You are here

Equity and the formation of revolutionary and conservative coalitions in triads

Download pdf | Full Screen View

Date Issued:
Title: Equity and the formation of revolutionary and conservative coalitions in triads.
Name(s): Messe, Lawrence A., creator
Vallacher, Robin R., creator
Phillips, James L., creator
Type of Resource: text
Date Issued: 1975
Publisher: American Psychological Association
Physical Description: text/pdf[7p]
Language(s): English
Identifier: 2796510 (digitool), FADT2796510 (IID), fau:2647 (fedora)
FAU Department/College: Department of Psychology Charles E. Schmidt College of Science
Note(s): This study tested opposing predictions made by Gamson's Minimum Resource Theory and equity theory concerning the type of coalitions that are formed when members of a triad expect that rewards will be correlated with amounts of individual resources. Results supported equity theory in that subjects, whose work on a pretask was used as the basis for assigning resources in a bargaining game, formed conservative (strong against weak) coalitions. When subjects either did not work or were paid prior to playing the game, results replicated past research in that there was a tendency to form revolutionary (weak against strong) coalitions. Findings were discussed in terms of their implications for the generality of existing theories of coalition formation.
This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. The final published version is available online at and may be cited as Messe, Lawrence A., Robin R. Vallacher and James L. Phillips (1975) Equity and the Formation of Revolutionary and Conservative Coalitions in Triads, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31(6):1141-1146
Subject(s): Social psychology.
Social interaction.
Persistent Link to This Record:
Restrictions on Access: ©1975 American Psychological Association.
Host Institution: FAU

In Collections