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COMPETITION AND PRICES IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
Title
COMPETITION AND PRICES IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE ECONOMY.
Creator
HORNER, GEORGE FRENCH, JR., Florida Atlantic University, Scheidell, John M., College of Business, Department of Economics
Abstract/Description
In classical economic theory, competition consisted of buyers outbidding one another and sellers underbidding one another; and it was argued that, for sufficiently large markets, competition would yield uniform prices in equilibrium. Neoclassical economists subsequently investigated the role of preferences in trading, concluding that, in equilibrium, each trader would obtain the most desirable commodity bundle affordable at prevailing prices, given his initial resources. In the process,...
Show moreIn classical economic theory, competition consisted of buyers outbidding one another and sellers underbidding one another; and it was argued that, for sufficiently large markets, competition would yield uniform prices in equilibrium. Neoclassical economists subsequently investigated the role of preferences in trading, concluding that, in equilibrium, each trader would obtain the most desirable commodity bundle affordable at prevailing prices, given his initial resources. In the process, however, neoclassical economists ultimately made price uniformity an assumption, assumed individuals incapable of influencing prices under any circumstances, and redefined competition to mean price-taking behavior. By thus denying individuals any active role in price determination, an inconsistency was introduced into the theory. This thesis eliminates the inconsistency by combining classical competitive behavior and the neoclassical insights into the role of preferences, to produce an axiomatic theory of competition within which the characteristics of equilibrium (uniform prices and utility maximization) are rigorously derived.
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Date Issued
1982
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/fcla/dt/14128
Subject Headings
Competition, Prices
Format
Document (PDF)
Essays on investing
Title
Essays on investing.
Creator
Johnson, William Fount III, College of Business, Department of Finance
Abstract/Description
The Market Timing - Buy and Hold (MT-BH) is introduced, tested against widely accepted performance models of market timing and tested if implamentation is possible. The MT-BH metric measures the condition of engaging in market timing strategies relative to buy and hold investing across an equity market. The metric provides an alternative explanation to why market timing results of investors and managers vary through time and across different equity markets. This dissertation examines how the...
Show moreThe Market Timing - Buy and Hold (MT-BH) is introduced, tested against widely accepted performance models of market timing and tested if implamentation is possible. The MT-BH metric measures the condition of engaging in market timing strategies relative to buy and hold investing across an equity market. The metric provides an alternative explanation to why market timing results of investors and managers vary through time and across different equity markets. This dissertation examines how the is correlated with traditional market timing measures of the Treynor and Sharpe ratios over the 1995-2010 time period and how it affects widely used measures of regression based market timing models of Treynor- Mazuy and Henriksson-Merton. The Market Timing - Buy and Hold (MT-BH) metric can be applied to any equity market over any time period to condition the market timing skill of money managers in any equity market around the world. The final accomplishment of this dissertation is to determine if readily available finance and macro-economic variables can help investors determine which years are more favorable to pursue market timing strategies and which years favor buy and hold investing. When real GDP growth rates, inflation rates and PE ratios were low or negative and when dividend yields were high, market timing strategies were favorable across 44 country market indexes from 1994-2008. These results were robust to country level of development, negative market return years and other control variables. The conditions for pursing market timing strategies were time variant and detectable with macro-economic and finance variables. The MT-BH metric allows investors and brokers to determine when to switch from buy and hold investing to a market timing strategy using macro-economic and financial variables and helps to explain why market timing skill of managers is rarely found to be persistent.
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Date Issued
2011
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/3183131
Subject Headings
Investment analysis, Stock options, Portfolio management, Finance, Personal, Asset allocation, Assets (Accounting), Prices, Forecasting, Econometric models
Format
Document (PDF)
Target stock price runup prior to acquisitions
Title
Target stock price runup prior to acquisitions.
Creator
Brigida, Matthew David., College of Business, Department of Finance
Abstract/Description
Information leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition...
Show moreInformation leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition then information leakage is greater. Further if the acquirer is foreign, if the target is a high-tech firm, and if the target has options on its stock all increase information leakage. I find hostile deals are effective in reducing information leakage. Lastly, information leakage increases in the percentage of managerial ownership. I next hypothesize that the identity and intent of partial acquirers is known to market participants before the announcement of a partial acquisition. I find that the market can anticipate whether a partial acquirer intends to fully-acquire or take an active role in the management of the target. Also, the market anticipates whether the acquirer is a private investment find or a non-financial corporation. Further, the acquirer's identity or intent is fully reflected in the target's stock price before the announcement of the partial acquisition. These results help explain why there are few partial acquisitions as precursors to full acquisitions., I next hypothesize that macroeconomic factors affect information leakage, and may serve as a signal of when to speculate on acquisitions. I find that information leakage is positively related to shocks in both expected economic conditions and financing costs, the latter signaling to speculators that acquisitions are imminent. I also find information about an imminent full acquisition is leaked earlier when there are positive shocks to economic conditions and financing costs.
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Date Issued
2009
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/368613
Subject Headings
Consolidation and merger of corporations, Negotiation in business, Investment analysis, Stocks, Prices, Securities industry, Corrupt practices
Format
Document (PDF)