

RETHINKING RELIGIOUS COMPETITION: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
IN CATHOLIC- AND ISLAMIC- MAJORITY AUTHORITARIAN STATES

by

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This thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate's thesis advisor, Dr. Timothy Steigenga, and has been approved by the members of her supervisory committee. It was submitted to the faculty of The Honors College and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences.

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ABSTRACT

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In his book *Rendering Unto Caesar*, Anthony Gill suggests that in countries with repressive authoritarian governments, religious competition plays a crucial role in determining whether the dominant religious institution will support or oppose the regime. Gill's theory, however, assumes that religious institutions are unitary rational actors. While this assumption may be reasonable in Catholic countries of Latin America where Gill based his theory on the hierarchical National Bishops' Councils, it is not applicable to Sunni Islamic countries of North Africa because of the decentralized Sunni Islamic religious structure. This finding suggests that although religious actors behave rationally in the religious market to maximize the souls for their religion, not all religious actors necessarily view the same religion and its role in the politics of the society in the same manner: in some cases, intra-religious competition is a larger factor in church-state relations than inter-religious competition.

To my family and friends, near and far

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
LITERATURE REVIEW	5
ARGENTINA	13
FROM POPULISM TO THE “DIRTY WAR”	13
THE MILITARY JUNTA: MACROECONOMIC AUTHORITARIANISM.....	14
THE DIRTY WAR: EXTERMINATION OF A GENERATION	15
IN SUPPORT OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION.....	18
APPLYING THE MODEL	19
CHILE	22
FROM SOCIALISM THROUGH LEGAL MEANS TO A MILITARY COUP.....	22
THE GENERAL: UNDISPUTED LEADER	23
THE PINOCHET ERA: DEPOLITICIZATION BY FORCE	24
IN DEFENSE OF THE CHURCH’S BELIEVERS	27
APPLYING THE MODEL	31
MOROCCO	33
FROM SULTANATE TO KINGDOM	33
THE MONARCHY: CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM	35
LES ANNÉES DE PLOMB: UNDER THE WATCH OF THE MAKHZEN	37
AMĪR AL-MU’MINĪN	40
APPLYING THE MODEL	44

EGYPT.....	46
SECULAR, WITH A TOUCH OF ISLAM	46
THE PRESIDENTS: DOMINATING THE POLITICAL ARENA	48
STATE OF EMERGENCY	51
HOLES IN THE SACRED CANOPY	52
APPLYING THE MODEL	56
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.....	59
WORKS CITED.....	68

RETHINKING RELIGIOUS COMPETITION: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CATHOLIC- AND ISLAMIC- MAJORITY AUTHORITARIAN STATES

Introduction

In many countries, religion plays a vital role in the everyday life of the population. Religion understandably influences the politics of many countries, particularly those where one religion is dominant, forming a “sacred canopy” of shared values (Berger 1969). In Latin America, Catholicism is predominant; in North Africa, Sunni Islam is ubiquitous. Though the two religions differ with respect to several beliefs, the Catholic culture of Latin America and the Islamic culture of North Africa place many similar restrictions on acceptable behavior and promote acceptance of authority figures. Authoritarian governments in the regions, however, do not necessarily interact with religious elements in the same manner. In Chile, the Catholic Church was persecuted under the military government of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), while in Argentina the Church cooperated with the military juntas (1976-1983) (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 121). In Morocco, Islamic parties are permitted to participate in the electoral system provided they accept certain conditions (Bahaji 2009, 4), while in Egypt such parties are banned (Zeghal, *Religion and Politics in Egypt* 1999, 380). This thesis will revisit the religious competition theory expounded by Anthony Gill in his study of the relation between religious institutions and authoritarian regimes in Latin America, and will demonstrate that while Gill’s theory holds in Catholic Latin American countries, the theory faces definitional problems in Islamic North African countries with similar

political climates (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998). I suggest that Gill's theory should be revised to account for the peculiarities of less centralized religions, and challenge his assumption of institutionalized religions as unitary actors. Furthermore, in considering the application of the theory to these Islamic countries and the issue of defining a unitary actor, I suggest that even in the Catholic Church, which seems to be strictly hierarchical and unified, there are multiple actors and intra-religious differences: liberation theologians and charismatic Catholics differ with Vatican Catholics on many issues. A religion directed by various levels of officials, or not explicitly directed by anyone, may *not* act as a unit.

In Argentina during the period of the military juntas, Catholicism remained the dominant religion, unchallenged by other ideologies or forms of Christianity (Gill, *Religion and Democracy* 2002, 201). In Chile, on the other hand, Protestantism was growing exponentially in the years leading up to and during General Augusto Pinochet's rule (Gill, *Religion and Democracy* 2002, 201). The variation in competition while preserving repressive authoritarian rule provides an ideal comparison test case for Gill's theory. In Egypt, a significant portion of the population (approximately 9 percent) describes itself as Coptic Christian rather than Sunni Muslim (CIA 2009). In contrast, Sunni Islam is the dominant religion in Morocco, practiced by 98 percent of the population (CIA 2009); there is no competition even from spiritualist sects since the monarch controls them by placing himself as a spiritual leader (Zeghal, *Islamism in Morocco* 2008, xxiv).

Despite the large body of research on the role of Catholic religious institutions in Latin American politics, there is relatively little comparative research on the interactions between Islamic religious institutions and political regimes in North Africa. This thesis expands analysis beyond the often-studied countries to fill a gap in the research on Islam and politics in North Africa. Scholars have long used Egypt as a means of studying regional phenomena. Morocco, however, has generally been seen as an unimportant, marginal, oilless anomaly, with one of the Middle East/North African region's only surviving monarchies, and with one of the two Sharifi (Prophetic descent) ruling families. Although Morocco may be a minor player in Middle Eastern affairs, as one of few reliably politically stable countries in the region, it has developed more politically and economically than its oil-rich neighbors have and boasts stronger ties with the international community than many other Arab nations. (Los Angeles Times 1987). Today, Morocco is a major non-NATO ally as well as a bilateral and multilateral free trade partner as signatory to both the WTO and free trade agreement with the United States (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2009). Despite its relative international privileges in comparison to some other states, Morocco remains tied to the region through its religion and culture.

The comparison of Egypt and Morocco, a country with competition and one without, is similar to the cases of Chile and Argentina. If Gill's theory holds true in this comparison, researchers can reasonably assume that it will apply to other like-matched comparisons, regardless of geography or religion. Whether the comparison holds or not, however, this research will be a contribution to the debate on the usefulness of economic

approaches for understanding the relations between religious institutions or actors and states. Such research on the role of religion in politics (and particularly concerning Islam) is increasingly important in the twenty-first century as nations face globalization in all of its forms. As politics becomes a more globalized affair, it is essential to understand how different forces and institutions interact with the political sphere around the world in order to adapt policies for optimal success. Few people would argue that Muslims and Jews in Israel or Hindus and Muslims on the Indian subcontinent do not have religious differences. Historically, these groups have also had their political differences, whether the creation of a Palestinian state or simply the character of Indian and Pakistani society and politics. Not all members of any religion, or leaders of one for that matter, agree on the role each religion should play in politics: some believe religion should play a more active role than others do. Religions are *not* monolithic actors with only one goal. They are comprised of multiple leaders who may have disparate aims. This thesis directs our attention to the role these different actors within the same religion play in relations between religious and political actors.

Literature Review

In Latin America of the mid-twentieth century, religious leaders began to raise awareness of the undignified life many people led under authoritarian regimes, and occasionally to engage repressive governments in dialogue to improve the citizens' lives. Bishops' roles in advocating for the people increased significantly after the revisions in Church policy following the Vatican II Council and the Medellin Bishops' Conference in 1968, where liberation theology was a large part of the agenda. Latin American bishops took advantage of the Vatican II reforms to become more involved with their local communities' problems through a "preferential option for the poor" rather than simply teaching the Church doctrine of waiting for a heavenly reward in return for today's suffering. The bishops belonging to the liberation theology movement desired a dignified life *now* for their people, believing that dignity is God's will, not suffering. The bishops created Catholic Base Communities (CBCs) where Catholicism included not only the catechism and worship of God, but also social action to improve daily life.

Gill's model adds to previous scholars' theories that opposition from Catholic religious actors occurs in response to increasing poverty awareness; outrage towards human rights abuses committed by authoritarian governments; and institutional reforms within the Catholic Church following Vatican II, which allowed individual national churches more freedom to address their own problems (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 7, Boff and Boff 1987, 69). As Catholic congregations in Latin America seized the opportunity to address the needs of their poorer members, their leaders were also conscious of the emerging theories of dependent development (Boff and Boff 1987, 68,

Gunder Frank 1986). Liberation theology emerged as one reaction of opposition to ruling governments that could possibly break the cycle of dependence. Eventually suppressed by the institutional Catholic Church for its nonconformist ideas, liberation theology was born out of a desire to improve the daily lives of the poor while also changing government policy.

Though liberation theology itself is a uniquely Latin American concept, the idea of a religious union between ministering to the poor and political activism is not foreign to North Africa. The Muslim Brotherhood, a grassroots organization of believers, also focuses on improving the daily life of common people while advocating for a more equal and Islamic system of government (Glain 2006, 18, El-Ghobashy 2005, 108). Based in Egypt, the Brotherhood maintains branches with varying degrees of political activism in several countries. Caring for the poor, however, remains the main concern.

Other development scholars, such as Walt Rostow, have suggested that increasing modernization will eliminate religion as an important political force (1960). Increasingly, however, scholars are challenging the assumption that modernization leads to the downfall of religion (Benomar 1988, 542). Historical data, such as the emergence of liberation theology in tandem with economic growth policies and the continuing importance of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, have shown the opposite, which seems to support theories of Third World exceptionalism promulgated by Howard Wiarda (1986). Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge, sociologists interested in religion, suggest that societies do not necessarily lose their religious roots, but may instead turn to religion as a reassuring factor in a changing world (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 528). Samuel

Huntington claims, “In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates people” (Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations* 1996, 66).

Governments are aware of the influence religious institutions have over the people. Many regimes have attempted to either co-opt religion to bolster their own legitimacy, or to eliminate a religion that opposed the regime (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 508). In recent decades, Latin American scholars have attempted to explain the resurgence of religion in the region through various models, the most important of which for the purposes of this thesis is the unitary rational actor competition model (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998).

Although the Catholic Church is composed of many individuals with varying political ideologies, the Church’s actions and positions can be determined on an institutional level through National Bishops’ Councils, which present the official position of the Catholic Church (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 9). Since Vatican II, National Bishops’ Councils have been largely responsible for Church positions in each country. When individuals do not agree, their complaints are normally handled within the hierarchical system, allowing the Church to present a unified front (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 9). This unified front becomes even more important as the Church faces competition from other religious groups, since intragroup differences are easily exploited to weaken the institution (Gill, *Religion and Democracy* 2002, 196).

Sunni Islam, on the other hand, does not have the strict hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church; in fact, there are no religious institutions directly comparable between the two other than at the most basic, community level. However, since this thesis

is concerned with church-state relations rather than church-society relations, for the purpose of this argument, I will suggest that each Muslim country's '*ulamā*' Council (or simply '*ulamā*') can be considered as roughly equivalent to the National Bishops' Council in a Catholic-majority country. The Council of '*ulamā*' is composed of imams (Islamic preachers) who are recognized as extremely knowledgeable in theology, jurisprudence, Islamic heritage, etc. Historically, '*ulamā*' were recognized by the community as they gained knowledge and were not appointed. Unlike bishops, however, the modern-day '*ulamā*', as the members of the '*ulamā*' are known, are often appointed by the national government rather than by an international religious authority (i.e. the Pope or the Vatican in Catholicism). Even in Muslim majority states where the state itself is technically secular, such as Egypt, the government subsidizes religious scholars, such as al-Azhar's '*ulamā*' (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 373). As such, the '*ulamā*' are dependent upon the government, but remain the religious authorities of the nation (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 375). As the religious authorities, they have the power to support or, less frequently, oppose the regime from within the government itself (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 383).

According to the religious economy model, new religions are constantly replacing old ones to satisfy popular demand, meaning religious competition is increasing (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 2). Adaptation is key to the survival of religion. When a faith has become too worldly or secularized and no longer fulfills the spiritual needs of a society, the religion may seem to decline, but a revivalist sect that had quarreled with the traditional religion and may split off and grow, addressing the new needs, desires, and

beliefs of the population (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 2). For example, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints seemed to decrease in size with the creation of its splinter group the Fundamentalist LDS Church; Catholicism seems to have decreased as well across the centuries, but the number of Christian sects, including liberation theology, derived across multiple generations from Catholicism, has increased substantially. Religion, then, is not dying but merely adapting to the needs of the consumers.

In addition, several authors have examined the effects of a single religion on a single state, and the role that the religion's institutions have played within the state. According to scholars, in a country where one religion enjoys a monopoly of the religious market, the religion will give less attention to the needs of the population and focus more on itself as an institution and the benefits it can obtain (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 169). For example, in Egypt, the '*ulamā*' sought to maintain its existence under Nasser's socialist programs, and so was willing to confer legitimacy on the regime's actions, including the dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic party with widespread popular support (Zeghal, *Religion and Politics in Egypt* 1999, 374). The Egyptian government maintains a monopoly on religion and will not allow a political party with a religious base to compete in elections, and to coexist, the '*ulamā*' support this position. The Egyptian government's monopoly of the internationally recognized Azhar institution allows the government to persecute the Muslim Brotherhood and prevent the group from challenging their authority despite its popularity.

Gill argues that in a repressive state, when a religion, namely the Catholic Church, faces competition for souls from other religions, it will follow a rational actor model

(Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 11). The Church's leaders, therefore, who are "subject to many of the same concerns and constraints as their secular counterparts," will aim to maximize their share of the religious market, supporting the repressed popular classes by opposing the regime while strengthening the Church's position amongst believers (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 11). In a repressive state with religious competition, then, according to Gill's model, the church should oppose the government to maintain a majority of the religious market. When there is no significant religious competition, the Church can continue to ally itself with the repressive government without fear of losing souls (the "goods" in a religious market) to other religions.

Gill suggested that the reason for religious authorities' decisions to support or oppose a government is the absence or presence of religious competition (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 7). If his theory is true, the religions in question should not matter. Many scholars, such as Nazih Ayubi, a well-known scholar in international relations and the politics of Islam, believe that Islam creates a different kind of politics by its very nature:

Many Muslims therefore believe in the holistic nature of Islam in the sense of its being a way of life and not simply a religion (*dunya' wa din*). [...] In Islam, separation of religion from politics ... is, to say the least, extremely difficult; furthermore, there is a large question mark in many Muslim circles as to whether it would be either desirable or appropriate. (Ayubi 1991, 51)

Does Gill's theory of religious competition hold true outside Latin America? Do different religions behave similarly when faced with a correspondingly right-wing authoritarian and repressive state? If the leading political actors in Muslim majority states believe that politics and religion are necessarily intertwined, is Gill's model still valid? This thesis

argues that religious competition is an important factor in determining church-state relations, regardless of what religion the “church” represents. However, although religious actors behave rationally in the religious market to maximize the souls for their religion, not all religious actors necessarily view the same religion and its role in the politics of the society in the same manner: in some cases, intra-religious competition is a larger factor in church-state relations than inter-religious competition.

This thesis will apply Gill’s model of religious competition to four states: two Latin American Catholic majority countries, and two North African Sunni Islamic majority countries. In Argentina, Catholicism is the unquestionable majority religion and faces no coherent opposition from Protestants, Jews, Muslims or other groups despite a history that encouraged immigration. With no opposition to the Catholic Church, Gill’s model predicts the clergy would support an authoritarian government. In Chile, on the other hand, though Catholicism is still the majority, Protestantism has increased. This growth is a threat to the Catholic Church, which is losing members to conversion. Gill’s model predicts the Church in this case will oppose the unpopular government. In Egypt, though Sunni Islam is the dominant religion, it is by no means the only one. Coptic Christians form a significant and vocal portion of the population at 9 percent. Though the percentage of Coptic Christians is relatively stable, the two vie for political influence. Gill’s model predicts that in Egypt, like Chile, the church (or in this case its representative, the *‘ulamā’*) will oppose an authoritarian government. Morocco, however, has no contentious religious minority. Though the Jewish community was sizeable before Israel’s creation, it has since dwindled. Despite the loss in size over the past decades,

members of the community remain influential independently; the community as a unit, however, poses no threat to the dominant religion. Gill's model, therefore, would predict that in nearly competition-free Morocco, the religious institution would support the state.

I will proceed with a country-by-country examination of the cases, including a relevant history of each, a description of the authoritarian government, information on the government's repression, the role of the religious institution (both historical and contemporary to the repression), and an in-depth application and analysis of Gill's model.

Argentina

From Populism to the “Dirty War”

Since independence from Spain in 1816, Argentina has experienced several cycles of elected and autocratic governments. In September of 1930, a military-aristocratic alliance ousted the elected government. The military leaders, however, disagreed on how to govern the country and civilians regained control (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 84). Nonetheless, corruption was rampant, and facing World War II, the military again seized control in 1943 “to revamp the entire political structure” (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 85). The military, though, did not foresee the growing popular movement led by one of its own, Colonel Juan Perón.

Perón, an army officer with nationalist and populist tendencies, was elected to the presidency in 1946 with a majority of votes. His first few years in office were successful, but the economy began to falter in 1949, forcing Perón to adopt stabilization measures, though paradoxically he maintained his popularity with the working class (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 87). After Perón “attacked” the Church by legalizing divorce and taking control of religious schools, supported by the working class, the conservative military refused to back down from its threat of civil war (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 89). Perón was exiled, and the military again took control in 1955.

Through the remainder of the 1950s and 1960s, the military continued to play an important role in ostensibly civilian controlled governments in order to protect against the threat posed by Perón and his programs (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 92). A military coup

in 1966, though repressive and nearly unleashing a civil war, still did not compare to the military dictatorship that followed ten years later (Skidmore and Smith 2005).

In 1972, the military government, facing increasing threats from revolutionaries and economic inflation, allowed the popular Perón to return and compete in the 1973 elections, which he won with his wife Isabel as vice-president. After Perón's unexpected death, which left the inept Isabel as President, the revolutionaries gained ground and the economic situation deteriorated, giving the military the necessary legitimacy to again overthrow the government of Argentina and inaugurating what would become known as the "dirty war" (1976-1983).

The Military Junta: Macroeconomic Authoritarianism

The junta that seized power in 1976 did not intend to relinquish control to a civilian leader as it had in the past, since the civilian leadership had repeatedly demonstrated its inability to govern the country acceptably (Pion-Berlin 1985, 55). When General Jorge Videla's five-year term as president ended, the military chose a successor from among its own ranks (Pion-Berlin 1985, 62).

Under Videla, the regime insulated itself from general opinion and discontent, which allowed the regime to use repressive tactics to enforce its unpopular policies focused on improving macroeconomic indicators (Pion-Berlin 1985, 60). The regime's monopoly of the repressive apparatus allowed it to maintain this global, non-society based focus, disregarding the negative effects many policies had on large segments of the population (Pion-Berlin 1985, 71). Though the junta laid out a plan of action, the Act of

National Reorganization or the *Proceso*, the *Proceso* did not include any limits on the power of the regime; it was purely a list of economic, social, and political goals that needed to be accomplished at all costs, including the cost of thousands of Argentine lives (Pion-Berlin 1985, 57, 71).

The Dirty War: Extermination of a Generation

Particularly during the first four years when the regime was most united in purpose, the military junta specialized in repressive tactics: the military was willing to use any means to minimize threats (Pion-Berlin 1985, 55, Knudson 1997, 93). Argentines originally welcomed the military as an institution that would save the country from the disarray of the Isabel Perón years and her inability to fight the guerrillas or restore economic stability (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 98, Knudson 1997, 95). However, as Ernesto Sábato, the head of the *Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas* (CONADEP), pointed out, the Argentine public soon regretted their previous support:

The military dictatorship unleashed a terrorism infinitely worse because the army, a gigantic power with the total impunity allowed under an absolute state, started an infernal witch-hunt in which not only the terrorists but also thousands and thousands of innocent persons paid with their lives. (Sábato 1985, 5)

Though the country had suffered atrocities committed by the guerillas during Isabel Perón's tenure, those acts could not compare with the horrors the military government perpetrated in the name of restoring order. With the revolutionaries quickly contained, the military based its legitimacy on an economic program that was unpopular and vehemently opposed by many sectors of society, forcing it to "extend its repressive

apparatus to the society at large” (Pion-Berlin 1985, 71). Any person with active ties to civil society groups was liable to disappear for expressing an opinion that was opposed to the government. Young professionals, especially journalists who reported the truth and those in the arts who dared to criticize the government, as well as academics, university students, community activists, and the working class were the most affected by the regime’s repression (Knudson 1997, 94). According to CONADEP, 150 of the disappeared were children under fifteen, while another 268 were pregnant women (many of whom gave birth in captivity) (Brysk 1994, 690).

Under the juntas of the dirty war, disappearances were extensive. Abductions during daylight hours from places full of witnesses were common, as were nighttime abductions (Knudson 1997, 94). Those abducted were then imprisoned in one of 365 secret detention centers without charge, without communication, and without legal protection, providing opportunity for systematic torture (Knudson 1997, 94, Dahl and Garro 1987, 320). Inevitably, prisoners would die. Their bodies would be buried in unmarked mass graves, thrown into the streets as “victims of ‘shootouts’ between the police and urban guerillas,” or thrown into the ocean with no hope of their families’ ever recovering a body for burial (Knudson 1997, 94). According to Adolfo Francisco Scilingo, a former officer in the Navy, those thrown into the Atlantic were not even always dead: in 1995, he claimed that “1,500 to 2,000 live and drugged bodies of victims had been jettisoned into the Atlantic from planes” (Knudson 1997, 93).

The repression, however, was not only physical. The military regime used fear as a major weapon against the population (Knudson 1997, 105). According to testimony

from officers, the military actively pursued a policy of instilling fear to ensure obedience (Timerman 1981). Although the disappearances and deaths were pervasive and well-known events in the society, the media reported nothing: families could get no information on their disappeared relatives from the normally informative newspapers (Knudson 1997, 102). Newspapers were unofficially ordered to censor their coverage of the military's actions, via an unsigned memo, which forbade them "to inform, comment or make reference to the death of subversive elements and/or the armed and security forces in these incidents" (Graham-Yooll 1982, c. 93). Instead, rumor became fact, which allowed the military to control the society through fear (Knudson 1997, 95). Witnesses were afraid to act during abductions on behalf of the abducted afterwards out of fear for their own safety (López 1988, 514): officially, those who disappeared were terrorist criminals who were not abducted by the regime, they just ceased to exist.

At the immediate conclusion of the war in 1984, the *Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas* (CONADEP) named 8,960 persons as killed or missing (CONADEP 1984, 372-374). The report recommended the prosecution of 1,351 officials (military and police) for crimes during the era (Dahl and Garro 1987, 320). Testimony in interviews from officers over the coming decades, however, has led to estimates as high as 30,000, which has become the accepted figure (Argentina - Patriotic Dates 2005, Knudson 1997, 93). One mother, who used her daughter's disappearance as a motivation to serve her community lamented, "The best of a whole generation was exterminated" (de Israel 1990).

In Support of the Catholic Religion

Under the 1819 Argentine Constitution, Roman Catholicism was the state religion, supported and protected by the state, but all Argentines, including immigrants, also enjoyed freedom of religion (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 151). In theory, the president retained the power to appoint clergy, though in practice the clergy provided a list to the government; any appointments depended upon approval from the Vatican (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 151, 160). Traditionally, the Vatican appointed clergy with no say from national officials. In 1822, the state expropriated Church properties and submitted religious orders to regulation, but also paid salaries of the clergy and funded many activities such as festivals (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 151). With these modifications, the clergy became paid functionaries of the state. The 1853 Constitution disestablished Catholicism as the official state religion while simultaneously introducing the requirement that the president must be Roman Catholic, even if constitutional freedom of religion was guaranteed (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 153). Though Catholicism was no longer the official state religion, the proviso relating to state support of Catholicism remained intact (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 152). In 1994, the Constitution was again amended to remove many conditions specifically referencing the Catholic Church: the current Constitution only retains the stipulations for the economic support of the Church (Constitution of the Argentine Nation 1994). The resulting current Constitution, though it guarantees religious freedom and does not establish Roman Catholicism as the state religion, nevertheless links Catholicism and the state through the provisions requiring the support of the Catholic Church.

Reflecting its heritage as a Spanish colony that had later encouraged immigration from select countries, 97 percent of the population identifies as white or of European origin, while the remaining 3 percent claims mixed heritage or a non-white classification (CIA 2009). As of 2009, Argentina remains 92 percent Roman Catholic, with small minorities of Protestants (2 percent) and Jews (2 percent) (CIA 2009). Various other religions complete the society. In the earlier 1990 World Value Survey, 92.1 percent of the population identified as Roman Catholic, with the remaining 7.9 percent of the population identifying as Protestant (World Value Survey 1990). Differences in the percentage of Protestants can likely be attributed to differences in surveying methods and available categories. Surveys for 1981's Catholic Almanac, after 4 years of the junta, reported the same percentage of Catholics (92.1 percent), though Protestant percentages were not reported (Catholic Almanac 1981). While we cannot automatically assume that the remaining portion was Protestant (there are still Jewish and Muslim minorities), assuming that the trend from 1990 to 2009 holds true, only a small portion would belong to these other categories. In 1970, 3.7 percent of the population identified as Protestant (D. B. Barrett 1982). Presumably, a large part of the remainder would be Catholic.

Applying the Model

Given the dominance and stability of Catholicism in the country (92.1 percent, 1981), Gill's model predicts that despite the regime's authoritarian and repressive character, the Church will cooperate with the military regime in order to maintain its own privileged political status. After Perón's attempt to minimize the Church's power, the

bishops allied with the military and spoke in support of the coup to preserve their own power (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 161). The Church continued to support the authoritarian military regime of the dirty war despite the suffering of the population since it did not need to worry about competition from another religious group trying to steal souls, which would have given the church incentive to risk its own position in favor of its followers (Gill, *Religion and Democracy* 2002, 195). In fact, Bishop Victor Bonamín equated the dirty war to a religious struggle in defense of the Church:

The antiguerrilla struggle is a struggle for the Argentine Republic, for its integrity, but for its altars as well. ... This struggle is a struggle to defend morality, human dignity, and ultimately to defend God. ... Therefore, I pray for divine protection over this “dirty war” in which we are engaged. (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 149)

The Church was so intimately allied with the leaders of the coup that two of the military leaders visited leaders of the Church to explain their plans and ask for consent to proceed (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 163). Furthermore, CONADEP recorded testimonies placing clergy and high-ranking Church officials in detention centers not only to visit with military leadership but also to ask for the prisoners’ cooperation (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 164). The Church knew what was happening in Argentina, and who was culpable, but the bishops chose not to act (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 164).

When the bishops did release statements referencing disappearances and abuses of the era, they framed the statements according to government policy, blaming guerillas instead of the military, despite the fact that guerilla groups had quickly been subdued after the military’s assumption of power (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 164). The Church ignored the abuses of the government with impunity since no other group in the

religious market could conceivably challenge the Church's monopoly on Argentine souls. Recognizing the depth of the Church's involvement, in 1995 the bishops asked for forgiveness from the Argentine populace for their complicity and "sinful participation" in the atrocities of the dirty war (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 166).

Chile

From Socialism through Legal Means to a Military Coup

In 1818, Chile won its independence from Spain and quickly moved towards democratic politics. By the 1930s, the Communist party had become an important part of the political system, even forming a component of the coalition holding the presidency from 1938 to 1947 (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 120). Though the popular Communist party was outlawed in 1948, the political system maintained its relevance to Chilean society: turnout in elections remained high and results were accepted, parties competed fiercely for centrist voters and attempted to form alliances, since the number of parties made it impossible for any individual party to gain a majority (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 122).

Since the many parties represented several different general locations on the political spectrum, it became increasingly difficult for even a coalition to achieve a majority; most victors were sworn in with a plurality of votes rather than a majority during the 1950s-1970s (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 122). In 1958, Jorge Alessandri (rightist) was elected president with only 31.6 percent of the vote. His competitors, Salvador Allende (Socialist-Communist alliance) and Eduardo Frei (Christian Democrat, centrist), received 28.9 percent and 20.7 percent respectively (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 123). Despite the name, the Christian Democratic Party was not actually allied with the Church; the party leaders wanted to appeal to Christian ideals in creating a centrist and reformist party (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 124). The long history of competitive democracy minimized the Church's role in politics as citizens freely chose to support

unallied parties.

In the 1970 election, after both Alessandri and Frei had served as president and failed to meet expectations, Allende received a small plurality of votes (36.3 percent Allende, 34.9 percent Alessandri, 27.8 percent Tomic for the Christian Democrats) (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 127). Allende embarked on a socialist program, which included nationalizations without compensation and land reform programs. The government was soon ostracized internationally and facing inflation and demonstrations at home (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 129). Throughout 1973, protests both against Allende's policies and in favor of them were common (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 131). On 11 September 1973, Allende was overthrown by a military coup, which installed General Augusto Pinochet as leader (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 133, Santos 2005, 2).

The General: Undisputed Leader

As General Augusto Pinochet seized power, he ordered political parties to disband, centralizing his own power. Some authors see this consolidation of power in one person as a decrease in the institutionalization of the state, as previously parties had been the main civil society institutions linking citizens and government (P. S. Barrett 2000, 4). Others claim Pinochet's actions cannot be considered deinstitutionalization as the parties had ceased performing their demand-aggregating function before Pinochet came to power, and that the parties' breakdown caused the military to step in (Garretón 1986, 98). Regardless of the level of institutionalization of the state, Pinochet undeniably succeeded in centralizing power and leading the country through his programs, though at the cost of

civil liberties, such as the right to organize. As a result of various Pinochet policies, the military was the only institution that retained any viable power, and that power was centralized in its chief, General Pinochet himself. The strong centralization, however, was achieved through the repression of opposition forces and the suspension of civil liberties.

The economic policies implemented by Pinochet were likely unpopular as they increased poverty without increasing welfare services (Santos 2005, 10), but there was no opportunity to express dissatisfaction during most of his tenure, as his coercive force was supreme. It is possible that the authoritarian nature of Pinochet's regime and its strongly repressive tactics allowed Pinochet to implement economic reform policies without regards to the social effects of those policies. When the economy faltered in the early 1980s due to a combination of the new economic model and the oncoming debt crisis, opposition groups from the business and middle classes began asserting demands for change, culminating in mass protests in 1983, ten years after Pinochet seized power (Garretón 1986, 112-3). Though the opposition's demands focused on policy changes rather than a change in government, they were met with further repression (Garretón 1986, 112-4). As an acknowledgement of the unrest, however, Pinochet offered a false opening of the political system (Garretón 1986, 112-4).

The Pinochet Era: Depoliticization by Force

Pinochet's regime has been characterized as one of the most repressive in recent history, with few political or civil freedoms. Under Pinochet's regime, Freedom House

rated the country consistently in the “Not Free” category between 1973 and 1978, and in the lower end of “Partially Free” from 1979 to 1988, when a plebiscite vote ordered the return to civilian power for 1990 (Freedom House 1973-2009, Santos 2005, 3).

In addition to banning organizations, Pinochet eliminated political opposition, such as those politicians loyal to President Allende, by arresting activists under the authority of the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), which he directly commanded (P. S. Barrett 2000, 4, Garretón 1986, 105). In the years leading to the military coup, Allende’s policies had caused massive civil discontent and riots, which President Allende was powerless to control or suppress (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 130). With the military in power under General Pinochet, such demonstrations quickly disappeared, as political opposition leaders were systematically imprisoned by Pinochet’s forces.

The need to imprison increasing numbers of political opponents suggests that some of the policies enacted were unpopular, but the population was unable to organize to force change of any kind due to the repression coordinated by the authoritarian Pinochet regime. Later resurgence of demonstrations was easily controlled, as Pinochet managed not only to centralize political (and coercive) power in the military, but also to personalize the military regime as his own (P. S. Barrett 2000, 4, Garretón 1986, 100). Opposition to Pinochet and his methods was not tolerated; such opposition inherently implied opposition to the military rule that had restored social and economic order after the turmoil of President Allende’s term. Politically, Pinochet directed these economic changes and was tacitly accepted for the majority of his time in office, even if the population did not agree with his methods or policies, which was a strong change from

the rampant demonstrations of the Allende years.

Over the extended period of Pinochet's repressive rule, however, citizens began to resent the restrictions on liberties and the blatant violations of human rights, eventually leading the population to desire competitive political life without Pinochet (Santos 2005, 3). The Chilean Bishops' Conferences allied with the population and expressed much of its discontent through condemnations of the neoliberal economic policies, social control tactics, disappearances, and human rights abuses (Gill, Religion and Democracy 2002, 200). The Catholic Church also helped organize opposition for the plebiscite vote that eventually returned civilian government (Santos 2005, 3). Of course, such opposition ensured that the Church would also be repressed (Gill, Rendering Unto Caesar 1998, 121). Samuel Huntington has theorized that once the economy is sufficiently stabilized and accepted by the population, the authoritarian regime may lose its legitimacy as the provider of order and the population may increase demands for the rights that had been sacrificed in the name of the modernization project (Huntington, Political Order 1968, 8). Huntington's theory is supported by the actions of individuals in Chile, but the Catholic Church had expressed its disapproval even before the economy recovered as soon as the violence of the regime became clear.

After the 1988 plebiscite resulted in a "No" vote for Pinochet's continued "presidency," Chileans elected Patricio Aylwin (Christian Democrat). President Aylwin authorized the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation to prepare a report documenting abuses committed during the Pinochet regime, but according to Antonia Santos's research, both the military and the Association of Family Members of Disappeared

Detainees rejected the report as inaccurate (Santos 2005, 13). The report was based on limited criteria for inclusion and did not assign blame: “The only registered cases are those of *sufficiently documented* death or disappearance; there is no mention of the criminal responsibility of individuals, nor does the report deal with cases of torture, mistreatment, or deprivation [*sic*] of liberty” (Santos 2005, 13).¹ Even with these limited criteria, the Commission “sufficiently documented” 2,279 deaths, 957 disappearances, and 1,068 torture executions (Santos 2005, 13).

In Defense of the Church’s Believers

Under the 1818 Constitution, Catholicism was established as the state religion. Though there were several changes in government during the turbulent decades following independence, the authority of the Church was not challenged until the mid-1800s when the Catholic monopoly was disestablished in favor of freedom of worship (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 123). With this revision, foreign-born Protestants were allowed to practice their faith openly, though Chileans were still officially Catholic. During the 1880s, the *Leyes Reformas Teológicas* transformed many church functions into civil affairs, such as registry of births, marriages, and deaths (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 115, Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 125). Fifty years later, under Alessandri and the 1925 Constitution, the Church was completely disestablished and freedom of conscience became law, allowing native-born Chileans to choose their own religion (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 126).

After disestablishment, the Church cooperated with the government and society

¹ Emphasis mine

elites for a period in order to combat the Communist threat (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 128). The bishops soon realized that their poorer members were easily converted to other ideologies, whether Communist or Protestant (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 129). In 1952, when the bishops published a list of threats to Catholicism, their primary concern was not Communism, but Protestantism (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 135). By the time Allende, a Socialist, won the presidency in 1970, the Church was willing to cautiously support him publicly, since his policies were geared towards helping the poor, just as the Catholic Church taught (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 140).

Traditionally, Chilean Independence Day was celebrated with a special Catholic ceremony known as a *Te Deum*. In 1971, the *Te Deum* ceremony included multiple denominations, Protestant and Roman Catholic (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 141). When General Pinochet and the military seized power in 1973, the Church supported the coup at first in the rational interest of achieving favor and believing the regime's stated timeframe. The bishops published a letter two days after the coup asking "citizens to cooperate with the armed forces so that 'Chile can return to institutional normality, as the participants of the military junta have promised'" (Oviedo 1974, 174). By 1975, when the Catholic Church was firmly in opposition to the military regime, the *Te Deum* Independence Day ceremony was celebrated by evangelicals who supported Pinochet and gave him a religious blessing for his actions (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 143). This celebration of a Catholic religious ceremony associated with a state holiday by Protestant groups instead of Catholic ones suggests that the Protestant groups exercised more power.

However, as Pinochet's policies began to negatively affect the lower classes, and as the repressive apparatus began to target any opposition, including those working with the Church, the bishops began to work against the regime (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 142). The Catholic Church was instrumental in the National Committee to Aid Refugees (CONAR) and the Committee of Cooperation for Peace (COPACHI), both of which tracked abuses and aided individuals who had been targeted by the military repression (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 142).

Helping those the military had labeled as threats set the Church in clear opposition to the regime. The bishops did not, however, only work behind the scenes. They also publicly denounced the injustices of Pinochet's economic policies and his methods in enforcing order, which had led to widespread human rights abuses (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 145). Several well-known clergy used their weekly homilies to deliver anti-government messages, and the bishops took the daring step of excommunicating a member of the security forces for his harassment of Church officials (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 145).

Since the Catholic Church was in opposition to the regime, some of the Protestant churches took the opportunity to fill the religious legitimacy void. In 1974, the group of Protestant churches aligned with the regime began accusing the Catholic Church of harboring Marxists, giving the regime reason to repress the Church's members and especially its leaders (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 143).

The religious legitimacy the Pinochet-allied churches offered was crucial for the repression of Catholic opposition in a country where despite religious competition,

Catholicism remained the majority religion. In 1978, approximately 90 percent of the country was Roman Catholic, with only 6 percent Protestant (The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1978). Throughout most of Pinochet's rule, statistics indicate 89 percent of Chileans identified as Catholic while the remaining 11 percent claimed a Protestant religion (CIA 1982, CIA 1986, The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1990). Other non-governmental surveys of the 1980s suggest slightly lower percentages for Roman Catholicism (85.5 percent in 1981 to 80.4 percent in 1992) and sharp growth in Protestantism (from 16.8 percent in 1970 to 19.2 percent in 1980).² The 1990 World Value Survey lists 83.7 percent Catholic and 16.3 percent Protestant (Gill, Religion and Democracy 2002, 203).

The differences in these statistics can likely be attributed to an official government survey completed at one point in time and not repeated for several years, but from which results were used over the course of a decade in official publications. It is unlikely that the percentages would have stayed precisely the same over such a prolonged period, particularly given the different measures obtained by other surveyors. The snapshot surveys reported by Gill may provide a more time-sensitive description of the changing religious composition of the society. It appears, therefore, that the dominant Catholic Church was losing its monopoly, specifically as Pinochet's regime persisted and given that Chile had legalized Protestant denominations in the 1930s (Willems 1967, Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 126).

In fact, according to Timothy Steigenga and Kenneth Coleman, Protestants were

² Figures are quoted from Anthony Gill's Religion and Democracy chapter, page 203. Catholic estimates from the Catholic Almanac, Protestant figures from David B. Barrett.

becoming more politically active in the years leading up to Pinochet's coup, bringing them into direct competition with the Catholic majority (Steigenga and Coleman 1995, 471). According to data obtained by Steigenga and Coleman, in 1972 83.4 percent of the capital city, Santiago, was Catholic (Steigenga and Coleman 1995, 471). Though the percentage dropped to 70.1 percent of the city in 1991, Catholics remained politically active while Protestants expressed disinterest in politics (Steigenga and Coleman 1995, 471, 476). Though the percentage of Catholics has decreased across the decades, Catholics remain active in politics while "growing" denominations have decreased their political participation. As of the 2002 census, the figures stand at Roman Catholic 70 percent; Evangelical 15.1 percent; Jehovah's Witness 1.1 percent; other Christian 1 percent; other 4.6 percent; none 8.3 percent (CIA 2009).

Applying the Model

In a country such as Chile, where the government is both authoritarian and repressive, and the dominant religious institution (Catholicism) faces increased competition from upstart denominations, Gill's model predicts that the religious institution will oppose the government in the interest of maintaining its share of the religious market. In Chile, Gill's prediction is precisely what we observe.

Under General Augusto Pinochet, the government transformed from a democracy that had elected a Socialist to the presidency to an authoritarian dictatorship that repressed all opposition groups in the interest of erasing the dangerous ideas of socialism and Marxism. One of the groups that denounced Pinochet's treatment of the population,

especially the lower classes, was the Catholic Church, an institution that had previously worked with the elites and disregarded its poorer constituents. However, with the discovery of the growth of Protestant denominations and communism among the lower classes in the mid-1900s, the Church had refocused its priorities and begun catering to the masses with a social welfare program to retain members. The Church became involved in organizing the poorer segments of society for collective action under its Catholic Action programs, such as *Joventud Obrera Católica* (JOC), *Joventud Agrícola Católica* (JAC), and *Acción Sindical Chilena* (ASICH) [*sic*] (Gill, Rendering Unto Caesar 1998, 129). In this manner, the Church became the point of contact, organizer, and advocate for workers' rights rather than one of its competitors. When Pinochet began targeting lower class citizens with his economic policies, and disappearing their leaders, the Catholic Church could either support the government and lose its newfound constituents, or side with the people and oppose the government. As a rational actor in the religious market looking to maximize its consumers, the Catholic Church chose to place itself in opposition to the government.

Morocco

From Sultanate to Kingdom

Under the protectorate, the French government assigned a governor to the area to oversee French business interests. However, the French also permitted traditional rule to continue in the form of a sultanate in order to maintain the support of the population (El Mansour 1994, 58). The Alaouite family, which held the sultanate and continues to hold the monarchy, claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad and had ruled for four centuries prior to French colonization (El Mansour 1994, 53). This lineage and history provided the Sultan and his family with immense symbolic power over the population. In fact, the motto of the country remains “*Allāh, al-waṭan, al-malik*,” meaning God, fatherland, and king. These three items are sacrosanct in Moroccan society; to malign any one of the three, even unintentionally, can be a criminal act.

Historically, however, the sultanate and political power in general were not hereditary, with the ‘*ulamā*’ designating a new ruler upon the death of the current one, though the current ruler may try to influence the ‘*ulamā*’ to choose the person he desires by placing the person of his choice in charge of the military (Perrault 1990, 12). In fact, inheritance of power by birthright is forbidden in Sunni Islam, though the ‘*ulamā*’ may choose the son of the ruler if he is the most suitable candidate (Perrault 1990, 50). The ‘*ulamā*’ may decide not to choose a direct descendent of the current ruler in favor of another family member, thus allowing the dynasty to continue. The confirmation of the ‘*ulamā*’ provides the leader with authority by demonstrating his religious backing, which is reinforced in the traditional Islamic institution of *beia*, or allegiance (Perrault 1990,

12). Under the *beia*, local officials must swear loyalty to the sultan or monarch, recognizing his supreme power and promising to obey his commands.

In 1953, Sultan Mohammed V and his family were exiled to Corsica and later Madagascar in an attempt to remove the popular and widely respected, though politically powerless, Sultan from the political scene and quiet demands for independence. The independence movement continued, though, even with its leader exiled, and the Kingdom of Morocco obtained its independence from France in 1956, after several years of negotiations and the Sultan's return in 1955. Upon independence, the former sultan became King Mohammad V. In modern Morocco, the monarchy quickly became hereditary by primogeniture through the efforts of Mehdi Ben Barka, a leader of a secular political party (Perrault 1990, 50). Primogeniture diminishes the power of the '*ulamā*' by removing their authority to select the successor to political power, while simultaneously confirming a political system that is at odds with Sunni Islam (Perrault 1990, 50).

King Mohammed V, however, did not rule as king for long: he died during a routine surgical procedure in 1961, after only 6 years of ruling as king. His oldest son, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, known in Morocco at the time as Sidi Hassan, immediately assumed the throne under the name of King Hassan II. Hassan II's reign coincided with a period of political unrest in the nascent state, and he used the powers granted him in the Constitution to repress opposition, particularly during four periods of urban riots in major cities (Casablanca in 1965 and 1981, northern and Rif areas in 1984, and Fez in 1990) when royal forces fired on demonstrators, killing hundreds (Instance Equité et Réconciliation 2006, 26).

*The Monarchy: Constitutional Authoritarianism*³

Since 1956, Morocco has enacted several constitutions and revisions, most recently in 1996. Most provisions, especially those pertaining to the king, have remained the same since the earliest versions. In fact, the 1996 revision was specifically for the creation of a bicameral legislature; it did not affect the power of the king, merely dividing further the legislative branch (CIA 2009). Though the king shares his Constitutional revision powers with the legislature, Article 106 states that neither the institution of the monarchy nor of Islam as the state religion is subject to revision. Even if the country were united in a desire to eliminate the monarchy or significantly curtail its powers, such action could not be undertaken without a revolution.

The king is not, however, just a figurehead: he also exercises vast political powers. If the king would like to extend debate on a particular bill to achieve a different decision, he may request a second reading of the draft (Article 67). Article 68 states that “Such a new reading shall not be refused”: the Parliament is obligated to reconsider its previous decision when the king is extremely interested in obtaining a different outcome. The Parliament can still reject or approve the law as it wishes, but must do so with a two-thirds majority to prevent the king from submitting the draft to a referendum (Article 69).

Furthermore, the king has the right to appoint the Prime Minister and the rest of the Cabinet (Article 24), and may dissolve the government at any time (Articles 24 and 27), or rule by decree under a State of Emergency (Articles 35 and 49). Hassan II dissolved the government in 1965 to rule by decree until 1970. Though the decision was

³ All references to Articles of the Constitution refer to current provisions, as of the 1996 revision, from the translation provided by the Embassy of Morocco at The Hague, unless otherwise noted.

legally within his powers as king, it was met with opposition (Joffé 2009, 152). The king also appoints various other officials, including military officers, ambassadors, and magistrates (Articles 30, 31, and 33). Because their careers depend upon the king's goodwill, appointees are generally loyal to his wishes.

Members of Parliament, however, are elected by universal suffrage via a complicated system that ensures that no party can obtain an absolute majority or even plurality. As of the 2007 legislative elections in Morocco, the government recognizes thirty-three parties from across the political spectrum. Most parties are unable to achieve more than one or two seats in parliament, but several parties have become influential. In the 2007 elections, the five parties with the largest winnings won only 66 percent of the seats: the remainder was divided amongst the remaining parties (Hamzawy 2007, 1, 4).⁴

While members of Parliament are immune from prosecution because of actions performed in the role of government officials, there is an exception for actions that “may be injurious to the monarchical system and the religion of Islam or derogatory to the respect owed to the King” (Article 39). Though members of Parliament have the power to introduce, debate, and approve laws on certain subjects, the king's appointed ministers have the right to veto a law if it is not in the realm of the legislature's power (Article 53). The appointed ministers also have the ability to control which amendments to current laws will be considered: only those that are submitted or approved by the ministers are

⁴ There are 325 seats in the legislature. Istiqlāl (Independence Party, conservative) won the most seats (52) with 16 percent of votes, followed by the Parti du Justice et Developpement (PJD, a party which includes Islam in its platform) at 14 percent (46 seats), Mouvement Populaire (MP, an Amazigh-linked party) at 12.5 percent (41 seats), the National Rally of Independents (RNI, slightly liberal) at 12 percent (39 seats), and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) at 11.5 percent (38 seats). These five parties form the core of both the governing coalition and the opposition, alternating as politically convenient. PJD has traditionally maintained an opposition standpoint in the legislature though it supports the King.

debated (Article 57). The ministers may implement laws when the Parliament is not in session, provided the laws are submitted for approval at the next session, giving the king's loyal inner circle extensive power over legislation (Article 55). The Constitution also reserves for the king the right to grant pardons as he wishes (Article 34).

*Les Années de plomb: Under the Watch of the Makhzen*⁵

The majority of Hassan II's reign, from the mid to late 1960s until the early 1990s, is known popularly as "*les années de plomb*" (the years of lead, Ar. *zamān al-ruṣāṣ* and *al-sanawāt al-sawdā'*) (Slyomovics 2001, 18). The period was characterized by an increasingly powerful state apparatus, known as the *Makhzen*, which was controlled by the palace and disregarded human rights in the interest of protecting the monarchy from any perceived opposition.

Press censorship was common during the era, facilitating the promulgation of the regime's single version of an event. Those segments of the press publishing unapproved versions of an event, or publishing about events that the regime did not wish to acknowledge, faced seizure of their materials and incarceration of their editors (Joffé 2009, 154). For example, when Mehdi Ben Barka, the exiled leader of a secular political party who had worked for a hereditary monarchy and a former teacher of Sidi Hassan, was kidnapped in France, French officials implicated General Mohamed Oufkir, who was

⁵ Though this section could easily have been titled "The Years of Lead," the period of repression is colloquially referred to as *les années de plomb*, even by those who only speak Moroccan Arabic or an Amazigh dialect. Also, "the years of lead" or "the dark years" is reminiscent of the title given to periods of repression in other countries. Using the French name will allow differentiation. Furthermore, though the proper transliteration of the Arabic portion is *Makhzin* since Arabic has no "e" sound, I will continue to use *Makhzen*, which has become the standardized form, particularly in French articles.

the head of the Moroccan security forces and feared throughout the country (Perrault 1990, 32). Gilles Perrault, author of a critical biography of King Hassan II, described General Oufkir thus: “His courage is without fail; his cruelty, without limits. His superiors say: ‘Compared with Oufkir, the paramilitaries are choir boys’” (Perrault 1990, 32).⁶ In Morocco, however, the only published news accounts of Ben Barka’s disappearance implicated French officials and denied any involvement of the *Makhzen*, and specifically of General Oufkir (The New York Times 1966).

Political dissidents were commonly jailed without charge or “disappeared” to minimize the threat to the monarchy during *les années de plomb*. Since Ben Barka disappeared from a Paris street in 1965, he has not been traced, and the Moroccan government continues to deny any knowledge of or involvement in his disappearance, despite recurrent pleas from his family for information and an ongoing investigation in France. These disappearances increased substantially after two attempts on the king’s life, led by his own military, in 1971 and 1972. Secular opposition groups, including the *23 mars* and Basri groups were imprisoned (Benomar 1988, 539). The entire immediate family of General Mohamed Oufkir, the leader of the second attempt and the minister previously implicated in the “Ben Barka Affair,” was disappeared for twenty years (Oufkir et Fitoussi 2000, Amnesty International 1999). Of the eight disappeared Oufkirs, six were children; one was only three years old, and the oldest had been adopted and raised as a princess in the palace by King Mohammed V as a playmate for his own daughter (Oufkir et Fitoussi 2000, Amnesty International 1999, 8). Though the Oufkir

⁶ Translation by author from original French: “Son courage est sans faille ; sa cruauté, sans limites. Ses supérieurs disent : « Auprès d’Oufkir, les paras sont des enfants de chœur. » ”

family, and the children especially, had held a privileged place under both kings, that position did not prevent the children from being punished for their father's treason. General Oufkir himself is said to have committed suicide in the palace, though his body received multiple gunshot wounds (Oufkir et Fitoussi 2000, Joffé 1998, 109). Under King Hassan II, the state apparatus of the *Makhzen*, or political power structure surrounding the Palace, was all-powerful: to threaten the *Makhzen* was to forfeit one's right to life and liberty.

According to *L'Instance Équité et Réconciliation* (IER), the official Moroccan government body responsible for determining human rights abuses including forced disappearances and arbitrary detention, only 742 people died due to state actions during the years of lead (Instance Équité et Réconciliation 2006, 13).⁷ Other sources, such as Amnesty International, suggest higher numbers. The IER received requests for arbitration for 16,861 individuals, of which it determined compensable merit in 9,779 (Instance Équité et Réconciliation 2006, 44).⁸ Only 854 cases were rejected outright for no evidence of harm, suggesting that totals for abuses were much higher than official numbers (Instance Équité et Réconciliation 2006, 26). The IER rejected the remainder of the 6,038 claims on various technical grounds, rather than as without merit at all.

⁷ The IER specified the causes and locations of death as follows: 89 people deceased during detention; 11 people in clashes with security forces; 325 total deceased during the riots of 1965, 1981, 1984, and 1990; 173 deceased in secret detention, of which 109 deaths occurred during the 1970s, nine in the 1980s, and two in the 1990s; 144 *Şahrawī* deceased during conflicts with POLISARIO. TOTAL: 742 deaths in forced disappearance. Sixty-seven *Şahrawī* presumed by many to have disappeared were "sent to Tindouf with the help of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 31 October 1996" (12).

⁸ According to the IER report, merit was determined on the basis of forced disappearance; arbitrary detention with or without a trial, or followed by execution; injuries sustained during the urban riots of 1965, 1981, 1984, or 1990; forced exile; or sexual violence (44).

Amīr al-Mu'minīn

Since the original constitution, the monarch has carried the titles of Commander of the Faithful (*Amīr al-Mu'minīn*) and Defender of the Faith, referencing his role as the supreme religious leader of the country. As the religious leader of the country, the king is legally “sacred and inviolable” (Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco at The Hague 2002, Article 23); to express any discontent with the king, even for political reasons, is treason, because of his religious function as *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*. When the king addresses the Parliament, his speeches are not open to debate (Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco at The Hague 2002, Article 28); to debate the king would be to challenge his authority as *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*.

Rather than being a political force in opposition to the king, the '*ulamā*' was a religious institution “focused on cultural, religious and social issues, with occasional public pronouncements in support of the King” (Benomar 1988, 540). When faced with rising unrest at home in the early 1980s, Hassan II called the '*ulamā*' together and ordered them to address everyday problems of the population rather than only those of religious significance (The Economist 1980). Bound by a Constitution that sanctifies the monarch even after death, the '*ulamā*' never denounced the abuses of Hassan II's reign. Furthermore, the *beia* oath binds the '*ulamā*' and other officials to recognizing the supreme religious authority of the king, preventing them from challenging him in any form. Since the '*ulamā*' is a religious group, and the *beia* is a religious oath, it is reasonable to assume that the '*ulamā*' would be least likely to violate the sanctity of the promise of allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful. Furthermore, with the loss of the

traditional role of the *'ulamā'* in naming the successor to political power with the legalization of hereditary monarchy, the *'ulamā'* has become little more than a legitimizing body serving the king (Perrault 1990, 12).

Religious opposition to the king is more appropriately examined through the actions of the *Parti du Justice et Developpement* (PJD), a party with a strong Islamic character, popularly perceived as an Islamic party, and the second-highest vote totals. Law forbids, however, that a party should have a religious, ethnic, or regional basis: the PJD, therefore, “seeks to create a democracy rooted in the principles of Islam and Morocco’s national traditions of peace, within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, thereby allowing people to exercise their rights” but is not based explicitly and rigorously on Islam (Bahaji 2009, 6). For example, the PJD supported the reform of the family code laws in 2005, a move opposed by strict Islamic circles (Hamzawy 2007, 3). Taking a practical stance, the PJD chooses to work with the government, believing

If one fought against a political regime and his political regime weakened by us, fell by the action of another, then the comportment of those who would follow would be without a doubt even more in the direction of the de-Islamization of the masses. [...] Our duty was first of all to make those with whom we were in contact [...] understand that Islam is indispensable. (Bahaji 2009, 15)

For the PJD, participation in politics, even if as part of the opposition is part of their Islamic duty: to weaken the regime, thereby encouraging intervention from non-Islamic powers, such as the French, is less desirable than the current regime, despite its faults.

Here again, the *beia* plays an important role in ensuring the loyalty of officials to the monarch. As officials elected to government, PJD leaders are bound by a religious promise to carry out the king’s wishes. As Gilles Perrault illustrates, even when a region

does not desire to submit to the political rule of a new leader and fights him, they respect the king because of his religious role as confirmed in the *beia*: “And so it happens that the troops of the sultan are defeated, his loyal ones massacred and mutilated, and the victors bow respectfully before the commander of the faithful and recite prayer with him” (Perrault 1990, 12).⁹ Even when an official disagrees, as a functionary of the government, he must show respect toward the king, which includes performing one’s duty as ordered even if one disagrees because the religious leader ordered it.

The PJD, though the only major party recognized with a strong Islamic character, is not the only Islamic political actor outside the official *‘ulamā’*: Abdessalam Yassine leads a personal cult in his *al-‘Adl wa al-Iḥsān* (Party of Justice and Charity), which is based on the goal of creating a true Islamic community and eliminating the corruption of the monarchy (Bahaji 2009, 14, *The Movement: The Political Circle* 2008). Yassine has repeatedly been jailed for his offenses, which include sending a letter to the king that was critical of the regime and its policies, publishing Islamist magazines, and preaching in mosques despite being forbidden to do so (Bahaji 2009, 7). In fact, Yassine refuses to acknowledge the king as legitimate religious *or* political ruler, since the king’s legitimacy is based on descent from the Prophet Muhammad rather than by his character; Yassine suggests that he himself is a more legitimate ruler, since he follows the example of the Prophet (Bahaji 2009, 9).

Despite its leader’s transgressions, *al-‘Adl wa al-Iḥsān* has never been explicitly forbidden from participating in politics. Under Yassine’s direction, however, the

⁹ Translated by author from original French. « Ainsi arrive-t-il que les troupes du sultan soient défaites, ses fidèles massacrés et mutilés, et que les vainqueurs s’inclinent respectueusement devant le commandeur des croyants et récitent la prière avec lui. »

movement refuses to comply with the regime's preconditions for doing so, viewing such participation as capitulation to the illegitimate monarch who claims to be *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* (The Movement: The Political Circle 2008, Bahaji 2009, 13). Clearly, Yassine poses a threat to the Moroccan state in this refusal to acknowledge even political authority. Yassine was profoundly influenced by Sayyīd Quṭb, one of the famous writers of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers who advocated the violent overthrow of the secular state and who was sentenced to death in absentia (Bahaji 2009, 8).

According to surveys, the population of Morocco is nearly homogenous. Sunni Islam is the official religion of the state, and is also the religion of choice for 98.7 percent of individuals (CIA 2009, The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1978). There are also tiny Christian (1.1 percent) and Jewish (0.2 percent) minorities (CIA 2009, CIA 1982, CIA 1986). The Jewish community at one point comprised a much larger portion of the population, but after the creation of Israel and Morocco's independence, many Jews migrated (Tessler 1978, 372). Further illustrating the homogeneity of the society, the population is also ethnically uniform: 99.1 percent of the population identifies as Arab-Berber (CIA 2009).

Since the king himself is the ultimate religious authority in Morocco, there is no possible or viable opposition that is not immediately suppressed as treason. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hassan II faced opposition from various secular and Marxist groups including *Ilal Amam*, *23 mars*, and the "Basri group," but all were arrested and imprisoned, successfully eliminating political and secular opposition (Benomar 1988, 539). The monarch was not challenged in the political sphere until the

late 1970s when Islamic groups, such as the PJD and *al-‘Adl wa al-Ihsān* emerged (Benomar 1988, 541). Previously, Islam had been a unifying social phenomenon, uninvolved in politics (Benomar 1988, 541).

Applying the Model

Morocco, therefore, since its independence has been an authoritarian state with most powers given to the king, though other political actors have exercised varying degrees of power at the king’s desire. Particularly under King Hassan II during *les années de plomb* (approximately 1965, when Ben Barka disappeared, to 1991 with the first major release of former disappeareds), the regime was also repressive and ordered the disappearance of opposition activists in addition to controlling freedom of expression (Amnesty International 1999, 1). Since the king was also *Amīr al-Mu‘minīn*, Commander of the Faithful, or religious leader, there was no significant religious competition from other religions, even when a larger Jewish community existed.

According to Gill’s model, such a state should witness cooperation between the religious institution (the ‘*ulamā*’) and the regime (the monarchy). While in Egypt the ‘*ulamā*’ were relegated to endorsing socialist policies under Nasser and condoning the repression of a grassroots Islamic movement, in Morocco, the ‘*ulamā*’ generally avoided the political, restricting themselves only to religious matters and condemning those who would threaten *Amīr al-Mu‘minīn*. By not opposing themselves to the repressive regime of Hassan II, the ‘*ulamā*’ risked alienating the populace; however, with no religious challengers until the mid- to late-1970s, the ‘*ulamā*’ stood to gain little and lose much by

opposing the monarch. In Morocco, Gill's theory again proves true: an authoritarian and repressive state with no interreligious competition allows the religious institution to support the state without fear of losing membership.

Even when considering other Islamic actors besides the *'ulamā'*, Gill's model holds in Morocco. Though *al-'Adl wa al-Iḥsān* possibly has a wider following than the PJD, its refusal to participate in the political system limits the party's capabilities for active opposition (Bahaji 2009, 14). While *al-'Adl wa al-Iḥsān* is relegated to monitoring by security services, the PJD is the second largest party in Parliament, yet continues to cooperate with the monarch. Surprisingly, despite the repression and authoritarian nature of *les années de plomb*, and the politico-religious competition between *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* and other religious actors such as the PJD and *al-'Adl wa al-Iḥsān*, the king remained largely unchallenged.

Egypt

Secular, with a Touch of Islam

Egypt was one of the first Arab countries officially to gain independence from its colonial master. In 1922, Britain granted Egypt its independence but installed a monarchy dependent upon Britain in place of the colonial structures. By 1952, the military had become dissatisfied with Britain's continued presence in the country, especially since the British were linked with the creation of Israel in 1948, on lands that Arabs claimed (Hinnebusch 2002, 92). The Free Officers movement, a military group, overthrew the British-backed King Farouk in July 1952. The Republic of Egypt was declared on June 18, 1953 (The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997). The first Constitution of the Republic recognized Islam as the state religion but also guaranteed freedom of belief and religious practice "providing that public order is not prejudiced and public morals are not offended" (Middle East Institute 1956, 300-301). Despite the religious provisions, the Egyptian Constitution largely followed a western model including separation of powers and a bill of rights (Middle East Institute 1956).

After a brief disagreement over the first presidency, Gamel Abdel Nasser assumed power in 1954 and was officially elected in 1956. He was a charismatic populist leader, though also authoritarian, and ruled until his death in 1970. Under Nasser, Egypt became a regional power focused on countering the perceived threat from Israel (Hinnebusch 2002, 92). Nasser increased Egypt's prestige in the Arab world by placing it in opposition to Israel, though the country suffered a major defeat in the 1967 war (also known as the Six Day War), which left Israel in possession of the Sinai Peninsula. Nasser also focused

on freeing Egypt from western economic domination, and is well known for his nationalization of the Suez Canal in order to pay for the Aswan Dam, which would provide electricity for the country (Hinnebusch 2002, 101). In the cultural realm, he emphasized the acceptance of the country's Islamic heritage while also encouraging its modernization in the hopes that a modern Islamic world outlook would benefit the country. Cairo's al-Azhar University and mosque are historical centers of traditional Sunni Islamic thought as well as symbols of national pride; the al-Azhar '*ulamā*' are respected throughout the Sunni Islamic world.

Following Nasser's death in 1970, Anwar Sadat, another key member of the Free Officers movement, held the Egyptian presidency. His major accomplishments include a 1973 war with Israel (also known as the Yom Kippur War), regaining part of the Sinai while almost losing the Suez, and the discussions that followed (Hinnebusch 2002, 105). The slight victory of the 1973 war restored Egyptian pride as the power that could challenge Israel. Despite riots in response to International Monetary Fund (IMF) restructuring in 1977, Sadat was able to maintain the support of the population, however, by manipulating the public's attention and focusing it on the international threat of Israel (Bush 2007, 1603).

In 1979, however, Sadat lost this political tool when he signed the Camp David accords, agreeing to forgo further war with Israel in return for the rest of the Sinai (Hinnebusch 2002, 106). In signing the agreement, Sadat was conceding that Egypt could not defend the Arab world from foreign groups (the Israelis) or ensure the political rights of all Arabs to their own state (the Palestinians) as the country had previously promised.

The best Egypt could guarantee was autonomy for Palestinians residing in the West Bank (Hinnebusch 2002, 106). This failure and the concession of Israel's right to exist led to Egypt's fall from grace in the Arab system, even though the treaty had been sanctioned by al-Azhar (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 387). Whereas the country had once been the center of the Arab system, it was now ignored by other countries (Hinnebusch 2002, 107).

The loss of prestige and accession to demands of foreigners, especially those previously identified as representing western domination, created great discontent at home and eventually led to Sadat's assassination by a violent extremist who viewed his signing of the accords and shaking hands with the Israeli leader as treason (Hinnebusch 2002, 98). Egypt had positioned itself as the center of the Arab-Islamic world, capable of expelling the Jewish population that had taken over Palestine; by signing the peace accords, Sadat acknowledged Egypt's failure not only as the leader of the Arab states, but also as the protector of Islamic lands.

A third member of the Free Officers movement, Hosni Mubarak, succeeded Sadat and continues to rule under a state of emergency today. Under his leadership, Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989, and played an important role in the second Gulf War (1990) (Hinnebusch 2002, 107).

The Presidents: Dominating the Political Arena

Since Nasser had been able to ally with himself the army, bureaucracy, and middle and working classes, he essentially dominated the political arena (Hinnebusch

2002, 97). With the society's support, Nasser formulated a republic with himself, a military-president, holding the power and subordinating all other political actors (political parties, judiciary, parliament, press) to the presidency (Hinnebusch 2002, 97). According to the Egyptian Constitution, the president commands the armed forces, and also may declare war and sign treaties, propose or veto laws, dissolve Parliament, or rule by decree under a state of emergency (Hinnebusch 2002, 99). He has the right to consultation with Parliament and others, but is not required to do so (Hinnebusch 2002, 99). Nasser spent the early years of his presidency consolidating the new power structure including forbidding multiple parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and subjugating the traditionally independent al-Azhar.

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna as a religious response to the Egyptian state's secularization campaign and originally focused on Islamic principles of self-improvement and living an Islamic life regardless of political systems (El-Ghobashy 2005, 376). The Brotherhood actively participated in politics, in order to enact their plans for society, as well as providing support services when the government was unable or unwilling (El-Ghobashy 2005, 382). Later, however, the group was also influenced by the writings of Sayyīd Quṭb, who advocated the violent overthrow of the secular state in favor of an Islamic one (El-Ghobashy 2005, 374, Glain 2006, 18). This led to a split amongst the Brothers into a violent and pacifist camp, though the politically active pacifist camp has gained precedence. There is a strict hierarchy, including a one hundred member legislative council, thirteen-member executive cabinet, and a supreme General Guide (El-Ghobashy 2005, 377).

Al-Azhar University has been the preeminent center of Sunni Islamic theology and learning for ten centuries. Its scholars are throughout the Sunni Islamic world and their pronouncements and legal rulings (*fatwas*) are given high value in decision making elsewhere. To provide himself with religious legitimacy immediately after the coup, Nasser took advantage of al-Azhar as a national symbol (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 376). Al-Azhar is not, however, just a religious university: the Azharite complex also includes a mosque, lower level schools, departments in non-religious subjects at the university level, and living space for scholars. Prior to Nasser's 1961 modernization projects, al-Azhar also provided for itself economically (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 374). As a religious and educational institution, rather than a political one, al-Azhar, in all of its many levels, traditionally was self-sufficient and independent of government intervention.

After Nasser's death, his successor Anwar Sadat delegated some power by allowing the creation of opposition parties contesting domestic policy decisions, and permitting the press to report on both the government-sponsored and opposition parties (Hinnebusch 2002, 98). In 1971, the Constitution was revised to give the government a more overtly Islamic character. The Preamble specifically references Islam and Allah, while the earlier constitution had refrained from doing so (Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971). As in the 1956 Constitution, the 1971 version maintained provisions guaranteeing Islam as the state religion while also giving citizens the right to freedom of belief and practice (Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971). However, other provisions name *sharī'a* (Islamic law) as the source of legislation and

guarantee religious education as part of general education requirements (Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971). The 1971 Constitution is still in effect today with amendments passed in 2005 and 2007, some of which allowed the president more power by legalizing many powers informally practiced under the state of emergency (Modernizing the Constitution of Egypt 2007).

Since shortly after Sadat's assassination, Mubarak has ruled under a state of emergency, giving himself powers beyond the extensive powers reserved for him in the Constitution (Besada 2007, 2). Mubarak has kept many of Sadat's policies intact, but also increasingly resorted to an authoritarian-repressive model to combat Islamic opposition groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood (Hinnebusch 2002, 98).

State of Emergency

Under Mubarak, the state maintains total control over the society. Though citizens technically have more political rights, when they overstep their bounds the regime has used repressive measures to revert to the more authoritarian character of Nasserism (Hinnebusch 2002, 98). While disappearances comparable to those in Argentina and Chile generally do not occur (and certainly not on the same scale), political arrests are common. Detainees are often held incommunicado or in unknown locations, particularly before elections or if their organization could be perceived as an actual threat to the regime or its party. However, unlike Argentina and Chile, detainees in Egypt generally resurface after the election has passed or unrest has died down. The Muslim Brotherhood has traditionally been the major target of such arrests, though by no means the only target

(El-Ghobashy 2005). Journalists who dare to support the Brotherhood or criticize the regime too sharply, even in political cartoons, are also commonly arrested and fined (Russell 2000). Furthermore, when these prisoners are finally brought to trial, they are often tried before military courts with few Constitutional protections (Modernizing the Constitution of Egypt 2007, Amnesty International 2007). In addition, the regime uses al-Azhar's religious position to justify delegating censoring powers to the Azharite complex: to prevent dangerous Islamic views that are against state interests from filtering into society, al-Azhar has the power to censor media and oversee education (Besada 2007, 22)

Holes in the Sacred Canopy

Though the Egyptian Constitution names Islam as the official state religion, freedom of worship is also guaranteed, opening the religious market to competition. Under Sadat, the large majority of Egyptians self reported as Sunni Muslim (92 percent in both 1976 and 1978) with only 7 percent claiming a form of Christianity (The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1978, The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1976). In 1982, shortly after Mubarak took the presidency, the CIA reported that 94 percent of Egyptians identified as Muslim while the remaining 6 percent were "Copt and other" (CIA 1982). In 1986, the CIA reported the same figures, with the caveat that most of the 94 percent were Sunni Muslims (CIA 1986). The 2009 CIA World Factbook notes a drop in the percentage of Sunni Muslims (90 percent) with a corresponding rise in Coptic Christians (9 percent) (CIA 2009). Despite the opportunity for competition, the majority of

Egyptians claim to adhere to the Sunni Muslim faith, and the religious composition of the nation seems to have remained relatively stable over the past five decades.

In 1961, Nasser implemented a series of reforms that resulted in the subjugation of al-Azhar to the state, transforming the institution into a modern university funded by the state and staffed by bureaucrats rather than a traditional religious institution with independent economic sources and led by independent religious scholars (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 373, 375). By gaining control of al-Azhar and its influential *'ulamā'*, Nasser was able to manipulate the scholars for his own political purposes. With the Azharite *'ulamā'* on his side, Nasser achieved religious legitimacy in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups that were not sanctioned by the well-known Azhar despite their popularity (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 374). The *'ulamā'* were able to provide religious rationale for Nasser's socialist program and its policies by reconciling socialist goals with Islamic doctrine emphasizing caring for the community (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 375). In return for legitimizing Nasser's program and his repression of opposition groups, Nasser ensured al-Azhar received the resources it needed to function (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 375). Since the regime was supplying the funds for al-Azhar, including salaries for its scholars, the *'ulamā'* had no option but to sanctify the regime's program.

Under Sadat, al-Azhar's support of the regime continued. The *'ulamā'* issued statements condemning as unbelievers student protesters, Communists, and other groups Sadat's regime identified as enemies (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 381).

While under Nasser al-Azhar's cooperation had largely been out of economic necessity, under Sadat the cooperation became more voluntary:

When they had to support Nasser against the Muslim Brothers, their statements were extremely short, wrapped in a few sentences, as if they only halfheartedly criticized the Muslim Brothers. From the 1970s on, the statements of the official ulema against radical Islam would be much more developed and finely shaded than they had been during the Nasser era. (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 384)

Islamic militant groups reappeared during the 1970s, challenging al-Azhar's interpretation of Islam as well as the regime's authority. In fact, the militant groups sometimes targeted religious scholars working for the government, including a Minister of Waqfs (religious endowments) who was assassinated (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 384). In this case, the '*ulamā*' of al-Azhar cooperated willingly with the government, publishing essays against killing Muslims for being non-believers (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 384). The institution of al-Azhar was less worried about other religions including secularism threatening than they were about other Islamic groups claiming authority.

Facing increasing Islamist threat from the *Jama'at Islamiyya* and a militant branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Azhar under Mubarak continued to speak against violence in the name of Islam, including the appearance of several scholars on television (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 385). In addition, the '*ulamā*' were encouraged to visit imprisoned Islamists to persuade them to modulate their thinking to ideas more in line with the regime (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 385). In the 1990s, though al-Azhar increasingly expressed disagreement with the regime on some issues, such as interest on stocks and women's status, in 1992 the '*ulamā*' supported

Mubarak's regime in the implementation of an unpopular land law (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 387-8, Bush 2007, 1607). As Islamist groups grew and became more active, the '*ulamā*' continued to adhere to the regime's demands and sanctioned the repression of militant Islamism (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 387-8).

Though there seems to be a religious consensus (90 to 94 percent Sunni Muslim), the Muslim sector cannot be treated as a homogenous group functioning under a "sacred canopy" (Berger 1969). Shortly after Nasser's coup, the popular Muslim Brotherhood began to break into two factions. One section of the Brotherhood began advocating for a violent demolition of the secularist state in favor of a true Islamic state based wholly on Islamic tradition, while another portion of the Brotherhood focused on using Islam to address the needs of society within the confines of the state laws (Besada 2007, 6). The regime correctly perceived the violent branch as a threat but did not differentiate between the two factions and began arresting outspoken leaders of the entire Muslim Brotherhood movement, regardless of whether they supported the violent or law-abiding sides of the Brotherhood. In fact, the '*ulamā*' of al-Azhar issued a statement condoning these mass arrests as necessary to combat violence (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 380).

In addition to the well-known Muslim Brotherhood, there are various other Islamist groups, such as the *Jama'āt Islamiyya*, with violent tendencies (Besada 2007, 7). Although the members of all of these groups, violent or pacifist, would be designated Muslim in surveys, they fall into a different category at odds with the official version of

Islam supported by the state via al-Azhar. The 94 percent Sunni Muslim majority is fractured at best, and outright competing amongst itself at worst.

Applying the Model

Since independence, Egypt has experienced three presidents who subjected the country to various degrees of repression, each reverting to a more authoritarian and repressive stance when challenged. At 94 percent Muslim, Egypt appears to be a society with a clear religious majority, though the majority is arguably far from united. Gill's model would suggest that in this case, the religious institution will ally itself with the regime since it faces no major religious competition.

Egypt, however, is an anomaly. Its Muslim majority is not as homogenous as statistical surveys suggest. Al-Azhar continues to ally itself with the regime even though it is facing competition from other groups within its own religion. The Muslim Brotherhood consistently speaks out against (and in the past acted against) the regime and its institutions, including the *'ulamā'* of al-Azhar, but the Brotherhood also works within the regime's laws, even winning a fifth of the current parliamentary seats despite being an illegal party (Zeghal, *Religion and Politics in Egypt* 1999, 373). Though legalities restrain al-Azhar to cooperating with the regime, the Brotherhood may both criticize the regime and work with the regime since it is a banned organization and therefore unregulated. To draw a parallel to Latin America, the Muslim Brotherhood is similar to grassroots liberation theology base communities that focused on immediate needs, while

the Azhar '*ulamā*' is equivalent to the National Bishops' Council that must contend with national pressure and perform a balancing act.

When we consider the size of the Coptic Christian population, which has regained coherence and strength over the last decades, in addition to the many alternative interpretations of Islam advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, Egypt clearly faces competition to the government-approved '*ulamā*' of al-Azhar (Henderson 2005, 163). According to Malika Zeghal, even the '*ulamā*' of al-Azhar themselves recognize that they no longer enjoy a monopoly in the interpretation of Islam, let alone a monopoly as the sole legitimate religious institution (Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt 1999, 372).

If, therefore, Egypt's religious institution *does* face competition, whether from within Islam or without, al-Azhar's continued cooperation with the regime would seem to suggest a different way of interpreting Gill's model. Perhaps the behavior of religious actors is not completely dependent on interreligious competition for souls, but more on revitalization and survival of the religion. Since the '*ulamā*' of al-Azhar have been overtaken by the state and are no longer independent, Islam creates many actors in the political sphere who claim a religious basis, including the non-militant members of the Muslim Brotherhood (the militant members have renounced political participation). The religion's support for the regime then depends on how strong its self-created competitor becomes: the official Islam of al-Azhar and the Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood compete, but by creating an independent competitor, the religious needs of the population can be fulfilled regardless of the regime's attempts to manipulate religion. If we accept

this assumption, the “religious institution” in Egypt is thus redefined as politically active Muslims, allowing us to consider statements of the Muslim Brotherhood against the regime in addition to those of the *‘ulamā’* against violence in the name of Islam. While in some cases, the statements will still be in agreement with the regime, in others, they will more accurately reflect the beliefs of the group, which could not be expressed because of the legal obligations of the *‘ulamā’* to the state.

The necessary redefinition to fit the case of Egypt challenges Gill’s assumption of the religious institution as a unitary actor. With no set hierarchy in Islam, the assumption of a unitary actor may render a misleading analysis. Since religious authority in Islam is delegated not through any central authority but by consensus of the people in recognition of superior knowledge, bureaucrats who capitulate to government demands rather than only following Islamic thought and community beliefs lose their legitimacy as religious spokespeople. The loss of community support for the high-level religious bureaucrats opens the door for grassroots religious leaders to become politically active and obtain community recognition. In Egypt, the submission of the Azharite *‘ulamā’* to the regime’s requests for a blessing of socialist programs and repression of members of the *umma*, or Muslim community, for acts that did not threaten the state led to their discrediting as sources of religious authority and true representation at the national level. The Muslim Brotherhood, a local group in opposition to the government, has repeatedly stepped in to fill this position. Though both groups are Muslim, they are not unified, presenting a significant challenge to Gill’s theory.

Conclusions and Implications for Further Research

Based on his research in Latin America, Anthony Gill posits that in a state with a repressive and authoritarian regime, the support or opposition of the dominant religious institution, the Catholic Church, is conditioned by the absence or presence of competition in the religious market. Closer examination of Argentina demonstrates that in a country with no significant religious or ideological competition, the religious institution willingly cooperated with the military juntas during the dirty war in the interest of obtaining favorable treatment. In Chile, however, the Church faced growing competition for the souls of the lower classes not only from Protestant denominations but also from secular “religions” such as Communism, Marxism, and socialism. To undermine these competitors and maximize its share of the religious market, the Church needed to increase its efforts to support the working class, which it achieved by opposing the Pinochet regime in support of the rights of the repressed lower classes through its Catholic Action programs, among others. Gill has established both of these cases, however, in his own work and the more relevant question for this thesis is whether Gill’s model of the religious institution acting rationally as a unitary actor in response to competition holds true when the religious institution is not the Catholic Church.

Argentina and Chile are both countries with majority Catholic populations, though in Chile the Church is increasingly facing competition from other belief systems. Public life in the past was dominated by the role of the Catholic Church and its principles of duty and submission to authority. Morocco and Egypt are both Sunni Muslim countries dominated by the Islamic values of duty and submission, first to God, then to family and

state. These values are similar to the Catholic principles that influence public life in Latin America. While the ideals differ in application, the implications of the religions result in similarly restricted public actions.

Applying Gill's model to Sunni Islam, however, presents some definitional challenges. Sunni Islam (for simplification referred to simply as Islam) does not have an international, institutionalized, hierarchical structure like the Catholic Church. Since Islam is such an important feature of society, however, many North African (and Middle Eastern) countries have used Islam as a basis for legitimacy, even if the regime practices separation of powers and of church and state, such as in Egypt. Instead of forcibly submitting to a central religious authority, national religious communities are free to organize themselves as they choose within each nation's boundaries. Most countries have opted for the creation of a national Council of '*ulamā*', or a council of religious scholars, to function as religious advisors to the government. With the '*ulamā*', the religious institution is satisfied that it can encourage observance of religious principles in secular life, while political leaders enjoy the legitimacy the blessing of the '*ulamā*' provides.

However, occasionally the '*ulamā*' may not be the sole religious institution. Since Islam is by its very nature decentralized, occasionally other movements claiming to speak for the religious institution arise, such as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. In this case, the '*ulamā*' had been deprived of any independence by the authoritarian character of the state, leaving them no opportunity to object even when faced with competition. In Morocco, the '*ulamā*' are also public servants bound by an oath of loyalty to the king, the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*, but no widespread movement has risen in challenge to the '*ulamā*' or

the king. Even the Justice and Development Party (PJD), an Islamic Party in opposition to the state, accepts the religious decisions of the king and *'ulamā'*. *Al-'Adl wa al-Iḥsan*, while opposing the king and his loyal *'ulamā'*, provides no practical alternatives by its refusal to participate in the system it views as corrupt. Therefore, when extending Gill's model to other religions, it is important to consider the characteristics of the religion in question (i.e. the decentralization) and examine alternative "institutions" that operate outside of state control.

After examining the two North African cases of Morocco and Egypt, it appears that Gill's model as currently defined does not hold true for Islamic countries. The different dynamics of such a decentralized and non-hierarchical religion negates Gill's assumption of a *unitary* rational actor. With no clearly defined hierarchy in Sunni Islam, it is understandable that multiple Islamic groups would try to monopolize the religious side of church-state interactions. In Morocco, though there is no interreligious competition, the *'ulamā'* as well as other major political actors such as the PJD supported the regime despite its repressive nature (or perhaps because of it? Fear is a great motivation.). *Al-'Adl wa al-Iḥsan*, a non-political actor, however, refuses to acknowledge the king's authority. In Egypt since independence, the *'ulamā'* of al-Azhar have consistently supported the authoritarian government despite religious competition from the Muslim Brotherhood and despite the country's Coptic population.

While these examples complicate Gill's theory of religious competition leading to opposition of an authoritarian ruler, removing the assumption of religious institutions as unitary actors addresses the problem. Broadening the definition of "religious institution"

to include the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups not paid by the government but respected by a large segment of the population, suggests that the *'ulamā'* were simply acting as government functionaries rather than as religious scholars; they did not actually represent the thinking of the religion but political ambitions of a group of people. Gill's theory is an admirable attempt at predicting the cooperation between religious institutions and authoritarian states and it should be studied further, but the theory is limited by the assumptions it requires.

With these two studies of Islamic countries, one of which boasts a secular government and is generally considered a bellwether for the region and the other one which is increasingly becoming one, I have attempted to expand Gill's model into a new arena. With this research however, Gill's model as currently defined has been shown applicable only to the Catholic Church in Latin America as he had first theorized. To expand beyond Catholicism and Latin America, the assumption of a unitary actor must be removed to describe adequately the politico-religious situation, particularly for religions without institutionalized structures, such as Sunni Islam in North Africa.

Though I have attempted to select cases that are representative of the region, many questions remain to be studied before Gill's model, whether the original or my suggested revision of removing the unitary actor assumption, can be accepted as a predictor of cooperation with authoritarian regimes in Islamic societies. Both cases here studied focus on North African countries where the dominant religion is Sunni Islam; further research must be undertaken to determine whether these two cases are simply coincidences. In the Levant, though Sunni Islam is still the general majority, competition

from other sects of Islam and Christianity, such as Shi'ism, may influence the model differently. In addition, Shi'ism as the majority religion, such as in Iran or Iraq, may significantly alter the outcome, since Shi'ite Islam is more institutional and hierarchical than Sunni Islam. A study of Israel would also present an interesting test for the model, as the world's only Jewish majority state, which is also home to a large Arab population (both Arab Israeli and Arab Palestinian). To truly test the veracity of Gill's model, however, research should be undertaken to apply the theory to a non-Abrahamic religion, such as Hinduism. Based on the current research, however, Gill's theory shows promise with the removal of the unitary actor assumption, and additional research based on this idea will undoubtedly further our understanding of church-state interactions under repressive authoritarian regimes.

Furthermore, since I find that Gill's unitary actor assumption inadequately describes the observed actors in Islam, it is also important to reconsider the Latin American cases without it. Though Gill's model as currently elaborated appeared to work for Argentina and Chile, if we remove the unitary actor assumption, his conclusions come into question.

The institutional Catholic Church, led by the Pope in Rome and represented by the National Bishops' Council, is *not* the only religious actor in Latin America: there are also communities of liberation theologians and congregations of charismatic Catholics. Though Gill assumes the Catholic Church is a unitary actor constrained by hierarchy, there is undeniably dissension in the ranks. Some bishops joined the liberation theology movement while others did not, and eventually, the institutional Catholic Church began

censoring liberation theologians. Catholic Base Communities (CBCs) continued to exist and grow despite the Vatican's attempts to extinguish liberation theology once it began challenging some Church doctrines (i.e., suffering now is God's unchangeable will and will be rewarded later was exchanged for social action programs) (Smith 1991, 222). Some priests and bishops, such as Leonardo Boff of Brazil and the founder of liberation theology Gustavo Gutiérrez of Peru, were so adamant in their disagreements with the institutional Catholic Church that they were recalled to Rome and censored (Smith 1991, 225). This censure can be seen as a parallel to al-Azhar's statements against the Muslim Brotherhood: both movements were developed to address the religious and physical needs of the population that were not being met by the "official" brand of religion, and both were suppressed.

The Church was threatened by the shift in doctrine advocated by liberation theology. The cardinal in charge of Church doctrine, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) issued a statement clearly indicating the institutional Church's fear that liberation theology was an internal competitor: "it favors the formation of a parallel church, the *Iglesia popular*, in opposition to the official church represented by the bishops" (Smith 1991, 225). Clearly, the Church does not even perceive itself as a fully unified actor. As Rosemary Radford Ruether of Claremont Graduate University and a former professor of the Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary writes in her article "Redemptive Community in Christianity," liberation theology "share[s] a common religious language, but not a common interpretation of that language" (Ruether 1991, 224). There are internal divisions in Catholicism, despite a hierarchy that is supposedly

designed to control dissent. The hierarchy's solution to this opposition, however, is to remove the nonconformist element, revealing the internal competition.

According to Gill, liberation theology is a Catholic-created response to increasing competition from other religions and ideologies, specifically Marxism and Communism (Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar* 1998, 7, 73). While liberation theology and CBCs may have started as a Catholic initiative to maintain the religion's share of the religious market, the movement soon took a different direction from the institutional Catholic Church. In Chile, then, where the episcopacy opposed the regime, perhaps it did so not only due to competition from Protestants, but also because of competition from its own community of liberation theologians who were viewed as "stealing" souls to their own view of the Church, which focused on self-reliance rather than traditional authority. In this interpretation, liberation theology would be understood as a fractured segment of the Church perceived as threatening by the bishops.

While Gill explains the creation of liberation theology as a Catholic response aimed at maximizing souls for Catholicism in the religious market where there was Protestant and socialist competition, he discounts cases where the bishops opposed liberation theology as an internal competitor. With an absence of external competition, liberation theology is an unnecessary and potentially dangerous form of Catholicism that challenges the institutional Church, as Cardinal Ratzinger's statement above demonstrates. Though interreligious competition may explain some variation in church-state relations, this new perspective would explain Church action as at least partially

driven by intra-religious rivalries, which more accurately reflect observed situations in Latin American countries.

In Argentina, on the other hand, where there was little religious competition from non-Catholic groups, the Church supported the regime. Liberation theologians in Argentina, though, continued to work for justice for the lower classes in opposition to the government. Just as the Muslim Brotherhood actively opposes the Egyptian regime despite the *'ulamā*'s cooperation, CBCs and liberation theologians in Argentina opposed a government supported by the Church and were highly represented among the disappeared because of their activism in the human rights field. In this scenario the interpretation opened by a focus on intra-religious competition is that the institutional Church may have chosen to cooperate with the Argentine regime to take advantage of the repressive apparatus to eliminate its internal liberationist competition. It may be that inter-religious competition provides a permissive explanation that partially determines the interactions of religious institutions with state actors, but intra-religious competition must also be taken into account if we want to examine and explain the full set of motivating factors for religious actors.

Religion undoubtedly plays a large role in the politics of countries around the world. In the developing world, many countries also have authoritarian governments. This paper attempted to expand previous theories on interactions between religion and repressive authoritarian governments in the interest of practical application. Anthony Gill's theory assumes a unitary actor, but in reality such situations do not exist. Not all directors of a religious institution agree on the role a religion should play in daily life or

politics: some envision a role limited to matters of faith, while others envision a more active political role to improve conditions of adherents. These conflicting opinions on the religion's function leads to competition within the religion as well as between religions. Though as Anthony Gill demonstrated competition from other religious groups may have an effect, this paper has shown that we cannot ignore the important role intra-religious competition plays in determining a religious institution's relations with authoritarian governments.

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