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order of battle deception of the Vietnam War: 1965-1968

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Date Issued:
1990
Summary:
In the years 1965 to 1968 of the Viet Nam War, high level U.S. military officials ordered arbitrary reductions of official estimates of the enemy order of battle. The motivation for their policy reflected the difficulties posed by this war. As divisiveness in the U.S. increased over support for the war, signs of progress in the war were in demand, but impressive military progress was not being made, although ARVN reports through 1966 reported military success. With bilateral intelligence, more accurate reports were made. The Johnson Administration called for dramatic progress reports. Among these, MACV's reports on enemy force estimates were useful to portray success. However, revised estimates showed increasing numbers, both in enemy force size and battalion and larger-scale enemy-initiated attacks. These reports were suppressed by destruction or modified through arbitrary cuts by military officials. Thus news on the war was falsified to the public.
Title: The order of battle deception of the Vietnam War: 1965-1968.
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Name(s): Stenson, Josephine.
Florida Atlantic University, Degree grantor
O'Sullivan, John, Thesis advisor
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Electronic Thesis Or Dissertation
Issuance: monographic
Date Issued: 1990
Publisher: Florida Atlantic University
Place of Publication: Boca Raton, Fla.
Physical Form: application/pdf
Extent: 140 p.
Language(s): English
Summary: In the years 1965 to 1968 of the Viet Nam War, high level U.S. military officials ordered arbitrary reductions of official estimates of the enemy order of battle. The motivation for their policy reflected the difficulties posed by this war. As divisiveness in the U.S. increased over support for the war, signs of progress in the war were in demand, but impressive military progress was not being made, although ARVN reports through 1966 reported military success. With bilateral intelligence, more accurate reports were made. The Johnson Administration called for dramatic progress reports. Among these, MACV's reports on enemy force estimates were useful to portray success. However, revised estimates showed increasing numbers, both in enemy force size and battalion and larger-scale enemy-initiated attacks. These reports were suppressed by destruction or modified through arbitrary cuts by military officials. Thus news on the war was falsified to the public.
Identifier: 14680 (digitool), FADT14680 (IID), fau:12700 (fedora)
Collection: FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection
Note(s): Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters
Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 1990.
Subject(s): Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Held by: Florida Atlantic University Libraries
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/fcla/dt/14680
Sublocation: Digital Library
Use and Reproduction: Copyright © is held by the author, with permission granted to Florida Atlantic University to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Use and Reproduction: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Host Institution: FAU
Is Part of Series: Florida Atlantic University Digital Library Collections.