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Exogenous Development vs. Endogenous Development in Haiti

Stephen Ewen

EXOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT
VS.
ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI

by Stephen Ewen

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
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Concentrations in Anthropology and Political Science

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This thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate's thesis advisor, Dr. Timothy Steigenga, and has been approved by the members of his supervisory committee. It was submitted to the faculty of The Honors College and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences.

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PREFACE

This thesis points to indicators of Haitian underdevelopment, examines development theories, shows their praxis[1] and outcomes across Haitian time, and lines key Haitian responses to exogenous development forms. It explains Haitian resistance to such forms, and argues that only a development form endogenous to the Haitian majority will bring development and long-term stability to the country.

My initial interest in Haiti sparked while reading Eldwidge Danticatt's *Breath, Eyes, Memory,* for an interdisciplinary honors course on Latin America. Though I had been interested in Latin America ever since I was naïve youth worker on the Latin American mainland within a religiously-based international non-governmental organization, Danticatt's poignant portrayal of her Haitian characters deeply tapped into my pre-existing bent to see social justice brought to those that my religious training taught me to consider as "the poorest of the poor." Although my on-ground experience in Haiti has been limited to this point, my exposure to the country in other ways has come from what I can only describe as a consuming passion over the course of the last two years.

Understanding the Haitian situation requires analysis that integrates macro and micro levels. On the one hand, macro-level analyses provide an understanding of the overriding historio-political forces that interject themselves onto the local. I therefore

[1] I use "praxis" to mean "the translation of development theories into action."

take a political economy approach in this thesis. On the other hand, micro-level analyses enable one to understand people's own histories, conceptions, reactions, resistances, adaptations, aspirations, and cultural, economic and identity formations. This thesis highlights these as well.

Toward both of those ends, I have equipped myself with the analytical and research tools from political science and anthropology. While this thesis is far from meeting my own aspirations, as all those who followed my thesis process closely will immediately understand, and while I am certainly still quite novice in my topic and academic disciplines, it is my hope that this work represents for me an important first step. In the future, my wish is to investigate first-hand how these macro and micro levels interact and even clash with one another, and how Haitian actors live, respond, and organize for their interests within such a context, while retaining and/or adapting their culture and identities.

Inherent within an interdisciplinary project is often a critique of the individual disciplines incorporated. This project is no exception, though I nowhere but in this preface state this critique explicitly. Analyses wrought from the methodologies and theories of political science, I feel, have often suffered greatly from a lack of insights that only the methods and theories of anthropology can offer. In political scientists' quest to reduce the drama of complex human events into positivistic and relatively universal predictive principles, they have often missed the most crucial elements needing incorporation into their outputs; namely, deep insights from the ground level. When political scientists, and most particularly political operatives, do access the works of anthropologists, it too often is only to selectively "pick and choose" works or excerpts of works that fit into their already decided upon theories or political courses, so as to bolster or justify them. Rarely do sound anthropological discoveries that run counter to expedient political interests foundationally *re-form* political policy or theories.

In following through on the largely un-heeded advice of anthropologist Sherry Ortner to make political economy more political,[2] I herein point out such discoveries. My contention is that it is in the best long-term interests of all actors involved if anthropological insights carry increased weight into the fundamental policy formulations of governmental actors, particularly in the case of Haiti. At the same time, due to anthropologists' close focus on the local, some, particularly early ones, have missed crucial interpretive keys into their focus people by neglecting the larger scenes within which their studies were undertaken. While the adoption of political economy analyses within anthropology during the early 1970s has done much to counter this lack, much still needs doing.

Throughout this thesis, I use the word "development" and its variants (e.g., "underdevelopment"). While I am well aware of postmodern critiques of the term, I have chosen not to make them a focus. My reasons for this are practical and case particular. Haitians of all sectors, not the least of which popular Haitians, long ago took up the term. While it may be true that discourse control that stemmed from the strong end of power relations are at root of this adoption, what is equally true is that popular Haitians long ago imbued the term with their own deep meanings. That a culture with a Creole linguistic form continually does as much should be something fully expected. My focus herein will therefore be to accept these realities, and to contrast the various meanings of "development" among various Haitian and non-Haitian actors, since that is what I see as the core tension within Haitian society. My focal point is to contrast development forms that are exogenous to the Haitian majority, with the Haitian majority's own endogenous development forms that find base in their cultural identity formations and practices. In this vein, the reader will readily understand my uses of the term "development" by the contexts in which it appears and modifiers I use to precede it.

[2] Sherry B. Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26, no. 1 (1984): 142.

I wish to dedicate this material, first, to my biological mother, whom I have never met, yet know so well. Thank you for giving me life and for your sacrifice to give me a chance at what you saw as a better life. Equally (it is impossible to stress that word enough), I wish to thank my adoptive mother for her love for me, and for remaining loyal to me during quite a few turbulent years while I "grew up." To both mothers, I know that my degree and this thesis elate you, and that it is a culmination to part of your dream for me. I am not finished yet! I hope always to do you proud.

Second, I wish to dedicate this to my family, who often put up with a very stressed-out and groggy person while I pursued (and pursued) my academic studies against many economic and social constraints. Though it *is* an overstatement, I trust you all will know what I mean when I say, "I say look forward to getting to know you again!" I would not have begun to pursue academics but for my persuaded conviction that it was both worth it and necessary.

Third, I dedicate this to the Haitian people and their quest for a completion to their long-ago-started revolution. May you achieve your long-deferred hope peacefully and with the highest level of self-determination, as I know is your wish. May you attain your hope with the highest level of dignity, as I know is your requirement.

Finally, I wish to dedicate this material to the faculty at the Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University, particularly my thesis committee, Dr. Timothy Steigenga, Associate Professor of Political Science, Dr. Rachel Corr, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, and Dr. William O'Brien, Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies. Your knowledge, example, inspiration, and challenges to and patience with me, have spurred me on to academic heights I hardly even knew existed before. That you have allowed my growth into a first name basis with each of you means more to me than you can possibly know. The level of academic acumen required by all of you has seemed almost untenable at times, as it should be, and I thank you for it.

To all of the people to which I dedicate this thesis, and to the many others I could mention but have not, including my friends in Haiti, your mark comes through on each page that follows. Any shortcoming are fully my own.

Stephen Ewen

ABSTRACT

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From before its independence to the present day, Haiti has had exogenous development schemes imposed upon it. These schemes stem from the development theories of Western political-economic thinkers that Western powers and Haitian elites have implemented. Yet Haiti is today the most impoverished nation of the Western hemisphere. What has gone wrong? In reply, I examine a key power-based explanation for the failure. I then examine the culturally-based practices, identity formations, and development aspirations of Haiti's popular class, and contrast these with exogenous development theory, praxis and outcomes. I show the profound "misfit" between the two and highlight conflicts that have arisen because of them. In Haiti, exogenous development forms will inevitably go awry because their starting points are and remain fundamentally flawed. An endogenous development form based upon the Haitian majority's culturally-based preferences and identities stands the best chance of bringing social justice and long-term stability to the nation.

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CHAPTER

CHAPTER ONE

DEVELOPMENT THEORIES AND PRAXIS ACROSS HAITIAN TIME

Introduction

From before its independence to the present day, exogenous sources have imposed development schemes upon Haiti. These schemes stem from the development theories of Western political and economic thinkers that Western powers, Haitian elites in league with them, and the majority of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and those who fund them have implemented.[1] In each case, something has obviously gone awry. Haiti stands today as the most impoverished nation of the Western hemisphere.

This chapter highlights current standard development indicators within Haiti and the theories and praxis of political-economic development schemes that have sought to address Haitian underdevelopment across Haitian time to the rise of the Jean-Claude Duvaliér regime in 1971. What I highlight will show the failure of these past development theories and their praxis, and the primary outcomes of the efforts including Haitian resistance. This will set the stage for Chapter Two where I will evaluate still other exogenous development efforts in Haiti from the rise of Jean-Claude to the present. The overriding theme is to show that exogenous development forms in Haiti have not only failed in their overall effect, but have created a deep undercurrent of aversion for such forms among popular Haitians. The experiences of these Haitians with past development efforts have greatly motivated them to work within their civil society

[1] Robert et. al McGuire, *Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood 1986-1996* (Providence: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996), Report.

organizations, especially during the 1987-1990 Democratic Revolution but also currently, for a development form that they consider endogenous to themselves.

Standard Indicators of Haitian Underdevelopment

Standard development indicators paint a most grim picture of Haiti. Only 50% of Haiti's population has access to safe drinking water, and only 28% have sewage disposal.[2] Life expectancy is 54 years, compared with an average of 69 years in all other Latin American States.[3] There is only 1 physician per 6,083 persons in Haiti; this contrasts with an average of 1 per 900 in the rest of the region. Malnutrition affects half of all Haitian children under five. Vaccination coverage is among the lowest in the world, the preventive measures reaching only about 25% of Haitian children. Haiti's infant mortality rate is 72 per 1000, which is almost twice that of elsewhere in Latin America. Haiti's HIV/AIDS rates are the worst in the world outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, while Haiti's combined public and private health expenditures total only about $21 per capita, an indicator that Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole at $38 per capita surpasses, and the rest of Latin America surpasses by ten times.[4]

Half of Haiti's population earns less than $61 per year, while the same half in the rest of the Western hemisphere earns nearly fifteen times that amount.[5] Eighty percent of today's nearly 7.9 million Haitians in the country live below the Haiti poverty line, with

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[2] The World Health Organization, *The World Health Organization Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report* [report] (2000, accessed 17 April 2002); available from http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/Globassessment/Global8-2.htm.

[3] The Central Intelligence Agency, *2001 Cia World-Fact Book, Haiti Profile* [book online] (The Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 17 March 2002); available from http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ha.htm.

[4] International Public Health Watch, *Haiti Profile* [database] (International Public Health Watch, 2001, accessed 17 March 2002); available from http://www.ldb.org/vl/geo/america/2hai.htm.

[5] The World Bank, *Urbanization* [report] (2002, accessed 12 March 2003); available from http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2001/pdfs/tab3_10.pdf.

70% of those earning less than $1 (U.S.) per day.[6] Meanwhile, a tiny elite comprised of just 1% of Haiti's population dominate the country's economy.[7]

Haiti's 1995 population figure was 6.5 million, by 2006 it is forecast to nearly double. Haiti is already the most densely populated country in the Western Hemisphere, and one of the most densely populated countries in the entire world. The increasing population density is especially grim in light of ever-increasing environmental degradation in the country. Already an "ecological nightmare," some go so far as to say that much of Haiti's land may soon become outright uninhabitable.[8]

Haiti is gravely deforested. The oldest available forestation figure indicates that in 1923 an estimated 60% of the island portion remained canopied. Later deforestation figures indicate that in 1956, 80% of Haiti was clear, 91% in 1978, and 98% in 1989. Today, it is 98.56% deforested, while the main source of fuel for most Haitian peasants, urban slum dwellers, and small to medium-sized enterprises throughout the country remains domestically produced charcoal, produced from *domestic* wood.[9]

Unilineal Evolutionist Development

Theory

Though development strategies have varied across Haitian time among actors both within and without Haiti, and though there may be contention over the underlying causes for underdevelopment as expressed above, the majority of Haitians have always

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[6] Ibid.(accessed).

[7] James Ridgeway, ed., *The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Essential Books, 1994), 29-33.

[8] The Haitian National Congress, *La Gestion De L'environnement En Haiti, Realités Et Perspectives* [report] (The Haitian National Congress, 1998, accessed 17 March 2002); available from http://www.rehred-haiti.net/membres/mde/pae-haiti/, trans., http://translation.lycos.com.

[9] Ibid. (accessed).

agreed that Haiti is dire need of development. In colonial times, most replies to underdevelopment took the form of Herbert Spencer's *unilineal cultural evolutionism*, which came to dominate development discourse of the period. For Spencer, "the law of evolution" held true for societies just as it did for the natural world, and "more evolved" societies could play a role in bringing "less evolved" societies to a higher stage.[10]

Praxis and Outcomes: Slavery, the Haitian Revolution, and Urbanization

In praxis, colonialists took up Spencer's philosophy as a handy justification for their practices. They viewed colonialism as "necessary" and "good" for the "evolution" of their dominated and imported peoples. On the Haitian scene, these imported peoples were Africans.[11] Historian Mavis Campbell points out that the Africans arriving into the Caribbean region came from the West Africa, and the northwest sub-Saharan and Bakongo regions.[12] While they entered enslavement in Haiti, another group of people came to the island, namely, Catholic missionaries to convert the Africans. In the meantime, the enslaved Africans cleared and worked huge sections of Haiti's land to produce export commodities for mother France. Thus was the "civilizing" mission of the colonizers. Yet as Anthropologist Leslie Desmangles states, the Africans arriving onto Haiti imbued their cultural and religious traditions into the cloth of the island's colonial life, and held ceremonies, often in secret and amidst maroonage,[13] that syncretized their

[10] J. D. Y Peel, ed., *Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution: Selected Writings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

[11] Emily A. and Robert H. Lavenda Schultz, *Anthropology: A Perspective on the Human Condition*, 3rd ed. (Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Co., 2001), 552.

[12] Mavis Christine Campbell, *The Maroons of Jamaica 1655-1796: A History of Resistance, Collaboration, and Betrayal* (South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey, 1988), 16.

[13] During slavery in Haiti, significant numbers of slaves escaped to form communities in Haitian forests. This is Haitian *maroonage* and it is still a deep conception among many popular Haitians today. When current Haitians "go into hiding" during times of political upheaval, they often refer to it as

African religions with Catholic imagery and rituals. Haitian Vodou developed. The development of the religion was the spark that led up to the Haitian response to colonial "development:" the only slave revolt in history that succeeded in founding a new nation.[14]

After Haitian independence in 1804, most eighteenth and early nineteenth century Haitian heads of State, in practice, followed an altered form of unilineal evolutionism. Absent colonialism (though the "economic policy" of Dessalines, Haiti's first ruler, was to re-impose slavery),[15] the early Haitian leaders unsuccessfully sought to bring Haiti into the world economy of the time on a level as possible playing field.[16] A primary outcome of this period is that Haitian society stratified, with a small elite centered in urban areas, and a peasantry marginalized into rural areas working a combination of state-owned and significant sections of their own lands.[17]

During the 1914-1934 U.S. Occupation of Haiti, unilineal evolutionism was still the reigning "development" scheme, as U.S. troops overtook the island portion. Prior the Occupation all Haitian Constitutions disallowed foreign ownership of Haitian land. One of the first things the Occupation undertook was to change that by writing a new Haitian Constitution ratified by a farcical election.[18] During the period, state land along with much of the Haitian peasantry's lands, as well as forests contingent to them, were confiscated and sold off to U.S. agricultural companies and other U. S. investors who created large plantations of bananas, sugar cane, rubber, sisal, and other agricultural

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maroonage. See Leslie G. Desmangles, *The Faces of the Gods: Vodou and Roman Catholicism in Haiti* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 24-26.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Jan Rogozinski, *A Brief History of the Caribbean* (New York: Facts on File, 1992), 218.

[16] No Haitian Head of State I am aware of followed unilineal evolutionism in intent. This is my assessment based upon their external actions.

[17] Rogozinski, 219.

[18] Noe Dorestant, *A Haitian Look at Haitian History* (1998, accessed 12 March 2002); available from http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/9972/haitipai.htm.

commodities.[19] Haitian intellectual Ben Dupuy argues that this change disrupted the semi-feudal economy that existed among the Haitian peasantry, as their large land tracts were taken over for export commodity production.[20] Georges Werleigh, Professor of Economics of the Université d'Etat d'Haïti adds that the occupationists abolished the quite thriving town centers that existed in each of Haiti's nine departments (provinces), and centralized health, finance, education, and security within Port-au-Prince. The centralization together with the land grabs that came during the Occupation forced a mass exodus of people from the provinces to the capital city and desertification of Haiti as other peasants took to hillsides to try to plant a living. Port-au-Prince grew from 500,000 to 2 million people in very short order.[21] Heinl family historians detail dozens of the still more popular-level uprisings that occurred against the Occupation, most which American troops put down by force, killing thousands of peasants.[22]

Modernizationist Development

Theory

Toward the mid-1900s, unilineal evolutionism morphed into *modernization theory*. Ideologically spearheaded by economist W.W. Rostow, modernization theory argued that all societies fell into one of five basic categories or stages, with the lowest being traditional societies and the highest being the age of high mass-consumption. For Rostow, much as with Spencer, dominant nations played a key role in the maturation of

[19] Ibid. (accessed). Sisal is a plant cultivated for its large, sword-shaped leaves that yield stiff fibers used for cordage and rope.

[20] Mouvement Haïtien de Liberation, "Bitter Cane," ed. Mouvement Haïtien de Liberation (New York: The Cinema Guild, 1983). Videocassette.

[21] Ginau Mathurin, *A Look at Haiti: 2003* (EchodHaiti, 2003, accessed 3 March 2003); available from http://www.echodhaiti.com/culture/lookathaiti03.htm.

[22] R. Heinl, N. Heinl, and M. Heinl, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 395-488.

societies from lower development stages to, as Rostow called it, the point of take off, after which they would follow a more or less natural course onto the higher stages and, ultimately, into the age of high mass-consumption. Then people were presumed to be "developed."[23]

Praxis and Outcomes: Duvalierism and Semi-Feudalism

During modernization theory's heyday surrounding the Kennedy years, the Haitian Head of State, François Duvaliér, subscribed to its basic tenants, at least in many of his outward actions and by implication. He received aid monies given under modernization theory's premises in the intent that he could create a Haitian middle-class, and that Haiti would overall experience development. While the latter scantly occurred, despite some investment in infrastructure throughout Haiti, a modest middle-class did develop under Duvaliér. However, following the cue of most Haitian rulers before him, Duvaliér accomplished this by creating new state and para-state institutions. The small middle-class Duvaliér created came to entrench themselves deeply within the structures—they fed at *la mamelle de l'etat* ["the udder of the state"], as elite sector Haitians tend to call it. These "udders" became a source of great dysfunction within Haitian society known as Duvalierism.[24] Today, some Haitians, particularly neo-Duvaliérist, still cycle within this dysfunction, as they seek to gain access to state coffers in most anyway they can.

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[23] W.W. Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

[24] Christian Alcindor, "U.S.-Haiti Relations Form 1957 to 1963: Anti-communism, Nation-Building, and Racial Diplomacy in the Age of the National Liberation" (PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University, 2002), 35-40. Duvalierism is a life and worldview whereby one gains their resources for life and social advancement by entering into and feeding off state apparati. Typically, Duvalierist seek to entrench themselves into state apparati in most any way they can, and protect their positions vehemently once there.

Foreign aid under modernization theory started the flight abroad of significant numbers of poor-sector Haitians. Haiti's semi-feudal economy became entrenched further among the peasantry, as confiscation of large plots of land occurred once again. Export commodities edged out subsistence agriculture. Ben Dupuy asserts that Haiti's peasants were baited and pushed to export for world capitalist markets under modernization theory. He states, "Workers received a wage, and it is this system the U.S. is still promoting in Haiti to this day."

Cultural Developmentalist Development

Theory

Despite the failure of modernization theory within Haiti during the François Duvaliér years, the theory is far from dead. Some of its adherents argue that the reasons for its failures in given contexts lie with the individuals and groups of actors who received aid to implement it, and not with the theory itself or its implementation. The most popular critique of this vein asserts the idea that development and "modernization" is improbable is not impossible for given cultures because they are inherently dysfunctional on too high of a level. If development is ever to come to such cultures, it must first come at the level of fundamental cultural changes that will "fit" the people for "development." In this modernizing view, cultures must change to fit the development form, and not vice-versa. This is the view of *cultural developmentalism*, which is little else than a revival of unilineal evolutionism, except that is replaces biology with culture as its picking point.[25]

[25] Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 3-15.

The most vocal advocate of the cultural developmentalist school for the Haitian context is Lawrence Harrison, a long-time United States Agency for International Development (USAID) operative in the Western hemisphere who is now a professor of International Affairs at Harvard. During Harrison's tenure with USAID, mostly during the Cold War-era, he served for two years as the agency's director in Haiti under George Bush, Sr.[26] Harrison's experiences in Haiti lead him to believe that "there is something going on in the minds of the Haitians that impedes progress and facilitates the perpetuation of a stagnant, exploitive, repressive system."[27] As for what that certain "something" is, he synopsizes it as "slave culture, sustained over the generations in substantial isolation."[28] According to Harrison, Haiti is underdeveloped because of its roots in its past, its maladaptive responses to that past as well as to modern events, and its inability to break away from both to "get with the larger world" and its standardized development plan.

Harrison's seeks to bolster his arguments by replying to the idea of dependency. He takes on the easiest to critique theory of dependency, *dependency theory*. While dependency theory finds its roots in Latin American critiques of U.S. neo-colonialism, it is popularly associated with economist André Gunder Frank. Frank argued in the late 1960s that the development of what he called "core capitalist nations" required the underdevelopment of "peripheral nations," whose economies had been oriented and distorted to serve the needs of the core. Frank's theory asserted that elite actors and decision makers in both the core and peripheral nations initiated and maintained the desperate condition. Because of this, elites within the peripheral countries tended to have

[26] It is important to note that we must assume USAID very carefully scrutinized Harrison's ideas about the problem of Haitian underdevelopment in the process of his receiving USAID posts, and that they therefore represented a subscribed-to stream of thought in U.S. "development" policy toward Haiti.

[27] Lawrence E. Harrison, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case* (Lanham: Madison Books, 1992), xxx. It is amazing that Harrison does not instead apply this assertion to Duvalierism in Haiti, in which case his point would take on important substance.

[28] Lawrence E. Harrison, *Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 199.

stronger ties to elites in the core countries than they did with their own people. Therefore, development forms would naturally follow in line with the interests of both elite groups, while the interests of the majority in the peripheral countries would go mostly unheeded. Because of this, for Frank, the only way for peripheral countries to remedy their underdevelopment was for them to somehow cut ties with the core countries, and concentrate on internal development oriented toward the needs of their own people.[29]

Harrison rejects dependency theory, as well as any notion that lower income countries are the way they are because they have been historically exploited by industrialized countries—"that the rich are rich *because* the poor are poor," to use Harrison's own words. He dismisses the idea with one phrase, calling it simply a "doctrine for Marxist-Leninists." Harrison states, "The almost exclusive focus on 'imperialism' and 'dependency' to explain underdevelopment has encouraged the evolution of a paralyzing, self-defeating mythology." While this assertion contains grains of truth, for Harrison it needs to be the full focus. For him, formerly colonized countries need to stop looking at the non-realities of notions of dependency, and instead look *inward*.[30]

Praxis and Outcomes: Problematic Assessments and Enforced Neo-Liberalism

The praxis and outcomes of Harrison's cultural developmentalism and his critique of dependency theory is, first, a belief in *the superior pattern of the West* and reification and universalizing of neo-liberalism for all peoples and cultures. Reminiscent of the underlying assumptions of both unilineal evolutionism and modernization theory,

[29] André Gunder Frank, "Capitalist Underdevelopment or Socialist Revolution?" in *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 371-409.

[30] Harrison, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind*, 1.

Harrison specifically forwards the notion that some cultures are inherently better or worse when compared to others.[31] Harrison asserts that there is a prototype for underdeveloped countries to emulate to become "developed." Harrison both assumes and asserts throughout his works that development means, in essence, helping formerly colonized states to become more like their former colonizers in world and life view. This includes having their cultures, governmental structures and policies, and economic and social behaviors conform to what he holds as the superior pattern of the West, importantly to include its current model of neo-liberal economics. Underlying this argument is Harrison's rejection of anthropology's general adherence to an appropriate cultural relativism.[32] The main of cultural relativism in anthropology asserts that, while there can still be moral universals that can be upheld, each culture makes significant sense when viewed on *its own* terms and from an understanding that can only be acquired from a stance of having been deeply *within* that culture for a time.[33] Clearly, this is not a perspective Harrison adopted during his tenure in Haiti.

It is not surprising therefore that, second, *problematic assessments* flow from cultural developmentalism, and that these assessments then formulate into the policies of important state, international, and NGO decision makers.[34] For example, Harrison targets Haiti's indigenous religion, Vodou. Harrison asserts that the religion is a key part of what he calls "Haiti's slave culture" that needs to be broken away from in order for the country to develop.[35] He admits, first, that most Haitians are Vodousaints in one measure or another.[36] From this admission, he goes on to maintain that the world and life view of

[31] Ibid., 18.
[32] Ibid., 22-25.
[33] Schultz, 234-237.
[34] Meli Glenn details some of the historical discrimination that Vodousaints have faced in being direct participants in the development efforts of NGO and state actors. Meli Glenn, "Vodou in Haiti: A Case Study of the Role of Religion in Development, 2003," Working manuscript.
[35] Harrison, *Who Prospers?* , 200.
[36] Ibid. It is cliché among many Haitianists to say that Haiti is 98% Catholic, 25% Protestant and other Christian sects, and 100% Vodou. That the figures do not add up is exactly the point.

Vodousaints causes them to focus not on the future, but on the ancestral past. Harrison asserts that "Voudon . . . is irrational," and that it "propagates the view that existence is essentially static and the world unchangeable" (sic).[37] Consequently, for Harrison, Vodou "tends to lock the Haitian into the status quo" to impede Haitian development.[38]

In this, Harrison quite transparently misses the fact that Vodou was central to the Haitian people making their break from "the status quo" (slavery) under colonial domination.[39] Today the religion's ritual replays of the Haitian Revolution bolster Vodousaints against *future* slavery forms[40]—forms that, to most Vodousaints, would seem tied to what Harrison, the USAID, and U.S. policy advocates for.

Beyond this obvious historical fact, current mayor of Pétionville, Haiti, Sully Guerrie would take issue with Harrison. The mayor would first point out the effectiveness of now President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's past mass *concientizacíon* efforts among Haitians, stemming from Aristide's Liberation Theology doctrine. The mayor would then point out how concientizacíon has led popular Haitians to question things, to *demand* change. Guerrie specifically asserts that *many* Vodousaints and their "clergy" are progressive and socially and politically active, and that they work within Haiti's popular movements for a just Haiti.[41] In other words, while spiritual elements of Vodou do focus on the past,[42] as is the case with most if not all religions, when it comes to the socio-political realm, most Vodousaints are, in fact, future-oriented. While having perhaps an underlying fear of mass mobilization from concientizacíon, Harrison apparently misses this important dualism.

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[37] Ibid., 201.
[38] Ibid., 200.
[39] Desmangles, 33-59
[40] Desmangles, 171, 177.
[41] *Thoughts of a Rhode Islander in Haiti*, [report] (2003, accessed 8 April 2003); available from http://haiti2002.homestead.com/About_Us.html. Emphasis in original.
[42] Desmangles, 93-130.

As well, many Vodousaints were highly politically conscious and future-oriented well before Aristide's mass concientizacíon efforts. During the end of the Jean-Claude Duvaliér years in the late 1980s, the intensely popular Haitian *rasin* ["roots music"] and openly Vodouist band *Boukman Eksperyans*, sharply criticized Jean-Claude in their music and became targets of the regime. Like Vodousaint Boukman Dutty, who helped spark the Haitian Revolution, many (recall that most Haitians are also at least nominally Vodousaints) attribute the pointing-music of Boukman Eksperyans with sparking initial fomentation against the Jean-Claude dictatorship. More recently (1992), one of the band's politicized songs, Vodou Adjae, expressed shock over problems related to capitalism, communism, "bullshitism," egotism, expansionism, imperialism, racism, fanaticism, corrupt money, war, and orphans.[43]

Guerrie's comments concerning mass concientizacíon and the music of Boukman Eksperyans indicate Harrison's problematic assessments of Haiti to be extensive. Harrison misses even main currents within the Haitian political climate and popular culture. Having to labor under the stigmatizations and constraining of sight stemming from cultural developmentalist praxis would seem to impede Haitians' development far more than Vodou itself.

Even so, with one eye targeted on Vodou, Harrison summarizes his remedy for Haiti as, "The Haitian people need to break with their past"[44] to emulate the universally applicable prototype for "development," the West, fully to include its neo-liberalism. Harrison bolsters this view with his Hegelian view of history and adherence to, as he states, "Francis Fukuyama's thesis that the world is inevitably if slowly moving toward the democratic-capitalist model, a forecast that the experiences of South Korea, Taiwan,

[43] Denise Sofranko, "Boukman Eksperyans: Soundtrack for a Revolution," *Dirty Linen*, Apr/May 1996. *Adjae* is a common phrase Haitians use to express shock over an event or thing, similar to how many English speakers might exclaim "oh my God!" to a similarly shocking event.

[44] Harrison, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind*, 83.

Chile, and Turkey tend to corroborate."[45] For Harrison, it is a foregone conclusion that the rest of the world, including Haiti, will follow suit. As we will see in chapter two, the majority of Haitians have significantly different ideas for their country.

[45] Lawrence E. Harrison, "Letters," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1998. See also Harrison and Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters*, 4. The thesis referred to is Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History?* [journal article] (The National Interest, Summer 1989, accessed 8 Oct. 2002); available from http://www.wku.edu/~sullib/history.htm. Fukuyama asserts a Hegelian view of history in this work.

CHAPTER TWO

ENFORCED NEO-LIBERALISM AND HAITI

Introduction

The recent and current stream of U.S. policy toward Haiti evidently concurs with Harrison's overall assessments concerning the underlying causes of Haitian underdevelopment and the need for an exogenous neo-liberal remedy. What is more, as the U.S. has done in the past, it directly ties that assessment to its power.

This chapter will follow this theme and continues the theme started in Chapter One that showed the failure of exogenous development forms within Haiti and their key outcomes. I will show how exogenous development efforts have overall wreaked havoc within the country from the rise of Jean-Claude Duvaliér in 1971 to the present day. I will highlight how high the stakes are within Haiti over ultimate development forms. This will set the backdrop for Chapter Three wherein I highlight popular-level Haitian conceptions, exhibit what an endogenous Haitian development form might look like, and argue that this form stands the best chance of bringing peace and long-term stability to the country.

"The American Plan"

Export Factories

In 1971 when Jean-Claude Duvaliér succeeded his father, François, as "President for Life," he boasted, "My father made the political revolution. I, I will make the economic revolution."[1] At the request of Jean-Claude, USAID undertook a development effort to turn Haiti into what it envisioned as "the Taiwan of the Caribbean" (recall Harrison's assertion regarding Taiwan in Chapter One). Amidst what became known by most Haitians as "The American Plan," because in reality that is what it was, USAID forecasted "a historic change toward deeper market interdependence" between Haiti and the United States.[2] To accomplish this, USAID tapped U.S. investors to open assembly plants within Port-au-Prince. The idea was to take advantage of Haiti's abundant and cheap labor. At the same time, USAID opened the way into Haiti for cheap U.S. agro-exports such as rice and flour,[3] where previous protections existed for Haitian agricultural products.[4] As the agro-exports flowed in, a first phase of Haitian peasants had to leave their land, since they could no longer compete in their own local markets with the U.S.-subsidized foodstuffs.[5]

Some peasant migrants to Port-au-Prince, mostly women, were able to attain jobs in the export factories. Because much of the work was break-neck piecework, many

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[1] Heinl, 646.

[2] Paul Farmer, *The Uses of Haiti*, 2nd ed. (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 21. Also see Haiti Info, "Haiti's Agricultural Production," *Haiti Info*, 28 Feb. 1996.

[3] Ibid.

[4] World of Information/Walden Publishing, [report] *World of Information Business Intelligence Reports, Haiti* (World of Information/Walden Publishing, 2001).

[5] Mouvement Haïtien de Liberation, "Bitter Cane," ed. Mouvement Haïtien de Liberation (New York: The Cinema Guild, 1983). Videocassette.

received only about 14 cents per hour.[6] One female factory worker expressed a widespread sentiment when she said, "They come here looking for higher profits. For us to do the work it is cheaper because they pay us less; so they make more profits off of us." Another added, "It is a good thing for him [the factory owner], but we don't benefit from the extra profits. I think they should pay us at least $20 per day. Foreign [U.S., etc.] workers may make $5.00 per hour. Here, we work for a whole day and make $2.64. So they make more profit here than in their own country."[7] Earlier, USAID-funded studies used to back the U.S.-led "development" effort during the Jean Claude years wrote, "Women workers tend to be quieter." The same report enticed investors with the fact that Haiti had no requirements for profit sharing and featherbedding.[8] One U.S. factory owner in Haiti at the time summed up the bargain for foreign business: "Nine-year tax holidays, duty-free exports, no restrictions on the repatriation of capital . . . and the foreigner can own his own business 100%."[9]

Infrastructure Projects

As 1980 drew near, and on the heels of the export-factory build up in Haiti, USAID and the World Bank funded numerous roads into Haiti's rural areas, as well as dams and canals in the areas. Most of the workers tapped to build the infrastructures came from among Haiti's peasantry. In order for the peasants to work building the

[6] Ibid. Charles Kernaghan, *Haiti after the Coup: Sweatshop or Real Development?* [report] (The National Labor Committee Education Fund in Support of Worker and Human Rights in Central America, accessed 30 Jan. 2003); available from http://www.nlcnet.org/Haiticoup.htm. The legal minimum wage at the time was $2.56 per day.

[7] Liberation.

[8] Ridgeway, ed., 143.

[9] Liberation.

infrastructures, they temporarily left their lands. Under a "work for food" program, the workers received their pay in U.S. agro-exports. However, when payday arrived, they discovered that they were unable to sell any of the foodstuffs—"NOT FOR SALE," was emboldened all over the sacks in three languages. The peasants soon became cash-strapped.[10]

As the infrastructures came in, the value of the lands around them rose. Soon, foreign agro-businesses arrived onto the scene. The mostly absentee elite Haitian land "owners" saw an opportunity in the businesses' arrival, and kicked the cash-strapped peasants off their lands to rent the lands for high-tech export crop production. This caused a second phase of peasant migration into Port-au-Prince slums. While watching from the thick of it, Ben Dupuy observed, "The ironic part is that these foreign capitalist companies say they are coming to Haiti to solve our unemployment problems, when in fact, it is those very companies that are causing our unemployment problems to increase, and the Haitian government gives them every possible incentive."[11]

"Swine Aid"

Surrounding the time of the USAID infrastructure ("work for food") projects, the agency also took up a project to modernize Haiti's pork industry with improved methods and an improved breed of pigs. The breed of pig that existed before the effort, the *kochon kreyòl* ["Creole pig"], was sometimes simply called "black pig" in Haiti because of the animal's color. Creole pigs developed on the island centuries ago by crossing

[10] Ibid. Also see Alex Stepick, "The New Haitian Exodus," *Caribbean Review* XI, no. 1 (1992).
[11] Liberation. Ridgeway, ed., 124-125.

imported Spanish pigs with wild boars then indigenous to Haiti. The breeding, and the pigs' adapting for centuries to the extreme Haitian environment caused the animals to evolve as extremely hardy, though ironically docile animals that required no housing, and scant additions of water and food-garbage to their diet.[12] Of the unique though typically skinny black animals, Bernard Diederich summarized, "Over a period of 500 years, the black pig had become a lean and degenerate scavenger. It was perfectly adapted to the most miserable of raising conditions in the world, and could go two to three days without food."[13]

What was actually going on behind the "modernization" project was that an outbreak of African swine fever occurred several years earlier, in 1978, in Haiti's neighboring Dominican Republic. A year later, the malady was in Haiti. Knowing that no vaccine existed for African swine fever, the multi-billion dollar U.S. Pork industry and other multinational corporations began petitioning U.S. government officials concerning the outbreak. The pork industry's fear was that if the virus reached the U.S., it would decimate their entire industry. [14]

The U.S. apparently agreed. Motivated by the threat of decreased tax revenues and food options for American consumers should the pork industry's fear be realized, the U.S undertook a massive program with the consent of the Dominican Republic and Haitian governments to kill all pigs on Hispaniola and replace them with U.S.-bred ones.[15] Administered by USAID with technicians from Mexico, Canada, and the Dominican Republic, and with the cooperation of numerous Haitian actors who saw a quick opportunity, the *Programme pour l'Eradication de la Peste Porcine Africaine et*

[12] Jennie M. Smith, *Where the Hands Are Many: Community Organization and Social Change in Rural Haiti* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 28-29.

[13] Bernard Diederich, "Swine Fever Ironies: The Slaughter of the Haitian Black Pig," *Caribbean Review* 14, no. 1 (1985): 14.

[14] Smith, 28-29.

[15] Ibid.

pour le Developpment de l'Elvage 'Porcin (PEPPADEP), known as "Swine Aid" to most Haitians, was carried out in Haiti throughout the early 1980s.[16]

Haitians who lost pigs under PEPPADEP did not freely receive the replacement pigs, typically called *kochon blan-s* ["foreign white pigs"] by most Haitians. USAID placed stipulations upon those who could receive the new, fat white pigs. Recipients had to demonstrate first that they had the capital to maintain the pigs.[17] One peasant farmer affected by PEPPADEP informed me that those in his community had to purchase the new pigs.[18] A pigpen also had to be constructed, featuring a concrete floor and a tin roof. Anthropologist Jennie Smith informs that the pigpen requirement alone was sufficient to bar most peasants from receiving a replacement pig or pigs, and that the reply of one particular Haitian peasant with whom she worked was typical of the majority who had to walk away empty-handed. "My own *family* does not live under a tin roof," the peasant exclaimed.[19] When peasant cooperatives with pooled resources appealed for permission to own one or numerous of the new pigs communally, USAID swept away their requests with one word: "communism."[20]

To make matters worse, those who did receive one of the Iowan-bred pigs found that they required frequent veterinary care and, as Smith notes, "turned their noses up at the garbage that was once the Creole pig's mainstay."[21] As it turned out, keeping the animals alive required expensive wheat-based and vitamin-enriched feed—food that, incidentally, recent imports of U.S.-based corporations made available. Physician-anthropologist Paul Farmer notes that it required from $120 to $250 per year to maintain

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[16] Ibid., 28.

[17] Jim Ridgeway and Billy Treger, *Aiding and Abetting Mayhem*, [journal article] (Multinational Monitor, 1994 1994, accessed March); available from http://216.239.39.100/search?q=cache:-m0SG8dm HP4C:www.intnet.net/pub/COUNTRIES/Haiti/AIDing.and.Abetting.Mayhem+peppadep+communism&hl =en&ie=UTF-8.

[18] Villias Vilsaint, interview by author. 12 April 2003, tape recording, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.

[19] Smith, 30.

[20] Treger, (accessed).

[21] Smith, 30.

one of the new pigs, amounts that exceeded the annual income of most Haitian peasants.[22] Not surprising most of the Iowan pigs quickly succumbed to the harsh Haitian environment, and some of the ones that did survive turned to attacking and eating infants and toddlers to get their caloric intake, something the Creole pig had almost never done.[23]

For Haiti's peasants, the loss of their Creole pigs represented far more than just a much-needed food source. In the immediate aftermath of PEPPADEP, one Haitian peasant man told Grassroots International, a U.S.-based NGO that works in Haiti, "All of our needs were taken care of by the pigs. Now people are cutting down all the trees to make charcoal to sell. You can already see the difference [in the landscape]."[24] As the peasant's words indicate, the pigs were enormously important economically to Haitian peasants. Diederich again summarizes,

> With no banking system available to him, the peasant relied on hog production as a bank account to meet his most pressing obligations: baptism, health care, schooling, funerals, religious ceremonies, and protection against urban-based loan sharks who would grab his land at the first opportunity (sic).[25]

Thus, as Smith points out, in the world of the Haitian peasant, PEPPADEP translated into *The Great Haitian Stock Market Crash of the Early 1980s*.[26]

With the bank accounts of peasants now liquidated, school attendance dropped in half, since peasant parents could no longer afford to pay for fees, uniforms, and supplies.[27] Malnutrition began to climb.[28] Migration to urban slums accelerated as a new

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[22] Quoted in Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Grassroots International, *Pig Parties,* [online] (Grassroots International, 2001, accessed 25 April); available from http://www.grassrootsonline.org/what_pigparty.html.
[25] Diederich: 16.
[26] Smith, 29.
[27] Elizabeth Abbott, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1988), 274-275.
[28] Smith, 17.

stream of peasants embarked to *cheche lavi* ["search out a living"]. Grassroots International charges that the exodus of peasants into the urban areas coincided far too conveniently with the factory build up in Port-au-Prince.[29] Thousands braved the seas as "boat people."[30]

To make matters still worse, some veterinarians felt that Creole pigs were immune to African swine fever. Though the disease typically kills 99% of domestic pigs, because of the Creole pig's genetic background and its long adaptation to such poor living conditions, markedly few ever died of the disease. Even so, except for a few Creole pigs whose owners stashed them away, PEPPADEP operatives killed every pig in Haiti.[31]

Haitian peasants with whom Smith has worked see PEPPADEP as a larger life-lesson. She informs, "All too clear to them is an analogy between themselves, the skinny, black, 'degenerated,' but hearty, beasts doomed to martyrdom—ostensibly in the name of progress but actually in the interest of another breed: a fat, white, manicured, foreign breed from the north."[32] Another Haitian peasant decried to Smith, PEPPADEP "allowed them to come in and take our market. Now, they come back and make money selling us hot dogs!"[33] Quoting a Haitian economist, Diederich provides another summary. "The real loss to the peasant is incalculable." The peasant economy "is reeling from the impact of being without pigs . . . . This is the worst calamity to ever befall the peasant."[34] The same economist placed the nominal value of the destroyed Creole pigs at $600 million. The whole PEPPADEP program had $23 million backing it.[35]

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[29] Treger, (accessed).
[30] Abbott, 274-275.
[31] Smith, 30. A small comeback is occurring from these stashed away Creole pigs.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 30.
[35] Ibid.

A Break with the Past

After Colonial France's slavery-based system in Haiti within the premises of unilineal evolutionism, and after a successful slave revolt that threw both off; after Haiti's early rulers enforced semi-feudalism upon most of the Haitian masses in order to bring Haiti into the international system of the time, which did little more than continue the exploitive system of slavery; after the racist U.S. Occupation reinforced semi-feudalism, used forced Haitian labor, and put down Haitian resistance, all while operating within unilineal evolutionist premises; after the U.S. gave monies under the premises of modernization theory to François Duvaliér, which did little other than prop up his more than twenty years of terror and create Duvalierism; after the neo-liberal "American Plan" during the Jean-Claude Duvaliér years, which brought exploitive factories, the near extinction of the Creole pig, and massive *slumification,* Haitians did indeed feel they needed to break with their past. It was a break away from exogenous development forms toward a form perceived by them as endogenous.

Déchoukaj

As protests rose against Jean Claude Duvalier, it became untenable for the U.S. to support him any longer. After his fall in 1986, Haiti-wide protests grew as a transitional government took power. Meanwhile, masses of popular Haitians blanketed their country conducting a *déchoukaj*. From a Haitian-Creole word meaning "pull the tree out by its roots (lest it grow back)," popular Haitians intent on democracy in Haiti sought to symbolically "uproot" the dysfunction of Duvalierism from their country in the hopes it would never rear its head again.[36]

[36] Farmer, 119-135. Also see James Ferguson, *Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers* (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 1989).

In déchoukaj, popular Haitians physically demolished anything they could associate with Duvalierism, including whatever they could associate with the Duvaliérs' paramilitary squad known as the *Tonton Macoutes* ["Uncle Boogiemen"]. Popular Haitians stripped some buildings to the walls, and burned their contents to a flame. They killed numerous of the most notorious macoutes, as other macoutes fled abroad or went into hiding.[37]

Lavalas

Meanwhile, elections mediated by the Organization of American States (OAS) drew close. At the same time, the U.S. began again an advocacy campaign to bring free-market neo-liberalism to post-Duvaliér Haiti—"The American Plan II." The U.S. argued that Haiti's deliverance from past economic deprivation lay in adopting free trade policies, with domestic production oriented toward exports. Backing the U.S. plan was presidential candidate Marc Brazin, a former World Bank official. As things would later come out, Brazin was not only U.S.-backed, but U.S.-funded as well.[38] A loop was about to be thrown into U.S. plans for Haiti.

Intensely popular among the Haitian poor (four-fifths of all Haiti) because of his bold radio sermons that shook the Haitian status-quo, Liberation Theologian and Roman Catholic priest Jean Bertrand Aristide entered the presidential race at the eleventh hour. Funded largely by a progressive Haitian businessman of Palestinian descent who later would be murdered for his support right in the midst of a Eucharist celebration, Aristide centered his campaign on the slogan *Lavalas* ["Flash flood" or, "Flood Rise"]. Aristide envisioned his mass of supporters as themselves being that "flash flood," who would

[37] Ibid.

[38] Alex Dupuy, *Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution* (Boulder: 1997), 22.

"raise" up to "flush away" the old Haitian order and bring social justice and democracy to the country.[39]

Aristide promised to take on entrenched corruption, abolish the Haitian military, and carry out moderate land reform and wealth redistribution.[40] Paying special attention to Article One of the 1987 Haitian Constitution, which states Haiti to be a "cooperatist" Republic,[41] Aristide based his development model for Haiti on a document, *La Chance qui Passé,* prepared by a coalition of Canadian diaspora Haitians and Haitians. Sociologist Alex Dupuy argues that *La Chance* "was essentially a moderate version of social democracy" that "appeared quite moderate" to most popular Haitians. However, to entrenched Haitian elites, *La Chance* represented a deep affront to their long-protected interest.[42]

In a race of eleven candidates, Aristide won a 68% victory. U.S.-hopeful Marc Brazin came in second with 14% of the vote.[43] The Organization of American States, who mediated the elections, declared the results "acceptable.[44] Not a year into his presidency, a coup financed by Haitian elites, carried out by neo-Duvaliérists,[45] and best evidence suggests backed by the U.S.,[46] overthrew Aristide.[47] Not surprising, a military junta took power.[48]

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[39] Ibid., 79-87.

[40] Ibid.

[41] *Constitution of Haiti, 1987,* [online] (accessed 29 Jan. 2002); available from http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Haiti/haiti1987.html.

[42] Dupuy, 101.

[43] Political Database of the Americas, *Haiti: 1990 Presidential Election Results,* [database] (Georgetown University and the Organization of American States, 2000, accessed 5 Nov. 2002); available from http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Haiti/90pres.html.

[44] Haiti Reborn, *Weekly News, June 15, 2000* [online] (Haiti Reborn, 2000, accessed 4 Oct. 2002); available from http://www.quixote.org/haiti/haitinews/2000/haiti_news_june_15_2000.html.

[45] Michael J. Dash, *The Culture and Customs of Haiti* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2000), 25.

[46] Fourteen Popular Organizations, *Position of the Popular Organizations on the Country's Crisis* (Port-au-Prince, 1994), Document. The document charges, "The U.S. is using Macoutes in the framework of its neo-liberal plan for Haiti."

[47] Dupuy adds, "In Haiti, the problem for Washington was how to compel its traditional allies—the bourgeoisie and the military establishment—to accept a minimal democracy, sever their ties with the system of corruption, and abandon their old-age practice of treating the masses like slaves, while at the same time preserving Haiti as a source of cheap labor for the assembly industries and the multinational

Breaking the Break with the Past

Coup d'Etat

As Aristide took exile in the U.S., junta operatives, many of them former macoutes who had now come out of hiding, conducted well-organized massacres throughout Haiti against the popular movements that brought Aristide to power. Done with the intent to demobilize and demoralize the movements, the massacres killed upwards of 6,000 and maimed others. Junta operatives dumped many of the dead into mass graves.[49]

During the military junta's reign between 1991 and 1994,[50] Marc Brazin showed up as the de facto Prime Minister of Haiti between 1992 and 1993. While at the post, Brazin took steps to realize his initial neo-liberal plans, including a signed agreement with the U.S.-controlled *Rice Corporation of Haiti* to renew rice imports into the country.[51] While the cheap U.S.-subsidized rice did help the needs of some poor Haitians, particularly slum-dwellers in Port- au-Prince, it caused yet more migration of Haitian peasant farmers into those same slums.

Politique de Doublure

The U.S. returned Aristide to power in 1994 during a U.S. intervention. Before doing so, however, the U.S. placed preconditions upon his return. Perforce, Aristide

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agribusiness's. The solution lay in electing a candidate who accepted the new game plan and whom the local oligarchies and the United States supported. Unfortunately, the Haitian masses who had been excluded from this new schema, spoiled it (in the opinion of the US strategists) by voting for their own unexpected and unpredictable candidate" (1997: 133).

[48] Dash, 25.

[49] Ridgeway, ed., 205-230. Also see Dupuy, 115-135. See most particularly Human Rights Watch, *Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993).

[50] Ridgeway, ed., 205-230. Also see Dupuy, 115-135.

[51] Ridgeway, ed., 218-222.

adopted standard neo-liberal economic policies and an accompanying aid package, just as the U.S. and their candidate Marc Brazin wanted previously for Haiti. All the typical preconditions came attached to the aid package, most notably a structural adjustment program that privatized Haiti's few nationally held industries and opened wide the country to foreign investment, ownership, and expropriation of profits.[52]

While the majority of Haitians were elated to "have their Papa back," few could miss the new change. Aristide's stances against neo-liberalism were greatly responsible for his initial election to power.[53] The Haitian majority had deeply wanted to break away from their past—break away from exogenous development forms. They had seen the best hope for that break in Aristide and his development policy, which combined some neo-liberal elements with socialism and intense grassroots, participatory democracy. Now those hopes appeared dashed.

Contention and Crisis

Resistance and Creativity

As the Haitian break with their past over development forms was broken by the mostly external actors, it significantly led to the current contentions in Haiti. Haitians perceive the development form they worked to bring about within the popular movements as endogenous, stemming from their consent, and directed toward their best interests. The other development form, neo-liberalism, they perceive as exogenous, forced upon them through coercion, and subversive to the very democratic revolution they gave so

[52] Dupuy, 137-151. Also see Morris Morely and Chris McGuillion, *"Disobedient" Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti* [online database] (Political Science Quarterly and Columbia International Affairs Online, 1994, accessed 9 Jan. 2002); available from http://www.ciaonet.org/book/caraley/index.html.

[53] Dupuy, 137-151. See also McGuillion, (accessed).

much to bring about. Aristide, as well as Rene Preval who held the Presidency during 1995-2000, could no longer carry out the expressed interests of the Haitian popular movements as before. Neo-liberalism tied to Northern power tied Haiti's hands.[54]

In the midst of Preval's term, he began to buck certain elements of neo-liberalism and the international aid regimes' structural adjustment packages in response to popular demands. As he did so, the U.S. the same year led an international aid embargo against Haiti.[55] As Aristide entered again into office in 2000, he instituted a dual foreign policy of *resistance and creativity* that has sought to adopt neo-liberalism on some points and reject it for more participatory and nationalistic approaches on others. Meanwhile, as some of the factories started under Jean-Claude closed, a lesser amount of factories came in. In 2003, a former female factory worker stated,

> I have a lot of experience in factories. It is a very grave and serious situation. I worked from 1979 to 1999 and my experiences were horrible. Especially because the workers work so hard and get nothing from that work. For example, the minimum wage no longer covers the cost of transportation to and from work, never mind housing, school and food. *In this form*, we are still in slavery. That is why people are getting so deteriorated on the machines. They don't have enough to live. I don't work in the factory now. I can die. I don't see the future for my children. There is a pattern when you reach 35-36 years old where they cut you off and try to take your first born. The majority of bosses will call the CIMO (riot police) if there are problems with workers instead of trying to work it out. After all these experiences I still haven't laid one cinder block for a home and the future. On payday, I have always tried to avoid food sellers so I could save the money instead of eating![56]

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[54] McGuillion, (accessed).

[55] Paul Farmer and Mary C. Smith Fawzi, *Unjust Embargo Deepens Haiti's Health Crisis* (Boston Globe, 30 Dec. 2002, accessed); available from http://www.pih.org/inthenews/021230farmersmithoped.htm.

[56] Melinda Miles, *Report of the Haiti Reborn/Quixote Center Delegation: Investigating the Human Effects of Witheld Humanitarian Aid,* January 11-19, 2003 (2003). Emphasis added. It should be noted that some very few current factory owners are quite politically conscious and voluntarily offer better conditions and somewhat better pay than what is required (e.g., through profit-sharing). Unfortunately, these factory owners are rare.

Funding Destabilization

From the onset of the aid embargo, rising militancy and social organization occurred among the Haitian popular movements throughout Haiti. While the embargo remains to this day, Haiti has poised as a one-party dominated political system, with Aristide's *Fanmi Lavalas* party at the fore.[57] Fearing the outcomes of this, the U.S. has channeled millions into Haiti to fund conservative NGOs and a coalition of eleven opposition parties, the *Democratic Convergence*.[58] Convergence operatives are mostly former Duvalierists friendly to standard neo-liberalism who, most worrying to popular Haitians, advocate for the return of the Haitian Army in the name of "keeping order." Best estimates indicate that the Convergence holds less than 10% of support from Haitians, not surprisingly from primarily elite sector Haitians and neo-Duvalierists in the country. Most popular level Haitians see the Convergence as simply playing the system in Duvalierist fashion with the end-intent of re-entrenching themselves within Haitian State apparati, including the military, so they enrich themselves.[59]

After elections in Haiti in 2000, Fanmi Lavalas won a landslide.[60] After the OAS declared the elections "acceptable,"[61] the organization reversed its position as the U.S. and several European nations declared numerous legislative elections flawed.[62] To appease the charges, each Senator in question resigned, and the Senate called for new elections to fill the empty seats. In response, the Convergence has forwarded an ever-

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[57] Canadian Foundation for the Americas, *La Classe Politique: Parties and Political Instability in Haiti*, [report] (Canadian Foundation for the Americas, accessed 28 Feb. 2003); available from http://www.focal.ca/summary/summary_haiti.htm.

[58] Council on Hemispheric Affairs, *By Ignoring Island's Suffering, U.S.'s Frivolous Haiti Policy Invites Approaching Catastrophe*, [report] (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2 June 2002, accessed 16 Nov. 2002); available from http://www.coha.org/Press_Releases/02-15-Haiti.htm.

[59] George Friemoth, "Haiti: U.S. Undermines Another Democracy," *Marin Interfaith Task Force on Central America Newsletter*, Spring 2002.

[60] Kim Ives, "This Week in Haiti," *Haiti Progress*, Sept. 11-17 2002.

[61] Eric Green, *OAS Says Credibility of Haitian Elections "Acceptable"* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2000).

[62] *The OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Haiti: Chief of Mission Report to the OAS Permanent Council* (The Organization of American States, 2000).

evolving list of demands, saying that until their demands are met, they will not participate in elections—a move that most in Haiti feel has no other aim but to wear down the Haitian popular movements under the poverty of the embargo, and turn Haiti into a U.S. client-State again.[63]

"*Many* are Ready to *Die*"

All the while, the level of social and militant organization among Haiti's popular movements has increased.[64] In the name of George W Bush's "War on Terror," the U.S. has placed troops along the Haitian-Dominican border.[65] A U.S. immersion-journalist living in Haiti, Kevin Pina, has made astute connections between the popular militancy and the troops and has tentatively asserted that the U.S. is quietly funding "Haitian Contras," based in part on reported incursions of Haitian Duvalierists crossing into bastions of armed, rural peasantry in Haiti from the Dominican border.[66] Kim Ives of the newspaper *Haiti Progress* makes confident assertions citing repeated and overwhelming evidence regarding what Pina reports, including nearly a dozen police station attacks during which the "contras" stole arms and ammunition.[67]

Because of the long experiences of Haitians with exogenous development from external powers, and because of the U.S.'s current funding of destabilizing elements within Haiti, many in the country feel it is teetering on the brink of civil war. With the identity-giving message embedded in the consciousnesses of most Haitians, "Live Free or

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[63] Friemoth.

[64] See for example Tim Collie, "Gangs: In Haiti's Slums, Protesters Turning to Violence," *The Sun-Sentinel*, 21 Nov. 2002, Michael Deibert, "Protests Rock Haiti Slum, Block Traffic," *Reuters*, 26 Sept. 2002, Michael Deibert, "Roadblocks Paralyze Haitian Capital," *Reuters*, 12 Oct. 2002.

[65] Kim Ives, "This Week in Haiti," *Haiti Progress*, March 26 - April 1 2003.

[66] Kevin Pina, *Is the U.S. Funding Haitian "Contras"?* [online] (The Black Commentator, April 2003, accessed 3 April 2003); available from http://www.blackcommentator.com/36/36_guest_ commentator.html.

[67] Ives, "March 26 - April 1, 2003."

Die," which stems from the same call during the Haitian Revolution and later,[68] the outcome could prove difficult. As George Friemoth of the Marin Interfaith Task Force on Central America, a San Francisco-based NGO, observed after a grassroots-oriented trip to Haiti,

> The Haitian people are angry—very angry—with the US for interfering in their transition to democracy. They are angry with the international community for promising aid and not delivering it. They are angry with their president and the government for making so many concessions and not meeting their many needs. They are angry at the Convergence for feeding into their greatest fear by advocating the return of the Haitian Army and setting the stage for the two coup attempts in July and December 2001, that required massive public mobilizations in the streets, not without some violence. They are extremely frustrated with the slow progress being made to improve their lives and realize democracy. Despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles they appear committed to defend their democracy at all costs.[69]

[68] Carolyn E. Fick, *The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below*, 1st ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 45-52.

[69] Friemoth. Most Haitians hard-tie together their conceptions of democracy and development.

CHAPTER THREE

VISIONS OF AN ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT FORM IN HAITI

Introduction

In chapters one and two, I followed the theme that exogenous development theory and praxis in Haiti have in the vast bulk failed. I showed in both chapters how exogenous development forms in the country have overall wreaked havoc on the majority Haitian population and subverted their own endogenous development form across Haitian time to the present day.

This chapter will move beyond these historically grounded assessments to look at possibilities for the Haitian future. Two relatively amicable development theories I highlight would do much to remedy Haitian underdevelopment. Moving beyond the two theories, I look closely at the cultural identity formations and key culturally-based practices of popular Haitians. Based upon the identities and practices is a crucially important explanation of the underlying causes of Haitian resistance to exogenous development forms. Endogenous preferences of popular Haitians should form the basis of an endogenous Haitian development form. I suggest that a Haiti-wide political economy based upon Haitian endogenous preferences may be possible, show what the development form might look like, point to a theory for it, and then argue in its defense.

Two Exceedingly Better Alternatives

"High-Modernist" vs. "Metis"

Incorporation Development

When state or international actors enforce development upon a country apart from what political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott calls "metis," such as we have seen across Haitian time to the present day, he would call it "high-modernist development." In *Seeing Like a State,* Scott makes a case against what he calls an "imperial or hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role" of this metis, which he indicates as "local knowledge and know-how."[1] In laying out his case against high-modernist development, Scott argues, "The most tragic episodes of state-initiated social engineering originate in a pernicious combination of four elements."[2] The first is the formation of simplified pictures of what in reality are complex on-ground situations. Scott argues that states press these complex situations into standardized data sets, but that the sets fail to incorporate metis. The second element is what Scott terms "high-modernist ideology," which he says drives the simplified formulations. Scott specifies high-modernist ideology as "a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws."[3] Scott argues that when data simplification occurs under high-modernist ideology at the behest of the third element, an authoritarian state undertaking development initiatives, it wreaks havoc on peoples, cultures,

[1] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 6.
[2] Ibid., 8.
[3] Ibid., 9.

environments, and productivity. Scott states that this is especially so if the fourth element, civil society, loses the fortitude to resist the imposed development initiatives.[4]

Along with a deft focus on the former USSR, Scott provides prolific evidence throughout his work that centrally managed and state-imposed development schemes that fail to incorporate metis inevitably go awry. Scott argues that for development initiatives to be successful, they must recognize and incorporate metis. He states that metis is just as important as "formal, epistemic knowledge."[5] Scott thus argues against any development theory and praxis that does not incorporate metis.[6] Many among the Haitian peasantry would sum up Scott's arguments with a Haitian proverb: "The big branch at the top of the tree thinks it has the best view, but it fails to see the sights enjoyed by the little bud tossed about by the wind."[7]

Roots-Embedded Capitalist Development

Very importantly, Scott allows his assertions regarding state commanded social and economic engineering to apply just as well to international aid regimes and hegemons who strive to "remake" the world and its societies after a single vision.[8] While Scott applies his ideas to the former USSR and smaller cases of command development in primarily Africa and Asia, economist John Gray would directly extend Scott's ideas to the coerced entry of what he calls "the global capitalist order."[9]

Gray points out that visions of "economic orders" have historically always been, and still are, brought about by power-actors, and that the notion of "free markets" are

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[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 34.
[6] Ibid., 10.
[7] Jennie M. Smith, "Constituents of Lavalas: The Rural Poor," in *Haiti's Political Challenges: Actors, Issues, Prospects* (Arlington, VA: 2001), 88.
[8] Scott, 8.
[9] John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism* (London: New Press, 1999), 1-121.

therefore largely an illusion.[10] Reminiscent of Scott, Gray argues that the attempt of great powers to bring about a single global market is largely the political project of a few planners[11] who hide their social vision behind modernist ideology—"free market" ideology, in Gray's argument. Gray argues that free market ideology, far from being truly free, relies heavily on a strong state in team with corporate capital that together must eliminate the portions of civil society who have the power to resist their drive.[12] Gray sharply asserts, "Global *laissez-faire* is an American project,"[13] that in reality is "a mere nationalization of American corporate interests,"[14] which is something that most popular-level Haitians and their leaders have understood all along.

Gray's deepest concern is over the long-term impact of this American project on international political stability,[15] which is another concern that most popular Haitians would share. Even so, and again reminiscent of Scott, Gray asserts that, because of the power-based manner in which America imposes its project upon others, it is "destined to fail,"[16] though not without social costs. Gray pointedly correlates how the American project "resembles that other twentieth century experiment in utopian social engineering, Marxian socialism."[17] Each, Gray says, was willing to impose its global social and economic vision at the price of significant human suffering and upheaval.[18] Gray contends that the future outcome of the America project is that America itself, who Gray asserts as "the supposed flagship of 'the new civilization,' stands to face moral and social disintegration up against other cultures that have never forgotten that development works best when it is embedded in the roots of their societies.[19] Gray argues that it is intolerable

[10] Ibid., 23-54.
[11] Ibid., 12.
[12] Ibid., 33.
[13] Ibid., 100.
[14] Ibid., 217.
[15] Ibid., 218.
[16] Ibid., 235.
[17] Ibid., 53.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., 88.

for the West to entertain the possibility of countries achieving alternative modernities not based upon individualism or ideals of progress towards a global civilization,[20] so, the West's imposed project continues.

Alternative Modernity: Beyond Metis and Embedment

Both Scott and Gray make very strong and helpful arguments. However, neither extends them quite far enough. Scott does not adequately extend his arguments to question the basic assumption that states have the right to be determiners of ultimate development forms against popular consent. Scott's argument is limited to *metis incorporation*—it is limited to having state powers *incorporate* metis into *their* state development schemes, so the schemes do not fail and cause human misery. Scott does not adequately address development schemes of state or foreign hegemons that may run deeply counter to what those in a given society may actually want. In sum, he does not extend his argument to allow those who actually hold the metis to be the theorizers, development planners, and final determiners of the development form under which they live.

Gray does not adequately develop upon what he allows as the possibility of countries achieving development apart from individualism and ideals of "a world civilization"—in short, an alternate modernity. He does not develop upon a fundamental questioning of the basic capitalist development form. Gray centers his arguments upon *the power-based manner* in which disparate societies have capitalism thrust upon them. His argument is to allow cultures to *embed* external capitalist development forms *within* their cultural roots, so that the roots of and social textures unique to each country are not

[20] Ibid., 46.

covered over by globalization.[21] Belgian development technocrat Thierry Verhelst persuasively argues this concern as well.[22]

While both *metis incorporation* and *embedded capitalism development* are exceeding improvements over coerced neo-liberalism or any other coerced development form, anthropologist Jennie Smith would point to still another vision. Smith would argue that high-modernist development theories and praxis have largely been unsuccessful because their fundamental starting points have been, and remain, flawed.[23] She would argue that external development forms must not only *incorporate* metis, and must not only *embed* external development forms within cultural roots, but must *begin with* "the practices and visions of the poor themselves."[24]

"Elementary Forms" Development

To conceptualize how Haitian development theory and praxis could have its starting point with the Haitian poor (recall that four-fifths of all Haitians would be included in this category), it is crucial to understand what eighteenth century sociologist Emile Durkheim contrasted as the division of labor between what he called "modern" and "primitive" societies.[25] For Durkheim, the division of labor between the two societies comprised the prime difference between the two. He focused much upon the solidarity

[21] Ibid.

[22] Thierry G. Verhelst, *No Life without Roots: Culture and Development*, trans. Bob Cummings (Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books, 1990).

[23] Smith, *Where the Hands Are Many*, 175.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Durkheim was a unilineal evolutionist who believed peoples would inevitably "mount the scale of social evolution," (1997 [1893], 105), which position I reject. I also reject Durkehim's use of the words "elementary," "primitive," and "mechanical" to lay out his case. The main of anthropolgy has long-ago debunked such terminology that was used in the eighteenth century to describe anthropological observations. What was once described as "elementary" (versus "advanced") "primitive" (verus "modern"), and "mechanical" (versus "organic") is, in reality, far from "elementary," "primitive," and "mechanical," as those terms are commonly underestood today. The terms instead point toward what are often complex *alternative modernities.* The reader is urged to understand that, though Durkheim was much a product of his eighteenth times in his use of this sort of terminology to describe his insights, his insights are nonetheless highly informative and, as I will argue, key to understanding the Haitian case.

forms that each type of division of labor produced. Durkheim argued that, while both "modern" and "primitive" divisions of labor each provided a form of solidarity, it was clear to him that the solidarity form in "modern" societies had its foundation in individualism.[26] "Primitive" societies, on the other hand, surrounded a solidarity form based on cooperatism.[27] To understand a cooperatist solidarity form, Durkheim felt we needed to view what he called "elementary forms" within societies that did not hinge around the dependent exchange of differentiated services and products.[28]

Kinship and Political Economy of the Haitian Peasantry

Smith helps us view Durkheim's "elementary forms" within Haiti. In viewing these forms, we can get a glimpse of what an endogenous Haitian development form might look like. During Smith's fieldwork in Haiti, she gave significant attention to the kinship structures and political economy of the Haitian peasantry with whom she lived and worked. She points out how much of the Haitian peasantry[29] situate themselves within *lakou* settlements. Lakou-s are compounds of cooperatively-based extended kin, including family members, non-kin, and fictive kin, headed by the oldest male (*mét lakou*). Smith shows that most extended families who do not reside in actual lakou-s still typically live close together, such as across a path or up a hill. She points out how both lakou-s as compounds and the clustering of extended kin in close proximity with each other enable Haitian peasant groups to take up voluntarily the excess burdens individuals may face during particularly difficult times one or some may be facing. In other words, and though we cannot idealize it to be something pristine, the larger group bears the

[26] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. Lewis Cosner (New York: Free Press, 1997 [1893]), 68-87.
[27] Ibid., 31-67
[28] Ibid., 11-30.
[29] Rural peasants make up 65% of the population in Haiti. Source: Bank, (accessed).

excess load of members in trouble for the good of the whole. Smith points out how lakou-s diminished during the 1800s, during which time Haitian kinship moved in the direction of nuclear families. She shows how the patterning around nuclear family units has created vulnerability within the units, who more often must bear risks apart from larger kin groups. Even so, Smith shows that lakou-s and clustering of extended kin are both still widespread in Haiti.[30]

Smith also shows various forms around which the political economy of the Haitian peasantry is organized. She first points out that within the Haitian political economy the lowest position one can have is as a paid laborer for a neighbor. However, in the economy and organization of Haitian *kove-s,* the whole idea is to work for one's neighbor.[31] Kove-s are membership-based agricultural work parties whose members are called upon when someone and/or their group needs assistance to clear land, plant, weed, or harvest. Smith displays how the events kove-s undertake involve reciprocal arrangements between lakou-s, other groups, or family units. She points out how when the host of a kove asks another kove or similar group to host a work party, moderate competition develops between the groups to out perform the other in calling in adequate laborers, and in providing correlative festivities, typically food, some rum, and socially-pointed call-and-response songs. As such, the nature of kove-s is to provide and multiply community solidarity, and to perform better continually.[32]

Smith displays another form of communal work party called *artibisyon-s.* Members of artibisyon-s work in part-time agricultural work parties for only non-members. Artibisyon-s receive payment once at the end of each year, which is *not* distributed to individual members. Instead, the entire proceeds go to a year-end feast held among artibisyon members.[33] Smith states that the idea behind artibisyon-s is for

[30] Smith, *Where the Hands Are Many*, 80-81.
[31] Smith, *Where the Hands Are Many*, 86.
[32] Ibid., 84.
[33] Ibid., 93-102.

members to assert "a certain type of personal and collective identity."[34] Smith goes on to display *eskwad-s* (also called *sori-s* or *wonn-s*),[35] *asoye-s*, *kominotè-s,*[36] *sosoyete-s,*[37] and *gwoupman peyizan-s,*[38] all which indicate labor arrangements that Smith characterizes as democratic, reciprocal, rotating, and cooperativistic.[39] Speaking of these arrangements, one peasant informed Smith, "They are our roots . . . . They sustain us."[40] To express that they have long existed among the Haitian peasantry and are a key part of much of current Haiti based upon its past, another peasant stated, "They've been around since the Old Testament."[41] As to the overriding meaning of these Haitian "elementary forms," Smith summarizes,

> The prioritization of collective labor in rural Haitian agriculture emerges not only from material and economic concerns. *It also reflects a larger commitment to sharing labor and resources that goes well beyond pragmatic interests, and comprises one of the very foundations of rural Haitian culture.*[42]

While Smith applies her observation only to rural areas in Haiti, my general observations in Haiti indicate that the values and cultural identity formations of the majority of rural Haitians are also held among the majority of popular urban Haitians as well (recall the exoduses of Haitian peasants into urban areas discussed). Though adapted to a much larger scale and not done strictly for labor ends, the formations are evident within many of the organizations through which both rural and urban popular movements contend for their social, economic, cultural, and political interests. In other words, the core values and conceptions within what Durkheim called "elementary

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[34] Ibid., 103.
[35] Ibid., 82.
[36] Ibid., 88-89.
[37] Ibid., 104-140.
[38] Ibid., 141-174.
[39] Ibid., 82.
[40] Ibid., 88-89.
[41] Ibid., 88.
[42] Smith, *Where the Hands Are Many*, 72. Emphasis added.

forms,"—what Smith has shown among the Haitian peasantry—have proliferated *throughout* popular-level Haitian society, adapted to expanded numbers.

Socio-cultural Identity Formation Among Popular Haitians

Durkheim expands his arguments concerning the sorts of "elementary forms" that Smith highlights and that I suggest form the foundation of popular-level organizations throughout Haiti. Durkheim argues that within these forms, members come to think correspondingly by internalizing and normalizing their conceptions of the social order. Members then project these conceptions out onto their larger world. Durkheim shows that within this social order, there is a generally shared symbolic universe and classification of nature, and that those comprise the principles of authority and cooperation for a people. The social order thereby becomes moral and legitimate to them.[43]

Explaining Haitian Solidarity in Defending the Citadel of their Sacred

Importantly, Durkheim extends his idea still further. He shows that this social order then becomes sacred to a given people, and deep solidarity forms around it along with a sort of "collective consciousness." Durkeim then points out that the character of the sacred is such that when endangerment comes to it, societal members feel a calling to defend it. Durkheim argues that an "advanced" division of labor endangers that sacred solidarity form, and replaces it with a solidarity form dependent on the workings of the market.[44] Durkheim saw "modern" divisions of labor based on individualism, what he

[43] Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, 31-67.
[44] Ibid.

called “organic” solidarity, replacing “primitive” divisions of labor and communal sacredness, what he called “mechanical” solidarity or “solidarity by similarities.”[45]

What, then, is most behind the Haitian Democratic Revolution? What, at the core-most level, is behind popular Haitians’ willingness to defend their democracy at all costs? What has been and is at root of the resistance to and militancy against exogenous development forms by popular-level Haitians? *It is nothing less than a defense of their solidarity form in which their conceptions and cultural identities as Haitians have long formed.* Popular-level Haitians’ simply do not want their identity formations and cooperativistic solidarity form supplanted with a solidarity form based upon individualism, the mere workings of the market, and the global economy. *All totaled, this comprises popular Haitians’ “sacred” solidarity.*

It cannot be overstressed how central the above points are to understanding the current Haitian situation; nor can it be overstressed how explicative the points are to an understanding of the contention of popular-level Haitians over exogenous versus endogenous development forms across Haitian time. Recall again Haitians’ experiences in slavery during colonialism, and their breaking out of it amidst the only successful slave revolution that led to the founding of a nation-state. Recall the “development” efforts during the post-colonial era, and how the Haitian State took an underlying approach to modernize their populace—modernization based upon whatever was in vogue with larger powers at the time. Recall the racist-based 1914-1934 U.S. Occupation of Haiti, and how forced labor and the confiscation of Haitian lands resulted, causing scores of uprisings. Recall how monies given under modernization theory’s premises during the François Duvaliér years led to little other than the dysfunction of Duvalierism, and continual terror from the *Tonton Macoutes*.[46] Recall how during Aristide and Preval the modernizing

[45] Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, 101-148.

[46] For additional insight into this under the Duvaliérs, see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Haiti, State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990).

came as coerced neo-liberalism that most popular-level Haitians had already deeply tasted of amidst "The American Plan" during the Jean-Claude years. Popular Haitians sought to provide a space for themselves—for their endogenous development form—through the Haitian Democratic Revolution; but as we have seen, coerced exogenous development subverted it. Across Haitian time to the present day, popular Haitians have had all along had experiences with exogenous "development" forms. They have all along found them to be most intensely bitter.

A "Cooperatist" Republic

It is therefore much *because of* experiences with exogenous development forms that most popular-level Haitians find the impetus for the creative continuity and resistive and even militant defense of their own endogenous development forms, and continue to work to see it brought about. The authors of the Haitian Constitution provided a recognition and basis for a Haiti-wide endogenous development form. Its authors wrote in Article One that Haiti is a "cooperatist" Republic.[47] Haiti as a cooperatist Republic respects and reflects the cultural identity formations and foundational values of the Haitian majority. It points toward their "commitment to sharing labor and resources."[48] It points toward the same recognition that Prime Minister of Haiti Yvon Neptune very recently articulated. "We must operate in the world market, but we want to build an alternative economy," he said, "so that small nations like ours are not enslaved or swallowed by this globalization."[49]

Recall again kinship lakou-s, and the labor-oriented artibisyon-s, eskwad-s, asoye-s, kominotè-s, sosoyete-s, and gwoupman peyizan-s, and the values within them. Recall

[47] *1987 Constitution of Haiti*, (accessed).
[48] Smith, *Where the Hands Are Many*, 72.
[49] Tom Reeves, *Haiti and the US Game*, [online] (ZNet Magazine, 27 March 2003, accessed 8 April 2003); available from http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=2&ItemID=3337.

that Smith characterizes the labor arrangements as democratic, reciprocal, rotating, and cooperativistic,[50] and how one peasant expressed their wider meaning as, "They are our roots."[51] Recall how Smith asserts they comprise the very foundations of rural Haitian culture,[52] and recall my assertion applying these foundations to urban Haiti as well. Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel argue that a nation-wide alternative political economy based upon such endogenous preferences is indeed possible. In *The Political Economy of Participatory Economics*, they lay out what Harvard economist Juliet Schor says is a plausible and sensible vision of non-hierarchical production and consumption relations with decentralized planning.[53] With the end goal of making production and consumption participatory and more equitable, Albert and Hahnel suggest the importance of democratic councils and participatory workplace and consumption decision making groups. Albert and Hahnel evoke the idea of balanced work complexes where labor is not so highly specialized.[54] Albert and Hahnel point out how their vision is consistent with the efficient use of productive potentials and provides incentives,[55] and show how democratized and "realistic versions of participatory planning" can outdo models of market and centrally planned economies.[56] Albert and Hahnel lay out feasibility models of participatory economics as only economists can do.[57] While Albert and Hahnel admit point-blank that their arguments are only a *prima facie*,[58] their arguments are compelling and call for much closer examination.

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[50] Ibid., 82.
[51] Ibid., 88-89.
[52] Smith, *Where the Hands Are Many*, 72. Emphasis added.
[53] Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, *The Political Economy of Participatory Economics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 17-23.
[54] Ibid., 23-36.
[55] Ibid., 35.
[56] Ibid., 59-71.
[57] Ibid., 109-130.
[58] Ibid., 132.

Conclusion

Within the frameworks of both anthropology and political science, and within a political economy framework that is common to both, I have looked at development theory and praxis across Haitian time, the outcomes of each, key Haitian responses, and argued for an endogenous vision of Haitian development. Unilineal evolutionism at work during the French colonial era resulted in widespread Haitian resistance, and the formation of Vodou that helped spark the Haitian Revolution. Unilineal evolutionism during the 1914-1934 U.S. Occupation re-enforced semi-feudalism and sparked scores of resistive uprisings among Haitians. Modernization theory during the Francois Duvaliér era entrenched Duvalierism. Cultural developmentalism is little else that a revival of unilineal evolutionism that replaces biological evolution with cultural evolution unto supposed higher life-ways. Holding the ideology constricts vision to cause blatant misconceptions of the Haitian "other" that a closer look proves false. "The American Plan" during the Jean-Claude Duvaliér years disrupted local labor arrangements, and caused significant landlessness and mass migrations of Haitians into slums of Port-au-Prince. The American Plan left a very bitter taste in the mouths of most Haitians for standard neo-liberalism. The Haitian Democratic Revolution arose from the bottom up to address all of the preceding exogenous development forms, but internal and outside elite forces again subverted Haitians from obtaining a completion to their long-ago started Revolution.

Both metis incorporation development and roots-embedded capitalist development are exceeding improvements over state-imposed development of whatever form, though neither theory adequately questions the assumption of state or hegemonic actors as the ultimate determiners of development forms. Endogenous development forms have long existed within Haitian culture. A crucial key to understanding Haitian

resistance and solidarity in defense of their endogenous development forms is within Durkheimian thought.

I have suggested that a Haiti-wide political economy based upon Haitian endogenous preferences may be possible. I have argued that cooperatism is at root of that political-economic development form, and have shown that the Haitian Constitution recognizes it. In sum, I have argued that key elements within Haitian culture stemming from its past are not something that needs to be broken away from for the country to develop, but that they should form the very basis of the country's future development.

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