latter students were overrepresented in the 28% of students in the study who did not generate any points in their colleges’ performance-based funding scores. Similarly, Kelchen and Stedrak (2016) found some evidence that both four-year and two-year colleges in states with performance-based funding policies changed their recruitment strategies to attract student from higher income families. This may be because students from higher-income families have the resources to afford college, and tend to have graduated from better resourced high schools that provide wider curricula and more intense academic preparation. In addition to admissions and enrollment management functions, there is evidence that shows how other departments and units are impacted by performance-based funding (Thornton, 2015; Dougherty et al., 2016).

Indeed, an important impact of performance-based funding is organizational responsiveness to the policy. Thornton (2015) discovered a wide range of rural community colleges' organizational changes in response to performance-based funding. As Thornton found, community college presidents and other leaders reported changes to internal communication, decision making, and practice. Dougherty et al. (2016) studied the effect of performance-based funding on two-year and four-year institutions in three states that had adopted such policies. They discovered impacts that spanned across the enterprise including academic affairs and student services. Not all institutional responses to performance-based funding are negative or detrimental to the campus and to students. Administrators at the institutions named performance-based funding as the impetus for improvements such as: curricular and instructional changes to developmental education like preterm remediation and corequisite programs; instituting online and early warning advising systems as well as increasing the number of advisors and counselors; and expanding tutoring and supplemental instruction through online programs, increased availability, and faculty requirements. Many also reported improving course articulation and transfer agreements with four-year institutions, which some performance-based funding systems explicitly reward. In accord, Thornton (2015) also identified a trend of increased student services and academic programming. These findings suggest some, albeit limited constructive benefits to performance-based funding policies. Though these changes all seems to increase a focus on student success, other research points out how departmental responses may be to the detriment of students.

Li and Kennedy (2018) found that community colleges might be pursuing a "path of least resistance" to performance-based funding dollars by dissuading students from

associate's degrees and instead encouraging them to earn short-term certificates, which are less beneficial in the labor market (p. 7). Schaller (2004) found that in general, both student affairs and academic affairs administrators in Ohio had limited understanding of the performance-based funding policy in their state and how it impacted their specific department. This is a common sentiment across the literature. The rural college leaders in Thornton's (2015) study also reported being "confounded with several other state and institutional initiatives" concurrent to performance-based funding including institutional level initiatives like a capstone requirement for first year students, and state level initiatives like modifications to statewide articulation and new assessments of the core curriculum (p. 51). Many of the respondents to Dougherty et al. (2016) echoed the same confusion and found it difficult to differentiate the impacts and responses to performance-based funding from those of other similar, concurrent programs and policies. However, both studies suggest the overlap of these policies with performance-based funding created synergy and alignment between state and institutional goals and changes. In all, it appears performance-based funding works to spur institutional changes, but has limited influence on student outcomes.

Performance-based Funding and HBCUs

There is sparse research on performance-based funding's impact on HBCUs. To date, more than 30 states have implemented some form of performance-based funding 2.0 for their public two-year or four-year institutions. Public HBCUs are currently impacted by performance-based funding in 14 states. Jones (2013, 2014, 2015) has studied the topic in the context of racial equity. In her 2013 dissertation, she explored how an institution was able to respond to performance-based funding due to their involvement

with the Equity Scorecard, a process “used to help colleges and universities close the achievement gap between White students and historically underrepresented students” (Jones, 2013, p. 10). Participants in the case study- including students, administrators, faculty, and alumni- appreciated that the performance-based funding policy and Equity Scorecard increased the institution’s attention to data and outcome, but were displeased with the policy’s diversity metrics and the state system of higher education in general. The HBCU in this study was responsible for closing gaps by increasing the percentage of “OTBU (Other than Black or Unknown) students”, transfer students and faculty to be on par with the average of those stakeholder at other master’s level HBCUs. This creates a number of challenges (Jones, 2013, p. 117). As Jones (2013) points out

the policy does not require a raw number increase in the number of OTBU students, but does require an increase in percentages or proportions, thus the only way to meet the performance funding targets for OTBU access without actually increasing the number of OTBU students is to decrease the number of Black students” (Jones, 2013, p. 117).

Students believed this requirement undermined the institution’s identity and historical mission, and pointed out the difficulty of recruiting white students. Other diversity metrics require the institution to increase the six-year graduation rate of OTBU students, nonblack, transfer students and Black transfer students. The policy only requires “gaps are reduced” without a focus on equity (p. 117). As such, if the institution increases graduation rates for both Black and OTBU students “gaps could persist and [the institution] could remain ineligible for the total performance award” (Jones, 2013, p. 117). This supports Hillman’s (2016) argument that focus on access and equity should be

foregrounded and at the center of such policies. Griffin (2013) also completed a single case study dissertation on an HBCU under performance-based funding. Three salient themes emerged:

1. Past discrimination of Black colleges continues to place JSU at a disadvantage for receiving equitable funding.
2. The traditional students at JSU are much different than the traditional student at nearby TWIs.
3. The call for JSU to improve their student outcomes, forces the university to make necessary changes in productivity. (Griffin, 2013, p. 77).

In another case study, Jones (2015) found similar themes of how HBCU stakeholders perceived the impact of race on their relationship with the state and their ability to meet performance-based funding standards.

In conjunction with colleagues and the Southern Education Foundation, Jones has offered critical discussion, implications, and policy recommendations for HBCUs and other Minority Serving Institutions (Jones, 2013). A recent book on *Outcomes Based Funding and Race* addressed the implications of performance-based funding allocations for HBCUs (Jones et al., 2017). The book draws connections between de jure segregation in Florida and the impact of performance-based funding on Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, the state's only public HBCU (Jones et al., 2017). The book also provides a content analysis of how performance-based funding systems impact Central State University in Ohio and Tennessee State University (Jones et al., 2017). Hillman and Corral (2018) followed the aforementioned qualitative study with a quantitative study, finding that Central State University and Tennessee State University were

disproportionately impacted by their states' more aggressive performance-based funding models. Their study addressed the changes in state funding for HBCUs and other Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs) between 2005-2015. Since the implementation of performance-based funding 2.0 in 2011, Tennessee State University has received almost no new state funding outside of its base allocation, despite being one of only two institutions to increase student enrollment in the same time period. The Hillman and Corral (2018) study presented major findings for MSIs and HBCUs, namely that, as they concluded, "MSIs in performance-based funding-states lose significant funding per student compared with MSIs in non-performance-based funding states and non-MSIs in the same performance-based funding state" (p. 1757). Nwosu and Koller (2014) also provide insight on Tennessee State University in a narrative of the institution's strategic planning and assessment in response to the changes to performance-based funding in 2010. They discuss key changes the institution implementing an online platform, centralizing responsibility for planning and assessment, establishing a planning committee with faculty and staff from each of the divisions and colleges, instituting a "uniform six-step assessment and improvement process... that requires campus units to align their plans with the strategic plan", and expanding planning capacity by investing in professional development and hiring new staff (Nwosu & Koller, p. 69).

Some research addresses HBCUs tangentially, mentioning the institution's HBCU status but not providing additional context or making considerations in the research design or findings. Garrick (1998) included Tennessee's only public HBCU, Tennessee State University, in a study on performance-based funding. However, outside of noting the differences in the student demographics between Tennessee State University and the

University of Memphis, the study did little else to consider the HBCU context. Other scholars have factored HBCU status into their quantitative studies without much discussion of the institution's unique context (Titus, 2006; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014). Exclusive of these studies, there is sparse scholarship which specifically addresses the relationship of HBCUs and performance-based funding. Thus, exploring the disparate impact of performance-based funding on HBCUs is particularly important because the literature does not support states' rationale that performance-based funding encourages student performance.

Performance-based Funding and State Power Relationships

As McLendon, Heller, and Young (2005) point out, few studies address why a state adopts certain policies. Their research on whether as state level postsecondary governance structures influenced the adoption of funding policies yielded mixed results. Centralized governance and decision-making authorities were very weakly associated with adoption of new finance policies, but there is no association between governance arrangements and accountability policies like performance-based funding (McLendon et al., 2005). An event history analysis showed states with more centralized governing boards were more likely to adopt performance-based funding (McLendon et al., 2006). The researchers surmise that governing boards represent and seek to meet the preferences of multiple groups of stakeholders. Coordinating boards of political appointees are more likely to align to the will of elected officials, while consolidated boards of faculty and administrators align with academic stakeholders. Dougherty et al. (2013) explored the political origins of performance-based funding. They established the arguments in the "prevailing perspective" on the rise of performance-based funding and sought to uncover

other actors and motives outside of this narrative (Dougherty et al., 2013, p. 5). The study showed that the advocacy roles of higher education boards are missing from accounts of the origin of performance-based funding. These advocacy roles included building coalitions and taking advantage of opportunities to put performance-based funding before state officials (Dougherty et al., 2013).

All of the aforementioned research addressed the role of the governing board in the adoption of performance-based funding. This seems to be the scope of empirical studies on the role of governance and power relationships relative to performance-based funding. One study used states with centralized boards that did not adopt performance-based funding as a comparison group in a falsification test (Tandberg & Hillman, 2014). Nisar (2015) addressed common theoretical explanations for the failure of performance-based funding and those explanations' common assumption about the role of governance and outcomes. Nisar (2015) offers a perspective of higher education governance as an ecology of games, asserting that higher education is a game of many players, where each player has their own agendas and strategies and no one player can control the game. Beyond this, the impact of governing boards on the adoption and implementation of performance-based funding is largely missing from the literature. And, there is scant research on the role of institutional, faculty, and student governance structures in the implementation and response to performance-based funding.

Power Relationships in Public Higher Education

This study on power relationships must be grounded in a definition of power that is supported by the literature. It is also important to review relevant theory and literature on how power is demonstrated in the context of public higher education, particularly

because one of the third research question which addresses theory. To address the void of literature on racism and power and HBCUs, this study uses organizational theory to define and discuss power, and Critical Race Theory to address racism and white supremacy. Critical Race Theory is addressed in the next section of the literature review. This section of the literature review focuses on the power or institutions, and distinguishes between power and authority. Additionally, I discuss the literature which frames autonomy as a form of institutional power and accountability as a tool states use to conserve their own power and check institutions' power. Unfortunately, the sources on power in higher education are not specific to the four-year HBCU context, emphasizing the need for this study.

Power and Authority in Public Higher Education

One purpose of this research is to understand the impact of a specific policy on the power relationships between a public four-year HBCU and the state. As this study is concerned with the internal and external relationships of institutions, it must be rooted in an understanding of power that is informed by the literature. To fulfill this, I begin by reviewing fundamental organizational theories which address power. As mentioned, there is a void in the literature on institutional power of HBCUs. Thus, this portion of the literature review focuses on research and theories on power and authority in public, four-year colleges and universities. Table 2 below provides interpretations from scholars who have studied the role of power in organizations.

Table 2

Interpretations of Power in Organizational Theory Literature

Author (Year of Publication)	Interpretation of power
W. Burke (1982)	“Power is the potential for influence... the potential must be acted upon” (p. 149)
Emerson (1962)	Power-dependence theory is centered on the notion that in a relationship, “power resides implicitly in the other’s dependency... dependence of one party provides the basis for the power of the other” (Emerson, 1962, p. 32).
Follett (1924)	“Genuine power can only be grown, it will slip from every arbitrary hand that grasps it; for genuine power is not coercive control, but coactive control. Coercive power is the curse of the universe; coactive power, the enrichment and advancement of every human soul.” (p.xii-xiii).
French & Raven (1959)	Power is the social influence exerted on a person by a social actor such as a person, group, or norm
March (1966)	“Power is a major explanatory concept in the study of social choice” (p .261)
Mintzberg (1983)	“Power is defined as the capacity of individuals or groups to effect, or affect, organizational outcomes” (p. 4)
Perrow (1986)	Power is “the ability of persons or groups to extract for themselves valued outputs from a system in which other persons or groups either seek the same outputs for themselves or would prefer to expend their effort towards other outputs” (p. 259).
Pfeffer (1992)	“The potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do” (p. 30)
Shafritz, Ott, Jang (2016)	“Power is the ability to get things done the way one wants them done; it is the latent ability to influence people” (p. 246)
Watson (2011)	“the capacity of an individual or group to affect the outcome of any situation so that access is achieved to whatever resources are scarce and desired within a society or part of the society” (p. 140)

I am relying on Pfeffer’s definition because it is most relevant to the analysis of the use of power in relationships in the study of organizations. According to Pfeffer, power is “the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do”

(1992, p. 45). Pfeffer (1981) posited that “politics is the study of power in action” (p. 7), thus it is important to understand the state and public universities as political entities with their own interests. Pfeffer’s description is more appropriate than others for this study on race and power for a few reasons. First, Pfeffer’s definition is an organizational theory which calls attention to the importance of people, their actions, and their desires. This allows us to understand power relationships at the organizational and individual levels, the latter of which is important when analyzing an institution’s internal relationships. Understanding power as organizational and individual helps to contextualize racism and oppression as both systemic and interpersonal. Further, Pfeffer’s definition characterizes power as the ability to exert one’s own influence, and to change or resist the influence of others. For example, this would allow us to capture the institution’s power to influence state policy, and its power to resist the influence of the state through the policy. The characterization of power as *overcoming resistance* is germane to understanding the racial oppression of the HBCUs the state. Finally, the emphasis on *potential* allows us to identify and analyze power even when it is not being exercised. For example, using other definitions, a passive, rubber stamp board of trustees may not be seen as having power.

In fact, much of the work on the political role of public universities’ power focuses on the role of trustees (Bastedo, 2005; Pusser, 2003; Ordorika & Pusser, (2007); Pusser, Slaughter, & Thomas, 2006). Scholars have used the political frame to understand the political role of power and authority in state and university relationships. Positing that the more prevalent bureaucratic and collegial models were insufficient, Baldrige (1971) put forth a political model for understanding the university. Slaughter, one of the foremost scholars the role of the state in higher education, has studied how power and

authority are impacted financial austerity (Slaughter, 1987), funding shifts (Slaughter & Silva, 1985), and board membership (Pusser et al., 2006). In the latter study, Pusser, et al. (2006) utilized empirical and theoretical literature on corporate networks to study board interlocks, and concluded that “colleges and universities can be conceptualized as networks of authority and legitimacy that provide a guide to understanding the role of governing boards in establishing and maintaining particular strategies, policies, forms of authority, and legitimate behavior” (p. 750). Pusser (2003) also studies networks of trustees and found them to serve political and economic interest groups outside of the university. Bastedo (2005) conducted similar work on activist boards and how the centralization of power at the state level siphons away campus autonomy and competition. The aforementioned studies affirm Pusser’s (2005) position that much the higher education literature on *power* actually focuses on central areas of *authority* such as governance, policymaking, and resource allocation. To that end, it is necessary to distinguish between power and authority.

Power and authority are not mutually exclusive. Organizational theorists define authority as a type or manifestation of power. Authority is power which has been legitimated by some designation, cultural value, or social norm (French & Raven, 1959). In Fayol’s 14 Principles, “authority is the right to give orders and the power to extract obedience” (1949, p. 21). Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) asserted that “Power in social systems may be vertical or horizontal” (p. 453). I will rely on Pfeffer’s (1981) characterization: “Authority is when a distribution of power becomes legitimated over time” (p. 4). There are, of course, limitations to the application of Pfeffer’s definitions to the study of higher education. Specific to higher education, Etzioni (1964) made the

important distinction between professional and administrative authority. The former inheres to the faculty as the experts and producers of knowledge. The latter is a function of control and coordination, which is exercised by a hierarchy of administrators and public officials. Still, this framework does not capture the racialized nuance to the political relationship between the state and a public HBCU. Thus, another purpose of this research is to combine theories that may explain the power relationship between an HBCU and its state.

Power does not always exist in formal lines authority. An analysis of authority would look only at central areas legitimate power such as state boards and the administrative hierarchy. An analysis of power would entail examining why certain things happen or change that cannot be explained by lines of authority or other formal aspects of bureaucracy in organizations; here, power is an explanatory variable (March, 1966). Centering power as an explanatory variable leads to new insights into the sources and directions of influence in the relationship between public universities and the state. More specifically, centering it in this study will allow for novel understandings of public four-year HBCUs.

Institutional Autonomy as Power

Autonomy is “the power to govern without outside controls” (Berdahl et al., 2011, p. 5). A discussion of institutional autonomy is helpful to understanding public HBCUs’ power in the era of performance-based funding. As public institutions, public colleges and universities occupy a unique space in relation to the state in relations to other service-oriented public agencies which like transportation or sanitation. Public colleges and universities are accountable to the state’s oversight and expectations, but governance

structures typically allow the institutions to exercise a greater level of autonomy and self-direction than other public agencies. States use performance-based funding to influence and encourage specific outcomes, shifting and limiting institutions' ability to act autonomously. Additionally, the history between public HBCUs and their states is fraught with the states' various violations, obstructions, and abuses of power. This history, discussed broadly in Chapter 1, and in the narrative of this case in Chapter 4, shapes the institutions' current relationship with the state, and their ability to exert power in that relationship.

The literature distinguishes between three interrelated variations of autonomy: academic freedom, substantive autonomy, and procedural autonomy (Berdahl et al., 2011). Quoting senior scholars in South Africa, United States Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter wrote in his concurrence for in *Sweezy v. New Hampshire* (1957)

It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.

Sweezy v. New Hampshire is a key case in academic freedom.

Academic freedom for faculty- and students- is a correlative right of the First Amendment. It is the freedom of an individual scholar to conduct his or her research and teaching without punishment or termination for violating social, religious, or political convention (Berdahl, et al., 2011). Schmidtlein and Berdahl (2011) emphasize that autonomy and academic freedom should not be conflated. As public entities, state institutions do not have rights. Rather, the two concepts reinforce one another. The courts recognize institutional autonomy through academic deference: the recognition of

universities' expertise in matters of education by giving judicial deference to institutions in academic matters (Kaplin & Lee, 2014). A few key cases demonstrate how public institutions can assert their institutional autonomy in disputes with governmental units that seek to interfere with the university's internal affairs (Kaplin & Lee, 2014).

In *Webb v. Board of Trustees of Ball State University*, the court established that a public institution's "ability to set a curriculum is as much an element of academic freedom as any scholar's right to express a point of view" (1999). In *Urofsky v. Gilmore*, the court found that faculty were entitled to First Amendment academic freedom rights, but "any right of 'academic freedom' above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors" (216 F.3d at 410). This deference to the university is established in case law. In *Edwards v. Cal University of Pennsylvania*, the court deferred to the university and found that public universities could control professors' in-class speech and teaching without violating professors' First Amendment rights. *Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing* is an authority on both institutional academic freedom and academic deference. The court established, "When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment" (474 U.S. at 225). Further, this case established "Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, ... but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision making by the academy itself" (474 U.S. at 226).

Autonomous decision-making is reflective of Berdahl et al.'s (2011) last two variants of autonomy: substantive autonomy and procedural autonomy. Substantive

autonomy is the power of the university to determine its goals and programs. Procedural autonomy is the power of the university to determine how it will pursue its goals and programs. Ashby (1966) provides a more specific, practical explanation of institutional autonomy, reflected in Table 3. An impediment of procedural autonomy might create difficulties, inefficiencies, and frustrations. An impediment of substantive autonomy might obstruct academic freedom and academic deference. The institutional autonomy of public universities is always counterbalanced with accountability to the state's authority. Recent increases in state authority have shifted this balance. Some of these changes have the potential to impede both procedural and substantive autonomy. These changes are reflective of the current era of accountability in higher education, and have already altered the power relationships between states and public universities in different ways.

Table 3

Models of Autonomy and Academic Freedom

Sweezy v. New Hampshire	Ashby, 1966	Berdahl et al., 2011
Four essential freedoms	Essential ingredients of autonomy	Academic freedom
To determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach	The freedom of universities to select staff and students and determine the conditions under which they remain in the university	The freedom of an individual scholar to conduct his or her research and teaching without punishment or termination for violating social, religious, or political convention
To determine for itself on academic grounds what may be taught	The freedom of universities to determine curriculum content and degree standards	The power of the university to determine its goals (substantive autonomy)

Table 3 (continued)

To determine for itself on academic grounds how it shall be taught	The freedom of universities to allocate funds (within the amounts available) across different categories of expenditure	The power of the university to determine how it will pursue its goals and programs (procedural autonomy)
To determine for itself on academic grounds		

Institutional Autonomy and Accountability Policies

Finally, in addition to understanding power, authority, and autonomy, a discussion on accountability in higher education context is helpful to understanding the context of public HBCUs in the era of performance-based funding. Performance-based funding is, at its core, an accountability mechanism. Accountability is “the requirement to demonstrate responsible actions to external constituencies” (Berdahl et al., 2011, p. 5). Performance-based funding requires public HBCUs to demonstrate specific outcomes to the state. An

understanding of accountability that is grounded in the literature helps to contextualize how the state uses performance-based funding to exert power. But again, the literature specific to HBCUs is limited. As such, this discussion focuses on accountability for public colleges and universities in general. One purpose of this study is to understand

how the implementation of performance-based funding influenced an HBCU and its relationships with the state. It is important to understand the broader policy context in which these relationships and the performance-based funding policy itself were developed.

Accountability measures and policies reached higher education in the late 2000s (Jones, 2013; McLendon et al., 2006). Influenced by federal K-12 policies like No Child Left Behind, the accountability era focuses on outcomes, gains, and efficiency (J. C. Burke, 2002; McLendon et al., 2006; Jones, 2013). It follows that performance-based funding 2.0 is an outgrowth of the accountability era. However, the diffusion of performance-based funding and other accountability policies from K-12 into higher education is complicated by academic freedom and institutional autonomy because universities “are the place in our educational system where the free flow of ideas and information should be cultivated.” (Kallison & Cohen, 2010, p. 41). The literature offers a number of discussions on the evolution of institutional autonomy during the accountability era.

Specifically, the literature looks at how states have offered institutions increased autonomy in exchange for increased accountability for outcomes. In Virginia, public universities were given the opportunity to increase their procedural autonomy in exchange for less substantive control (Leslie & Berdahl, 2008). The institutions that did opt-in to the law saw the change as a test of their relationship with the state. Ultimately, because of the new law, institutions received increased autonomy at the cost of increased accountability, including demonstrating performance on about 14 different indicators and numerous related metrics. Hearn, Warshaw, and Ciaramboli (2016) offer discussion on

how mid-tier, lesser-resourced institutions responded to offers of greater autonomy from the states of California and Virginia. In both examples, the more elite, research institutions were more willing and able to sacrifice funding for autonomy because they already have strong resource and organizational capacity. This aligns with case study findings that some public institutions in Virginia felt left out of the state's expectations and excluded from the opportunity, which reinforced stratification and status-differentials between institutions in the state (Leslie & Berdahl, 2008; Healy, 1997). Their insights on factors such as strategic enrollment management and stratified enrollments by student income mirror the concerns of administrators (Thornton, 2015; Dougherty et al., 2012) and the evidence of student creaming (Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016; McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015; Umbrecht et al., 2015).

McLendon's (2013) study on how and why states began redistributing authority revealed that conflicts over institutional autonomy were not the primary impetus for decentralization. Instead, the policy was driven a few key political actors, each with a unique motive for redefining state-campus relationships: in Arkansas, a Democratic state senator sought to assert his authority in a power vacuum; in Hawaii, the university system president tied institutional autonomy to the state's economic revitalization; and in Illinois, a Republican governor sought to do away with the state board for political and personal reasons. These results concur with Dougherty and Natow's (2015) characterization of policy entrepreneurs who built advocacy coalitions to enact performance-based funding in their state.

There is evidence in the literature that performance-based funding complicates the boundaries of autonomy and accountability. Campus leaders have reported that

performance-based funding erodes institutional autonomy (J. C. Burke & Modarresi, 2001; Dougherty et al., 2012). Specifically, administrators felt the state impeded on institutions' autonomy by failing to adequately consult higher education institutions in the design of the process, and by enacting performance metrics that were ineffective and costly (Dougherty et al., 2012). These frustrations are not taken lightly, with one administrator in Thornton's study suggesting they would leave their position rather than "being pushed around by ill-informed lawmakers" in the undoing of the community college mission (2015, p. 122). Campus autonomy is important because it is necessary for institutional diversity (Bastedo, 2005; J. C. Burke & Modarresi, 2001). This is particularly germane for HBCUs, which fulfill a unique mission within their states. Performance-based funding curtails autonomy by steering institutions toward conforming in their structures and processes to state-level interests and accountability systems. While on the surface-level, institutions can decide how to adapt to improve performance, the performance-based funding policy incentivizes organizational homogeneity rather than incentivizing performance through distinctive organizational changes.

Conceptual Framework

The literature reviewed hitherto leads toward my consideration of three different theories of explanation for power relationships between a state and public HBCU, and power relationships within a public HBCU. It was important to choose theories which would collectively contextualize the contours of these relationships. The conceptual framework by which to analyze this case study is based on the three following theories: Principal Agent Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, and Critical Race Theory. Each theory's contributions to the study are detailed in the following sections.

Principal Agent Theory

Principal Agent Theory is perhaps the most prevalent theoretical perspective on studying performance-based funding. Many current scholars have used the theory to frame their research and to offer discussion for their findings (Hillman et al., 2014; Hillman et al., 2015; Hillman et al., 2017; Lane, 2007; McLendon, 2006, 2007; Shin, 2010; Tandberg & Hillman, 2014; Tandberg, Fowles, & McLendon, 2017). The theory focuses on the relationship between a principal who has delegated authority to an agent who acts on the principal's behalf to perform a task or responsibility. The theory assumes both parties seek to maximize their own self-interests, compelling the principal to monitor the agent (Tandberg et al., 2017). Monitoring behaviors may be actions like requiring departments to submit budgets and reports to the board of trustees, or it may be authorities like a governor having the ability to dismiss the state higher education executive officer. The theory is helpful for understanding, in part, the power relationship between the state and a public HBCU. Analytically, this theory will be used to understand the state's expectations of public HBCUs' achievement of delegated tasks, how the state monitors public HBCUs, and how the state realizes outcomes in the performance-based funding metrics.

The application of Principal Agent Theory to public HBCUs has some unique considerations. First, in government relationships, "the agents are often created by the government and then assume a semi-autonomous role in the bureaucracy" (Lane, 2007, p. 622). Lane (2007) points out that, unlike other agents in the private sector, government agents do not have the ability to end the contractual relationship. Further, the state often treats colleges different than other government agencies like a department of

transportation (McGuinness, 2011). McGuinness (2011) describes four levels of state control and institutional legal status from high to low regulatory control. In this typology, public HBCUs have a moderate level of regulatory control and most closely resembles a state-aided institution, where “higher education institutions have a legal status according substantial autonomy from state government. The state provides base, categorical, and capital funding, but with an exception of substantial nonstate funding (tuition, private giving, etc.)” (McGuinness, 2011, p. 149). Finally, HBCU status accords other special consideration in the principal-agent relationship. States’ budgeting and finance relationships are impacted by their unique history, culture, politics, and economics (McGuinness, 2011). Thus, the impact of performance-based funding cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of the ongoing saga between public HBCUs and the state from the institutions’ inception.

Even with these considerations, Principal Agent Theory has some limitations for the scope of this study. The theory centers the relationship on the achievement of the task the principal designates for the agent. While the agent’s interests are acknowledged, agents cannot truly or independently satisfy their own interests because states set the rules of the game that marginalize agents’ core interests. Additionally, the theory focuses on the interchange between one principal and one agent. This binary scope that may not address the complex web of relationships between multiple boards, agencies, and individuals in this study, where an entity may be a principal in one context and an agent in another. For example, a public HBCU’s board of trustees is the agent of the state, while simultaneously being the principal of the president and administration.

Resource Dependence Theory

Resource Dependence Theory fulfills some of the limitations of Principal Agent Theory for the purposes of this study. This theory focuses on inter-organizational dependencies for resources and an institution's efforts to be less beholden, over time, to any one resource provider. In the resource dependence theoretical frame, all organizations exist as part of interdependent networks of organizations. The interdependencies and dependencies within these networks shape each organization's prospects for survival. To alleviate these risks, individual organizations seek to minimize their dependence, which produces new patterns of dependence and interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Spreading out dependencies can allow for more managerial discretion and control. Organizations, in turn, allocate their own resources in ways that support these broader goals of decreasing dependence on any one resource provider. This will be helpful in understanding how the institution's administration has attempted to pursue other funding, and the impact of that pursuit on internal and external relationships. For example, departments that capture new external sources of funding may also win disproportionate shares of organizational funds because of contributions to broader goals of increasing that organization's managerial discretion.

Using this frame, studies on internal power at universities have shown that power and social influence become more important when organizations are faced with increasing competition for funds, scarcity, (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Hills & Mahoney, 1978), and uncertainty (Pfeffer, Salancik, & Leblebici, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This will be helpful in understanding how performance-based funding has impacted relationships within the university. Pfeffer and Moore (1980) found that departmental power within the institution was a function of the department's ability to enroll students

and obtain grants and contracts. Resource Dependence Theory will help understand the determinants of power within public HBCUs. As performance-based funding is a deliberate shift away from enrollment-based funding, this is a shortcoming of the theory. Some scholars have applied a resource dependence framework to research on performance-based funding in the community college context (D'Amico, Friedel, Katsinas, & Thornton, 2014; Driskill, 2016; Li, 2017; McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015; Shin, 2010). Coupet has applied the theory to HBCU's unique financial position to mixed results (Coupet, 2013; Coupet, 2017). The earlier study showed a significant, negative relationship between institutional support expenditures and graduation rates at HBCUs; "Specifically, for Black universities, a 1 per cent increase in expenditures related to student support is, on average, associated with an 8.74-point decrease in graduation rates" (Coupet, 2013, p. 363). Using resource dependence in the 2017 study, Coupet (2017) found "increases in the proportion of federal revenue significantly increases efficiency, and increases in the proportion of state revenue tend to decrease efficiency" (p. 51).

While Resource Dependence Theory addresses power directly, it does so only in the scope of resources or capital. The interpreting of power through an exclusively monetary lens does not capture the political reality of universities (Pusser & Marginson, 2013). In the literature, the theory is most often utilized for financial resources. From a Resource Dependence Theory perspective, power is about source of influence through capturing resources and increasing shares of highly valued resources. Resource Dependence Theory does not address the social, historical, and interpersonal contours of relationships. Specifically, Resource Dependence Theory does not address racism and how and why racism, as a form of power, influences power relationships at public

HBCUs. For example, Resource Dependence Theory does not address how racism could lead toward resource asymmetries despite the fact that public HBCUs are associated with strong positive outcomes for their students. This frame of analysis is more typical of theories and relevant scholarship from the critical paradigm.

Critical Race Theory

Critical Race Theory is a conceptual approach to studying the law and race, which arose in the legal field in response to “the limitations of mainstream race analysis” (Buras, 2013, p. 218). Specifically, when researching public policies such as performance-based funding, critical “[s]cholars are interested in understanding how it emerged, what problems it was intended to solve, how it changed and developed over time, and its role in reinforcing the dominant culture” (Diem, Young, Welton, Mansfield, & Lee, 2014, p. 1072). Critical Race Theory advances five main tenets. First, racism is central/endemic to American life. Second, Critical Race Theory challenges dominant ideology such as neutrality, colorblindness, and meritocracy. Third, Critical Race Theory values the experiential knowledge of people of color as legitimate and integral to understanding issues of racial equity. Fourth, Critical Race Theory challenges ahistoricism and advocates interdisciplinary perspectives and methods. Finally, Critical Race Theory mandates a social justice agenda for eliminating all forms of oppression. (Dixson & Rousseau, 2005). Applying this framework addresses the unique mission, demographics, and history of HBCUs.

Ladson-Billings and Tate’s (1995) Critical Race Theory of education has been heavily utilized in the study of race and racial inequity in K-12 education. Lori Patton Davis, in conjunction with colleagues, has extended and applied the theory to higher

education (Patton, 2006; Patton, McEwen, Rendón, & Howard-Hamilton, 2007; Harper, Patton, & Wooden, 2009; Croom & Patton, 2011-2012; Patton, Harper, & Harris, 2015).

In 2016, Patton offered the following as a Critical Race Theory of higher education:

- Proposition 1: The establishment of U.S. higher education is deeply rooted in racism/White supremacy, the vestiges of which remain palatable.
- Proposition 2: The functioning of U.S. higher education is intricately linked to imperialistic and capitalistic efforts that fuel the intersections of race, property, and oppression.
- Proposition 3: U.S. higher education institutions serve as venues through which formal knowledge production rooted in racism/White supremacy is generated (2016, p. 317).

Applying this framework addresses the unique mission, demographics, and history of HBCUs. Indeed, all of the scholarship on HBCUs and performance-based funding has applied this theoretical framework, finding various discrepancies between the states' and institutions' goals (Griffin, 2013; Jones, 2013; Jones, 2015; Jones et al., 2017). This will be useful in understanding the current power relationships between public HBCUs and the state, honoring the history of the relationships between the state and the university, and examining the complexities of race and class within the performance-based funding system.

Patton (2016) notes that HBCUs and other Minority Serving Institutions are not impervious to the pervasive racism/White supremacy of U.S. higher education because of inequitable state funding, shallow federal support, the interpretation and racial undertones of "elite and selective" institutions as White and wealthy, and the exclusion from generations of wealth which elite colleges benefit from (p. 331). It will be particularly interesting to analyze internal power relationships and decisions from Proposition 3 of the framework, and determine its relevance to the internal operations and intraracial

relationships at HBCUs. I aim to extend the work of Patton (2016) to help conceptualize the relationships within public HBCUs vis-à-vis the influence of racism. In this context, then, there may be increased conflict among stakeholders within a public HBCU in relation to undermining institutional commitments to access and equity. In effect, racism may create inequities and self-doubt in ways that are exacerbated by performance-based funding and detrimental to the institution as a whole.

Concluding Remarks

In all, this literature review forms a solid foundation of knowledge for this study on power relationships between. The literature on public HBCUs' origins provides context on the institutions' mission and the history of the tension and oppression between public HBCUs and their states. We learn even more about this by examining the case law, state policy, and finance policies relevant to HBCU. The various studies on HBCUs' holistic performance and outcomes unpack the institutions' added value and unique contributions to their states. Focusing on internal HBCU power relationships revealed gaps in the literature which this study may fill. Further, examining the literature on the origins and motives of performance-based funding helped to elucidate the policy in relation to broader trends in public higher education accountability. These studies also contextualized the role of power relationships and state entities in adopting and implementing performance-based funding policies. It was important to ground the study in the literature on the general outcomes of performance-based funding, as well as the outcomes and perspectives specific to public HBCUs. It was also important to explore the literature on power and its applications to public higher education by way of institutional autonomy and authority. The case law and literature provide a foundation for why and

how I interpreted and applied the meaning of power relationships. considered all of the aforementioned literature when selecting theories that could jointly address the nuances of both the power relationships between the state and public HBCUs, and the power relationships inside public HBCUs. The resultant conceptual framework is based on the three following theories: Principal Agent Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, and Critical Race Theory. Individually, each distinctively speaks to some important aspect of the study: Principal Agent Theory contextualizes the authority and agency of the different entities in the case; Resource Dependence Theory underscores the role of performance-based funding; and Critical Race Theory factors in the intersecting dynamics of race, property, and oppression in higher education. Altogether, the literature review provided a solid basis for the subsequent theoretical, methodological, and analytical decisions in this case study.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This research utilizes the case-study research design because case studies are suitable for “complex, situated, problematic relationships” such as the power relationships between a state and a public HBCU, and the power relationships within the HBCU (Stake, 2000, p. 440). The qualitative case study design focuses on the daily realities and “routine and problematic moments and meanings in individual’s lives.” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 3). As it requires multiple forms of data, the case study format inherently provides “an all-encompassing method with the logic of design incorporating specific approaches to data collection and to data analysis” (Yin, 1994, p. 13).

The case in this study entails the HBCU’s internal and campus context, and its state policy context, including policymakers and their advisors, state higher education staff, higher education experts and consultants, other universities in the state, and intermediaries like foundations and advocacy organizations. The study explores the internal and external power relationships of a public, four-year HBCU experiencing performance-based funding. “A case study is an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 37). Power relationships are the associations or avenues where one entity can influence, change, defeat, or persuade another. For this study, this includes: relevant interactions and changes by actors within the institution; relevant interactions and changes between the state and the institution; and relevant actors, interactions, and changes of the state that influence the institution.

Research Questions

1. How does performance-based funding influence power relationships between a public HBCU and its state?
2. How does performance-based funding influence power relationships within a public HBCU?
3. How does theory explain the influence of performance-based funding on power relationships in this context?

Sampling Strategy

As described above, this case focused on the HBCU and its state policy context. I primarily employed criterion-based sampling, wherein I determined the characteristics of the sample which are germane to the study, and identified a site that best fulfilled the criteria. These criteria “directly reflect the purpose of the study and guide in the identification of information-rich cases” (Merriam & Tisdale, 2016, p. 97). I employed criteria-based sampling to select the site of the study and to identify individual interview respondents who can discuss these relationships and issues. I used snowball sampling to identify interview participants. I reviewed conversations on Twitter, a social media platform, to recruit Twitter users engaged in conversations about the state’s performance-based funding after the annual allocations were announced. I did not use Twitter for data collection or analysis. These sampling strategies are detailed below.

Site Selection

In identifying potential sites, I defined five baseline criteria:

1. Holds a federal HBCU designation
2. Public institution
3. Four-year institution

4. Regionally accredited
5. Typical level of underfunding by the state
6. Active performance-based funding policy at the time of the study

Sampling of the first five criteria yielded 12 institutions. The fifth criterion was important as institutions with unusual, more equitable state funding would not fit into the larger narrative of resource dependence, and would result in power relationships between the state and the HBCU that were also unusual or unrepresentative. The sixth criterion surrounds the issue of time. Some states had recently approved performance-based funding, but had not yet awarded funding through the model. Other states had discontinued the use of performance-based funding. This criterion decreased the number of eligible HBCUs institutions to eight.

To continue the criterion-based sampling method, I attempted to find similarities amongst the remaining eight institutions, the states, and the performance-based funding policies in each. As each state's performance funding model is different, further use of this sampling method would not generate a clear path forward. I then considered my own ability to access the site, which revealed two institutions. I have previously visited both of these institutions. I also have personal contacts at both of these institutions who were students, alumni, administrators, board members. Access is discussed in detail in the next section.

Upon further examination of the two states' performance-based funding models and recommendations in the literature, a single site case study was chosen. I used one site for my pilot study, and the other site for this dissertation. Focusing on a single site allowed for in-depth probing of the context of the case (Yin, 2013). The site

for the pilot and the site for the dissertation are similar in total enrollment, and both institutions are close to the average percentages of full-time equivalent enrollment for all HBCUs in states with active performance-based funding policies (88%). The dissertation site is close to the median of all HBCUs in states with active performance-based funding policies for the percentage of full-time equivalent enrollment (91.3%), and the median percentage of Black students (87%). The site selected for this study was given the alias Warren Technical State University (Warren Tech). The institution currently is an 1890 land-grant university and has approximately 10,000 students in approximately 50 undergraduate programs, 30 masters and professional degrees, and a dozen doctoral programs. Eighty-five percent of students at the institution are Black, and 91.3% of all students are enrolled full time. The institution is described in more detail in Chapter 4.

Access. As a public institution, Warren Tech's records fall under the state's open records or freedom of information laws. This law guarantees public access to records of state agencies, including universities. Thus, there is public access to the records and events described above. Additionally, I have close connections with Warren Tech alumni who were formerly part of the faculty, a former member of the Warren Tech Board of Trustees, a state legislator, and staff at a large foundation. They each agreed to connect me to potential participants. My preliminary conversations with these stakeholders helped me confirm that the site would be appropriate to study within the aim and scope of the research project. I worked with each of these stakeholders to identify an initial list of approximately 15 potential interview respondents.

Interview Sampling

Interviewees were involved in or knowledgeable of Warren Tech, one of the state actors, and/or the state performance-based funding policy. All interviewees held some combination of relevant affiliations for at least one year. This included faculty members, student leaders, administrators, trustees, community members, journalists, higher education scholars, consultants, state employees, and state legislators. I connected with state board members at the meetings I attended and via email; one state board member declined to participate without additional context, and none of the other state board members responded to my communication. I was unable to identify connections to the governor and lieutenant governor or their staff. I also scanned Twitter, a social media platform, for conversations about the state's performance-based funding after the annual allocations were announced in June of 2018. I did not use Twitter for data collection or analysis. I employed snowball sampling, which involves identifying a few strategic participants who clearly fit the criteria of the study, who each recommend others to interview (Merriam & Tisdale, 2016). This method was best suited for this study because of the expectation that participants have a working knowledge or involvement of performance-based funding. Compared to the entire universe of thousands of state and institutional stakeholders, this is a relatively small number of a few hundred people. Snowball sampling allowed me to utilize the knowledge and recommendations of those people in this number who personally know or observe others in the group. Pseudonyms are used for all participants and the institution. Gender neutral first names and common surnames were chosen to protect participant's identities. Where possible, gendered pronouns are avoided. The gender neutral, abridged term "alum" is used for participants

who are alumni of Warren Tech. Table 4 provides a synopsis of participants' pseudonyms, affiliation, and length of interview in minutes.

Table 4

Pseudonyms of Interview Participants with Institutional Affiliation and Length of Interview

Pseudonym	Affiliation(s)	Length of Interview in minutes
Alex Johnson	Administrator	0:50
Val Walker	Administrator, Alum	0:32
Adrian Smith	Administrator	0:22
Sam Perry	Alum	1:19
Charlie Baker	Alumni	0:22
Avery Benjamin	Trustee, Alum	0:10
Blake Davis	Trustee	0:39
Jay Bryant	Trustee, Former State Board Staff	0:21
Bailey Walker	Trustee, Alum	0:28
Cameron Mitchell	Faculty	0:34
Jamie Young	Faculty	0:35
Andy Williams	Faculty, Alum	0:28
Quinn Evans	Faculty, Graduate Student, Alum	0:35
Jordan Phillips	Higher Education Foundation Staff	0:19
Courtney Moore	Higher Education Foundation Staff	0:30
Jean White	Higher Education Foundation Staff	0:10
Morgan Wilson	Local Journalist	0:27
Kelsey Martin	National Journalist	0:19
Kendall Campbell	Policy Consultant, Former Faculty	0:29
Logan Thompson	Policy Consultant	0:49
Sydney Wright	Senior Administrator, Former Faculty	0:27
Kelly Harris	Senior Administrator	0:17
Peyton Edwards	Senior Administrator, Former Faculty	0:38
Casey Miller	Senior Administrator, Alu	0:27
Parker Clark	Senior Administrator	0:44
Jesse Long	Senior Administrator	0:51
Pat Collins	Senior Administrator	0:53
Aubrey Jones	Former President, Former Faculty, Alum	0:38
Reese Hall	State Board Admin	0:27

Table 4 (continued)

Riley Jackson	State Board Staff	0:15
Addison Brown	State Legislator, Alum	0:55
Dee Henderson	Graduate Student, Staff, Alum	0:35
Hayden Turner	Student Leader	0:15
Reagan Green	Student Leader	0:25
Terry Scott	Student Leader	0:55
Amari Peterson	Student Leader	0:45
Shawn Lee	Student Leader	0:19
Mckenzie Adams	Student Leader	0:23
Ryan King	Student Leader	0:45
Remy Cooper	Student Leader	0:24
Frances Roberts	Former Student Leader, Former Student Trustee, Alum	0:28
Harper Anderson	Former Student Leader, Former Student Trustee, Alum	0:45

Document sampling

Documents were purposely selected from multiple sources for their importance to the context of the case. First, to better understand the performance-based funding policy, I collected public documents such as the state website, announcements, and the annual performance-based funding allocations and score sheets. Second, to better understand Warren Tech's context, governance and response to performance-based funding, I reviewed institutional documents from four different stakeholder groups: administration, the Board of Trustees, faculty, and students. such as faculty handbooks, press releases, and improvement plans. Table 5 shows the number of documents from each source and provides a brief sample of the types of documents collected and analyzed.

Table 5

Documents Collected and Analyzed in This Study

SOURCE	# of Documents	Sample Documents
Administration	10	Warren Tech constitution Warren Tech strategic plans Warren Tech policies Work plans submitted to the Board of Trustees Work plans submitted to the BOG
Board of Governors (BOG)	86	BOG performance-based funding explanations, procedures, and reports BOG operating procedures BOG website and bios BOG studies and reports BOG meeting minutes BOG meeting reports and materials BOG committee meeting minutes State University System press releases State University System strategic plans State University System accountability reports BOG letters and statements BOG policies on university Board of Trustees powers and duties
Board of Trustees	47	Board of Trustees operating procedures Board of Trustees website and bios Board of Trustees meeting minutes Board of Trustees meeting reports and materials Board of Trustees committee meeting minutes Presidential evaluations
External organizations	7	Reports on performance-based funding Reports on national and state college attainment goals Report on university-industry partnerships
Faculty	77	Faculty handbook Faculty senate constitution Faculty credentialing policy Faculty meeting minutes Warren Tech collective bargaining agreements Faculty union newsletter Warren Tech statement on academic freedom and responsibility Warren Tech statement on faculty role in governance

Table 5 (continued)

Students	17	Student handbook Student body constitution Student senate rules of procedure Student senate meeting minutes Student senate committee meeting minutes Student government president resignation letter Website message from chief justice Website message from senate leadership Website message from president and vice president
TOTAL	239	

Observation sampling

In total, I conducted eight semi-structured observations of various meetings pertinent to the case. The observation protocol provided in Appendix D shows how I used general categories like HBCUs, race, performance-based funding, and power to take notes and guide my observations. This simple but pointed structure is based on the research questions for this study. I observed a three-day meeting of the state Board of Governors. I also attended two meetings of the institution's Board of Trustees and related committees. After building a rapport with a few administrators, Peyton Edwards invited me to attend the annual fall faculty planning seminar, which took place over the course of two days. Finally, I observed one meeting of the Higher Education Council via live stream. Table 6 gives the months and lengths of each meeting.

Table 6

Meetings Observed as Part of This Case Study

Date	Meeting	Length
June 2018	Warren Tech Board of Trustees Committee Meetings	5 hours
June 2018	Warren Tech Board of Trustees Meeting	2 hours
June 2018	Warren Tech Board of Trustees Conference Call	15 minutes

Table 6 (continued)

June 2018	State Higher Education Board of Governors Meeting	Day 1: 5 hours Day 2: 10 hours Day 3: 4 hours
June 2018	State Higher Education Council Meeting	3 hours
August 2018	Warren Tech Board of Trustees Committee Meetings	3 hours
August 2018	Warren Tech Board of Trustees Meeting	1 hour
August 2018	Faculty Planning Meeting	Day 1: 8 hours Day 2: 5 hours

Data Collection

Interviews

Data were collected from Warren Tech stakeholders through one-on-one, semi-structured interviews in person or by phone. Of the 42 interviews, 25 were conducted in person, and the remaining 17 were conducted via phone. Participants were recruited with a pre-approved email detailing the purpose of the study and the confidentiality of the interview. Interviews followed the interview protocol of open-ended questions included in Appendix B. With participants' permission, interviews were recorded and transcribed.

When starting the interview, I would tell the participants about myself and my study. I could see participants becoming more comfortable when I told them I was a fellow HBCU alum. To initiate the interviews, I typically asked each participant about their connection to Warren Tech or the state, including the length and nature of their current role and any former roles. All participants were asked about their understanding of the HBCU mission and the performance-based funding model. Questions explicitly explored participants' perceptions of the power relationships in the case such as:

1. How would you describe the power relationships between:
 - a. the Warren Tech administration and students?

- b. the Warren Tech administration and faculty?
 - c. the Warren Tech administration and the Board of Trustees?
 - d. the Warren Tech faculty and students?
 - e. the Warren Tech faculty and the Board of Trustees?
2. What is your perception of the power relationships between:
- a. the Warren Tech administration and the state legislature?
 - b. the Warren Tech administration and the governor?
 - c. the Warren Tech administration and the members of the Board of Governors?
 - d. the Warren Tech administration and staff at the Board of Governors office?

Depending on their role, participants were asked more specifically about the power relationships they experienced and witnessed. For example, students were primarily asked about the internal power relationships of the institution, while trustees and senior administrators were asked about the institution's power relationships and the relationships between the state and the institution. State higher education staff were asked questions from Jones's (2013) work, with the author's permission. Interviewees were asked to describe what shaped the relationships they described, and how race plays into the relationships. Importantly, I asked participants if and how the power relationships they discussed had changed since the implementation of performance-based funding. All of the interviews followed the semi-structured protocol, but I tailored the tone, depth, and path of each interview. This allowed me to ask probing questions which revealed interviewees' unique context and perspectives, and probe these data in other interviews.

For example, one student mentioned gentrification and the physical proximity of a nearby predominantly white public four-year university. When I probed her concerns deeper, she contrasted the nearby institution's continuous growth to Warren Tech's dated facilities and stalled construction as part of a broader trend of funding inequity. Before ending the interview, I asked participants if there was anything they'd like to discuss that we had not covered, or anything they recommended I seek out. This question often led to additional conversation, such as the senior administrator who began to delve into a conversation about admissions standards. I concluded by asking every interviewee if they could recommend other participants, and if they were comfortable connecting me via text or email. This served two important purposes. First, it helped me identify additional participants. Second, when the interviewee recommended participants I had already included in the sample, this helped me confirm I was including the right stakeholders.

Document Review

Additionally, document review was conducted to better understand the context of the case. I collected most documents from the state, institution, and external organization's websites. Some documents were also collected at the state board meeting, and from participants' offices. I also spent a day in the institution's archives reviewing relevant documents from the 1930s to the early 2000s. Documents were particularly important in contextualizing aspects of power relationships I was unable to probe through interviews and observations. For instance, I was only able to attend one meeting of the board of governors, and none of the members agreed to participate in an interview. To be sure I collected adequate data on this aspect of the case, I reviewed 86 Board of Governors documents such as websites, reports, operating procedures, and meeting

minutes and materials. Documents were also helpful “because of what can be learned directly from them but also as stimulus for paths of inquiry” through other methods (Patton, 2002, p. 294). For example, document analysis revealed that there is a student representative to the faculty union and the Board of Trustees, but these students were rarely included in the minutes of either group’s meetings. This led me to include student leaders who had served in these roles in the sample. Because of the document review, I specifically asked student leaders about, the power of the student body in general and more specifically, the power of their positions.

Observations

Using an observation protocol, I observed multiple meetings to document the interpersonal aspects of governance. Observations were helpful in identifying documents and interview participants. I received the Institutional Review Board’s approval to collect data the day before the first Warren Tech Board of Trustees meeting, so it was my first interaction with the institution as a researcher. This helped me identify potential interviewees based on their participation in the meeting. It was useful to observe which trustees were more involved in the discussion of performance-based funding, and have some idea of their familiarity with and views of the policy. Using the protocol, I was able to take notes on specific comments related to the case, and then probe them further during the interview. For example, one trustee began a conversation about the importance of academic department chairs understanding how their departments impacted the institution’s performance-based funding scores and allocations. I followed up on this when I interviewed the trustee, and when I interviewed faculty, gaining both perspectives on the issue and the power relationships at play.

There are advantages and disadvantages to observing public meetings. The open nature of the meetings may invite skepticism on whether they really reveal contentious issues and political dynamics. Indeed, I cannot provide insight into whether those types of dynamics surface behind-the-scenes and out of the public eye. However, the public meetings lent insight into how the university and the state publicly present and portray various policy issues and official statements. This is certainly an important aspect the size of the board meetings and retreat allowed me some level of obscurity amongst hundreds of other attendees. Observations held on Warren Tech's campuses were brief immersions in the institution. When interviewees referred to the stalled construction in the middle of the campus, I was able to picture the site because I had seen the incomplete structure myself. When senior administrators presented about the performance-based funding metrics at the faculty retreat, I could observe firsthand the temper of the attendees and hear the casual comments of the instructors and professors I sat with at the faculty retreat. Like this exchange, other small interactions and side conversations during observations were also helpful. For instance, I was sitting next to a staff member from the athletics department who muttered many comments during any of the trustees' discussion of budget and finance matters. Thus, through observation did not provide central findings on, these meetings provided preliminary or supplementary data which corroborated and substantiated data collected from interviews and documents.

Data Analysis

I analyzed data using Yin's (1994) early guidance on explanation-building, an approach to analyzing case study evidence which is guided by theoretical propositions. This process is gradual and iterative, building an explanation by entertaining and

eliminating “plausible or rival explanations” (Yin, 1994, p. 111). Aligned with this approach, before collecting data, I distilled a series of a priori codes from the three theories in the conceptual framework. These ideas were built into in all three of my collection protocols. After collecting the raw data, I employed Bhattacharya’s (2017) recommendations for approaching inductive analysis. Before coding, I familiarized myself with all of the raw data: listening to interviews, reading transcripts, and reviewing documents and notes. When I had sufficiently reviewed each research material at least once, I organized them all using the MAXQDA analysis software.

MAXQDA is a computer program which helps researcher organize and analyze text for qualitative and mixed methods research. I primarily used the program to organize, code, and theme the data. With the assistance of the software, multiple rounds of coding were conducted to identify dominant categories and themes (Creswell, 2013). I began with the a priori codes for each of the three theories guiding the case study. This type of analytical strategy serves the third research question which centers on identifying which theory best explains the case. A list of a priori codes is provided in Table 7. This list changed and expanded immensely during data analysis. As I looked for the established a priori codes, some such as *metrics*, *allocations*, and *outcomes* were used too frequently and in too many varying contexts to serve as theoretical considerations. Others, like *state investment* were used too infrequently or not at all. However, the a priori coding process provided guidance for both theoretical and topical lines of inquiry.

Table 7

A Priori Codes for Each Theory in the Conceptual Framework Created Before Data Collection

Theory	Description	A Priori Codes
Principal Agent Theory	The relationship between a principal who has delegated authority to an agent who acts on the principal's behalf to perform a task or responsibility	Metrics Outcomes University improvement plan Autonomy Excellence Improvement Pre-eminence/Pre-eminent institutions Graduation rates Rankings
Resource Dependence Theory	All organizations exist as part of interdependent networks of organizations, causing uncertainty for each organization's survival. To alleviate these risks, individual organizations seek to minimize their dependence	State University System/SUS State investment Base funding Allocations Risk/Uncertainty/Fear Spending Fundraising/Alumni Giving Foundations/Grants
Critical Race Theory of Higher Education	Prioritizes the deep roots and vestiges of white supremacy in higher education, the connection of higher education to imperialism and capitalism which fuel the intersections of race, property, and oppression; and positions knowledge production in universities as a venue for racism	White supremacy/racism Black/African American/Afrocentrism Colorblind or colorblindness Historical references Segregation Social justice Mission Equity Pell grant/Pell status/Low-income

While I conducted a priori analysis with the codes distilled from each theory, I noticed themes many themes were linked. For example, while searching for the code *autonomy*, I saw overlapping themes around *influence*. While searching for *alumni*, I saw themes of *advocacy* and *activism* in the same sections. I coded the data accordingly, and

kept a list of these new emergent codes. The other themes that arose during the a priori coding process offered new topics for analysis and consideration. For example, a priori codes on *mission* revealed new topics such as *creaming*, *comparison*, and *economic impact*. Additionally, other codes arose that were specific to the topic of the paper, rather than the theory. These included codes like *poor design*, *instability in the model*, and *privileging certain institutions*. This emergent coding assisted with the detection of any rival explanations, competing understandings, and discrepancies that call into question the assumptions from the a priori coding. I kept all of these topical considerations on a separate list. When I finished the a priori codes, I reviewed all of the raw data with list of the emergent topics. During this process, I allowed entirely new and seemingly unrelated codes to emerge such as *gentrification*, *social media*, and specific people.

During the a priori analysis and emergent coding, I also employed In Vivo codes of distinctive data. Saldaña (2009) recommends using in vivo coding for “words and phrases that seem to call for bolding, underlining, italicizing, highlighting or vocal emphasis when spoken aloud” (p. 75). This included such codes as: the word *insidious*; the phrases *blinded by the white* and *just trying to grasp for straws*; the assertion *Because performance in your eyes and performance in my eyes are different*; and the excerpt *Most racist ideas don’t just come out of nowhere. They’re a means to justify why to do something*. In all, I had a master list of 68 initial codes which were employed over 1,500 times throughout all of the raw data. At the end of this process, I transitioned to second cycle coding.

The second cycle of coding helps narrow the master code list into a fewer, related categories. Similar to the first level of analysis, I approached this level of analysis using

the research questions and three guiding theories. I sought explanations of each theory in the codes independently. Pattern coding groups together codes that offer explanations and is appropriate for forming theoretical constructs (Saldaña, 2009). Thus, I used this method to form categories that offered theoretical explanations for the third research question. For the first and second research questions, which seek to understand the influence of the performance-based policy, I looked not for patterns of codes, but for “the most frequent or significant” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 155) codes which “reveal the most salient categories” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 46).

Throughout the process of distilling and refining theoretical patterns and topical categories, I continued to follow Bhattacharya’s (2017) guidance on writing analytically and reflexively about the patterns being made. I arrived on a few central themes for each of the research questions and heeded her advice to “Look for silences, contradictions, and tensions”, discuss findings, and revisit earlier steps in the process as needed (Bhattacharya, 2017, p. 151). As I scrutinized the findings, I conducted axial coding, which relates categories and subcategories to one another and helps identify the “conditions, causes, and consequences of a process” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 62). I further compared and analyzed the theoretical patterns and topical categories along the axes. Axial coding encourages visual representations of the central phenomena (Saldaña, 2009).

Triangulation, Trustworthiness, and Rigor

This study has three built in methods of triangulation: participant triangulation, data triangulation, and theory triangulation. Interview participants represented various levels of formal authority and responsibility, but shared perspectives on common

topics/issues. Thus, I was able to triangulate perceptions on power relationships from multiple and different levels throughout the case. I also achieved data triangulation by including multiple forms and sources of evidence in the study. In this type of triangulation, there is convergence of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994). The aim of data triangulation is to test for consistency across different types of data, in this case interviews, documents, and observations (Patton, 2002). Additionally, this study design incorporated theory triangulation. This type of triangulation applies multiple perspectives on the same data (Yin, 1994). Triangulation also served to increase rigor and trustworthiness. I included my reflexivity and positionality above in order to acknowledge my orientations and foster trustworthiness (Patton, 2002). As suggested by Lincoln and Guba (2000), I considered multiple realities, perspectives and interests. I drew upon literature and theory to distinguish which findings are particular and distinctive to HBCUs.

Limitations

The limitations of this study are outlined in Chapter 1. To reiterate, this study is limited in that it focuses on only one public, four-year institution in one state. Because performance-based funding is a state funding policy applied to public institutions, the results of this research are not applicable to private HBCUs which have fundamentally different relationships with states. Since Warren Tech is a four-year institution, this research may not be applicable to the context of public two-year HBCUs. This research focuses only on one state, so it does not address the variations of performance-based funding policies. Respondents' ability to self-select possibly influences the characteristics

of the sample. Given this and the sample size, the Warren Tech stakeholders' perceptions should not be generalized to represent the views of all HBCU stakeholders.

CHAPTER 4: THE CASE OF PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING AND WARREN TECH

Chapter 4 describes the case in this study. This narrative description is informed by the interviews, document reviews, and observations conducted as a part of the study, including primary sources which are not cited in order to maintain the confidentiality of the state and the institution. The narrative is organized by the first two research questions, beginning with the state-university relationship (research question 1), then narrowing to the internal institutional relationships (research question 2). The third research question is addressed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

Higher Education in the State

The case entails the HBCU's internal dynamics and its external policy context with the state through entities which influence the performance-based funding policy such as policymakers and their advisors, state higher education staff, higher education experts and consultants, other universities in the state, and intermediaries like foundations and advocacy organizations. Race and power are key to understanding the relationship between the state and Warren Tech and relationships within Warren Tech. Race and power are key to understanding the relationship between the state and Warren Tech and relationships within Warren Tech. The state boasts some of the oldest colonial settlements in the contiguous U.S., and was the site of multiple wars between the early US government and Native American peoples. In the mid-1800s, thousands of Native American peoples, including descendants of free and escaped Black people, were relocated to Indian Territory. Around this time, the legislature and governor provided for public support of two seminaries. The state formally entered the union before the Civil

War, but seceded from the United States as part of the conflict. During the war, one seminary closed and the other became a military training institute. After the war, the state sanctioned one institution for white men, one for white women, and one for Black students.

During the 1940s and 1950s, case law and state records show the state was one in which the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund led a targeted litigation campaign against racial segregation in graduate and professional education programs. Despite the landmark *Brown vs. Board* case, the state-maintained segregation in its PWIs, going so far as opening graduate schools at Warren Tech for Black students who had applied to PWIs in the state, or paying for the Black students to attend other institutions out of state. Even after the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling in 1954, state records show the state continued to segregate higher education and underfund HBCUs. When Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, it made it illegal for the government to fund these programs, and allowed the federal government to enforce desegregation by levying sanctions, withholding funds, or pursuing legal action (Jones, 2013). Ten states were required to submit desegregation plans to the federal Higher Education and Welfare (HEW) department (Gaines, 2010). A group of Black citizens, led by the NAACP, sued the director or the HEW for failing to hold the states accountable. The subsequent 1973 *Adams v. Richardson* case grew to encompass 19 states over the next 16 years (Jones et al., 2017). State and institutional records show the state experienced population growth throughout the 1960s through the 1990s, chartering multiple universities and professional programs to meet the increased demand for education throughout the state. This growth

doubled the size of the university system. Until the turn of the century, the public colleges and universities were overseen by a state level Board of Regents, and public community colleges were overseen by a state level Board of Community Colleges. Both boards and the K-12 Department of Education reported to a State Education Council. The State Education Council consisted of the seven, elected state level cabinet members, including the governor. A late 1990s ballot measure was proposing multiple changes to higher education governance was approved and the changes subsequently enacted by the state legislature.

According to state records and historical documents, in the early 2000s, the state legislature moved to consolidate public K-12 schools, community colleges, and universities under a new Board of Education with one commissioner, and members appointed by the governor. This legislation also created institutional Boards of Trustees for all four-year colleges and universities, with members also appointed by the governor. A powerful state senator and former state governor successfully led a charge to advance a referendum to institute a coordinating board as a buffer between the state Board of Education and the institutional Boards of Trustees. Thus, today, all public four-year colleges and universities exist as part of a unified State University System (SUS) overseen by a state Board of Governors. There is also a council made up of the heads of each of the public education systems, the state senate, state house of representatives, associations for independent education institutions, and a public-private partnership. The council meets almost monthly, and primarily functions as a means to foster discussion and information sharing between the entities.

As noted in legislative records, in the early 2000s, the Republican governor issued an executive order banning the use of race-conscious admissions at all public colleges and universities. This move paralleled affirmative action bans in other states during that time. In the place of this affirmative action was a policy granting admission to the State University System for the top 20% of graduating seniors at all state high schools. According to news articles and state reports, the year after the policy, the number of Black freshmen at the flagship, land-grant institution decreased by 45%. Black student enrollment for the overall system steadily decreased throughout the 2000s. According to the state website, today, the state's large, diverse population is served by approximately 150 higher education institutions in the state, with about 85 four-year institutions and 60 two-year and technical institutions. The approximately 10 public four-year colleges and universities enroll more than 300,000 students. Collectively, the public four-year institutions award more than 60,000 undergraduate degrees. In the 2016-2017 academic year, 40% of bachelor's degrees were awarded to Black and Latino students.

Performance-based Funding in the State

The state began exploring performance-based funding in 2011 as a part of the State University System strategic planning process. Confirming the literature, state records show the state had a Republican governor and Republican controlled legislature at the time of performance-based funding adoption. The state's trajectory toward performance-based funding documented in state documents aligns with the national trajectory and literature on accountability policies in the late 2000s. This is evidenced by the evolution of the state strategic plans. The straightforward strategic plan of the 1990s, which I retrieved from the state's online archives, discussed trends and conditions and

outlined three large priorities for the system with related but unfixed objectives and aspirations. The plan guiding the late 1990s into the early 2000s quadrupled the big goals, and set the state's first numerical objectives. These metrics measured: growth in student enrollment; on-campus residency; and state, local, and industry support for university research and development. Reflective of the trend toward neoliberalism in higher education (Ziskin, Rabourn, & Hossler, 2018) the strategic plan for the mid-2000s was centered on numerous specific, measurable goal for increasing enrollment, expanding programs, and meeting workforce demands. Centered on three points of emphasis but featuring multiple goals, and numerous key performance indicators, the plan approved in 2011 combined language and approaches from previous plans.

In early 2012, the state legislature passed a bill authorizing a pilot project for a performance-based funding model focused on select science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) programs. As described in state documents and meeting minutes, this model awarded universities for the percentage of employed graduates from the specified programs. The pilot model required universities to apply and was only authorized for two academic years. Ultimately, three universities did not apply (one submitted an incomplete, late application), leaving the majority to compete, and four secured funding. By the fall of 2012, public discussions on system-wide performance-based funding began at the Board of Governors meetings with a visit from the governor. Legislative records show a senate bill was filed in the beginning of the 2013 legislative session and subsequently passed and signed by the governor. The model was developed throughout 2013. The chair of the Board of Governors' finance committee worked with the state senate president and staff Board of Governors to create a methodology. Conversations to

generate metrics were held with university Boards of Trustees and executive leadership in person and via phone calls. The Board of Governors established four guiding criteria in an effort to develop a model that acknowledged institutions' differing missions, rewarded both growth and excellence, and adhered to the state strategic plan with a few metrics. The performance-based funding model was formally approved by the Board of Governors in late 2013.

According to documents from the Board of Governors, the system awards a portion of base funding and all new funding using the performance-based funding system. To fund the initial funding allocations, the state reduced each institution's base funding by about 10%. The sum of all of the withheld funds was consolidated then redistributed based on the results of the performance-based funding policy. At the onset, the 50-point system awarded five points for each of the 10 metrics. Points can be earned for achieving the set benchmark, or for improving a certain percentage from the previous year. Eight of the metrics are universal to all universities. The ninth metric is chosen annually by each institution's Board of Trustees, and the tenth is chosen annually for each university by the Board of Governors. Institutions that received 25 points or fewer are not eligible for any new funding above their base allocation. Additionally, regardless of their individual scores, the institutions that receive the lowest scores are not eligible for new funding. This means that an institution can meet the 25-point minimum and improve their scores from the last year, and still only receive their base allocation. An institution that falls in the bottom two years in the row has its base funding reduced. The first rankings and allocations were made in 2014 based on institutions' performance during the 2013–2014 academic year.

Board of Governors' documents show the system is marked by ongoing changes and instability. Initially, the system awarded \$100 million across all institutions by taking a portion of funding from each institution's base. The legislature has since increased the amount of performance-based funding to \$265 million and approved a change to a 100-point system awarding 10 points for each metric. With the ninth and tenth metrics, some change is expected and intentional. However, the metrics- and many times their calculations and methodology- have changed in other ways. One metric changed from instructional costs for the university to costs to the student. Another metric expanded from only rewarding alumni employed in the state to those in more than 40 states and districts. The timing and nature of changes to the model increasing volatility and uncertainty. For example, some changes adopted during the legislative session were applied to the current academic year and annual allocations. Most notably, this is the manner in which the graduation rate was switched from the six-year measurement to a four-year measurement.

Power Relationships between Warren Tech and the State

Since the implementation of performance-based funding, there has only been one governor in the state throughout that period. According to state records, the governor of the state sits atop formalized power structure of higher education in the state. Fourteen of the 17 Board of Governors members are appointed by the governor. The governor also appoints the commissioner of education, who is the head of the K-12 Department of Education and sits on both the State Board of Education and the Board of Governors. There is one faculty representative, who is the head of the of the state faculty senate association, made up of the senate leaders from each institution. Similarly, the one

student representative is the head of the state student association, made up of the student government leaders from each institution. Thus far, no Warren Tech alumni have been appointed to the Board of Governors. There have only been two Black members on the Board of Governors during the duration of performance-based funding. One was the Warren Tech student body president who also served as the student representative on the Board of Governors. This lack of diversity limits the Board of Governors' understanding of the HBCU mission, and Warren Tech's power in the governance and performance-based funding processes. This is asymmetry evident in Board of Governors meetings. Board of Governors members who are alumni of other state universities celebrate their successes in the rankings during meetings, and make jovial conversation with the leaders of their respective alma maters during breaks.

Since the implementation of performance-based funding, the state has used appointments to the Board of Trustees to exert new power over the institution. According to Board of Governors' documents and records, each state university has 13 Board of Trustees members. Five are appointed by the Board of Governors, and six are appointed by the governor. Similar to the Board of Governors, the last two positions are held by the faculty senate president and the student body president. The governor moved the one Black member of the Board of Governors to the Warren Tech Board of Trustees. The Board of Governors member had previously worked for two different Florida Senate committees. After his removal, there is no Black representation on the Board of Governors, and only three of the 14 appointed members are people of color. The same year, the governor appointed a former staffer who also served in a staff role for the Board of Governors and a large foundation invested in advancing performance-based funding.

In addition to appointments on the university's Board of Trustees, the Board of Governors has exerted power through other formal positions. A Board of Governors member was appointed a special liaison between Warren Tech and the Board of Governors. Warren Tech is the only institution with this added oversight, though it is not the only university which has consistently ranked low in the performance-based funding metrics. In a particularly public and contentious moment, the liaison wrote an op-ed for a local newspaper which many Warren Tech stakeholders found problematic, condescending, and unnecessarily public. According to faculty senate meeting minutes, at the faculty's request, the liaison, the chancellor of the state system, and other representatives from the Board of Governors staff attended a meeting of Warren Tech's faculty senate to discuss performance-based funding. The op-ed served as a display of power and warning to Warren Tech about the turmoil between the administration and Board of Trustees, and the specific tension between the president and the chair of the Board of Trustees. The transitions in the president's office impacted the institution's ability to exert power within the university system and within state governance relationships. Without a consistent and permanent executive officer, the institution had a limited ability to exert power in political activities such as lobbying legislators.

Though gubernatorial appointments of Warren Tech alumni to state level positions are rare or nonexistent, there are state level elected officials who are Warren Tech alum. Three state representatives and one state senator are Warren Tech alumni. Warren Tech is in the congressional district of one of the alumni state representatives who serves on the higher education appropriations subcommittee, allowing the university a voice in the legislative budgeting process. A former student leader, this representative

has proved to be an ally to the institution and a critic of performance-based funding. Another former student leader serves as mayor of Warren Tech's hometown. At least eight Warren Tech alumni serve as mayors, including cities in Warren Tech's state.

In the tradition of former students and alumni who were active in demonstrations of the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, according to interviewees and local news articles, students and alumni are influencers of the institution's power relationships with the state. Since the implementation of performance-based funding, students have marched and protested at the state capitol and the governor's mansion regarding a number of the state's statements and decisions. Meeting minutes show leaders and members of national and local alumni chapters regularly attend meetings of both the Board of Trustees and Board of Governors meetings, and made public statements at the meetings I attended. Dozens of alumni dressed in Warren Tech's bright colors, and a few submitted public comments in support of the university, its mission, and its leadership. According to interviewees, alumni based in the state write letters to their congressmen. Though few in number, select alumni and students also join the university president and lobbyist for meetings with state legislators.




Figure 1. Hierarchy of state power relationships and structures.



Figure 2. Hierarchy of positional power between Warren Tech and the state.

Warren Technical State University

Founded as a normal college to train teachers in the late 1800s after its state banned integrated schooling, Warren Technical State University (Warren Tech) is an 1890 Morrill land-grant institution, and the only public HBCU in its state. Like many of the HBCU land-grant institutions, the majority of Warren Tech's earliest learners focused on basic primary, secondary, and vocational education. The college conferred its first baccalaureate degrees after the turn of the century, but the state did not allow the institution to offer graduate programs until the 1950s. Despite the landmark *Brown vs.*

Board case, the state-maintained segregation in its PWIs, going so far as to open graduate schools at Warren Tech for Black students who had applied to PWIs in the state, or paying for the Black students to attend other institutions out of state. Like many HBCU students across the country, Warren Tech students were active in demonstrations of civil disobedience, including lunch counter sit-ins. Perhaps in retaliation for these actions, the state board closed Warren Tech's hospital and law school in the 1960s and 1970s.

The university experienced rapid growth in the 1970s and began conferring doctoral degree programs in 1980s. The law school was finally reinstated in the early 2000s. Under consecutive, stable, and well-respected leaders, the university thrived from the 1970s to the turn of the century. At various points in the late 1990s and early 2000s the university boasted accolades such as the largest HBCU, the top public HBCU, the most Gates Millennium scholars, the top producer of Black undergraduate degrees, and the number two producer of Black professional doctoral degrees. Unfortunately, multiple leadership transitions, highly publicized student events, and federal finance policy changes have impacted the university's course.

As neoliberal state policies have redefined higher education, the university has adjusted to the transition of a long-term and beloved leader with multiple presidents and interim presidents. Some were dismissed, and others resigned. Almost all remain tenured faculty members at the institution. This was exacerbated by the implementation of a new Board of Trustees, and multiple transitions on and off the board. According to interviewees and local news articles, Warren Tech's Board of Trustees is a hands-on board whose enthusiasm and constant communication can be perceived as meddling by the administration. Conflicts between executive administrators and members of the Board

of Trustees were highly publicized, to the detriment of the university's reputation. The volatility in Warren Tech's leadership is not uncommon in this era of HBCUs. Table 8 represents the leadership transitions at HBCUs over the last four academic year as reported by Will Broussard in HBCU Digest (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2019).

Table 8

Number of HBCU President Transitions at Campuses During the Last Four Academic Years

	2015-2016	2016-2017	2017-2018	2018-2019
Number of Executive Transitions	34	37	18	10
Number of Campuses	35	31	16	10

Exacerbating these leadership struggles, inflammatory and at times violent events placed students in the spotlight of public scrutiny. Continuing the tradition of public activism and civil disobedience, Warren Tech students notably protested the aforementioned ban on affirmative action with a march to the governor's office in the early 2000s. Students staged another widely known protest in the late 2000s after the death of a Black child at the hands of a state officer. Soon thereafter, multiple fraternity members became the first to convicted of felony hazing for seriously injuring a prospective member. This reputation of violence was reinforced years later after the death of a student, resulting in felony convictions for additional students. It is believed that this event and subsequent changes to federal finance policies contributed to a decline in enrollment in the 2010s.

Like many HBCUs, Warren Tech is heavily reliant on public funding including student financial aid or state allocations. As such, Warren Tech's enrollment and funding decreased due to the economic recession and the changes to Parent PLUS Loan standards and to Pell eligibility, from 18 semesters of coverage to only 12, and in 2011. Over 500 loan applications from parents and guardians of Warren Tech students were rejected for the fall 2012 semester. In all, the 14,616 HBCU students were denied, resulting in a loss of approximately \$168 million from students who could not afford to start or continue their college educations (Lee & Keys, 2013a).

Today, the institution has approximately 10,000 students in more than 50 undergraduate programs, approximately 30 masters and professional degrees, and roughly a dozen doctoral programs. The majority of students, faculty, and administrators are Black. The institution is a national leader in graduating Black STEM students at all levels, and is consistently recognized as one of the top HBCUs by various ranking systems.

Warren Tech's Performance-based Funding Scores

In general, Warren Tech depends on the state for over 40% of its annual revenues. This is comparable to other public four-year HBCUs, but higher than other public four-year institutions in the state. Thus, Warren Tech is susceptible to fluctuations in funding, especially given biases and blindspots in the performance-based funding formula. The annual performance-based funding allocation is approximately 6-7% of the institution's annual budget. The largest dip in funding since the policy was enacted reduced the institution's annual budget by more than \$17 million, including losses in tuition and fees. The authority to set tuition lies with the state legislature, preventing Warren Tech from

subsidizing losses with tuition support. This reinforces Warren Tech's resource dependence on the state, in that the institution The university's endowment is approximately \$115 million, but is one of the smallest in the state, despite it being one of the oldest institutions. The endowment is stable, experiencing steady, moderate growth in the years since performance-based funding was enacted. However, fundraising at the institution has not increased as a response to performance-based funding. Warren Tech's base allocation increased slightly during the first two years of performance-based funding allocations, but decreased in year three, and finally exceeded previous years in the last year covered. The vacillations in general revenue are reflected of the institutions' gains and losses in the performance-based funding model.

According Board of Governors' meeting minutes and documents, , Warren Tech did not receive funding in three of the five years since the first allocation of performance-based funding in 2014. Warren Tech has had their base allocation reduced one year because, despite improving their overall score, the score was still amongst the lowest in the state. In some years, the institution has mitigated this by negotiating increases to their base allocation from the legislature. Table 9 shows how Warren Tech has performed and been awarded. As shown, Warren Tech did improve in the rankings in the three unfunded years, but still did not receive any new performance-based funding above their base allocation because of the punishment for being amongst the lowest scoring institutions in the State University System. Continued depreciation despite sustained improvement shows how difficult it might be for Warren Tech to improve on certain metrics given its unique historical mission and access-orientation.

Table 9

Warren Tech's Performance and Allocations in the Performance-Based Funding Model

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Lowest performer	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Improved in metrics	N/A	Yes	Yes	No (Same score as 2016)	Yes
New performance-based funding awarded	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

Beyond the financial implications, there are a number of administrative impacts of performance-based funding. With the state's open records laws, all of the Board of Governors' meetings and discussion on allocations are public. The Board of Governors' meetings and the performance-based funding results and awards are almost always covered by campus and local newspapers. This coverage contributes to an ongoing media narrative of HBCU inferiority which pitches the institutions as "second-hand universities that are poorly managed, outdated and are a drain on the economy" (Waymer & Street, 2016, p. 489). A 2017 study on coverage of HBCUs in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* showed that the majority of reporting depicted "funding challenges at HBCUs, status differential between PWIs vs HBCUs, questionable leadership practices at HBCUs and achievement success" (Waymer & Street, 2016, p. 489). In a review of 300 mainstream national media articles, those that featured HBCUs did not provide important context such as "percentage of Pell Grant eligibility, SAT scores and selectivity, student expenditures, and endowments" (para 15), and showed a "tendency to report the direst circumstances at HBCUs and then portray these circumstances as the norm" (para 4) (Gasman & Bowman, 2011).

To alleviate this strain, the university has outlined a number of goals to improve branding, media relations and stakeholder engagements. Performance-based funding and the resultant increase in media scrutiny were both a factor in tension between the board and a former president. The relationship with the board and the administration has improved during the tenure of the new president, in large part because he was a respected member of the faculty and administration prior to his appointment. Nevertheless, the president's role is also impacted by performance-based funding, as many of the president's annual goals and evaluation criteria are directly correlated to metrics in the performance-based funding model. Another major administrative change resulting from performance-based funding is the university's creation of a strategic planning unit to create synergies between the assessment, accreditation, and institutional research functions. Indeed, performance-based funding has had an impact on the university's external and internal power relationships.

Power Relationships within Warren Tech

Much of the internal power relationships at Warren Tech have been introduced earlier in the chapter. As mentioned, there has been turnover in significant executive leadership positions, including the president and provost. According to the institution's website and archives, the university enjoyed stability for approximately 25 years under two leaders seen as respected and innovative by the study participants across institutional affiliation. Together, these presidents greatly increased the power of the university and the role within the state and within the national HBCU community. After leading for more than 15 years, the second aforementioned president left a memorable legacy, as depicted in documents and meeting minutes, and described by interviewees. Interviewees

recalled how he was able to garner public and financial support from private organizations, particularly Fortune 500 companies which offered donations, scholarships, and student internships. Under his tenure, student enrollment more than doubled. The stability, prosperity, and growth engendered high trust and approval from students, faculty, administrators, and alumni. In particular, faculty morale and productivity improved greatly. As a young faculty at the university in the 1960s, the president stood against a powerful state senator who recommended merging the institution with a nearby PWI. At the end of the president's tenure, the same state senator championed the referendum which altered the reorganization of the entire State University System, creating the Board of Governors as a buffer between the state and the institutional Boards of Trustees.

As described above and in state and institutional records and policies, Warren Tech has 13 trustees: five appointed by the Board of Governors; six are appointed by the governor. The faculty are represented by the faculty senate president and student interests are represented by the student body president. A peculiar intermediary, Board of Governors' meeting minutes show the board has at times acted as an external overseer, and at other times as an internal stakeholder. In any case, the Board of Trustees has commanded and commandeered power from its implementation. Based on analysis of interviewees' comments and the departure of the respected president and left a power vacancy which the board quickly usurped. From the outset, the Board of Trustees clashed with the newly appointed president. Collectively, the new changes proved to diminish the power and formal authority of the Warren Tech presidency, redirected decision making and leadership to the Board of Trustees. The new president proved unable to navigate the

new higher education terrain. In an effort to improve the university's relationship with a local community college, he issued directives for faculty without consulting faculty leadership, and subsequently lost their respect and support. Faculty, students, and alumni all called for the president's resignation. The new president's tenure ended with shouting at a Board of Trustees only a few short years later. In a controversy, a former Board of Governors member was appointed to the interim president. This presidency also ended with contempt from students, faculty, and trustees after a few years. News articles and institutional documents show how this cycle continued for two more interim presidencies and two presidencies, each as contested and contemptuous as the last. News articles reveal a trend of yelling at Boards of Trustees meetings as longstanding as the faculty's push back against the Boards of Trustees and administration.

As evidenced above, the Warren Tech faculty is a force of accountability and influence over the presidency. Institutional documents show faculty hold authority in various roles throughout the university, even outside of academic concerns. In accordance with the traditional rules of academe and tenure, the faculty enjoys a high level of autonomy from the administration. Like all faculty members, they are deeply invested in the curriculum and canon. Like many HBCU faculty members, Warren Tech faculty are deeply invested in the institution's mission and students. Institutional documents and the faculty senate constitutions reveal their power is formalized in the senate and the Warren Tech chapter of the state faculty union. Faculty senators are elected every two years. The faculty senate is also a connector of different power institutions in the university. The senate faculty president sits on the Board of Trustees. An elected student body leader serves as a voting member of the faculty senate. Despite

their autonomy, the faculty has not been immune to the changes within the administration and state. The advent of the Board of Trustees impacted the power of the administration and the faculty. The presidential transitions impacted the power of that role, and the faculty as well. According documents in the institutional archives, not long after the first transition, over 100 of the most senior professors and deans retired concurrently, creating volatility and vacancies in the faculty's power. To compound this, with each new president comes a new round of dean dismissals. Through the years and changes, the faculty has clenched onto their power at the university. The senate president has proven to be a consistent figure, and has witnessed the evolution of the board since the first allocations in 2014. While the senate has generally proven to be very active, the group was somewhat reactive to performance-based funding, only moving it to discussion after the Board of Trustees liaison's inciting op-ed.

As the largest group of stakeholders on campus, Warren Tech students' perspectives must be considered. Just as Warren Tech students have continued the legacy of civil disobedience against state level decisions and policies, Warren Tech students have been known to march and protest against institutional matters as well. Using marches, protests, student publications, public comments, and petitions, Warren Tech students were an active voice in each of the presidential turnovers and dismissals. They have also made public stances for banning tobacco products on campus, against gun violence, and state level elections. On one occasion, the governor of the state attempted to relate to students during protest by talking about living in public housing as a child, inciting backlash from students who buffed the idea that Blackness and poverty are interchangeable. In particular, the student government association has proven to be a

powerful actor in the university. Student government presidents have gone on to become mayors, state representatives, and members of the Board of Trustees. Yet, there has been a perceived decrease in the power of students and their elected representatives since the advent of the Board of Trustees. Power is “the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do” (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 45). Current and former student leaders who participated in interviews all pointed to former student leaders who had the power to raise awareness at a national level and influence decisions by the administration and the state. This speculation and the decrease in power is undoubtedly connected to the highly-contested public battle for the student presidency documented in institution and state documents, as well as local and student news outlets. The initial winner had been a vocal detractor of the president, and the university president of interfering in student elections because the administration favored the candidate who lost. The initial winner challenged the election results, and after filing a lawsuit, was once again declared the winner. This was not the end of the saga, as the student president’s second term was also riddled with dispute and eventually cut short. Student interviewees scrutinized recent study body administrations for wanting power and popularity without fulfilling campaign promises. Student leaders are acutely aware of performance-based funding, its inner workings, the institution’s allocations, and how it impacts their matriculation and leadership roles. Despite this activity and awareness with student leadership, student interviewees report that factions of the general student body prove to be somewhat unaware of the various turmoil with student and university leadership. Though diminished by recent events and general sentiments, Warren Tech students enjoy a level of power in their institution.

The diminished power of current students does not eclipse their potential or the very real impact of former students and alumni. The tradition of activism and civic engagement has propelled alumni who are active in their institution. Warren Tech alumni have enjoyed a long-term presence on the Board of Trustees. Leadership from the local alumni association submits public comment at every Board of Trustees and Board of Governors meeting, including those I observed. As many as 30 alumni are visible and present in the institution's bright colors at every Board of Governors meeting. Alumni are avid fans of the university's band and athletics. Warren Tech alumni are known for their pride in alma mater, and for their expansive network of support. The national alumni association documents show the membership boasts a high and spirited enrollment. Though typically reactive, alumni rally to the support of their institution in a number of ways. In recent years, they have rallied to create a successful scholarship campaign to counter student debt and increase retention. Like students, alumni were active voices in each presidential transition. Alumni have run a popular blog with almost daily posts on university matters for over 10 years. As the faculty are deeply committed to students and the institution, Warren Tech alumni are deeply loyal to their faculty mentors and the institution's mission. Indeed, alumni wield a unique sense of power and influence within the institution.

Case Summary

This chapter described the influence of performance-based funding on the internal and external power relationships of one public, four-year HBCU. It is important to understand the context of both the institution and the state in the case. I started the case description with the context of the state in order to contextualize the broader context of

the state's adoption and implementation of the policy. The case and its subsequent analysis must be centered in an understanding of race and power and how they have shaped the current policy environment. Race is a key contributor to the power relationship between the state and Warren Tech. The state was oppressive to Black and Native American peoples. In accordance with Critical Race Theory, the state institutionalized race, property, and oppression in its system of higher education at the outset, chartering three separate institutions for white men, white women, and Black residents. Initially, Warren Tech could only offer basic primary, secondary, and vocational education. This ongoing racism continued through segregation policies well after *Brown vs. Board*, and subjugating Warren Tech with inequitable funding, denying graduate programs, and shutting valuable programs. Despite these impediments, Warren Tech grew rapidly in the 1970s and began conferring doctoral degree programs in 1980s, and experienced decades of stable, capable leadership. The vestiges of state racism and oppression persisted in the early 2000s, when the Republican governor banned affirmative action at public colleges and universities. At the same time, the state consolidated all public four-year institutions under a State University System, governed by a Board of Governors. No Warren Tech alumni have ever been appointed to the Board of Governors, and there has only been one Black member appointed to the Board of Governors during the duration of performance-based funding. This racialized history contributes to the biases and oversights in the performance-based funding policy.

The complex policy changes frequently and has major equity concerns. The policy takes much needed funding from every institution, despite major differences in their respective budgets, nonpublic funding, and endowments. Punitive measures mean

institutions can meet the minimum score *and* improve their scores from the last year, and still only receive their *base* allocation. This has consistently happened to Warren Tech three of the five years performance-based funding has been allocated. Because of Warren Tech's dependence on the public funds, the institution is vulnerable to fluctuations in state funding, especially given biases and blind spots in the performance-based funding formula. This has certainly complicated the responsibilities of Warren Tech's leadership.

Warren Tech's Board of Trustees is a key aspect of the power relationship between the institution and the state. The governor has appointed two former state staffers from his administration. The Board of Governors has made other power plays such as appointing a special liaison between Warren Tech and the Board of Governors. This liaison- the only such appointment in the state- wrote an op-ed for a local newspaper which many Warren Tech stakeholders found problematic, and attended a Warren Tech faculty senate meeting of to discuss performance-based funding. Warren Tech regains some power in the state-university relationship because of three state representatives and one state senator who are Warren Tech alumni. Warren Tech's state representative and city mayor are both alumni. Other alumni show up to Board of Governors meeting and lobby their state legislators to support their alma mater.

Alumni are important players inside the institution as well, holding multiple leadership roles. One alumnus president left a powerful legacy after leading for more than 15 years, and advocating for the university for decades more. His growth of enrollment, facilities, and public and private funding fostered high trust and approval from students, faculty, administrators, and alumni. After his tenure ended, the university experienced years of transition, tension, and intervention by the state. The current Board of Trustees

and the current president seem to enjoy a positive relationship. This is reflected by the faculty, who have confidence in one of their own. This is important, as faculty hold power and authority throughout the institution. Finally, though Warren Tech students have a legacy of activism and civil disobedience against state level decisions and policies, participants perceived a decrease in the power of students and the authority of their elected representatives since the advent of the Board of Trustees. This decrease is exacerbated by transition and turmoil in the student body leadership, which many believe was orchestrated by a former president.

All of this context is important in understanding the case of the HBCU and its state policy context. When studying state finance, it is important to understand how it is influenced by history, culture, politics, and economics (McGuinness, 2011). This chapter sets the foundation for sharp and in-depth analysis. This cohesive narrative of the case grounds the findings in the purpose of the case: understanding how performance-based funding influences power relationships between an HBCU and the state, and inside an HBCU.

CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS

The purpose of this case study was to explore how performance-based funding influences power relationships inside a public four-year HBCU, understand how performance-based funding influences power relationships between an HBCU and its state, and examine how theory explains the changes taking place within an HBCU and between an HBCUs and its state. The case entails one HBCU's internal and campus relationships and the institution's external policy context of state entities that influence performance-based funding, including policymakers and their advisors, state higher education staff, higher education experts and consultants, other universities in the state, and intermediaries like foundations and advocacy organizations.

This chapter outlines findings relating to the three research questions:

1. How does performance-based funding influence power relationships between a public HBCU and its state?
2. How does performance-based funding influence power relationships within a public HBCU?
3. How does theory explain the influence of performance-based funding on power relationships in this context?

The findings reported below are based on data collected in the interviews, document reviews, and observations conducted as a part of the study. Themes are organized by the research questions: findings for the first research question on the state-university relationship are reported first, followed by findings on internal power relationships for the second research question. Theory, the third research question, is infused throughout

the reportage of results by highlighting the linkages between the findings and elements of the conceptual framework.

Power Relationships Between Warren Tech and the State

The relationship between the state and the public university is unique in nature. As public entities, public universities are part of the state, and accountable to its expectations and oversight. However, given their institutional autonomy, they function as much more independent organizations than other public agencies. The state-university relationship is a function of both power and authority. Authority is gained when power is legitimized over a length of time (Pfeffer, 1981). In different ways, performance-based funding has shifted the power and authority in the state by legitimizing certain dynamics in the state-university relationship. For example, the policy engenders mistrust on both sides of the relationship. However, the onus must be rightly placed with the state as the creator and implementer of the policy. These findings reveal performance-based funding limits the institution's autonomy. Further, performance-based funding acts as an obstacle in the state-university relationship itself, obstructing the entities abilities to connect and work together. These and other factors incite fear and insecurity at Warren Tech about the institution's future. Finally, notable power strongholds such as other institutions slant the power relationships between in the state-university relationship. On the whole, performance-based funding complicates and impedes the state-university relationship. The sections below describe these changes at Warren Tech.

Performance-Based Funding Engenders Mistrust

Study participants characterized the state-university relationship in a wide range from adversarial to neutral to positive. The discovery here is not in the assessment of the

relationship, but in which elements of the relationship had been influenced by performance-based funding. Throughout the study, data showed a long-term trend of mistrust between the state and the institution based on historic events described in Chapter 4. The design and implementation of the policy extend and exacerbate existing feelings of skepticism among Warren Tech stakeholders. This mistrust takes the form of skepticism towards the state, and suspicion of racism in the state's intentions. The institutional stakeholders' suspicion of racism in the state-university relationship predated performance-based funding, but the uncertainty in the model also engendered new mistrust about the state's motives.

Multiple alumni who serve in different capacities inside and outside of the institution were similarly suspicious of performance-based funding as an extension of racist policies and beliefs. As Quinn Evans, one alum who is now a faculty member and graduate student expressed,

We all know the game, like, there's a reason why education is delegated to the states as opposed to it being a federal issue. So, when you leave education up to the state, then it's almost like "coded speech." When you hear states' rights, you know what that means. And it's the same situation with the performance-based funding. You can look at any list, you're always gonna see [other state institutions] situated ahead of Warren Tech.

Here, they express a key sentiment shared by other alumni: a suspicion that performance-based funding is coded language of white supremacist notions. Sam Perry, an alum who attended one of the Board of Trustees meetings noted, "I don't think the relationship has changed. It may be more cordial, because no one's using the 'n' word but, at the end of

the day, the results are the same.” Sam’s mistrust relates to the language used and also to the intentions of the entire policy. Sam noted,

You can make something seem benign, and that it’s not connected to race, but it still has an impact. And that’s what’s happening now. They’ve become very sophisticated, so you can’t say anything against race. That’s why everybody gotta do it. But it impacts the person that doesn’t have much from the start in life.

Addison Brown, an alum who serves in the state legislature, expressed similar sentiments, “It’s straight-up institutionalized racism! And racist ideas now form to justify where the money goes. Most racist ideas don’t just come out of nowhere. They’re a means to justify why you do something, and why you don’t do stuff.” This skepticism about the state’s intentions for performance-based funding is also a result of the changing nature of the model.

Based on this case, it could be posited that mistrust is inevitable in a model built on nonrecurring monies, which can fluctuate widely from one year to the next. Reese Hall, a lead staff member in the Board of Governors’ staff office, agreed that Chief Financial Officers at the institutions across the state expressed,

several issues, but the biggest one is the funds are non-recurring for them because you only get them for one year. That constant struggle between whether or not you’re going to be in the money or not is a concern.

Sydney Wright, a senior administrator, echoed this from the institution’s perspective,

We received it one year but the other years we haven’t received it. Then the year that we did receive it, you don’t get it the next year. As a result, it’s caused us to

not base what we do on receiving it. If you received it, it becomes the add-on, but our goals are made more along the lines of assuming that we're not going to get it.

The changing nature of the system and its precarious impact makes the institution skeptical of the policy's overall purpose. This mistrust is compounded because the state's model is particularly volatile. As Sydney noted, "It can change multiple times during the year. It can change in the middle of the actual cycle. There is no stability." Since implementation, the state has changed multiple metrics, score calculations, and the number of possible points. With this, institutions' scores can fluctuate greatly year to year. In addition to the actual scores, their allocation can also fluctuate depending on other institutions' performance. Peyton, a senior administrator, described this tension and questioned the utility of the entire model,

The one thing I always ask myself because of the process, is I always say it's not clear to me that they really know what the goal of the model is. It's called a performance funding model. So, it's intended to incentivize and reward improvement. But when I look at what actually is happening, there are many cases where improvement is not rewarded. Or, in some years, a school will perform worse than they did the previous year and still get performance funding. For example, in 2018-2019, Warren Tech increased its score by seven points over- the highest growth of any institution, but because of the punitive measures, they received no new dollars outside of their base funding. Thus, the constant changes to the policy make the institution mistrust the state's intentions.

The model and its related processes increase mistrust and frustration on both sides of the state-university power relationship, impeding the ability of the entities to work

together. The mistrust is also felt by the state. On the state side, mistrust manifested as skepticism towards the institution. In addition to the direct allocations, the Board of Governors members and staff base other decisions on the institution's performance in the metrics. During meetings, Board of Governors members questioned Warren Tech's abilities to sustain programs multiple times. Finance staff believe that what they perceive to be the institution's lackluster performance in the metrics is also a factor in why the state continues to deny loans, allocations, and other funding to the institution. At the state board meeting I attended, the Board of Governors denied a new doctoral program, recommending the university focus on licensure passage rates before expanding. Outside of the official, public meetings the private process of performance-based funding also is also shrouded in mistrust.

Each year, institutions try to influence the changes through conversations with the Board of Governors staff and with state legislators. Changes to one particular metric created mistrust not just for the way the metric was changed but also the timing and manner of the change. The metric in question addressed the number of Pell-eligible undergraduate students enrolled at each institution. Since the inception of the performance-based funding model, Warren Tech has performed well in this area. One year, the state changed the language and the calculation of the metric from the number of Pell recipients enrolled to the percentage of Pell recipients who graduate. This changes the metric, and thus the entire model, in a way that allowed other institutions to gain more points, while Warren Tech's prospects stayed the same. As Peyton Edwards, an administrator explained,

Now it was the percentage of your Pell recipients who graduated. Therefore [the flagship] could have only 10 Pell recipients, but they'll graduate all those 10, so they get all the points. So, we want to change that metric. It wasn't going to go well with him. So, we backed off. Instead, we came up with some language. [A state senator] asked me what I thought. Well the Chancellor thought that we were going behind his back and drafting legislation for the senator. The session was over, but they did some punitive stuff [to Warren Tech].

Thus, mistrust manifests on both sides of the state-university relationship. As Sam Perry, an active local alum noted, "We acknowledge it on both sides, the Board of Governors and Warren Tech. We cannot paint a pretty picture when there is no pretty picture."

Fortunately, there were efforts to ameliorate the mistrust between the state and institution. One administrator noted that the Board of Governors' chair's appointment of another member of the Board of Governors as a liaison to the university allowed that person to understand Warren Tech's mission and provide an opportunity to rebuild the relationship between the administration and the Board of Governors. Many interviewees- from administrators, Board of Governors staff, alumni, and students- expressed hope and confidence in the new president and their ability to repair the state-university relationship. Casey Miller, a senior administrator and alum shared,

I think a lot of members of the Board of Governors are really, really perceptive that the Board of Trustees at Warren Tech selected this president. I think [the president] is a very articulate, very forward-thinking person who understands that at the end of the day we have to abide by the rules and regulations that are set by the Board of Governors as far as moving our university forward. And I think that

when he has issues or questions, he has no problems calling up the Board of Governors for a thorough explanation about what's going on and they'll listen to what other institutions are doing.

Casey's reflection shows the potential for trust in the future, and speaks to the role of the institution's communication with the Board of Governors and the special liaison, a controversial figure in the state-university relationship and the balance of autonomy and accountability.

Performance-Based Funding Upsets the Balance of Institutional Autonomy and Accountability

The state-university relationship is a careful balance of institutional autonomy and accountability to the state. The literature shows that states typically offer institutions increased autonomy in exchange for increased accountability on performance and outcomes. This case reveals something different. Instead, the state has increased accountability and decreased autonomy, upsetting the balance of the state-university relationship and exacerbating the mistrust described above. Specifically, the policy limits the institution's ability to act autonomously within its HBCU mission. This has an influence on the autonomy throughout the hierarchy of authority from the Board of Trustees down to the administration, faculty, and students.

With the implementation of performance-based funding, the Board of Governors assumed new authority and increased power over the institution through strategic appointments to Warren Tech's Board of Trustees as evidenced by interviews and institutional documents. As described in Chapter 4, in recent years, the governor has appointed multiple trustees who formerly served in as gubernatorial staff or Board of

Governors office staff. This political influence opens Warren Tech up to an increased level of influence by the state on its Board of Trustees. In the past, the institution has shown animosity to former trustees who were seen as too loyal to the Republican governors and their agendas. Unlike the feelings toward other changes, the sentiment toward this particular change to the relationship between the state and institution is generally positive. These gubernatorial allies are respected by administrators and fellow trustees as assets and advocates of the university. Many board members and senior administrators expressed an appreciation for the insight and insider knowledge provided by the trustee who formerly served as a staff member with Board of Governors. This particular trustee has quickly become a leader on the Board and is seen as the subject matter expert on performance-based funding.

In addition to gubernatorial allies on the Board of Trustees, the Board of Governors also appointed one of its members as a special liaison to Warren Tech. Though skeptical at first, the Board of Trustees and administration grew to appreciate this person's insight, describing the trustee as an ally and a resource. Jesse Long, a senior administrator with government experience, noted that the trustee's relationships with former employers are assets because the trustee can "put a bug in their ear". Jesse affirmed that the trustee has been a good board member and "carries the message" of Warren Tech to colleagues in the governor's office, Board of Governors, and national foundations. During Board of Trustees meetings, trustees specifically directed questions about the performance-based funding model to this trustee. Morgan Wilson also observed and affirmed the trustee's expertise on performance-based funding from his perspective as a journalist.

I think that there's a real key, a couple of real key people on the Board of Trustees who pay attention to performance-based funding, and one is [redacted], who's a former Board of Governors employee, who is very, very sharp, very sharp and very businesslike, and very questioning. She wants to see data, and she wants to see statistics, measurements, how are we doing, and we should be doing something differently there.

It must be noted that the institution's *reception* of the increase in accountability does not negate the reality of the corresponding decrease in autonomy. In this case, the appointment of each of these individuals provides additional oversight and controls. Their positions as decision makers means the state is influencing the university's substantive autonomy.

On the surface, some level of autonomy appears to be built into the performance-based funding model. Various communications from the Board of Governors note that one of the four guiding principles of the policy was to "acknowledge the unique mission of the different institutions". This exact language is used across multiple documents including one pagers, web pages, and iterations of the strategic plan. In meetings and communications like webpages, reports, and press releases, the Board of Governors maintains that the performance-based funding policy acknowledges the unique missions of the state institutions through the Board of Trustees Choice Metric. Like the commitment to acknowledge missions in and of itself, this metric is only minimally conducive to institutional autonomy.

First, the choice metric is but one of 10 metrics which the policy measures, clearly siphoning the institution's substantive autonomy. This exemplifies the policy's

fundamental partiality toward the state. Second, this study reveals that there is less autonomy in the choice metric than assumed or implied. A general description of this metric provided in the 2018 informational overview document is, “Each Board of Trustees has chosen a metric from the remaining metrics in the University Work Plans that are applicable to the mission of that university and have not been previously chosen for the model.” However, administrators and trustees both describe pressure and influence from the state in choosing the metric. Avery Benjamin, a longtime trustee, described how the process for changing metrics and identifying the Board of Governors choice metric actually inhibit the institution’s autonomy because both processes allow the state to bend the will of the institution:

I think the state has gotten even more involved because, clearly, they are the setter and evaluator of the metric. We have to, then, negotiate with them on any changes to the metric, as well as the choice metric that each institution gets to choose. The state also has to approve that choice metric. I think it’s given the state even more purview into specifically what we’re doing on each university’s campus. It also has given the state an opportunity to normalize the types of things that each university work on the top.

Thus, state support for institutional autonomy in the performance-based funding is espoused but not realized or supported. Further, this finding reveals that autonomy is not consistent across institutions, marginalizing Warren Tech in the application of the metrics. This marginalization is compounded by the institution’s lack of autonomy to advocate in the state-university relationship. As Patton (2016) asserts, “Higher education

is not only a racist system, but one mediated by class and status of various institutions” (p. 332).

Institutional autonomy awards an institution “freedom from external intervention and control” (McGuinness, 2011, p. 145). In the case of Warren Tech and its state policy context, we see a lack of both of these components. First, leaders at the institution perceive that performance-based funding has allowed the state to exert more power and control over the institution. Avery Benjamin, a trustee, shared, “I think the state has gotten even more involved because, clearly, they are the setter and the evaluator of the metrics.” While the state would counter that some autonomy is built in to the design of the model with the choice metric, it is important to note that this is one of 10 metrics. Board members and administrators both described how even this perceived choice is controlled by the Board of Governors. “We have to negotiate the choice metric. The state also has to approve that choice metric. I think it’s given the state even more purview into specifically what we’re doing on each university’s campus”, Avery surmised. Peyton Edwards noted how institutional diversity is unrecognized and penalized by performance-based funding:

We have different types of institutions. We have the research institutions. We have a good liberal arts institution. We’re an HBCU. And then you have the regional institutions. The choice metric doesn’t really speak to the mission. You can pick your own mission, but I don’t think many, if any of them, speak to those differences I just talked about in terms of being a research institution or being a regional. So, it’d be different if you said okay, you can pick a metric that has to do

with your national rating within your category. As an HBCU, that would be fantastic. There's some choice, but it's not autonomy.

The board's relationship with the institution can be seen as an avenue for increasing the state's control and decreasing the institution's autonomy. This finding was presented in interviews with senior administrators, in discussions during board meetings, and in documents such as the Board of Trustees meeting minutes, reports, and materials, as well as institutional materials. Peyton Edwards works with the board in his role. He described the board's increased input and intervention as directly related to the Board of Governors.

What I've seen with the trustees and the Board of Governors, is that the Board of Governors has really gotten a lot more influential over the last several years. I mean, they really have evolved to where they really are dictating what happens. And I'm not saying that's a bad thing. Because they set the goals and they really got the schools to align with the direction they want to go. So, I don't have a problem with any of that when it's done well. It's just when it goes wrong, it's not good.

Peyton described this as a positive and needed change for Warren Tech,

because you have more scrutiny and more guidance in terms of where the institution should go. It's a good thing, compared to not having that structure. But if you go back several years back now, there have been times where many people felt it was not good for us. But what I see is you really need to have some structure and oversight for the institution, and you need a group that's going to chart the path.

Thus, the increase to power in itself is not inherently or even predominantly a negative attribute. While they would not characterize it as an increase in the state's power, state Board of Governors staff certainly eschewed performance-based funding's increase in oversight and accountability for the institution. In all, the increased power of the state has brought increased involvement by the state.

Performance-Based funding Constricts the Institution's Communication with the State

In this study, the primary resources in question are the funds the university desires to gain through the performance-based funding model. The findings of the study show that performance-based funding limits the institution's ability to secure funding from the state, as well as the institution's ability to secure an audience with the state. As described in the case in Chapter 4, the relationship between the state and the institution has been tense. As Kendall Campbell, an external consultant, who has worked with both the state and the institution on various projects reflected, "From my perspective Warren Tech has always been late to the table." Across the board, interviewees described the relationship between the state and the institution as limited in scope, quantity, and quality. Data analysis shows that performance-based funding has only served to exacerbate these limitations and limit Warren Tech's already constrained communication with the state by diminishing its voice in the performance-based funding process and its bargaining power with the state legislature.

Perhaps the most pronounced barrier to communication with the state is the perceived lack of understanding of Warren Tech's mission and institutional context as an HBCU. Alumni, administrators, journalists, and students alike agreed that the state had

little “understanding or appreciation” of HBCUs, as evidence by the history of racism and oppression in the state. In fact, many believed that the state had a negative perception of the institution that was only worsened by performance-based funding. Pat Collins, a Warren Tech administration who works with the state, observed,

They seem to associate or think there’s a correlation between low-income and low academic performance. Nothing is farther from the truth. As the president says, our students don’t have academic problems, they have economic challenges because they’re working and they’re trying to balance. That’s what people fail to see.

This aligns to Patton’s (2016) assertion that “racial signifiers” and racially coded language is used to connote HBCUs’ inferiority. Warren Tech administrator Peyton Edwards said “Trying to be objective, I do believe that there’s just not a lot of appreciation and understanding.” Kendall Campbell, a policy consultant who assisted multiple states design and improve their performance-based funding policies assessed, “I don’t think that the policies were created with really very much respect for that history or mission at all.” Minutes from Board of Governors meetings support this perception. Board of Governors members’ lack of awareness is evident in pedestrian questions about the HBCU designation such as how many white students Warren Tech can attract while maintaining HBCU status. Here, the Board of Governors member suggests the institution should attract more white students in order to have higher scores in the performance-based funding model. Performance-based funding only exacerbates the lack of understanding of the HBCU mission. Without understanding the institution’s unique context, the state cannot fairly measure and reward its progress. One student leader noted,

It's kind of hard to relate to something that you've never kind of been a part of. They can't relate to a number of things such as being black in America or trying to find jobs as a black person or get an education as a black person. They don't really understand the importance of a school such as Warren Tech and other HBCU's. Because of that, I think that's why you see a kind of disregard for the university.

Here, the student refers directly to the metrics, which measure the number of graduates who are employed after graduation. This example demonstrates the general is one of many wherein the performance-based funding policy increases accountability without regard for the unique mission of HBCUs. Here, the concerns about a lack of Black representation are echoed and pronounced.

As Morgan Wilson, a local journalist so aptly put it, "Warren Tech doesn't have a strong advocate on the Board of Governors. If you look at the makeup there, it is all white, all very wealthy people appointed from business, government, and investment companies or real estate companies or health care companies." Because Board of Governors members are gubernatorial appointments, the lack of representation also weakens the relationship and communication with the state at an executive level. As Pat Collins, an administrator with government experience, observed,

I think it's a shame that our governor didn't think enough of African Americans to appoint an African American to the Board of Governors. To keep an African American on the Board of Governors. The one Black person, who was on the Board of Governors, was asked to serve on our board. That was by design, so that

there wouldn't have representation. There's nobody that carries our message for us. There's nobody on the board that will stand up for Warren Tech.

With performance-based funding, the lack of diversity on the board weakens Warren Tech's representation in conversation. As described in Chapter 4, there are only three people of color on the 14-member Board of Governors, none of whom are Black.

Concerns about a lack of representation have been present since the implementation of performance-based funding. As one trustee, Jay Bryant, said with sureness, "Obviously, we didn't go into the design." The lack of representation was perceived as an intentional racist obstruction put in place for Warren Tech. Interviewees believed performance-based funding was deliberately enacted on a board with no Black representation in order to silence the institutions. Kendall Campbell, an external consultant who has worked with both the state and the institution on various projects affirmed this perception. When asked if Warren Tech was at the table during the implementation of performance-based funding, Kendall reflected,

I'm not sure if the branch was extended to them. And it's typical of what I see in some other places. HBCUs find out after the deal has gone down instead of helping to shape the deal. When things get redeveloped, they're typically not redeveloped for us.

The design, implementation, and calculation of the metrics suggests that the state does not understand the HBCU mission, the students they serve, and how those factors can place Warren Tech at a disadvantage in the overall performance-based funding model and allocation. Reagan Green, a student leader, reiterated this sentiment:

So, with PWIs and the different factors that are held, and just seeing that they always, at the end of the day, get way more funding, it's like, "Okay, you guys don't even care at this point as a state to try to make this HBCU on a better playing field. You think that it's okay for the lowest ranked schools to still receive zero funding. You're funding millions of dollars into these top institutions just because you think they're performing better. When in all actuality you have to consider population. You have to consider the different dynamics and just the factors of how children were raised that are coming to HBCUs. You have to think about their personal financial situations. And then you have to even think about: "Well, why aren't these students then completing school? What are the different social and economic factors that are taking place in their households that are actually happening that are pushing them away from school?"

Many interviewees' beliefs about the state's motive for this ranged from setting the university up to fail in the performance-based funding metrics, setting the university up for closure or merger, engineering performance-based funding to benefit other institutions, and limiting Warren Tech's ability to influence the implementation and changes to the performance-based funding model.

Findings support the latter belief about limiting the institution's ability to influence the performance-based funding model, namely through relationships with the state legislature and political factions. Jay Bryant, a trustee who has prior experience working with the state said, "I think performance funding itself is involving, and is not a bad policy direction. I just think that our policy makers aren't as understanding of the nuance to be able to be thoughtful in implementation." Thus, some of the same

challenges presented with Board of Governors members. Addison Brown, an alum and state legislator, described the difficulty he endured trying to “educate people, and literally change the conversation” with peers in the legislature about Warren Tech and performance-based funding. “They don’t understand the dynamics,” they said, “You’d be amazed what people didn’t know.” Just as there was limited representation of Warren Tech on the Board of Governors, there is limited representation of Warren Tech in the state legislature as well, with fewer than five alumni in the state house and senate. A reflection by Kelsey Martin, a national journalist on HBCU issues best sums up this finding:

Every time...the headline in the local paper is Warren Tech is last in performance-based funding or Warren Tech misses additional funding. For the people who aren’t really nuanced students of higher education, they just think Warren Tech is failing. That’s a bad move for improvement, it’s a bad move for philanthropic outreach, and it’s a bad move for legislative outreach, because even those folks who are in the state capital who care about Warren Tech, it’s hard for them to go to their peers in state legislature and say, “Hey, we worked on this project for you. Can you guys do something for Warren Tech?” When it’s so easy for their staffers to reference well, “What about this story? What do you have to say about that?” There’s really not context.

While the critique of communication with the Board of Governors focused on the lack of Black representatives, it also included Warren Tech’s role in doing more to foster goodwill. Students in particular noted Warren Tech could do more. One student leader reflected,

We don't have a lot of students civically engaged. We're not gonna make any type of change in the university, outside the university, at the Capitol lobbying.

Because of the in-house problems, nine times out of 10 we won't see the changes we want to see within performance-based funding.

Kendall Campbell, a policy consultant, provided a parallel to this issue at the administrative level.

I don't think that Warren Tech developed the kind of relationships and alliances on both sides of the aisle that's needed in today's political environment because quite frankly, political decisions get made about higher education and that's not going to change and that's the case in all states. I think it's incumbent upon HBCUs to develop relationships on both sides especially in this state where Republicans control the purse strings and the policies related to those purse strings. And I think there's greater recognition of that now.

In all, interviewees' discussion of partisanship often linked directly to discussions of other institutions. This linked directly to another finding on power relationships and race within the State University System discussed in the next section.

Performance-Based Funding Reveals Power Strongholds

Throughout the analysis, two entities emerged as loci of power within the case. These entities each overly influence the relationship between Warren Tech and the state. In essence, the establishment and administration of performance-based funding has illuminated the presence of strongholds of power in the state-university relationship. These strongholds serve as bastions of power which amass control in the relationship between the state and the institution. In this study, neither of the two current strongholds

of power are internal to Warren Tech, such as the president or an administrator, or a body like the Board of Trustees or the faculty senate. In this case, the two strongholds are the Board of Governors, and two other institutions designated by the state as distinguished. While the case entails the university and its policy context, this analysis shows how the policy context includes other institutions because of their connections to policymaking, board representation, and influence on the performance-based funding policy.

The Board of Governors. The Board of Governors is a powerful tool of the state's control and influence. They have primarily exerted this power over the State University System using the strategic plan. As one administrator opined, "Everything needs to support the Board of Governors' strategic planning." This analysis shows how the goals, tactics, and even specific language in the strategic plan have influenced Warren Tech, from board meetings to faculty senate meetings to Warren Tech's own strategic plan. As Kendall Campbell, a local consultant who helped with Warren Tech's strategic plan observed,

Performance-based funding has had a tremendous influence on the strategic plan.

In fact, the performance-based funding was a part of just about every discussion we had about strategic priorities and goals and the extent to which they align with the metrics.

The influence of the Board of Governors on the state relationship between the state and the institution can be seen from the top down, starting with the institutional Board of Trustees. Much time at the Board of Trustees' own meetings is dedicated discussion of the Board of Governors' strategic plan. The Board of Trustees' the president's goals from

the institutional Board of Trustees are also explicitly tied to the state performance-based funding metrics from the Board of Governors.

The Board of Governors has utilized strategic planning for many years, however, it was the intervention of performance-based funding that pushed Warren Tech to adhere to this plan so strictly. As Morgan Wilson observed, “Performance-based funding prompted a serious cultural change at Warren Tech under the trustees and the new Board of Trustees. The university has really become laser focused on goal setting and coming up with a strong strategic plan.” Morgan pointed to the university’s focus on hiring new and more faculty, particularly in STEM positions and departments as additional examples of the power of the strategic plan. Morgan stressed this as a much-needed “change of culture” at Warren Tech, saying,

It was an overwhelming drive for student success as an overall goal, which meant hiring more counselors, hiring more faculty, trying to work on reducing the student to professor ratio, putting measures into place measures to improve the graduation rate.

As Morgan pointed out, data collection and analysis revealed many changes to the administration and its process for planning and decision making.

The influence of the Board of Governors is evident in the administration’s plans and processes. In 2017, the university combined various units into one office of Strategic Planning, Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness under a new vice president. Statements and minutes reveal the office and position were created to meet and excel in the performance-based funding metrics. The office established a new strategic plan deeply rooted in the performance-based funding metrics. The institution’s former strategic plan,

a 15-page document, made no mention of metrics and have no numeric or percentage-based goals. The institution's strategic plan is directly tied to the performance-based funding metrics, using the same terminology for Warren Tech's goals. Performance-based funding has clearly influenced the institution's strategic planning process and document. At more than 70 pages long, the plan itself is more measured, and includes more measurements. There are over 130 mentions of metrics, and 18 key performance indicators. Parker Clark, an administrator described how the university was at first caught off guard by the performance-based metrics. In Parker's view, Warren Tech did not at first realize how critical rankings in the metrics would be. "I just think that we need to step up our game. We need to be more involved at every aspect of what goes on," Parker said. "We've created a new division here at the university... they want to make sure that we are doing the best we can when it comes to these numbers, because that's our lifeblood. I think it's paying off." Here again, we see that while this is an intrusion and increase in the state's power, stakeholders at the institution admit it has some utility and positive impacts.

As, Frances, a former student body president reflected,

I think it's important for us not to always get so defensive... if you look at how everything is designed, it is pretty standard. There may be some kinks and things that need to be worked out, things that need to be addressed because it is a new system. I think it's really important for us to acknowledge that there may be some unfair components of it, but also see it as an opportunity to improve upon some things that we are probably already doing wrong in the first place.

In this instance, Warren Tech was able to invest in a new strategic plan by including various stakeholder groups in the strategic planning process. Instead of viewing it as an intrusion from the state, some stakeholders repositioned it as a university output. Adrian Smith, one alum who joined the Warren Tech staff during the strategic planning process reflected on how important and appreciated it was for the Board of Trustees to involve students, staff, and alumni in the process.

The strategic plan document is so intense. I know it's all tied to the Board of Governors and performance-based funding but it still feels it's like ours. It was developed by us. It gives you something to look forward to. If we focus on that, I hope we'd reap the rewards- even if they are intrinsic like just knowing we're doing something for us.

This process allowed an opportunity for positive visibility for the president and other leaders, fostering some goodwill toward the metrics. As Adrian reflected, "If you just really subscribe to what this document is trying to get us to do, it takes the worry or anything else off of the performance-based funding. That's when you feel motivated to make it happen." By including the voices of stakeholders alongside the words of the Board of Governors, the university was able to foster goodwill and commitment toward the strategic plan. In effect, found a way to tap into the some of the state's power- the Board of Governors' strategic plan- while still adhering to its goals. This is not the situation for the other power stronghold in the SUS: two PWIs favored by the state.

Distinguished institutions. In 2013, the state legislature designated two PWIs as *distinguished institutions*. The special designation brought upwards of \$15 million in funding annually for each institution. The decision to literally distinguish these

institutions from others affirms Patton's (2016) assertion that "the language used to reference different institutional types is racially coded where 'elite and selective' mean White and wealthy" (p. 331). Along with Warren Tech, the two institutions are the oldest in the state. After the Civil War, one institution was originally sanctioned one for white women, and the other was sanctioned for white women. The former, "Neighbor State University" (Neighbor State) became coed soon after, and the latter, "Flagship State University" (Flagship State) became the state's flagship institution. The two distinguished institutions' also boast the largest endowments in the state, with the flagship's coffers exceeding \$1 billion. Performance-based funding demonstrates the power stronghold of the two distinguished institutions by illuminating the influence they hold in the state's relationships with other institutions in the SUS. While not always at the top of the performance-based funding rankings, the two distinguished institutions typically have the biggest allocations each year because the performance-based funding allotment is a portion of the overall budget. Just as the two institutions seem to dominate the resources in the state, they also dominate the power. The two distinguished institutions are such strongholds of power in the state that their impact is felt in other institution's relationships with the state; in this case, Warren Tech's.

Warren Tech has commonalities with both of the institutions. Both Warren Tech and the flagship are land-grant universities, while Warren Tech and the second institution share a small city. Both of these similarities make for instinctive comparison points with Warren Tech, as demonstrated by Quinn Evans, an instructor who is also a current Warren Tech doctoral student and alum noted, "Just being around the corner from a predominantly white institution, that's the main comparison right there. And there's

obviously a vast difference in performance-based funding.” Performance-based funding serves to exacerbate these long-standing comparisons. Students in particular felt the sting of the proximity to the distinguished institution, especially given the institution’s ongoing improvements and expansion to the institution “across the tracks”. One student provided reflected:

Students are livid when we see what’s going on across the tracks, honestly.

Because it’s just like, oh they’re a PWI, I guess they have the money. Certain projects that they’ll get done in, I want to say, not even three months. You’ll see a building or a program go up in seconds at [Neighbor State]. And then we’re stuck looking at a building that has been proposed for a couple years now, and we’re still breaking ground.

Students offered valuable insight into the discrepancies in funding and approvals for buildings at the two neighboring institutions. While the PWI is able to rely on its endowment and external support, Warren Tech relies heavily on state funding and loans. With its volatility and uncertainty, performance-based funding not only strips away much needed funding, it also makes it difficult to plan for new projects.

The students were able to draw this connection between the distinguished institution and the performance-based funding. After scanning Twitter for comments on Warren Tech and performance-based funding, I reached out to Amari Peterson, a journalism student who offered rich insight. Amari shared,

We live in a food desert, and you see how we live compared to the [Neighbor State’s] side- it’s a gentrified area. All the white people were living real lavish. So, when you see the difference, it’s kind of, like, it’s a slap in the face. It’s really

telling with the way that we fight for our school and how we're trying to change a lot of things, and they just go to [Neighbor State] and everything is pretty much set in stone. The board is forgetting that we're fighting just for basic acknowledgement. Like, hey, you're giving us nothing and you still expect us to perform on a metrics with everybody else who is getting nine million?

Here, the student brings in a helpful addendum: gentrification. Against the backdrop of performance-based funding, the changing landscape of the limited space between the institutions is a reminder of the neighboring institution's power in the city and the state.

The gentrification of the previously majority Black neighborhoods around Warren Tech is a direct result of the power of Neighbor State. This has direct relation to Patton's (2016) Critical Race Theory, wherein,

Gentrification allows more White, affluent, educated people to encroach on and displace low-income and racially marginalized communities, shifting everything from racial demographics, education, and housing options. Where higher education is concerned, several institutions, especially those located in urban areas, have used their power and money to displace and dislocate communities of color over the years (p.330).

This was an unexpected but very frequent insight from stakeholders. It is also confirmed by Neighbor State's expansion plans and documents submitted for state meetings. Aubrey Jones, a former Warren Tech president, provided additional insight into the expansion. "Neighbor State is doing micro business stuff around campus. They're building, actually providing seed capital to businesses all around the perimeter of their campus." This further supports the institution's stronghold in the state. With the financial safety net and

support of their endowment, Neighbor State is not dependent on performance-based funding. With this freedom, they can literally design the community to serve their institution and students. Without financial stability and backing, Warren Tech is unable to protect its interests, or that of the community around them.

Within the two distinguished institutions, there is one particular force that backs the stronghold: the president of Neighbor State. This president is the only external person identified by name, by multiple interviewees other than current and governor, Board of Governors members, and state legislator. This is underscored and understood given their relationships and power in the state. As a former state legislator, political party leader, and colleague of the governor, this president is well respected by the state and much of the public. As a campaign sponsor and fundraiser for the governor, they have a direct line to the executive office. Appointed without any prior higher education experience, the president has used political fundraising experience to the great benefit of the institution. This skill earned him praise from Warren Tech stakeholders, including a former student leader who said,

I will give it their president, that man is a hell of a fundraiser. When you look at it, the president has one job: that is to fundraise and to cultivate those relationships and be the face and the voice of the university. It's up to you to build a stellar leadership team that can do the rest. He don't have time to stress. He don't have time to be bothered. That's one job and he gets it done. We lack in that area.

In comparison, the student leader reflected on Warren Tech's current president taking late night meeting with state legislators and testifying at committee meetings, where Neighbor

State's president was not expected to appear as often. Again, the proximity makes easy fodder for direct comparison between the two leaders. Morgan Wilson, a local journalist offered this comparison of how each of the leaders interact in Board of Governors meetings:

Warren Tech's president is viewed as a somewhat reserved, compassionate, and somewhat meek leader. He's very smart, very well respected on campus, he shows up everywhere, he wants to support everyone, from the faculty to students to the maintenance staff there, you know what I mean. Neighbor State's president walks in the Board of Governors meetings, kinda daring them to challenge him, and when they do challenge him, he is not afraid to speak up and say, 'Well wait a minute. Don't blame, or don't criticize. That was my decision. And if you got an issue with that, you come to me on that.' He speaks up. Warren Tech's president would be hard pressed to speak like that in a board of governors meeting.

Any suppositions about the reason Neighbor State's president is able to command such power in meetings would be conjecture. What is evident is that he is afforded flexibility and authority the president of Warren Tech is not. As Morgan reflected, "Even more germane to this case, the president holds strong relationships with their successors and former colleagues in the state legislature, where the institution is able to curry favor.

Morgan called Neighbor State's president "one of the most influential house and senate leaders that the legislature has known". He does not hold all of the influential relationships himself. As Peyton Edwards reflected,

Whether it's a Board of Governors member or staff person, they're connected to some of the bigger schools. And inherently, they want those schools to do well.

So, I think what happens is that you got this kind of dynamic that's really focused on a certain subset of schools and when you look at the performance-based funding, there is a bifurcation. The people with the influence are the big schools with the money. And the large numbers of, not just alums, but the political influence. In some of the larger urban areas. Those things are- behind closed doors- driving a lot of what happens.

Harper Anderson, former student leader mentioned the difficulty of lobbying and advocating for Warren Tech without alumni representation in the state legislature. Harper reflected on how alumni from the two distinguished universities formed powerful caucuses. In a state Senate of only 40 members, each of the institutions have approximately 10 members in their Senate caucus. Neighbor State has approximately 20 members in its House caucus. Flagship State's caucus of almost 40 members is approximately one third of the 120 members of the state House of Representatives. With this level of legislative control and influence, it is no wonder the state advantages these institutions with special designations and funding. This aligns with Patton's (2016) assertion from the Critical Race Theory perspective that higher education will remain racist because decisionmakers have been taught to uphold White supremacy by virtue of their indoctrination as college students (Patton, 2016, p. 324). As Patton (2016) writes, "The reproduction of racism occurs without much disruption because those with the power to change institutions were also educated by these institutions, meaning they graduate from their institutions and often perform their lives devoid of racial consciousness" (p. 324).

Many senior administrators and students believed the performance-based funding model was altered to optimize Neighbor State's results in the metrics, citing how the measure of low-income students was actually changed in a way that allowed institutions with fewer low-income students to gain more points. Addison Brown, a Warren Tech alum in the state legislature concurred, describing how he did not take issue with supporting state universities, or Flagship State being a prominent research institution. This grievance is with the unfair ranking of institutions that penalizes institutions, and "creates this image that this institution is inferior to this institution". Addison provided insight into the legislature's role in favoring the distinguished universities. "We created tiers from the beginning, and then, if the system doesn't work out the way we want it, we go back and change it so we can justify the allocation to the top institutions"

Peyton Edwards asserted,

Those two schools really are the drivers. The state wants them to perform well.

So, if the model is either adversely impacting them or causes them to be viewed in a negative light, history has shown there will be some changes. It's not speculation, there's some examples.

Peyton gave a specific example of seeing this in action with performance-based funding. In an exercise, all of the institutions in the State University System were split into groups and given the task of designing a new metric. During the activity, he perceived a bias toward one group over the others, and toward certain institutions in the group. "Some schools were able to propose grand changes and ideas- and there was some reception to it. But there were other schools who didn't get that latitude. You could suggest them but it had to be from certain institutions." Indeed, many thought this nepotism was

purposefully designed to favor the distinguished institutions. Notably, Warren Tech stakeholder saw and maligned the stronghold the two distinguished universities hold over not just Warren Tech, but the State University System as a whole.

You represent the whole system, but your consciousness is focused on a subset of schools, and then you try to act as if you're not biased. When they evaluate the effectiveness of the model, I don't believe they look at how it impacts all the institutions and I don't think they ask themselves if the model is serving the system well- in all schools- in the way it was designed to.

Many of these perspectives come from their own observations of the Board of Governors meetings. Peyton recalled, "So, literally, you will hear them in the meeting, say 'They've got to do well', 'We gotta make sure that they succeed.' I mean, they have no problem saying it." Harper Anderson, a student leader echoed these sentiments:

That's when I really saw through performance-based funding, we were falling behind, but it wasn't just us. It was sister institutions, such as [redacted], and [redacted]. But just seeing how the metrics are set up, it's not that Warren Tech as an HBCU cannot achieve the goals. It's just that we couldn't compete in the bracket with the premier institutions, such as Flagship State and Neighbor State.

Their reflections echo my observations of the performance-based funding discussions at the Board of Governors meeting I attended in person. The two distinguished institutions' interactions with the Board of Governors were markedly different. On one end of the spectrum, Neighbor State received a standing ovation from Board of Governors members during the meeting. On the other end of the spectrum, the leadership of Flagship State pushed back vehemently, going so far as to call the state's metric calculations wrong. The

chancellor of the State University System only intervened to correct Flagship State after the third time one of their leaders made the same misstatement about the flagship and the entire SUS. Warren Tech- and other institutions- received no such liberties or celebrations. From my observation of the meeting, they were dealt with sternly or dismissively, with one Board of Governors member harshly questioning a university president, and scolding another's growth. This finding supports the Critical Race Theory argument that, "Higher education is not only a racist system, but one mediated by class and status of various institutions" (Patton, 2016, p. 332).

In all, it is clear performance-based funding has influenced the power relationships between the institution and the state in a number of ways. The state has used tools like the Board of Governors strategic plan to shore up its stronghold on power over Warren Tech, and the State University System as a whole. Though Warren Tech succumbs to this power play, it does so in a way which builds goodwill, and admits the positive outcomes and changes this has brought to the university. While Warren Tech's relationship with the state is impeded by mistrust, powerful distinguished universities, and reduced autonomy, the institution is not without some culpability for partisanship and lax accountability before the intrusions from performance-based funding. Thus, many of the internal changes in response to performance-based funding were welcomed, especially with the administration's smart efforts to build buy-in by including stakeholders in the strategic planning process. The next section details findings on specific power relationships between Warren Tech stakeholders within the institution.

Power Relationships within Warren Tech

While the last section focused on how performance-based funding influenced the power relationships between the state and the institution, many of the examples and results were felt internally. This chapter narrows in on the particular influence of performance-based funding on power relationships within the institution. As described in the case in Chapter 4, stakeholders within Warren Tech all exercise their own forms of power. From the administration to the faculty to students and alumni, Warren Tech stakeholders in the study were all knowledgeable about the impact of performance-based funding on their relationships with other stakeholders. Unsurprisingly, the financial uncertainty within the model complicates the budget process and the relationships of units and individuals involved in university finance. Additionally, performance-based funding influences current and potential Warren Tech students' enrollment in that it influences recruitment and student financial aid.

Performance-Based Funding Increases Volatility in Campus Budgeting

A university's budget influences every individual, department, relationship, and decision on campus. Across the board, stakeholders discussed how performance-based funding impacted their budget and the budgeting process. All three administrators who work directly in budgeting and finance positions agreed that performance-based funding has impacted their unit, their responsibilities, and their ability to perform their role. Many of their specific examples pointed to the inherent volatility in the model and the fact that all funds were allocated through the model are nonrecurring, making it difficult to plan.

There were many internal frustrations with how the model's design made obtaining new funding above the base seem obscure if not totally unattainable. When participants were hopeful that changes the institution made would increase Warren

Tech's ability to garner points and status in the rankings, they were continuously dismayed. Provisions like the lowest-performers-rule prevent this from being an effective strategy that leads to reasonable results. The institution's score has either held constant or increased year to year. In two years- 2015 and 2017- they received money, in three years -2014, 2016, 2018- they did not receive money. This is reflected in Table 9. Warren Tech improved their performance and scores in 2015 and 2018, but did not receive any new performance-based funding beyond the base allocation because of the punishment for being amongst the lowest scoring institutions in the State University System. Warren Tech received funding in 2016 for improving their score, however, the increase in their score from 2017 to 2018 was even greater than that from 2015-2016 and they still did not receive funding. It is important to note that the interview with Board of Governors staff revealed and confirmed that this deprivation and uncertainty is an intentional part of the model's design. As a Board of Governors staff member explained,

When we allocated money that first year, it went into the university's base budget. So, then the next year you get a new pot of money to reallocate. So, that money would stay at the university and they wouldn't have to worry about this what if the money goes away. That first year, half of the money went to the university space, but it was decided that no, we're going to keep the rest down. They'll have to compete every year. Now, the universities have their data way before we have their data. We don't know until the data is submitted to us and throughout the fall term, and we don't start capitalizing stuff until probably the beginning of first of the year, which is several months after university already knows. And a lot of them will tell us, 'Hey, we looked at it. We think we're going to get this many

points.’ We think we’re going to be okay. What they don’t know is what their colleague is doing and how they may be.

This quotation highlights many of the university’s complaints about the constant changing nature of the performance-based funding model, starting with the first year. From the outset, performance-based funding has made it difficult for the university to budget because it has constantly changed. As Alex Johnson, an administrator, noted, “The whole process [of performance-based funding] impacts the planning. Then they changed it from 50 points to 100, so we made 60-something that year and that still wasn’t enough.” Much of the insight boiled down to the fact that performance-based funding reduced the institution’s already limited funds. As Parker said, “We should always think out of the box and beyond Z, but at the same time you have to be kind of realistic with what is possible with the money that we have.” As Quinn, an instructional faculty member who is also an alum and graduate student noted, “Inside the institution, money’s definitely tight: always waiting for the next budget to see what can be done; where funds can be allocated.” These concessions are felt by administrators and faculty alike.

Inasmuch as performance-based funding increased mistrust between the state and the institution, it has much of the same impact inside the institution. That is, the uncertainty trickles down into relationships between offices, units, and departments. Performance-based funding certainly impacts the relationships between faculty and administration. The complaint about course loads, workloads, and hiring new faculty was resonant. An entire session at the fall faculty planning institute was dedicated to a faculty workload audit. As Parker Clark, a senior administrator pointed out, “Performance-based funding was supposed to be moneys the universities received to enhance and move

forward. Well, to enhance and move forward, we need to hire faculty. Performance-based funding is annual. Its year-to-year: it's not recurring and you never know." This echoes the Board of Governors leader's explanation almost verbatim. The key difference here is how the Warren Tech administrator clearly identifies how it has impacts roles and positions at the institution. Parker continued:

Well, performance-based funding has kind of thrown a little wrinkle into what I do, because normally I could say to most of the academic units that, if anything, you will get what you got last year. However, now with the performance-based funding and the way that the funds are divvied out, [I have to say] you don't get any additional moneys. As a matter of fact, you don't get to share in any additional funding, and, in some cases, in one case with us, we actually lost some money one year.

While Parker provided the administrative side of this conversation, Andy Williams, an instructional faculty, provide the faculty perspective. Andy worked in an academic program that provide student support services. When the program's funding was not renewed, Andy believed this was related to the loss of performance-based funding that year. Andy believed that, amongst other factors, existing funding went to units and programs that could more directly help Warren Tech increase its performance in the metrics. Even though Andy and other faculty were not directly involved in the budget process like Parker, they were able to perceive a connection between the budget, performance-based funding, and their roles at the institution. Power relationships between faculty and academic units, were also addressed.

When asked if this process fostered resentment between departments or units, perspectives differed. For example, Jesse Long, an administrator, surmised that there were no arguments, because there was no money to argue over. Underscoring the finding about power strongholds, Sydney Wright, an administrator and former dean admitted that animosities between departments and units had happened and was possible. “Now, we try to make funding decisions based on the strategic plans,” Sydney said, “It’s a recognition that existing resources will be reallocated to focus on our priority at the time. That can create angst in departments if that department is not necessarily perceived as being directly related to a strategic priority area.” This extends from faculty hiring to faculty support as well. Faculty at the fall planning retreat mentioned a lack of support for conference attendance and travel. Current professor Jamie Young mentioned a need for professional development and support securing grants. Quinn, a former graduate assistant, tied the availability of graduate student support for professors to the lack of funds from performance-based funding.

Well, everything trickles down. I used to serve as a graduate assistant before I started teaching, and I used to have tuition waivers, but sometimes they’re just not available. And that’s due to the funding either disappearing or money being allocated to other priorities. And that’s not to say that those priorities aren’t more important, but if there was more money available, then maybe we could have those graduate assistantships and take care of those other priorities at the same time.

Quinn and other students were well aware of this impacted them financially. This segues to the next finding: performance-based funding limiting student possibilities with limited funding.

Performance-Based Funding Exacerbates Student Financial Difficulty

All too often, students are left out of conversations that impact their college experience from issues of access, affordability, and attainment. While there was initial skepticism by my dissertation committee of whether student would have enough knowledge and context of the performance-based funding to be worthwhile interviewees in the study, the 12 undergraduate students, graduate students, and recent graduates interviewed were all tapped into the conversation from each of their unique vantage points. This section prioritizes their perspectives as experts on their own experiences, while also including and triangulating perspectives from other stakeholders including a trustee, alumni, an administrator, and a professor.

One commonality to all of the students' perspectives was a perceived connection between the loss of performance-based funding at the institutional level and the loss of student funding at the individual level. This insight is particularly relevant for the Warren Tech context where more than two-thirds of students are from a low-income background. Some students believed the loss of performance-based funding directly related to a lack of institutional support for students. During the study, Terry Scott was one of the students I observed in an ongoing Twitter discussion when the institution's annual performance-based funding metrics and allocations were announced. Student reactions ranged from frustration to dismay to anger. When asked if the online conversations mirrored in-person discussions she'd had on the topic, Terry explained,

Some of the things I've been hearing is, "Well, if we had the funding that we needed, then more students would be able to stay in school. They would be able to pursue their degrees within the four years that we need in order to get our retention rate to the level that they need." A lot of people have the same opinion that the funding is a huge factor in how we perform, or how we're able to perform. I know, personally, students and friends of mine that can't even return after the second semester because they can't afford it, or the tuition has become too much for them, or their financial aid has decreased because of whatever reason. Those financial burdens, that's a large factor in it.

Hayden Turner was one of the students who lost an institutional scholarship, recounting, "They can't give me another chance. You know why? Because they don't have the money to do so. They are at scholarship students' necks." Hayden explained that the institutional scholarship held strict parameters which offered little to no room for grace. Hayden discusses the academic restrictions put on students.

We can't even change our majors. So, you mean to tell me once I come in as a freshman, I gotta have my whole life planned out cause if I change my major or add a minor, I'm gonna lose my scholarship? They put so many parameters on you. You can't step left wrong or you lose your scholarship.

In the tense environment of performance-based funding, the institution operates from a mindset of scarcity, holding students to unforgiving standards- just like those the system holds the institution to.

Under performance-based funding, stakeholders have a heightened awareness of student financial needs. Stakeholders are acutely aware of the student socioeconomic

dynamics in comparison to PWIs, particularly Neighbor State. One professor, Cameron Mitchell, readily provided statistics on students' family income at both institutions.

This school is different from every other school in SUS. The average family income for students here is around \$40,000. That's about 100,000 less than it is at Neighbor State. We're talking just two different classes of students, financially. And the students here, many of them, work close to full time, while trying to go to school full time. And that's just more than a lot of people can handle. So, they take extra time.

One student, Ryan King, was able to articulate the complexity of student financial aid, surmising:

Students cannot afford to go to school and they rely on the Pell Grant. But some students don't have Pell Grants and therefore when you're dealing with a student who doesn't have Pell Grant, they're only allowed to take a limited amount of classes unless they take out a loan. Whereas at Neighbor State, you can have a student who can graduate in four years on time because they didn't have to worry about money or a loan or paying rent. You have students at Warren Tech solely living off of a refund check.

In one fell swoop, Ryan has articulated the complex college affordability issues including the limitations of Pell grant funding and middle-income students who do not qualify for Pell but cannot afford college. As Pat Collins, a senior administrator, mentioned, "If the course you need isn't available, you're just taking a course to maintain your Pell eligibility. That increases indebtedness and time to degree. Students articulate that better

than I can.” Under performance-based funding, students and other stakeholders are keenly aware of the financial need and student mix of the student body.

Trustees, administrators, faculty, students, and alumni, including alumni legislators, are aware that this socioeconomic reality is germane to the mission of HBCUs and how this related to performance-based funding policy. In general, stakeholders did not believe the performance-based funding policy accounted for the HBCU mission. Both Quinn Evans, an alum, instructor, and graduate student, and Addison Brown, an alum and state legislator, related the performance-based funding model’s four-year graduation metric to student financial difficulty. As Quinn said,

Being a historically black institution, we’re taking on non-traditional student populations that might otherwise not have been accepted to school. And simultaneously these students are facing different issues, socioeconomic issues, structural issues in the family that may hamper their efforts to graduate within that timeframe.

A four-year graduation metric does not consider hardships low-income students cannot avoid and the ways in which they try to persist. Addison extended the conversation with specific examples of financial hinderances that Warren Tech students must conquer to graduate:

You’re talking about students that are first time in college students. Their parents don’t have the funds to support them. They’re working at Wendy’s, they’re working at the bookstore on campus, they’re working two or three jobs, just to pay themselves through school. They may not just take 15 hours. In fact, one semester, they may have to take nine hours. They may have other responsibilities.

In addition to pointing out unfair metrics, institutional stakeholders such as trustees and administrators also articulated new considerations to foster equity in the performance-based funding system. One trustee, Jay Bryant, suggested:

Most of [the students] are on financial aid. Some of them are helping and sending resources back home, working. They don't have what they need here. Like they are literally coming to us because they are expecting that we'll give them a better life afterwards. That's the investment in their education that we should be giving back to them. That's how we should be measured, right?

From his perspective as a state legislator, Addison also supported the idea of measuring and rewarding institutions for students' increased social mobility.

Just imagine if [other] public institutions and state universities had to go through what Warren Tech has had to go through. And in spite of, Warren Tech is still performing with many of these high acumens of their peers. It's performing and providing a quality for the state, with students going on to address the poverty level within their family, and breaking down the racial cycle of poverty. And that's what the education stats to be about: in being able to improve yourself, you're able to improve the situation of your family dynamic.

This calls attention to not only the predetermined disadvantages HBCUs have in meeting this goal, but their ability to succeed despite the deterrents. It also draws attention to the positioning of HBCUs as compared to their PWI counterparts.

Other stakeholders also reiterated that Warren Tech students- by virtue of their HBCU attendance- have very different socioeconomic backgrounds than students at PWIs. The impact of this important finding must be carefully explained in order to

understand its relevance to internal power relationships and its distinction for the findings on distinguished institutions in the last section. Performance-based funding creates an atmosphere of comparison and inferiority so intense it shifts the internal narrative away from Warren Tech's own students. Instead of centering Warren Tech students, stakeholders qualify their students' needs and outcomes alongside PWI students- just like the performance-based funding model. For example, students drew additional direct comparisons when discussing PWIs. As Ryan, a current student, pointed out,

When you have to work to pay for classes, you're only taking two or three classes a semester. That's why you're graduating in six years. Whereas, Neighbor State across the track, mom and dad can give you money and say, "Hey, you don't gotta worry about nothing. I'll pay your rent, I'll pay your car note, just go to college."

At Warren Tech and HBCUs you're dealing with a lot of students who are on financial aid.

Rather than being viewed on their own merit and unique positioning, Warren Tech students are constantly compared to PWI students. This influences the internal power relationships by decentering Warren Tech's own students. Warren Tech should rightly be focusing on the unique challenges their low-income students, without feeling the need to justify performance in direct relation to PWIs in the SUS. Under performance-based funding, the institution is forced to cut corners instead of pursuing what is holistically best for students.

Performance-Based Funding Intensifies Academic and Personal Hardships for Students

Despite the financial gaps created by performance-based funding, one administrator, Parker Clark noted that Warren Tech always tries to prioritize the needs of students. When asked if Warren Tech ever considered tactics that would garner more performance-based funding (i.e. increasing admissions standards, directing students to summer bridge programs designed to weed out weaker students, or admitting students in the spring so they did not impact the four-year graduation rates), Parker insisted,

If we play that game, we would not be doing our students a service; we would be doing them a disservice. So, we try to provide as much assistance ... Most of our students are on financial aid. A lot of them have to work to make ends meet, so we try to provide as much on the caring side as we do on the academic side.

Playing the game the way others play it, so to speak, is not in the best interest of Warren Tech because the students would be the ones who are hurt, and most of our students are students of color.

Notwithstanding the ways performance-based funding has shifted the narrative inside the institution, it does not seem to have swayed the mission. This sentiment- that Warren Tech cared for its students- resonated amongst all stakeholders. However, participants offered differing and sometimes contradictory insights into when caring was not enough, or when caring was eclipsed by the need to succeed in the performance-based funding metrics. Addison, an alum and state legislator, provided an example of the latter, sharing,

So now, I have a young man I was talking to, he's a top student, he can go anywhere in the country. I said hey man, what are you majoring in? He said, well, I'm going to be majoring in business. OK, so, why won't you double-major? Well I really want to double-major in political science and business, but they won't let

me. I said, why won't they let you double-major? He said, well, because I have to graduate in four years. So now we're starting to impact the ability that young people have to decide what they want to do with their future, based on somebody having the idea that everybody should graduate in four years.

Stakeholders provided additional examples of how performance-based funding contributed to academic barriers and restrictions of vital student support services.

Participants explicitly connected the institution's failings in academic offerings to a lack of funding, and by proxy- to performance-based funding. Inasmuch as the perceived performance-based funding prevented the institutions from providing financial support to students, they also perceived that performance-based funding prevented the institution from providing the necessary academic supports for students to graduate.

Amari Peterson was another student who I observed discussing performance-based funding on Twitter. "It's hard to graduate within four years if a class that you really need isn't offered when you need it because there aren't enough professors, you know?", Amari said. Parker Clark, an administrator, affirmed this sentiment from his perspective as an academic administrator,

Performance-based funding is not recurring, so we can't hire faculty with it.

That's a real drawback for us. That's what I think the main issue is. You've got to look at it annually, and that really causes some heartburn for us.

Terry echoed these sentiments with the added context of the difficulty for students in intensive academic programs:

If you're a STEM major, that requires time in the lab, doing research and things like that. If you don't have the resources to be able to carry that out effectively,

that makes it very stressful, on top of the rigor of the program. It's just a lot of weight on the students if stuff's not given to them. It does not encourage that excellence that we're needing [in the metrics] because that support is not there. That's affected me and friends of mine personally, and that's kind of students' viewpoint now: we just don't have resources that we need.

Terry was able to articulate how these types of hindrances impeded their academic progress to graduation, thus hindering the institution's ability to perform against certain metrics. As Terry said,

It kinda correlates with whatever metrics that they have up. It's kind of like they're setting us up to still receive the short end of the stick because they're not giving us the money that we need. Therefore, that results in poor performance, or lack of resources for students to be able to perform the way they need to perform.

Students' firsthand perspectives on how they are impacted by performance-based funding are complemented by other interview participants perspectives on how the institution responds to student hardship. For example, Jay spoke to these issues from the vantage point of a trustee.

Outside of the financial consequences, there are other internal implications of performance-based funding. Jay admitted that performance-based funding has highlighted the need to revamp internal systems which currently cause hardship for students.

Course structures need to be redone. I think it needs overhaul, total overhaul.

Faculty have been able to say, "I want to teach pottery at 3:26 in the afternoon,"

and students who wanted to take that class were expected to accommodate. I don't

think that's fair. The students are consumers, so we should be offering courses based on what makes the most sense for your customer.

In this case, performance-based funding did not directly intensify hardship for students. Rather, it led the institution to discover the sources of hardship for students, and seek solutions which would help students, and help the institution's performance in the metrics. Jay also reflected on how performance-based funding has changed the institutional approach to students' academic progress and hardship at Warren Tech and across the SUS.

Performance-based funding has changed the conversation- and I would say this across the system. We used to talk a lot about input, and now they're talking about advisement, and student services, and outcomes, and graduation rates. These are conversations- rich, data conversations- that weren't necessarily happening on campuses before performance-based funding, so I do think that it has changed higher ed culture in a positive way to an extent. There are negatives, obviously, but changing it to a conversation on how are we serving students, rather than how our students are serving us is right.

Jay's comments highlight how performance-based funding has transformed institutions' approaches to students' overall academic support and well-being. Jay reflected,

You used to go into college, and your first class your professor would say, 'Look to your left, look to your right, one of you won't make it.' That is not the conversation that's being had right now. It's like how do we keep every single student. I know at [a different institution in the SUS], they track every single student for retention. If that student does not show up to class, somebody's calling

them, somebody's emailing them, all of these intrusive sorts of models, of electively retaining your students, I think is really the right direction to be going. Thus, performance-based funding's emphasis on outcomes has prompted the institution to increase its focus on students and address institutional barriers which create student hardship.

It must be noted that the students interviewed were all positional leaders who held roles in the student government association, student senate, fraternities, sororities, or other loci of student power. Many surmised that their vantage points allowed them to be more tapped into the general conversation. However, as Reagan observed, "With students complaining about different financial issues on campus- even if they don't look at it as financial- like complaining about professors or lack of open classes and things like that- it all trickles down to money." True, the typical student would not have been aware of performance-based funding or, if aware, likely not able to articulate the complexities of the metrics and rules. However, Reagan's comment shows us that students' unfamiliarity with the policy does not mean they are unimpacted by it or unaware of its impact.

Insofar as respondents were able to articulate how performance-based funding and financial limitations limit students' academic experience, they were also able to identify how financial constraints impact hinder services that are integral to students' social experience and their wellness. Respondents repeatedly pointed to the previously discussed findings on financial hardship and academic difficulties as sources of stress and worry for students. Amari linked student stress to the lack of adequate facilities. Pointing to moldy and outdated facilities, Amari surmised "if every day I'm dreading going back to my dorm, where I have to lay my head, it's hard." Many Warren Tech students face

even more dire situations. Pat Collins, a senior administrator who has previously worked for the state, mentioned more than one hundred students who are homeless on the campus. Instead, Pat said that student affairs was “doing some things to help them, trying to raise money now, so we respond to their basic needs.” In the atmosphere of scarcity created by performance-based funding, the institution has limited funds to allocate to additional resources for even students experiencing the direst situations. One of the student participants, Hayden Turner, spoke directly to the stress and trauma students need help coping with.

An out of state student with no family support, when we spoke Hayden had just withdrawn from Warren Tech. A student leader and otherwise strong academic performer, Hayden was diagnosed with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder after getting to Warren Tech. Hayden’s grades slipped when two close friends died in a car accident. Hayden was sexually assaulted on campus a few months later. In the beginning of the interview, Hayden was positive and clear headed, echoing many of the positive aspects of relationships with peers, faculty, and administrators. She shared,

I’m sitting here and I’m just trying not to get emotional because I have had to deal with just a lot of hard stuff since I’ve gotten to Warren Tech. Warren Tech is so loving and the administration here can be so much like a family- people are really there for you when you’re going through stuff.

However, as Hayden began to talk about the trauma, the tenor of the sentiments changed:

Nobody really gives a crap about me having ADHD and anxiety and being clinically depressed and being raped- no one cares. I’m trying to deal with all of this on my own is exhausting, and I am 19 years old. This is difficult. I came to

college at 17. It's my third year. I'm trying to be an adult, pay for my own way, figure all this stuff out, and I'm basically on my own. So, without the support from Warren Tech, it's so easy to fall into the abyss of just living paycheck to paycheck. I'm just trying to stay motivated and keep praying, but I feel like Warren Tech could help retention if they just have people that actually gave a crap.

Hayden's doubts that Warren Tech was not equipped to support students is confirmed by a Board of Governors audit that noted the institution's backlog and need for additional counselors and mental health professionals. The Board of Governors recently set up a special task force on mental-health, drug and alcohol issues on campuses. As a result, the Board of Governors urged all of the institutions in the State University System to meet the International Association of Counseling Services (2019) suggested ratio of one mental health professional to every 1,500 students enrolled, a figure used in state documents. Warren Tech has almost 2,000 students per counselor. Students' personal power is irrefutably diminished when they do not have basic needs or holistic wellness. The shortages created by performance-based funding have very real and serious consequences for student health and wellness. From financial stress to academic stress, and homelessness to sexual assault, Warren Tech students are facing very real and present trauma. Students who are literally or figuratively starved are disempowered, and disenchanted with the institution. Limiting funds inhibits the university's ability to meet students' needs. Furthermore, the analysis shows how performance-based funding can also impede future students by hampering student recruitment.

Performance-Based Funding Hampers Student Recruitment

I included students in the interview sample in order to capture the insight of all of the different stakeholder groups influenced by performance-based funding. Ultimately, students' perceptions held their own alongside those of faculty, staff, alumni, trustees and policy consultants. However, this analysis brought forth a stakeholder group previously not considered within the scope: potential students or applicants. In the current literature, discussion of the impact of performance-based funding on potential students involves institutions increasing recruitment of high achieving students from higher income families and decreasing recruitment of students who procured significantly less (McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015; Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016). This study builds on that literature and posits that performance-based funding influences HBCUs' abilities to recruit students. The very public, dramatic, and caustic nature of the conversation about performance-based funding in the State University System casts a negative shadow on Warren Tech, damaging the institution's image, and hampering recruitment of potential students.

Recruitment challenges are part of a broader discovery of a perception of inferiority created by performance-based funding. Casey Miller, an academic administrator, discussed how this is seen at the Board of Governors meetings.

Some of the non-STEM areas are making good, decent money. Those in all the STEM areas, they're making some big money. The Board of Governors doesn't really see that. One of them asked the president a question about our licensure exams. Now that's one of the areas that we definitely have to improve on. But he asked the question, 'Why would a student, or why would somebody send their student to one of those programs?'

Even though certain programs perform well, performance-based funding contributes to a general perception of the whole institution as inferior.

Amari, an undergraduate student, believed that performance-based funding “really puts a damper on how Warren Tech is viewed as whole, and especially within the state. People just think that Warren Tech is just a party school, and it’s not whatsoever.” The public nature and critical tone of the Board of Governors meetings only exacerbates these conditions. Asked about the impact of performance-based funding, Kelsey Martin, a national journalist, noted,

First and foremost is the negative perception it creates around the school. Every time that the performance-based funding report and the headline in the [local newspaper] is “Warren Tech is last in performance-based funding” or “Warren Tech misses additional funding” for the people who aren’t really nuanced students of higher education they just think Warren Tech is failing.

Kelsey’s caveat about understanding the nuances of higher education and the funding formula is important. Prospective students and their families do not have the knowledge of the inequity in the state’s performance-based funding formula to filter and gauge information for themselves. This, of course, is perplexing for Warren Tech stakeholders who understand the nuance of the formula, and the value-add of the institution. As a senior administrator, Sydney Wright, reflected,

It’s ironic because one consultant that we brought in a few years ago made the statement that, outside of the state, we have a great brand recognition and presence and perceived value. It’s unfortunate that we don’t have that same type of brand recognition and perceived value right here in our own state. To me, that

spoke volumes and was something that stuck with me. Like I said, it's an uphill battle trying to educate on that. I believe the way the system is not, it's to pit one against another: fighting for resources.

This aligns to state legislator Addison Brown's earlier quoted perspective that the state's performance-based funding inherently condones a narrative that Warren Tech is inferior because of the ranking system in its design. This impalpable damage to Warren Tech's reputation created by performance-based funding is worsened by the very tangible detriments of decreased funding.

Just as participants saw the financial constraints of performance-based funding as a reason the institution could not afford certain academic and social services for students, many made similar connections regarding the state of facilities and its impact on prospective students and their families. Amari's comment about the worn condition of Warren Tech's facilities is relevant to this comment as well. Jesse Long, a senior administrator, mentioned "The members of the Board of Governors should at least come to Warren Tech and look at what we don't have. Maybe they would understand where we're coming from." Other stakeholders also believed the current facilities and amenities could taint prospective students' impressions of the school. Jay Bryant, a trustee, considered the choices of prospective students and their families, pondering:

Do you pick, especially now, with the wealth of colleges and universities that are available, do you pick one with all the resources, and the shining Starbucks, and the gym, and the fancy football team, or do you pick the HBCU that's probably, the facilities aren't as good, though they have the same sort of options and opportunities. I mean, these are real choices that people have to make.

Again, we see the theme of comparisons between HBCUs and PWIs. Kelsey believed prospective students' expectations were not only based on what they were looking for in the future, but also on characteristics to which they were accustomed. Similar to Jay, Kelsey pondered about incoming students' feelings:

I don't want to stay in a dorm. I grew up in my house, my house had central air.

I'm not living in a room where we don't have central air. I don't want to be in a place with [limited] visitation [hours for guests]- What is that?" Other areas of the collegiate experience are lacking where a lot of students of today are thinking,

'There should be more amenities associated, especially for the price I'm paying.'

In addition to being accustomed to certain features in their living spaces, policy consultant Kendall Campbell noted that prospective students may also be accustomed to certain features in their learning spaces. Kendall supposed, "Some of these students are coming from high schools that have better facilities, better labs, all of that. Institutions like Warren Tech have to attract students but they also have to do some things to keep them there and that means facilities." Kendall also reflected,

The higher education environment is a whole lot more competitive than what it used to be. At one point, years ago you could count on getting 90% of African American students. Parents went [to the same alma mater], grandmas, all of that. That's not the case anymore and then you've got students who come to an institution with an entirely different set of expectations about what they're gonna get and what they're gonna receive.

The discussion of academic expectations leads to another hinderance to student recruitment: increased competition for high achieving Black students by PWIs.

Performance-based funding limits the institution's ability to recruit academically proficient students by tarnishing the public image of the institution's academic abilities. From Amari's insight about people believing Warren Tech was a "party school", to senior administrator Pat Collins's comments about the Board of Governors correlating students' low-income background to low academic performance, previously presented data shows how performance-based funding contributes to a deficit narrative on Warren Tech. Performance-based funding also limits the resources the institution can offer for academic scholarships and support. In this state, the performance-based funding budget is funded by taking a portion of funding from each institution's base allocations. This forfeiture impacts the institution in various ways. As previously discussed, it inhibits the institution's ability to budget. Giving up money from the base allocation means giving up guaranteed recurring funds that would fund multiyear expenses like academic scholarships. Instead, distinguished institutions continuously receive large performance-based funding allocations, bolstering their ability to attract students. As Quinn weighed in,

PWIs raided the Black schools for athletes in the 70s so that they could compete. And now they raid the Black schools for black scholars. But now if you're from the hood and you got a 4.0, they'll give you a full ride. They drained our athletic genius. Now they're draining our intellectual genius as well.

His comments were supported by observations of the Board of Governors meeting, where Neighbor State touted their simultaneous increases in graduation and diversity. Thus, this discussion is not limited to competition for high achieving students, but to Black students more broadly.

Performance-based funding also impacts Warren Tech's recruitment of less competitive students. As Morgan Wilson, the local journalist noted, "There's a lot of competition for the top scholars. There's a lot of competition for even the middle scholars." Much of the previously presented data speaks to this point as well. In addition to the aforementioned competition with PWIs' facilities and academic scholarship, HBCUs are competing with PWIs for the presence of Black students. While neither of the distinguished institutions have chosen to focus on student diversity, namely Black and Latino students, other PWIs in the state have used this as their institutional choice metric. Simultaneously, performance-based funding's high stakes demand for increased outcomes has caused the institution to change its student admissions standards. Casey Miller, an academic administrator, explained recent changes and the impetus for them

Every year there's some subtle increases, increments, as far as the GPA, as well as the SAT and ACT scores. When I look at last year's data, we had a very high, significant number of students who had a 3.5 GPA coming into the university.

And so, the admission standards will continue to be increased because the expectation is there. And, again, with the better students you're getting, you definitely expect to see better results as far as students' outcomes, as far as their progression, and as well as their completion of their degrees in a timely fashion.

Yet, as the national journalist Kelsey surmised,

It always escapes me that Black folks are really high up on, "Hey, let's increase the enrollments and let's increase the admissions standard." What? Let me get this straight. HBCUs are increasing the admission standards to make it harder for Black people to get in so they can have better performance outcomes but you have

schools like Harvard saying, “Forget what your academic capability is, if you’re black and poor, you’re in.”

Morgan also offered insight: “Other schools are out recruiting minority students all over the state. They’re doing a much better job and working very diligently to have a multicultural student base there.” Together with expanded amenities and negative narratives of Warren Tech, increased recruitment efforts by PWIs inhibit the institution’s overall ability to recruit. Accordingly, performance-based funding makes it difficult for Warren Tech to recruit students due to increasing competition for high achieving students and Black students in general, and limiting the funds available for student scholarships, facilities, and amenities.

Performance-Based Funding Highlights Power Vacancies in Internal Relationships

As the study identified two external loci of power in Warren Tech’s relationship with the state, the analysis also revealed two notable vacancies in the institution’s power relationships. Similarly, these vacancies illuminate imbalances in the power relationships. Instead of locating stockpiles of power, these vacuums of power illuminate deficits of power. The power vacancies are both internal to the university. In this case, the internal power vacancies are the continuous changes in the leadership- namely the president’s office. It follows that the second vacancy is the void left by a fierce, beloved president who served the institutions for decades. With its high stakes metrics, the state’s performance-based funding system highlight the vacancies, shining a light on the institution’s internal shortcomings and shortfalls.

Leadership transitions. Warren Tech has experienced excessive transitions over the last twenty years. With leadership changes in the administration, faculty, athletics,

and the student body, this level of turnover is unprecedented for Warren Tech. The university has had only one less permanent president in the last 20 years as it had in its first 100 years of existence. Warren Tech's well-known and highly-regarded marching band has had only one fewer director in the last 20 years as it had in its first 100 years of existence. This, of course, made relationships with the state difficult. As Kendall Campbell noted,

I think performance-based funding has influenced relationships. At one point, Warren Tech's relationship with the state was more adversarial than it probably should have been. Warren Tech positioned itself as being on the defensive of that. Virtually everything and every criticism pointed out is that maybe they needed to be doing some things differently. The ups and downs of leadership changes have tremendous impact on things.

These ups and downs have transformed the power relationships in Warren Tech. While the expectations of performance-based funding have contributed to some of these changes- namely those of academic deans and presidents- it certainly is not the sole or chief cause. Rather, performance-based funding acts as a spotlight on these issues, illuminate the voids they leave in internal power relationships.

Since the implementation of performance-based funding in 2012, the university has had four changes of permanent and interim president appointments. The high stakes nature of performance-based funding serves to intensify power grabs. The impact of this is felt across the university and various stakeholder groups, including the faculty. During a period of interim presidency, the provost dismissed three college deans at once. This was a show of force by the interim president to demonstrate the willingness and ability to

make drastic changes in accordance to the Board of Governors' strategic plan and demands for higher performance. Publicly and in faculty meetings, their dismissal was correlated to underperformance in key areas such as graduation, retention, and professional licensing, all areas critical to performance-based funding. This exodus sparked protest across the faculty. Despite this, participants in the study held this president in high regard. This brings forward another aspect of power vacancies. When a void is highlighted, it is easier to identify the need. For instance, performance-based funding illuminated the power void left by the academic dean vacancies. With their departure, the need to develop faculty understanding became clearer. One prominent trustee, Avery Benjamin, believed the institutions next step toward success in performance-based funding lay with the faculty.

I feel like departmental awareness is the next iteration for us. We're getting there.

The way we as a board are trying to drive that is we're literally asking, inviting deans in to present to the board. Because, I don't think it's enough for us to just be told, "Yep, they have a plan." We need to make sure there it's a detailed plan, because it's not just funding, it's a competition.

This has an amplified effect. As previously mentioned, many of the Board of Trustees' annual goals and evaluation criteria for this president are directly correlated to metrics in the performance-based funding model. As such, the president has focused on building awareness amongst peers and colleagues in the faculty. Peyton described how the president has prioritized performance-based funding at the faculty's annual planning retreat and faculty senate meetings.

I think there probably was a big disconnect when the model was first implemented. The faculty by and large saw it as just another requirement. Over time, I have personally seen a great appreciation form. One reason is, the administration has really worked hard engaging faculty and through those efforts, the faculty has become more aware of the importance of the model and how it's impacting us. They're paying attention to the funding and really starting to see, 'Okay, this is what it means for us.'

Thus, when performance-based funding shines a light on an internal power vacancy, it is easier to see how and when the void is filled. To further support this finding, both of the aforementioned leaders, as well as many other participants in the study, asserted that students' awareness of and involvement in leadership discussions and decisions around performance-based funding were limited in great part by tense and contested transitions in student leadership.

Performance-based funding has more direct correlations to student power vacancies at Warren Tech. During a contentious election for student body president, a new Warren Tech president made multiple decisions that were seen as overstepping by the students. Tensions rose to high when the student filed a law-suit against the university. The suit claimed the president and other administrators intentionally intervened in the student election process to keep the candidate out of the presidency, and thus, off of the Board of Trustees as a voting member on issues of the president's employment. The student government eventually won the dispute and a second election, only to resign halfway through the second term, citing repeated attempts by the administration to obstruct student power amongst reasons for abdicating.

Students were also susceptible to the volatility and power grabs characteristic of power vacancies. Frances Roberts, a former student leader, noted, “For the most part, most students don’t even understand the system itself, so they don’t really understand that there had been a change to a performance-based funding system just because it wasn’t available knowledge.” As Mckenzie Adams, a current undergraduate student, pointed out about students’ unfamiliarity with performance-based funding

Well, Warren Tech goes through a lot of changes in leadership. It’s almost like you keep changing teams and it’s hard to build team chemistry because you keep losing players. That’s kind of why I feel like some of the students are left in the dark, because there could just be a lot of darkness up top in general because there’s just so many changes all the time.

Though Mckenzie was referencing changes in university and academic leadership, this observation also applies to student leadership. As longtime trustee Avery Benjamin noted,

I think students are in the conversation. I think there’s an opportunity for students to be brought more into the conversation. I think one of the challenges that we’ve had is we’ve had, unfortunately, a fair amount of revolving leadership in our SGA President. I feel like we now have a bit more stability there. My hope is that we can introduce it to them in a way that’s constructive and productive... I don’t think there’s any real upside into fighting the system. It’s a state generated system. I think we should channel our energy into, “How do you win within the system? How do you maximize your scores within the system?”

Avery's last few statements demonstrate a disconnect from the student perspective.

Current and former student leaders reiterated a decrease in student power over the last 10-15 years.

Avery's statement also implies a desire to avoid the activist approaches Warren Tech students employ. As former president Aubrey Jones stated, "Our students will march in a minute and people think about that." Most believed that students had a voice, but that traditional seats of power- namely, the student body president, had been diluted. Many blamed the administration. Performance-based funding serves as a spotlight on this issue as well. Faculty senate meeting minutes reveal an exchange between a faculty leader and the Board of Governors liaison, wherein the faculty leader asked the liaison to clarify a written statement about students' protest around leadership changes with the administration and Board of Trustees. The faculty leader inquired, "You made a comment about students' in active. If you check the history of Warren Tech students have been involved and were active in civil rights movement." The liaison attempted to explain his comments by saying,

I think some people may have misunderstood what I said. What I believe I said was that student's involvement was both welcomed and positive. What I also said was that I was ashamed of the fact that they needed to go and protest the governing body and president. The whole thing is wrong. It is good that they went and protest. Like I said, that is positive and welcoming. But why should they have to protest governance? That's the point I was trying to make. They should not have to worry about the governance at their university. The students should have

confidence that the governance is working properly. That was the point I was attempting to make with that.

While his mixed sentiments affirm student's activism, they send a clear message about the Board of Governors' perceptions of Warren Tech's leadership at the student and institutional levels.

Frances reflected on the efforts to make students more aware of performance-based funding and the institution's results, noting, "One of the challenges I had was getting my students, my constituents to actually understand and care that we're falling behind. You're not getting the funding that you're supposed to be for your education because something's not happening properly." Frances offered a bleak assessment and word of caution on university leadership's approach to student leaders,

The university board and the administration can almost create this illusion that students are adequately being represented because you have a student that's representing them on the board. Then you have your student government association in place, but it's only an illusion because ... I don't know if it was intentional because obviously as an administrator, they don't necessarily want 18 to 24-year-olds telling me what to do. If I can somehow dilute the power in student government, or in a student government official, I'm probably gonna want to do that because I don't necessarily want this person, this figurehead, or this person who has the influence, making my job harder. If I can somehow still make it seem like there's adequate student leadership, but kind of take it away at the same time, that's probably gonna be my ideal situation.

The differing views of Avery as a trustee and Frances as a student demonstrate a key point. When a void is highlighted, it is easier to identify the need and the solution, however, the resultant solution is dependent on the stakeholder making the assessments. Where Avery saw the student power vacancy and proposed to fill it with positional leaders, Frances saw the student power vacancy and proposed to fill it by increasing student awareness and, potentially, activism.

Presidential legacy. Performance-based funding draws attention to the vacancy of one leader in particular: the highly regarded emeritus president who served the institution and the broader HBCU community for decades. Performance-based funding highlights the void left by his legacy by enabling frequent reminiscences about his tenure as a golden era of Warren Tech, and constant comparisons to his successors.

The emeritus president's departure left a powerful legacy and palpable void. Morgan Wilson posed, "That era goes down through generations. The students here don't have a clue who he is, but if he came on campus to meet with students or even just a convocation, they would see the awestruck feeling people have." In many ways, his presidency and leadership are treated as a gold standard for the university. The adulation is not unfounded- the emeritus president led the institution to much of the growth and accolades the university received in the late 1990s and early 2000s chronicled in Chapter 4 such as the largest HBCU, the top public HBCU, the most Gates Millennium scholars, the top producer of Black undergraduate degrees, and the number two producer of Black professional doctoral degrees. Sam Perry, a local alum who criticized Warren Tech's student outcomes during public comments at a Board of Trustees meeting, lauded the

emeritus president's high standards during our follow up interview. Morgan Wilson, the local journalist commended his skill as a fundraiser

[The emeritus president] brought in money, he left the running of the day to day a strong provost, and he was out meeting with major corporations. And saying, "You need to give us money, because if you're looking for minority engineers, I need a half million dollars to give scholarships to the brightest Black students I can find. And then you need to offer them an internship program." And companies would do it.

Administrators in particular mused over the emeritus president's years at Warren Tech. Many of them served the university in some capacity or were students during his tenure, and treat this as a personal and professional honor. Asked about performance-based funding, some heralded his abilities to garner funding for Warren Tech. Senior administrator Pat Collins recalled,

There was a statement that in the 70s or early 80s, that Warren Tech didn't ask [the state] for enough. But then, Warren Tech was always fighting with Neighbor State for what they could get. [The emeritus president] changed all that. I was there then.

Serving the university during the president emeritus's tenure is a point of pride. When presenting a faculty award for service to the faculty senate, the senate leader noted that the first award was presented to the emeritus president, obviously meaning this to indicate the magnitude of the award. Only six awards had been presented in the 17 years since then, though senate rules allow two awards to be bestowed each year.

Asked about policymakers' knowledge of Warren Tech's HBCU mission, Peyton Edwards also harkened back to the emeritus president's impact,

We do have to educate them about what does it mean to say we're the best public HBCU. Now, there was a time, in this state, when those things were lauded. Back in the [emeritus president's] era. I remember it. He was able to get the state to commend Warren Tech for those types of awards and achievements. And somehow, we have to get back to where there's an appreciation for what we do.

This leads to the second highlight: performance-based funding fuels constant comparisons to the emeritus president and the gold standard of his leadership.

Performance-based funding provides ample opportunity for these comparisons to thrive. Before his term of more than 15 years, the average tenure of a permanent president was 14 years. The average term of the five presidents after him is two years. He remains the standard by which all other presidents are judged. As Morgan noted, "Any president at Warren Tech is gonna be measured by the older alumni who still revere [the emeritus president]." However, the constant comparison seems unfair. The Board of Trustees has gone so far as to invite him to speak at their meetings and suggest a new president seek out his guidance on certain issues. According to minutes from the Board of Trustees meeting, alumni trustees showed no hesitation in voicing their displeasure when the new president expressed "reservations" around allowing the emeritus president to assist with recruiting. A former trustee said,

Reservations? About [the emeritus president]? I'd arguably say he's easily the most successful recruiter we've had in the history of the school. But [you have] reservations? Is it personal, or are we dealing with the facts here? Because if you

start from the perspective -- or the position that anyone coming to this institution needs to have a demonstrated track record of success, who would have had a better track record of success with recruiting than [the emeritus president]?

The comparisons demonstrate the desire to fill the power vacancy with another similar leader. Performance-based funding provides ample opportunity for these comparisons to thrive. The current president seems to recognize this. Minutes from one of his first Board of Trustees meetings in 2018 as president show how he cites the emeritus president's work, showing the Board of Trustees that he is willing to honor and emulate the emeritus president. "The first President's retreat that I've had, I modeled this on what the emeritus president did. The only thing different is I invited all designated managers." This president has recognized the power vacancy and the Board of Trustees' preferred solution to restoring it. Though the president is willing to bend to this, not all see this the right remedy to fill the power void. During a battle between a past president and past board chair about the institution's performance in the metrics, a well-respected senior faculty member countered,

If you hire the president, you ought to have the confidence and let her do or him do what you hired him or her to do, and if you don't do that then that image is even more tarnished. You know, we've come a long way from a normal 19 college to Warren College to Warren Technical State University and we have had a whole lot of presidents. We didn't put no limitations on [the emeritus president], we didn't put no limitations on [past presidents], and now that we are on a position to move to another level, those individuals who appoint individuals

to this Board ought to be concerned as to what kind of image they're sending from the Board to the rest of this institution... outside of this room and the rest of the world.

Morgan also rebuked the Board of Trustees' attempts to restrict new presidents to leading in the same ways as the emeritus president. Morgan posited that a different solution to the vacancy was necessary to succeed under the performance-based funding and the state's new governance structure.

[The current president] is not [the emeritus president]. [The emeritus president] would challenge the Board of Governors. He certainly he commanded a lot of respect and he lost some things too, though. But there was a new time for a new era here. This is the time now for Warren Tech with [the current president]. He has expertise. He's a brilliant guy.

The commonality in these two comments, that was not present in the memories and comparisons to the golden era of the emeritus president, is the recognition that a new era calls for a new leadership. The emeritus president is the gold standard although- or perhaps in part, because- he never led the institution under performance-based funding. A new type of state funding requires a new type of leader. It is unrealistic to expect a power vacancy to be filled with new leader who imitates a prior one. Amongst other implications for this research, the next chapter discusses ways Warren Tech and other HBCUs can use this finding and others to address power vacancies and power strongholds.

Summary of Findings

This case study provided insight into the influence of performance-based funding on power relationships at public HBCUs. Specifically, the study sought to answer three central research questions: How does performance-based funding influence power relationships between a public HBCU and its state? How does performance-based funding influence power relationships within a public HBCU? How does theory explain the influence of performance-based funding on power relationships in this context? By design, the study addresses how this state finance policy influences a public HBCU's internal and external power relationships. The findings revealed a few central themes for each question. Externally, performance-based funding: 1) engenders mistrust; 2) upsets the balance of autonomy and accountability; 3) constricts the institution's limited communication with the state; and 4) highlights power strongholds, specifically the Board of Governors through the use of the strategic plan, and the two PWIs designated as distinguished by the Board of Governors. Internally, performance-based funding: 1) increases volatility in budgeting; 2) underscores student financial difficulty; 3) intensifies academic and personal hardships for students; 4) hampers student recruitment; and 5) highlights power vacancies in internal institutional relationships such as those left by leadership transitions and the legacy of a powerful emeritus president.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Discussion of Findings

The purpose of this case study was to understand how performance-based funding influenced power relationships inside a public four-year HBCU, explore how performance-based funding influenced power relationships between a public HBCU and the state, and ascertain how theory explains the changes taking place within the HBCU and between the HBCU and the state. This study analyzed the case of the public HBCU and its state policy context, including policymakers and their advisors, state higher education staff, higher education experts and consultants, other universities in the state, and intermediaries such as foundations and advocacy organizations. The research was guided by three central research questions:

1. How does performance-based funding influence power relationships between a public HBCU and its state?
2. How does performance-based funding influence power relationships within a public HBCU?
3. How does theory explain the influence of performance-based funding on power relationships in this context?

The two preceding chapters address the first and second research questions, focusing on findings on the power relationships at Warren Tech and between the state and the institution. The next sections summarize findings from the first and second research questions, including two potentially unique contributions to the literature: power strongholds and power vacancies.

Findings on Race and Power Relationships in the HBCU

In relation to this dissertation's first research question, the findings on Warren Tech's external relationships with the state suggest that performance-based funding engenders mistrust between the state and institution, constricting their already strained communication. The mistrust and lack of communication are connected to race, property, and oppression. Campus-based stakeholders are skeptical of the lack of diversity at the state in the Board of Governors and the legislature. The lack of diversity leads institutional stakeholders to doubt the state's ability to understand HBCU mission and culture, and to perceive the state as operating in a way that is inherently biased against the institution as an HBCU. Such findings from this dissertation lend to support to Jones' (2013, 2015) findings about performance-based funding for HBCUs' historical mission in the era of accountability. By design, performance-based funding alters the balance of institutional autonomy and public accountability in the state's favor. Most of the literature points to a trade-off of increased autonomy for increased accountability. This study supports the inverse of that relationship: Warren Tech's autonomy declined as their ability to meet the demands of the new accountability policy declined. In line with Hillman (2016), this study also showed flaws in the premise of performance-based funding. While the policy incentivized some changes, the lack of funding made it difficult for Warren Tech to meet the new metrics and standards.

Notably, the findings from the first research question introduced the idea of power strongholds. The concept of power strongholds has not been covered in the literature on public HBCUs or higher education more broadly. In this case study, the implementation of performance-based funding shined a light on two external power strongholds and the tools used to maintain them: the state Board of Governors and two predominantly white

institutions labeled as distinguished by the state. In the first instance, the Board of Governors used the strategic plan to maintain a power stronghold over the State University System. This idea has great implications for the study of state and institution relationships. The second power stronghold was two public PWIs which maintained power through their designation as distinguished institutions by the state, and their various connections to the state through entities such as the governor's office, Board of Governors and state legislature. Many studies have explored party affiliation and governance structures at the time of the adoption of performance-based funding (J. C. Burke & Modarresi, 2001; Dougherty, & Natow, 2015; Gorbunov, 2013; McLendon, et al., 2005; McLendon, et al., 2006). Few, if any, have focused on institutions' relationships with political parties and within governance structures. This dissertation's focus on power relationships allowed for unique discoveries like these external power strongholds. In accordance, the findings on internal relationships also affirmed the current literature and offered some potential contributions.

Findings on Race and Power Relationships Between the HBCU and the State

In relation to this dissertation's second research question, the findings on Warren Tech's internal relationships revealed that performance-based funding increase financial difficulty at both the institutional and student level. This confirms Hillman and Corral's (2018) calculations that showed MSIs in states with performance-based funding lost more funding per student than non-MSIs in the same state, and more than MSIs in non-performance-based funding states. In this study, the policy increased students' academic and personal hardships. Stakeholders' reflections on Warren Tech refusing students from double majoring out of an obligation for students to finish in four years are directly in

line with Li and Kennedy's (2018) concerns that performance-based funding compelled institutions to limit students' academic pathways. Warren Tech's responses to alleviating academic difficulties and increasing student performance are similar to the methods noted in the current literature such as increased advising and academic services (Thornton, 2015; Dougherty et al., 2016). The changes to Warren Tech's admissions standards support the arguments in the literature around creaming (Dougherty et al., 2012; Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016; McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015; Thornton, 2015; Umbricht et al., 2017). This study's findings about the public nature of performance-based funding encumbering the recruitment of potential students are notable in relation to findings from previous literature. This assertion is only loosely reminiscent of Jones's (2013) study participants' belief that requiring HBCUs to recruit white students undermined their institution's identity and created an impossible task.

Where performance-based funding underscored bastions of power outside the organization, it underlines *power vacancies* inside the organization. The influential vacancies in internal institutional relationships were associated with leadership transitions and the memory of a powerful former president. This affirms the current literature on vision setting, leadership, and the role of the president (Abelman & Dalessandro, 2009; Hinton, 2013; R. E. L. Brown, 2010). However, with few studies on power relationships within HBCUs, there is little to correlate with this dissertation's findings. Most notably, the students' perspectives on HBCUs' leadership and power are largely absent from the literature. The findings affirm that students can speak to complex policy issues from their unique vantage point. As noted, the student interviewees all held formal roles in the student government association, student senate, fraternities, sororities, or other modes of

student authority. The typical student without a leadership position likely would not have been aware of performance-based funding, or be able to discuss the policy at length. However, this study affirms that students are the experts of their own experiences, and their unfamiliarity with policy does not preclude them from understanding and articulating how they are affected by it. Their perspectives were supported by those of other stakeholders, and triangulated by other data including board meeting observations and minutes and minutes from the faculty senate meetings.

Using the case study method allowed me to collect diverse data that not only informed the case, but also triangulated other data sources, and provided guidance on additional data sources and inquiries. The explanation-building approach to analyzing case study evidence allowed me to elevate the role of theory in creating the sampling strategy, data collection protocols, and analyzing the data. This final chapter concludes the study with discussion and implications for theory, policy, practice, and research. I will present recommendations for improving performance-based funding models to increase equity for HBCUs, as well as recommendations for HBCUs on internal policy and practice. Finally, I will offer recommendations for future research on HBCUs, power relationships, performance-based funding, and other topics germane to the findings.

Implications for Theory

According to Yin (2009), “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” (p.15). With the third research question, this study seeks to determine how theory explains the influence of performance-based funding on HBCUs’ power relationships with the state and the power relationships within HBCUs. Each of the three theories brought valuable and nuanced

framing to the study. The sections below describe the contributions of each theory to the study. Each section describes how the theories led to and framed key findings and themes in the study.

Principal Agent Theory

Specific to performance-based funding, Principal Agent Theory holds that agents in an outcomes-based agreement are more likely to act in the interests of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). Typically, under this theory, the principal and agent would each attempt to maximize their own, conflicting self-interests, compelling the principal to monitor the agent. However, in a model dependent on outcomes, such as performance-based funding, this theory posits that the interests of the principal and agent will actually align since the success of both parties depends on the same results (Eisenhardt, 1989). Consequentially, the self-interests of each will disappear (Eisenhardt, 1989). I saw many of these theoretical tenets in this case study. Namely, Warren Tech acts in the state's interest because of performance-based funding and mechanisms like the Board of Governors' strategic plan. However, the parties in this case each steadfastly pursued their own self-interests, resulting in conflicts over accountability and autonomy and the state's increased monitoring of Warren Tech.

Warren Tech acted in the interests of the state. The performance-based funding model has greatly influenced power relationships between the state and the institution. This funding model has altered the way Warren Tech behaves as an organization and an agent of the state. As discussed in Chapter 5, Warren Tech has adopted many of the state's tools and terms such as metrics and key performance indicators. For the administration, this impact is best seen in Warren Tech's altered

orientation toward strategic planning. The university not only embarked on a complex strategic planning process that involved a large number of various stakeholders, they went so far as to realign administrative functions into an entirely new unit centered on strategic planning and outcomes for the university. While including alumni and other stakeholders was appreciated and resulted in internal stakeholders feeling an affinity for the plan, the state's imprint is all over the document.

Outside of the administration's plan for the institution, the Warren Tech Board of Trustees' acted in the state's interest in its oversight of the institution and the president. The Board of Trustees devotes a significant amount of time at its meetings to discussion of the Board of Governors' strategic plan and the performance-based funding metrics. The goals the Board of Trustees uses to evaluate and compensate the president are explicitly tied to specific state performance-based funding metrics. In addition to matters of administration and governance, Warren Tech has also made academic decisions in order to serve the interests of the state.

The university has altered the admissions process and increased minimum standards such as GPA in an attempt to garner better performance in metrics on retention and graduation. When the university continued to underperform in the metrics, the president and provost terminated three college deans in order to show the state that Warren Tech's new leadership was willing to take extreme action towards the state's goals. In all, performance-based funding has increased the state's expectations for Warren Tech, placing high stakes- in this case, all new monies allocated to the institution- on the institution's performance. To receive the much-needed funding, Warren Tech

concedes to the state. The next section discusses the institutions' largest concession: institutional autonomy.

Warren Tech and the state sought to maximize their self-interests. Principal Agent Theory assumes both parties seek to maximize their own, conflicting self-interests, compelling the principal to monitor the agent. As a principal, the state has demanded increased accountability for student outcomes. As an agent, Warren Tech is interested in maintaining its autonomy as an HBCU. While the literature suggests that the interests of the principal and the agent will align and reduce conflicts, performance-based funding has not had this result in this power relationship. The state maintains that performance-based funding is a system-wide model designed to assess the performance of the State University System as a whole. The state's espoused goal is to increase the performance and profile of the state in national contexts and standings. As such, the state has designed a one-size fits all system which does not account for institutional differences and contexts. Because Warren Tech's interests conflict with the state's, the state exercises its authority as a principal to monitor the institution.

Generally, Warren Tech stakeholders report increased intervention and control of Warren Tech since implementing performance-based funding. The most obvious evidence is the member of the Board of Governors assigning a formal liaison to Warren Tech's Board of Trustees in order to monitor the institution. The Board of Governors' choice to appoint one of its own members instead of an institutional leader or a neutral, knowledgeable party such as a policy consultant or higher education expert shows that the liaison's primary job was not to liaise or mediate in the relationship between the state

and the university, but to monitor Warren Tech's actions and ensure they were in service of the state's interests.

Warren Tech is fighting to sustain its unique mission as an HBCU. Though the state attempts to decrease the institution's autonomy through performance-based funding, Warren Tech keeps trying to preserve its historic mission and continue educating Black students who are predominantly low-income. The misalignment between the state and Warren Tech around the HBCU mission and the prioritization of Black students is evident in the lack of Black representation on the Board of Governors, and the sitting members' lack of understanding the HBCU role and mission. Though Warren Tech strives to maintain its legacy, the current narratives around performance-based funding make this difficult.

In conclusion, Principal Agent Theory provides helpful explanations for the power relationships between the state and the institution, but has notable limitations. Principal Agent Theory explains the state's monitoring of the institution, as evidenced by increased performance expectations, the appointment of a Board of Governors liaison, and the appointment of former state employees to the institution's Board of Trustees. Principal Agent Theory also approaches the principal-agent relationship as a one to one connection focused on how the agent achieves the task delegated by the principal. This was useful in examining the power relationships between the state and institution at a macro level such as the relationship between the Board of Governors and the institutional Board of Trustees. However, it was not helpful for understanding more micro level power relationships such as the relationship between students and the administration of the institution.

The findings of this study further contradict the principle that the interests of the principal and agent will actually align in contexts dependent on outcomes, like performance-based funding (Eisenhardt, 1989). In contradiction to the theory, the self-interests of the state and the institution did not disappear. While the institution in this study did act in the state's interest because of performance-based funding and mechanisms like the Board of Governors' strategic plan, the institution never abandoned its core self-interest: the HBCU mission. This is a notable shortcoming of using Principal Agent Theory in public settings. The theory does not fully capture the complexity of institutional autonomy. It is difficult for public agents to independently act in their own interests because states set the rules of the game that marginalize agents' core interests.

Resource Dependence Theory

Resource Dependence Theory offers explanations for how interdependent organizations pursue resources, especially when the interdependencies foster a sense of scarcity like performance-based funding. Resource Dependence Theory posits that all organizations exist as part of an interdependent network, in this case the State University System. Certainly, the interdependencies and dependencies within the State University System cause risk and uncertainty for each university's survival. The president of Neighbor State's and the distinguished institutions' power stronghold within the State University System are a good example of these types of interdependencies. To assuage the risks, individual institutions like Warren Tech seek to minimize their dependence, which produces new patterns of dependence and interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theory posits that the ability to exert power and social influence becomes more important in environments of uncertainty and scarcity like performance-based

funding. Specific to universities, studies using Resource Dependence Theory have linked departmental power to the department's ability to enroll students and obtain grants and contracts. The leadership transitions and internal power vacancies at Warren Tech impact the institution's power and influence both internally and externally.

Performance-based funding increased the importance of Warren Tech's ability to exert power and social influence. Externally, Warren Tech's social influence is susceptible to recurrent detrimental narratives about the institution's performance and leadership. The state's open records laws, the publicity around Board of Governors' meetings, and the public narrative around performance-based funding all make it difficult for Warren Tech to exert social influence. This is seen in the institution's difficulty recruiting academically proficient students, as the negative narratives around the institution's performance sow doubt about the institution's academic abilities.

Warren Tech stakeholders hold the emeritus president and his term as a golden era of the institution because this is when most remember the institution being able to exert power and social influence in the State University System. More specifically, the emeritus president and his leadership are treated as a gold standard for all successive presidents because stakeholders can point to multiple instances when he was able to exert power against the state's encroachments. The turnover in the president's office has had a negative influence on the institution's external and internal power relationships. The malicious, public nature of disputes between a former president and the Board of Trustees decreased the institution's social influences. The periods of interim presidency, while stable, still left the institution without a permanent leader at the helm to advocate on its behalf with the state.

Internally, McKenzie's reflection that the frequent transitions between presidents left students in the dark is also applicable to the turmoil and turnover with the student body president position. The former president's and current Board of Trustees' attempts to check student trustees' power, limit students' knowledge of performance-based funding, and prevent student protest are attempts to control students' power and social influence so they do not interfere with the institution's relationship with the state. Finally, this case provides an example of Resource Dependence Theory when unit/departmental power was linked to the unit/department's ability to help the institution increase performance in the metrics. The institution's performance was often cited in critiques of the last president, and in the termination of three academic deans. The creation of an entirely new unit to specifically address strategic planning is also an example of this.

To conclude, Resource Dependence Theory partially explains how public HBCUs exist and adapt in interdependent networks like the State University System. The findings of this study align with literature on internal power at universities which showed that power and social influence become more important tools when organizations are faced with increasing competition for funds, scarcity, (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Hills & Mahoney, 1978), and uncertainty (Pfeffer, Salancik, & Leblebici; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, through the frame of Resource Dependence Theory, we now see that stakeholders harken back to the emeritus president's tenure because it was a time when the institution appreciated a high level of power and social influence. Resource Dependence Theory was particularly helpful in understanding power strongholds as contributors to scarcity and uncertainty within the broader system, namely the Board of Governors and the two distinguished PWIs. Resource Dependence Theory's tenet that

institutions seek to minimize their dependence within the network explains Warren Tech's views of the distinguished institutions, particularly Neighbor State and its president.

Resource Dependence Theory only partially explained the findings in this study. While it moves the study of relationships past the one-to-one binary of Principal Agent Theory, neither theory fully accounts for the contours of real-life power relationships. Power relationships are informed by the social, historical, and interpersonal contexts surrounding all of the interconnected parties. Neither Principal Agent Theory or Resource Dependence Theory addresses the role of race and racism. Using these two theories on their own would overlook the influence of racism on power relationships with and within public HBCUs. For example, Resource Dependence Theory explains why the public HBCU would mistrust the state's motives due to increased accountability and decreased accountability, however, it does not help explain how this is compounded by a history of discrimination and a contemporary lack of diversity in agencies such as the Board of Governors.

Critical Race Theory

Specific to higher education, Patton's (2016, p. 317) Critical Race Theory for Higher Education offers three propositions:

- Proposition 1: The establishment of U.S. higher education is deeply rooted in racism/White supremacy, the vestiges of which remain palatable.
- Proposition 2: The functioning of U.S. higher education is intricately linked to imperialistic and capitalistic efforts that fuel the intersections of race, property, and oppression.
- Proposition 3: U.S. higher education institutions serve as venues through which formal knowledge production rooted in racism/White supremacy is generated (2016, p. 317).

This case study is strongly indicative of the first two propositions. Particularly, from the outset, the establishment of State University System and the founding of Warren Tech are rooted in racism, segregation and white supremacy. We see vestiges of these ills in sustained funding inequities and the continued exclusion of Black people from the Board of Governors and other authorities. Further, performance-based funding reiterates whiteness as property by continuing to elevate the distinguished institutions without accounting for the privilege they have received historically and currently, and continuing to denigrate Warren Tech without accounting for the poverty of its students and the oppression the students and the institution have faced historically and currently.

Performance-based funding functions as a vestige of white supremacy

(Proposition 1). As recounted in Chapter 4, Warren Tech was founded as a segregated institution after the state banned integrated schooling. Over the years, Warren Tech was consistently marginalized, with the state delaying advancements such as offering graduate degrees. As an example of interest convergence, Warren Tech was only allowed graduate and professional programs when Black students attempted to integrate Flagship State. Today, the Board of Governors continues to deny Warren Tech's request for new graduate programs- even those listed as high need for the state's workforce- based on their performance in the state metrics. As evidenced by the state's history and the data collected, higher education in the state is mired in racism. The state and the school remained segregated even past the *Brown vs. Board* ruling and mandate to desegregate, even opening a segregated white institution after the ruling, and paying for Black students to attend other institutions out of state if the programs were not offered at Warren Tech.

On the whole, the findings of this study suggest the creation of the State University System and the Board of Governors sustained the state's legacy of racial inequity. The state continues to reinforce narratives of white supremacy by promoting and favoring PWIs through actions such as naming of Neighbor State and Flagship State as distinguished institutions without recognizing how they have achieved distinction at the expense of Warren Tech and Black students across the state. Further, the findings from this analysis, suggest a minimal effort by the state to acknowledge or remedy longstanding forms of oppression of Warren Tech. Modern day expectations for performance without corrections for historic hinderances to performance are ill-informed. The state's emphasis on rewarding performance-based on merit masks longstanding biases in favoring PWIs and disadvantaging HBCUs.

When the Board of Governors fails to account for Warren Tech's unique mission of access and equity, it suggests a form of colorblind racism. Colorblind racism entails the use of rhetoric touting equality and meritocracy in ways that disadvantage HBCUs and Black populations more generally. From a Critical Race Theory lens, ignoring past and present racism in the State University System only serves to sustain it. The continued exclusion of Black people from the Board of Governors and other authorities is an example of this. Excluding Black people from the board almost ensures the state does not have to account for any oppressive actions (whether intended or not). When viewed through the lens of Critical Race Theory, performance-based funding functions as a vestige of white supremacy by allowing the state to prolong and maintain the supremacy of PWIs by embracing imperialistic and capitalistic efforts in its design.

Performance-based funding exists at the intersections of race, property, and oppression. (Proposition 2). As seen through the lens of Critical Race Theory, the design of performance-based funding utilizes imperialistic and capitalistic measures. For example, the state finances the performance-based funding budget by taking a portion of each institution's base allocations, stripping limited funds from Warren Tech as a colonizer would one of its modest settlements. Much like a meager colony, many of Warren Tech's facilities are outdated and in need of repair. Performance-based funding uses the capitalist notion of whiteness as property, literally allowing Neighbor State to grow and tower of Warren Tech, the PWIs' facilities and students inching closer and closer every day to the HBCU's comparatively meager campus. Performance-based funding also presents whiteness as citizenship for institutions. Indeed, the Minority Serving Institutions in the state, and the smaller regional institutions with more diverse students tend to fall to the bottom of the performance-based funding rankings.

Patton (2016) discusses how the law constructed race as a social concept to regulate citizenship and property, awarded white people full citizenship and excluding all others. Today, with its inherent biases, the performance-based funding model positions Warren Tech as a second-class citizen, denying the institution funding for three of the five years it has been awarded, even despite growth and improvement. Finally, performance-based funding reiterates whiteness as intellectual property. Patton (2016) posits that "Overall, intellectual 'property' in the academy is about more than creative license and ownership. It is also about having the capacity and resources to produce 'valued' knowledge and capitalize on it for increased advantages" (p. 329). Because Warren Tech not produce this "valued" knowledge demanded by the performance-based

funding metrics, the institution is relegated to second class citizenship in the State University System (p. 329).

The performance-based funding system is an imperialistic and capitalistic effort that fuels the intersections of race, property, and oppression but this does not mean it recognizes these elements individually or at their intersections. For example, the model has a metric that addresses income through students who are Pell eligible, but makes no mention of race. The optional metric on race is only considered if an institution selects it. The majority of students at Warren Tech are Pell-eligible. Ignoring race ignores the significant role Warren Tech plays in producing Black graduates for the state, and its impact on these students' social mobility. Illustrating how the many changes to the volatile system have only served to advantage PWIs and diminish HBCUs, when the state changed the language and the calculation of the aforementioned metric from the number of Pell recipients enrolled to the percentage of Pell recipients who graduate, Warren Tech's points stayed the same, but the distinguished institutions and other PWIs gained points. The next section offers recommendations for ameliorating racism- like this example- against Warren Tech, and addressing oppression in the performance-based funding model.

In summary, Critical Race Theory provides the essential framing for addressing race and racism in the HBCU and its policy context which is missing from organizational theories. This theory complements Principal Agent Theory and Resource Dependence Theory to provide a framework that addresses the entirety of the study. Collectively, the framework fostered understanding of how public HBCUs attempt to exert their own social influence and fulfill the interests of the state while managing complex,

interconnected power relationships in a policy context characterized by scarcity, uncertainty, and white supremacy.

Recommendations for State Policy

Performance-Based Funding Must Prioritize Race

States must prioritize race in the design, oversight, and implementation of performance-based funding. Beginning with the state's power relationships, state higher education boards should be representative of the racial demographics of students in the state. With three people of color on the 14-member board, the state in this case is not nearly representative of its incredibly and increasingly diverse and immigrant students. To ensure diversity, states can depoliticize higher education boards by allowing methods outside of gubernatorial appointments. Only four states in the United States have had a Black governor; there are none currently in office. As cautioned by Critical Race Theory, allowing overwhelmingly white politicians to appoint members from their racially uniform personal and professional circles allows not just for racism but cronyism as well. Rather than political appointees who are the governor's friends, fundraisers, and donors, higher education boards could include policy experts, faculty, advocates, or former university administrators from outside the state system. Higher education boards should utilize the knowledge and skills of higher education experts who are well-informed on higher education processes, trends, and racial disparities, but not beholden to any one institution or political official. Prioritizing race in the performance-based funding model can help level the playing field for institutions that serve students of color, and those like Warren Tech that do not have strong relationships with the state- whether through the governor, legislature or other body.

An emphasis on race will not inherently prioritize any one institution or type of institution, but all underserved students across the state. In addition to Black students, Latino and Native American students must also be prioritized in that they too are underrepresented in higher education. States' performance-based funding models, and other goals and mechanisms, should be based not only on the state's demographics, but on distinct goals disaggregated by race. In this study, the higher education committee made up of the heads major systems has also adopted a goal to increase degree attainment in the state, but it is not disaggregated by race. The Board of Governors has a statewide goal for increasing the proportion of Black and Latino degree recipients in the multiyear strategic plan. However, neither of these seems to have influenced the design of the performance-based funding system, or the many changes to the metrics and calculations since its inception. Some claim that the metric which measures the share of students who receive a Pell grant is sufficient for addressing race. However, income is not a proxy for race (Jones et al., 2017). As an alternative to a specific metric on race, some state use weights and premiums for students of color in other metrics. For example, the state in this study could assign additional weight for Black students in its calculation of current metrics on graduation rates, retention rates, and graduation of Pell-eligible students.

Funding Must Be Proportional to Performance

To reward allocations that are more proportional to institutional performance, the state must reorient their understanding and interpretation of performance. Policies must consider inputs such as the race, income, and academic preparedness of an institution's students. Considering inputs as part of performance can inform goals and metrics. It can also help provide funding to offset the cost of educating these students' unique contexts

and challenges, providing much needed funds for the institutions to continuously improve. In this way, performance-based funding has the potential to serve the dual function of need-based aid. Per the last recommendation, states must not conflate race with income. Income is not a proxy for race, but can inform a policy's use of and focus on race, especially a policy based on outputs like performance-based funding. When assessing and rewarding institutions based on an institution's outputs, states must also consider inputs. Metrics and goals assigned should reflect the trends and demographics of the state and the institutions. For instance, the goal for increasing graduation rates at HBCUs like Warren Tech should be based on data for institutions that also serve students who are predominantly Black and low-income.

In addition to the above, there are currently multiple mechanisms which prevent proportional performance-based funding. Warren Tech's current model does not set goals for outputs based on student inputs, nor does it compensate institutions on their own performance. The state in this case study awards new performance-based funding based on its proportionality to the institution's annual base funds. This privileges institutions that already receive large allocations from the state. Accordingly, states may also reconsider policies that reward additional bonus allocation for the highest scoring universities who are already receiving large performance-based funding allocations.

States should abandon high stakes, all-or-nothing rules that prevent institutions from gaining any new funding above the base allocation. Because the institution was among the lowest scoring in the most recent allocations, Warren Tech did not receive any new funding above their base allocation despite having the highest increase in points of any institution that year. Rules which penalize institutions by comparing them to their

peers create potential for these types of contradictions. Comparison is inherent in performance-based funding models which also serve as ranking mechanisms. This type of classification does not speak to the nuances and missions of the various types of institutions in the state. States should abandon any and all rankings functions in performance-based funding. Comparisons and rankings only serve to recreate inequity by denigrating institutions that are already struggling and elevating institutions which are already primed to succeed. Comparisons foster unfair competition and feed negative narratives that lack nuance and understanding of institution's individual performance.

Recommendations for Institutional Policy and Practice

As demonstrated by the work of Broussard (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2019) in Table 8, leadership transitions at HBCUs are all too common. Though the number of campuses impacted has slowed each year, the current rate still means 10% of HBCUs are in transition. The pitfalls of this volatility under the specific context of performance-based funding were detailed in Chapter 5. This section offers recommendations for Warren Tech and other HBCUs to decrease transition overall and increase the ease of specific successions for all of those impacted, notably trustees, administrators, faculty, and students. HBCUs must intentionally build leadership from within.

Engage Purposeful Succession Planning, Training, and Professional Development

Warren Tech already has the skills to start this work. The institution's strategic planning process provides best practices that are transferable to succession planning. The process was led by highly qualified working group of leaders from across the campus. The group engaged a wide array and number of university stakeholders in order to gain a well-rounded view of the institution's strengths and opportunities. As a result,

stakeholders feel pride and investment in the plan and making it work. Similar tactics can be used when seeking a new president, especially when the predecessor is perceived as a legend, like this case study. Engaging the institution's Board of Trustees must be a priority. As was evident in this case, the board has the power to quickly undermine, upend, and undo a presidency.

As HBCU boards tend to involve, senior faculty and administration must work in tandem with them to ensure successful transitions. For public HBCUs in particular, it is necessary to have and work with a sober and realistic understanding of the state's goals as well. As Warren Tech did when strategic planning, the succession process should consider the expectations of the governor, legislature, higher education executive officer, and the related coordinating or governing boards. Incorporating their perspective on the front end shows a commitment to accountability which could decrease the state's inclination to monitor the institution and decrease its autonomy. Succession planning also includes developing the leadership of the faculty and administration, and empowering students as future leaders.

To that end, HBCUs can engage training and professional development for new and current leaders that ensures stakeholders across the institution are invested in strategic goals and prepared to implement them in their work. Workshops for academic department heads and deans could help them identify the key performance indicators their units and departments impact. Every department head could be trained to identify their department's retention, graduation, and employment rates. Chairs could then set goals for their programs based on the performance-based funding metric. This approach fosters leadership and investment across the institution.

Intentionally Build Internal Leadership and Policy Acumen

HBCUs should also focus on building leadership from within. Almost all of Warren Tech's most recent presidents are alumni of the institution, as are many of the current faculty and administration. Most of Warren Tech's presidents have been former faculty members at the institution who also served in academic leadership positions at Warren Tech or other HBCUs. These attributes and experiences are highly valued by HBCU boards. Knowing this, HBCUs only benefit from fostering leadership within. This includes targeted mentorship and professional development for proven leaders who show a commitment to the institution's success, especially through service. Policy acumen must improve for faculty, administration, and students if HBCUs are to survive. Outside of building a leadership pipeline for HBCUs institutional leadership, building this acumen creates informed citizens and voters who can advocate on the institution's behalf. HBCUs must engage stakeholders in training and development for advocacy. HBCU leaders can incentivize advocacy as a fulfillment of service for faculty, and as leadership development for students.

Finally, HBCUs must not be a hinderance to student power. In this case, students accused the Warren Tech administration of keeping students in the dark, interfering in student matters, and simply allowing students' influence to wither over the years. Many HBCUs share a tradition of activism and civic engagement with Warren Tech. HBCUs must deliberately develop student leadership to empower students who are prepared to not only represent student interests during their matriculation, but also have the skill to represent the institution and its mission as alumni. This means training students, giving them opportunities to lead at the student and institutional levels. Many institutions have

begun implementing undergraduate Leadership Studies programs that introduce students to leadership theory and build their leadership acumen. HBCUs may also consider tapping into established national and regional student leadership organizations and associations. These organizations often offer access to resources like training, development, speakers, and online learning portals.

Minimize Resource Dependence on Performance-based Funding

Operationalizing Resource Dependence Theory, Warren Tech and other HBCUs must minimize their dependencies and interdependencies within their states and university systems. True, Warren Tech, like many HBCUs, is heavily reliant on public funding, and should attempt to decrease this dependence by increasing alternative and innovative revenues. There is much advice on increasing financial resources through approaches such as alumni giving and other fundraising. Instead of reverberating this, I offer recommendations on minimizing dependencies on nonfinancial resources. This study showed how performance-based funding has a negative impact on Warren Tech's social capital by limiting the institution's communication with the state, tarnishes the institution's image, and contributing to harmful narratives about the institution's impact. HBCUs must employ innovative and high impact approaches to aggressively build their social and political capital.

Hollywood directors, writers, and wardrobe designers have recently spotlighted Howard University on the big and small screens. Two highly-rated primetime shows, *Black-ish* (Hall & Bray, 2018) and *This is Us* (Tilghman & Olin, 2017), each aired an episode with the central focus on one of the characters choosing to attend Howard. In 2019, the lead actor in the film *Us* wears a Howard sweatshirt (Blum, Cooper,

McKittrick, & Peele, 2019). The film's lead actress and actor were both part of the ensemble cast for *Black Panther* (Feige & Coogler, 2018), the highest grossing film of 2018, and the third highest grossing film of all time. HBCUs like Warren Tech must tap into this upsurge in publicity through building connections and relationships in Hollywood. This could begin with engaging alumni who work in the film and television industries, and extend to recruiting board members who also have philanthropic and fundraising capacity. The lead actor in *Us* wears the Howard sweatshirt in the film's trailer, which was viewed over 19 million times on Twitter. When musical star and artist Beyoncé headlined the Coachella music festival in 2018, her entire show was modeled after the signature HBCU homecoming band show (deGregory, 2019). In 2019, she released a recording of the performance entitled, and a Netflix film chronicling her preparation for the 2018 festival (Beyoncé, 2019; Knowles-Carter, 2019). In the interlude *So Much Damn Swag*, she says

I grew up in Houston, Texas visiting Prairie View. We rehearsed at TSU for many years in Third Ward, and I always dreamed of going to an HBCU. My college was Destiny's Child. My college was traveling around the world, and life was my teacher. I wanted a black orchestra. I wanted the steppers. I needed the vocalists. I wanted different characters, I didn't want us all doing the same thing. And the amount of swag is just limitless. Like the things that these young people can do with their bodies and the music they can play, and the drumrolls, and the haircuts and the bodies, and the- It's just not right, it's just so much damn swag (Beyoncé, 2019).

The current buzz on HBCUs can be a tool for shoring up social capital and decreasing dependencies on the negative narratives spread by the very public nature of performance-based funding. HBCUs can take control of their public image and narratives by utilizing social media and other aggressive and innovative approaches to amplify their image and brand recognition.

These increased publicity efforts can also be used to improve HBCUs' image in the eye of state actors to build their political capital. In this case study, the two distinguished state institutions each had a state caucus of legislative supporters. HBCUs can pursue the same type of support at the state level. There is a good federal example in the bipartisan HBCU Congressional Caucus. Established in the United States Congress in 2015, the bipartisan group currently has over 60 members including two current Democratic candidates, Senator Kamala Harris, a Howard University alumna, and Senator Cory Booker, the son of a Fisk University alumna and a North Carolina Central University alumnus. Legislators at the state and federal level all depend on aids and staffs to inform their policymaking. HBCUs must infiltrate this process. All too often, conversations are conducted *about* HBCUs instead of *with* HBCUs. Too many decisions which impact HBCUs are made without their input or even their consideration. Continuing the trend of developing students as future institutional leaders, HBCUs must also train students as future policy makers and influences as part of broader strategies to increase political influence. HBCUs must amplify their rich traditions of activism and civic engagement by preparing students to represent their alma maters as policy influencers.

Recommendations for Future Research

In seeking to understand how a finance policy influenced internal and external power relationships, this study brought forth two distinct concepts of power: power strongholds, and power vacancies. Additionally, in seeking to understand how theory contributes to concepts of power and change in this case. This section offers considerations for future research around power strongholds, power vacancies, and the three theories employed.

Research on Power Relationships

The concept of power in organizations was considered at length in the literature review which informs this study. Table 3 provided multiple scholars' interpretations of power. This study revealed the presence of entities which strong arm power within a bounded system or organizations. Power strongholds may be policy instruments, such as the strategic plan in this case, or others like court rulings or ongoing cases, laws, rules, or regulations. The power stronghold may also be a person or person(s) as well as an organization or group of organizations. The study also highlighted vacuums of power. In this case, a power vacancy was created by the revolving door of presidents after the retirement of the powerful emeritus president. This suggests that internal vacancies arise in the absence of strongholds. Further research is needed to explore this concept. A study focused primarily on the power relationships in and of themselves could employ the notions of strongholds and vacancies as a conceptual framework.

This case study addressed the influence of performance-based funding on power relationships. As noted throughout, performance-based funding creates an environment of scarcity, uncertainty, and volatility. Due to the state's constant changes to the system and ranking of the institutions, this particular performance-based funding model also created

mistrust and competition. These sentiments and conditions shape the findings of the study, and as such, the current concept of power strongholds and vacancies. Future studies might explore whether these concepts arise in contexts that are not competitive and resource-dependent. Additional scholarship may help unveil criteria to better define and identify strongholds and vacancies. Further, this study positions strongholds as external to the institution at the center of the study, and vacancies as internal to the institution. Research on a different institution, a system of institutions, or entirely different context may reveal internal strongholds and external vacancies. For example, scholars who study community colleges, private institutions, proprietary institutions, or other organizational contexts may utilize these concepts for different results.

This study focused on an HBCU and demonstrated how that mission orientation has a unique impact on power relationships. It is important to note that the findings of this study do not suggest that HBCUs do not have internal power strongholds, or that they are not influenced by external power vacancies. First, while this research centered Warren Tech, as noted in Chapter 3 and in this section, the case also involved actors, interactions and changes within the institution and actors, interactions and changes between the state and the institution. Second, as discussed in Chapter 3, Warren Tech was not selected for its typicality or potential generalizability. A major finding of this study was how data and decisions by the state can contribute to harmful images about HBCUs' value and performance. These findings must not be misconstrued to contribute to this narrative. With these cautions, certainly, the concepts of power vacancies and strongholds can be applied to HBCUs as a group, and to individual institutions. The findings of this study provide multiple lines of inquiry for future study on exploring the rich context of

HBCUs. Regarding the state relationship, as noted in Table 8, there was great deal of turnover across HBCUs from 2014-109. Future research may examine the state's response to executive leadership changes and power vacancies at public HBCUs.

HBCU Student Centered Research

There was much discussion of students' power and how they have been impacted by performance-based funding. There is much need for research that centers HBCU students. When studying HBCUs, scholars must identify and prioritize the roles of race, history, culture, and politics. Specific to performance-based funding, researchers may examine trends in state allocations against institutional spending on student scholarships, student services, and instruction. As noted in the literature review, there are few studies on student leadership and student governance at HBCUs. Future research in student affairs can examine the availability, content, and impact of HBCU student leadership programs. Studies should center the voice of students in ascertaining the experience of HBCU student government leaders and the perceptions of these leaders by the broader student body. Students in this case believed administrators had purposely suppressed student leadership and power, or simply allowed it to fizzle. Research may seek to better understand this at Warren Tech specifically, or to better understand the relationship of HBCU student leaders and administrators more broadly.

Additionally, scholars of student affairs and scholars of university governance alike would find interest in studies on student trustees at HBCUs. On a cursory level, new studies could simply ascertain the presence and prevalence of student trustees at HBCUs across type, size, and location. Research could also address the power of student trustees, examine student voting records, and better understand the experience of serving on an

HBCU institutional board. Finally, it would be remiss not to mention the important issue of sexual assault shared by Hayden. Scholars who study HBCU students and scholars who study sexual assault must push the boundaries of their research and work together to ensure HBCU students are reflected in the literature and broader conversation of campus sexual violence.

Theoretical, Methodological, and Paradigmatic Considerations

The third research question for this dissertation enquired how three differing theories frame. In all, we see that McGuinness' (2011) claim is true: States' budgeting and finance relationships are impacted by their unique history, culture, politics, and economics. No one theory or concept explained in full the facts and dilemmas brought forward in the analysis. Rather, all three theories each informed the case and the resulting findings in various ways. As such, there are a number of theoretical considerations for future study. Regarding Research Dependence Theory, future research may inquire if PWIs are more likely to co-align their interests to the state. Even more poignantly, a cross-state analysis could address whether each state's flagship and/or distinguished institutions are more likely to co-align their interests to the state. This study highlighted how institutions depend on the state for nonfinancial resources. Future study may consider studies on human resources such as the applicants and institutional presidents in this study, or social capital such as the institution's public image and relationships. Some financial resources not often considered are land, especially in respect to gentrification and imminent domain and physical capital, such as facilities for students support services.

Finally, there is much to be considered from a methodological perspective. Much of the research on performance-based funding is quantitative. This case study has shown

the utility of qualitative research on the topic. The case study approach allowed me to focus on “complex, situated, problematic relationships” (Stake, 2000, p. 440). As new states adopt performance-based funding, an ethnographer might approach this issue by embedding themselves at an HBCU to observe changes in culture at the institution. Other qualitative approaches such as a phenomenology of HBCU budget and finance administrators could be considered.

This study also advances the use of Critical Race Theory and its propositions in higher education, at a time when racism, white supremacy, and capitalism are in the national spotlight. By using Critical Race Theory, this study allowed demonstrated how power relationships are racialized. Critical Race Theory also contextualized performance-based funding as part of the history between the state and the institution. HBCUs carry their histories and Blackness in their very name. Research on these institutions must center these concepts as well.

Conclusion

Each state performance-based funding model is unique. Many models, like the one central to this case, were clearly established without a goal- or perhaps even an awareness- of racial equity. However, the outlook is cautiously optimistic. With increased research and advocacy, many states have revamped their orientation toward inequity. Most recently, New Jersey adopted a performance-based funding model which prioritized students of color and low-income students. However, these highlights must not become the central focus of the conversation- or the resultant actions. We cannot admire the bright spots without acknowledging the darkness that surrounds them and why that darkness exists.

Performance-based funding is only one of a plethora of state higher education policies. Established policies like affirmative action are being disputed in the legal system. New state policies like free college tuition programs and statewide attainment goals are increasing in adoption. Conversations are happening at the state and federal level about increasing access and equity for marginalized students like those who are undocumented residents and those who have been impacted by the criminal justice system. Performance-based funding has demonstrated the detriments of allowing policies to function as one-size-fits-all systems for all public institutions in a state, without regard for differences in the institutions and the students they serve.

All policymakers, advisors, and advocates should take heed of this study's counsel: policies which do not explicitly name and emphatically prioritize racial equity, will foster racial inequity. Rather than an impediment to their success, state policies must be a catalyst for increasing equity for the predominantly Black and low-income, first generation Black students at HBCUs. This case study provided insight into the influence of performance-based funding on power relationships at public HBCUs and brought forth ugly truths on mistrust, racism, and nepotism. Students related this policy to academic, financial, and personal difficulties. Researchers, policymakers, practitioners, funders, and advocates of higher education must face these perceptions head on, and ensure new policies do not repeat their mistakes.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Interview Recruitment Email

Hello _____,

(Introduction and context of connection to recipient) I am a doctoral candidate in the Higher Education Leadership program at Florida Atlantic University. My research focuses on how finance policies impact HBCUs. Although I am a Fisk University alumna, my father is an enthusiastic *(Institution Name)* alumna/us and supporter and I hold a deep love for the institution.

The purpose of my dissertation is to understand the impact of performance-based funding on power relationships within the institution, as well as the power relationships between the *(Institution Name)*. I am interested in learning how performance funding has affected power relationships and processes in and between actors like the administration, the board of trustees, faculty senate, and student government. I would love to hear your perspective from your role as *(Role at Institution)*.

I would like to conduct **45-minute** interviews with institutional stakeholders over the next month. The interview will be **confidential**. I will be using pseudonyms for the institution and all participants. **Would you be willing to speak with me some time in the next few weeks?** Your involvement will significantly contribute to the success of my dissertation.

If you are willing, I plan to be in *(Institution City)* the weeks of May 14th-25th. If that window does not work for you, I will be available via phone on weekdays and weekends after June 11th.

I hope that you will be able to participate in this study. Many thanks,
Kayla

Kayla C. Elliott

<phone>

<e-mail>

Appendix B: Interview Protocol

Name of Interviewee: _____

Position: _____

Site: _____

Date: _____ Starting Time: _____ Ending

Time: _____

Introduction

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. As a reminder, this is a 45-minute interview that begins at XX:XXpm and will end at XX: XXpm. Does this time still work for you?

Great! As mentioned in our communications via email, the purpose of this case study is to understand the impact of performance-based funding on power relationships within the institution, as well as the power relationships between the *(Institution Name)*. I am interested in learning how performance funding has affected power relationships and processes in and between actors like the administration, the board of trustees, faculty senate, and student government.

This interview will be **confidential**. I will be using pseudonyms for the institution and all participants. As mentioned in the consent form, I would like to record our conversation. My notes and recordings will not include any identifying information and will only be shared with a transcription service. Do I have your permission to audio record this interview?

Do you have any questions before we begin? Okay, let's get started!

My first few questions will help me understand the context of (Institution Name) and your role at the institution.

1. Tell me about your role at (Institution Name)? How long have you held this position?
2. Did you purposely choose to work at an HBCU? Why?

This study specially focuses on (Institution Name) as an HBCU. My next few questions will revolve around (Institution Name)'s specific context as an HBCU.

3. How do you see (Institution Name)'s status as an HBCU impacting your work? Have you felt that change in any way in recent years?
4. What role does race play in the organizational culture and decision making of (Institution Name)?

One focus of this study is the internal power relationships of (Institution Name). I'm interested in learning about the shared responsibility and cooperative decision making at a university through things like the board of trustees, the faculty senate, and the student government.

5. How would you describe the power relationships of (Institution Name)? Who holds the power at (Institution Name)?
6. Can you tell me about your involvement in any formal governance or decision-making structures at (Institution Name)?
7. What impact have the recent executive leadership changes at the institution had on internal power relationships?
8. How would you describe the power relationships between:
 - a. the (Institution Name) administration and students?

- b. the (Institution Name) administration and faculty?
 - c. the (Institution Name) administration and the Board of Trustees?
 - d. the (Institution Name) faculty and students?
 - e. the (Institution Name) faculty and the Board of Trustees?
9. What factors contribute to these relationships?
10. Have these relationships changed since the implementation of performance-based funding?

We've talked a little about (Institution Name)'s Board of Trustees. I'm interested in hearing your perspective on the (Institution State) Board of Governors and state agencies and policies more broadly.

11. What is your perception of the relationship and power relationships between:
- a. the (Institution Name) administration and the state legislature?
 - b. the (Institution Name) administration and the governor?
 - c. the (Institution Name) administration and the members of the Board of Governors?
 - d. the (Institution Name) administration and staff at the Board of Governors office?
12. What factors contribute to these relationships?
13. How does race play into these relationships?
14. Have these relationships changes since the implementation of performance-based funding?
15. How do you think the executive leadership changes at the institution have impacted power relationships between (Institution Name) and the state?

16. Do you think the (Institution State) Board of Governors considers (Institution Name)'s unique position as the only HBCU in the state when making policy decisions?
17. There are some major elections occurring at the state level this year. How do you see a potential change from a Republican governor or a Republican controlled state legislature changing the power relationships between (Institution Name) and the state?

My case study specifically looks at the impact of (Institution State)'s performance-based funding policy on (Institution Name) on power at the institution.

18. What is your perception of (Institution State)'s performance-based funding policy?
19. What impact do you believe performance-based funding has had on (Institution Name)?
20. Have you observed any connections between performance-based funding and changes of power within the institution?
21. Do you think the state performance-based funding policy fairly measures and rewards (Institution Name)'s outcomes and effectiveness?
22. What do you believe are the student outcomes where (Institution Name) excels?
23. What do you believe are the student outcomes (Institution Name) can improve?
24. What ways do you think (Institution Name) could adapt to the policy?
25. What changes would you suggest to the performance-based funding policy?

Additional Questions for State Board of Governors Representatives (Jones, 2013)

26. In what ways do you think the current performance-based funding policy could *help* (Institution Name)?
27. In what ways do you think the current performance-based funding policy could *harm* (Institution Name)?
28. Who was involved in designing the performance-based funding policy? Were there any representatives from (Institution Name)? Why/Why not?
29. How were participants selected to participate in the designing of the performance-based funding policy?
30. What considerations if any were given to (Institution Name) and their unique mission in the designing of the performance-based funding policy?
31. What do you think will be the impact of the performance-based funding policy on (Institution Name)?

Appendix C: Document Review Protocol

<u>Name/Description of Document</u>
<u>Date Received/Located:</u>
<u>Site:</u>
<u>Significance:</u>
<u>Brief Summary of Contents:</u>

Appendix D: Observation Protocol

<u>Date/Time:</u>
<u>Site/Event:</u>
<u>Notes</u>
<u>HBCU/Race:</u>
<u>Performance-based funding:</u>
<u>Power:</u>
<u>Observation Analysis:</u>
<u>Researcher Effect:</u>

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