ENEMY WITHIN

HUTCHINSON

A FIGHT FOR FREEDOM PUBLIC
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“FIGHT FOR FREEDOM”

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“Heste gehört uns Deutschland
und Morgen die ganze Welt.”
(Deutsches Lied, 1933)

(“To-day Germany is ours, to-morrow the whole world will be”)
(German Song, 1933)
GERMAN MINORITIES AS A WEAPON OF
GERMAN POLICY

Introduction by Prof. A. Pragier

Outside Germany and Austria proper there are about 20 million
Germans in the world. Their greatest concentrations are to be
found in eastern and south-eastern Europe, as well as in America.
When the Drang nach Osten of the German population ceased about
the middle of the nineteenth century, the political tendency towards
eastward expansion remained, but the main flow of emigration was
turned westward, to the United States. In the 1809–1929 period at
least six million Germans settled in the United States. German
experts estimate the number of inhabitants of the United States
who still speak German at three million. According to the German
national doctrine, however, there are in the United States eight
million persons of German descent, called upon to serve the
interests of the German State.

German scholars have been studying the problem of Germans
abroad since the end of the eighteenth century. The names of men
like Jacob Grimm, Ernst Moritz Arndt, Ludwig Uhland, Friedrich
Christoph, Dahlmann or Wilhelm Stricker recall not only the
investigation of the German settlements in the world, but also
endeavours to make political use of the Germans living abroad.

After the first world war the problem of Germans living in
foreign countries became something of a separate science, which
was taught at German universities. Some German universities not
only had special lectures on the subject of Germans abroad, but
also formed committees of faculties and professors for the purpose
of promoting the study of that subject. The parliament of Prussia
decided on November 13, 1925, that the subject was sufficiently
important to warrant vast financial support, and large credits were
granted, in view of the political significance of the problem. The
parliaments of Württemberg and Hesse followed the example of the
Prussian parliament. Besides the universities, two autonomous
institutions devoted their efforts to the development of the German
forces abroad. They were the Deutsches Auslandsinstitut of
Stuttgart, founded in 1917, and the Institut für Auslandkunde, Grenz-
und Auslanddeutschum in Leipzig, founded in 1914. The ten-
dencies of the German science dealing with Germans resident
abroad, which were well formed long before the appearance of the
National-Socialist movement, are best expressed in the officially
accepted terms of that science.

The Germans living outside Germany are divided into five
distinct groups. The first group comprises those who live in territo-
tories separated from the Reich against their will. Such territories
included, for instance, Austria and Danzig. Such a definition, of course, carries an Anschluss as its logical conclusion.

The second group is that of Binnendeutsche; that is, Germans living, by free consent, in independent countries contiguous to Germany. The German professors include in this group the German-speaking inhabitants of Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg.

The third group, Grenzdeutsche, includes Germans living in compact settlements in close proximity to Germany proper, but on foreign territory.

The fourth group, known as Insel-und Streudeutsche, includes Germans living either in compact settlements or scattered in foreign countries outside Central Europe.

The fifth group is that of the Germans outside Europe—the Überseedeutsche.

All the classes of Germans abroad have their duties assigned to them by the science dealing with their political exploitation. They have to maintain their national individuality, keep in permanent contact with the mother country and serve its interests.

The Germans abroad are to be an extension of Germany herself. Fidelity to the German State, as the highest expression of the political ambitions of the German nation, takes precedence before loyal citizenship of the country of residence.

This principle was recognized by the Germans for 150 years, but it found a particularly striking illustration when German citizens of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Jugoslavia, America, etc., were called upon to swear an oath of loyalty and obedience to Hitler as the leader of the Reich and the German nation.

National-Socialism gave a final form to all the aspirations and ideas which regarded the word Grossdeutschland not as a mystical slogan of spiritual unity but as the practical description of a Germany incorporating all the territories with any German minorities whatever. Such were the views of Ludo Moritz Hartmann and of all the authors who always included Grossdeutschland in the titles of their works: Johannes Hohlfeld, Max Hildebert Boehm, Herbert Dankworth, Hugo Grothe, H. Graner, Heinz v. Paller, Rudolf Henle, Peter Kuranda, Felix Behrend, Willy Andreas, Ottomar Schuchardt and—the most grasping of all—Karl Haushofer, as well as the scientifically logical Carl Schmitt.

The danger of disruption of all the countries with German minorities was due not only to the precedence of allegiance to Germany over any other. The theoreticians of the science of the German Volkstum tried to prove that not only all the lands with German inhabitants, however few, but also lands which belonged to the sphere of German cultural influence at any time in history, should belong by right to the Reich. In 1926 the professor of geography, Albrecht Penck, published in Leipzig a book entitled Der deutsche Volks-und Kulturboden. The writer was an old man at the time (he was born in 1858) but he supported a theory which
the Nazis later presented as their own revolutionary idea. Penck, followed by M. H. Boehm, described as deutscher Kulturboden all the parts of the world which felt the influence of German culture, of the work of German scholars and of German pioneers. He declared that the German nation has a right to all such territories. German “science” introduced also the term Kulturdeutsche, which is defined by Grothe in the following words:

“All those who use, besides their native language, the German language, or who attend German schools, are Germans by culture, even if they belong to another race or language group. They are thus giving expression to their desire of joining the German nation.” (Handwörterbuch des Grenz-und Auslanddeutschums.)

The German imperialist ambitions found much inspiration in such “scientific” terms and theories. Germans living abroad, especially in various countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe, were encouraged to regard as “German” what never had any connection with Germany at all. German learning assisted such tendencies as those expressed by F. von Bernhardi in one of his books:

“We have recognized in ourselves, in us Germans, a factor as powerful as it is necessary for the development of all humanity. Our knowledge of this fact imposes on us the obligation to assert our intellectual and moral influence as far as possible, and to open out all over the world a free road to German labour and German idealism. But we can fulfil these higher tasks of civilization only if our civilizing work is carried on and sustained by increasing political power, a power which must find its expression in an enlargement of our colonial domain, the extension of foreign commerce, the greatest possible diffusion of Germanism in all the regions of the earth, and, most of all, in the complete consolidation of our power in Europe.” (Vom heutigen Kriege, 1912.)

At first the interest in Germans abroad and in “Germanity” found expression mainly in numerous publications, going far ahead of the actual work done by the Germans in foreign countries. But this state of things prevailed only until 1933. Scores of associations were dealing with the problem of organizing the Germans abroad. The principal of them was the Verein fur das Deutsch­tum im Auslande, founded in Constanzt in 1908 and based on the tradition of the German and Austrian Deutscher Schulverein. The religious life of the Germans abroad was—and still is—under the care of the protestant Deutsch-evangelisch im Ausland organization, founded in 1919 in Leipzig, and of the Catholic Reichsverband fur die katholischen Auslanddeutschen, active since October 1918. When the National-Socialists came to power all these bodies were
Automatically amalgamated under central control. The documents, data, propaganda instructions and identity files of all the German organizations in the world are concentrated in the Deutsches Auslandinstitut of Stuttgart. In August 1937 and June 1938, at the annual meetings of that institute, two basic questions were debated:

1. The ideological Gleichschaltung of Germans living abroad;
2. The ideological uniformity and news efficiency of the German minority propaganda in various countries.

The speakers openly stressed the importance of approaching major events of German foreign policy.

The Berlin offices of the Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im Ausland are the headquarters of the German organizations abroad. The chief of the association is General Karl Haushofer. Whenever full amalgamation was not possible for tactical reasons, steps have been taken to ensure full control of the "independent" German organizations abroad. The Nazis secured control even over the Catholic organization of Germans abroad. In accordance with a papal instruction of 1928 the bishop of Osnabruck is also the guardian of the religious interests of German catholics in the east and south-east of Europe. The present bishop of Osnabruck is Dr. Wilhelm Berning, one of the members of the German clergy to collaborate to the fullest extent with the National-Socialists and the present government of Germany. The ecclesiastical seminary of Osnabruck trains priests for German Catholics abroad—naturally in accordance with the precepts of Nazism and its minority doctrine.

The control over the associations of Germans who are citizens of foreign countries is in the hands of the Auslandorganisation der National Sozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter Partei, which is run by members of the party, German subjects resident in various European and overseas countries. It is directed by Ernest Wilhelm Bohle (born in Bradford, in England), who holds the rank of Gauleiter. The fact that he is also an under-secretary of State at the German Foreign Office testifies to the close connection between the German minority policy and foreign policy proper.

The "Fifth Column" is not an invention of anti-German propaganda, but a weapon deliberately used by Hitler and National-Socialism in their efforts of world conquest. Bohle stressed it in his speech at the Congress of the Auslandorganisation der N.S.D.A.P in Hamburg, in April 1941:

"The winning over of the Germans living abroad to the revolution resulted in an increased activity of the members of the German minorities, who acquired the proud consciousness of belonging to a National-Socialist Germany. Attempts have been made to describe these efforts as subversive 'fifth column' work. The persecution of the Germans living abroad and of the Auslandorganisation der N.S.D.A.P. is the result of the same activities as those directed against the creation of a strong and united Reich. (Voelkischer Beobachter, April 10, 1941.)
Bohle looks upon the organization of the Germans abroad as one of the foundations of German influence. In that respect he is quite right. Until Hitler’s ascent to power, the German doctrine of minorities was more advanced than organizational practice. After 1933, however, the Nazis carried out all the boldest plans of the former theoreticians, surpassing their wildest dreams. The Germans abroad were given a dose of strong-stimulant. They became a conscious outpost of Germanism. In some countries they disrupted the organization of the State in open warfare (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Jugoslavia); in others, acting under orders from Berlin, they merely practised internal blackmail (Slovakia, Hungary, Roumanfa, Croatia.)

The Third Reich claimed autonomy of organization for its minorities in foreign countries. The conception of cultural autonomy for national minorities was not a purely German invention. The first country to grant cultural autonomy to its minorities (Germans, Russians and Swedes) was Estonia. The law of February 12, 1925, dealing with “The cultural autonomy of national minorities” was promulgated in accordance with articles 2, 3, 12, 20 and 21 of the Estonian constitution of 1920. The Nazis, however, claimed for their minorities a full political autonomy. They expect the countries in which such Germans reside to release them from many of the obligations of citizenship, while granting them privileges placing them at an advantage over the people of the principal nationality of the country itself.

Poland was the first and only country to reject such claims. German propaganda replied by proclaiming to the world that the territory of Poland belongs to the German Kulturraum and should therefore be annexed by the Reich. As to the Poles themselves, they were described as Kulturdeutsch, and the population of western Poland was gratuitously adopted by the German nation. The invasion of Poland permitted the Germans to apply their theories to the Poles in practice and to endeavour to make Poland a German Siedlungsraum.

Roumania gave way to the German demands. The German minority in Roumania was recognized as a separate legal entity. The control over the Germans in Roumania passed into the hands of the Nazi party in Roumania. The Roumanian Germans were organized in the same way as the Germans in the Reich itself. They have their own armed militia, they do not have to serve in the Roumanian army, they have their own schools, independent of the Roumanian government. They are, in fact, a State within the State.

The German minority policy in the east and south-east of Europe deserves close attention. It achieved a part of the programme which has been worked out by German scholars and writers in the last 150 years. The practical execution of this plan was started only about ten years ago. The mastery of Europe and the political rule of the world with the help of the Germans in foreign countries are the next stages of the plan. The British-born
Gauleiter Bohle must be greatly worried by the absence of a docile German minority in Great Britain. Nevertheless, German publications speak of Great Britain as a part of the German Kulturraum. The encyclopaedia of Grothe, which is a kind of Bible of the Germans abroad, mentions “the help of the Hanseatic League in the development of British trade” and the “German religious influence in England”, before going on to say:

“Space does not allow us to give a fuller account of the vital contribution to British political, spiritual and economic life made by German soldiers, scholars, theologians, lawyers, physicians, statesmen, businessmen and industrialists. In the beginning of the nineteenth century German music began its triumphant march into England.”

Such observations are by no means uncommon in German literature. Germany has also very definite designs on the United States. They are still considered to have practical possibilities of realization. The Berlin Studium fremder Länder, under the direction of Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schoenemann, late of Harvard University, trains 600 young Germans fitted to take up “administrative duties” in what is at present the United States of America.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By G. Borsky

Introduction

The German-speaking minority in the Czechoslovakian Republic, the recently so-called Sudeten Germans, must occupy a special place in any discussion of the role played by the various German-speaking minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, as the instruments of pan-German imperialist policy, and, in our own day, as a powerful Fifth Column for Adolf Hitler and his armies.

In Poland, Roumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia the so-called “awakening of the German people”, or, in other words, their political organization in so-called “German Folk-Groups” as special instruments of pan-German foreign policy, was of comparatively recent date. In fact in the majority of cases it was 1918 and later before these minorities were jockeyed into their role. Usually it was quite a new one for them, and the “movements” thus created were provided with the requisite “ideology” ready made by the foreign political experts of the Wilhelmstrasse, who also guided them in the interests of Germany’s foreign policy. The situation in Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, was quite different. There we find the Sudeten-German group as a political movement sui generis, having its own traditions and cherishing its own special aims.
In fact it was the alliance of this group and the related National-Socialist group of Austria (which, incidentally, was led by Sudeten-Germans) with Prussian-German reaction which actually gave birth to the National-Socialist Party of Adolf Hitler, and led ultimately to the foundation of the Third Reich.

The Prussian-German reactionaries were anxious to avenge the defeat they had suffered both at home and abroad in 1918, and to continue their efforts to establish German hegemony in the world by force of arms, whilst their ally, a numerically small but, up to 1918, influential group of national German bourgeois under the former Habsburg monarchy, had long fostered pan-German aims and what were called “Folk-German” ideals, and was also anxious to continue once again the policy which had suffered eclipse in 1918. Its aim was to turn the territory of the former Danubian monarchy into a sphere of German influence, where German interests would be absolutely predominant. Something of the sort had been attempted a score of years before under the slogan of Mitteleuropa. In this way the German-speaking nationalist bourgeoisie in Central Europe hoped to win back the privileged position of a ruling Herrenvolk, such as it had enjoyed up to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Even the name “National-Socialist Party”, or, to give the full title, “The National-Socialist German Workers Party”, originated in the Sudeten-German movement, and not only the name, but also the general theory and programme of the National-Socialist movement and all the slogans of the pan-German minority group, or “Folk-German”, movement. There was a National-Socialist German Workers Party in the Sudeten-German constituencies of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire a score of years before Adolf Hitler’s “Struggle for Power” began in Germany proper, and as early as 1911 this party sent its first three Deputies to the Reichsrat in Vienna.

However, we must not exaggerate the importance of all this, or forget that prior to 1918 and after 1933, when this movement was a real power and a very real danger, it owed its strength and influence to its alliance with the infinitely more powerful and aggressive forces of Prussian-German imperialism. Without the active support of the German Reich the Sudeten-German group would never have been more than a weak minority amongst the German-speaking population of what was formerly part of the Austrian half of the Danubian Monarchy, and which later became the Czechoslovakian Republic, though it would always have been a potential source of danger and disturbance.

It is clear, therefore, that the special position occupied by the German-speaking minority in the Czechoslovakian Republic justifies a detailed examination of the historical and social factors which gave rise to the so-called Henlein movement and its “Sudeten-German Party” as the final embodiment of a spirit and a policy which have worked nothing but evil for many generations, and brought hatred and destruction to Central Europe and its peoples.
Germany’s Central European Policy up to 1918.

The military defeat and the collapse of the Central Powers in 1918 released the various subject nations of the Habsburg Empire from their unnatural alliance with German imperialism, an alliance which had been forced on them against their will and without so much as a by-your-leave. With the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire the power of the German nationalist bourgeoisie in the Austrian half of the Empire came to an abrupt end, and they were left without any ground under their feet.

Although this particular group, which was strongly nationalistic, represented only a minority of the German-speaking population of the old Danubian Monarchy, it had, up to then, always succeeded in maintaining a predominant position in all spheres of economic, social and public life, and, above all, in the Army, thanks to the support of the Court and, still more, of the allied German Reich. In this way it exercised a controlling influence on the policy of the Empire, although even the whole German-speaking population was only a minority compared with the numerically far more powerful body of non-German subjects of the Empire, who were primarily Slavs.

Quite often this small German-speaking group even succeeded in obtaining a parliamentary majority, and this was due not so much to the fact that it controlled the political and economic key positions in the Empire, or to its influence at Court, or to the support accorded to it by the German Reich, or even to the prevailing arrangement of parliamentary constituency and municipal ward organizations, which was extremely favourable to the German bourgeois parties, but rather to the circumstance that the dominant political party in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was in an unusually favourable position for playing off the parties and national groups of the opposition against each other.

Now, although in this way old Austria’s domestic politics lacked any permanent basis, the same was, rather unfortunately, not true of her foreign policy, which was rigidly encased in the strait-jacket of her alliance with Germany. This alliance opened the doors wide to German political influence, and, quite naturally, this influence was exercised strongly in favour of the German-speaking government parties.

In return for this support Berlin expected that these parties would make every effort to facilitate and support its efforts to use the territory of the Danubian Monarchy as a bridgehead and a gateway for its imperialist expansion to the South-East of Europe and, beyond that, to the Orient in pursuit of its Berlin-Bagdad scheme.

In following this policy, which, incidentally, was vigorously supported by the Magyar gentry, who ruled almost absolutely in the Hungarian half of the Danubian monarchy, the German nationalist bourgeoisie parties embroiled themselves with practically the whole of the Slav world, and obstinately ignored repeated
warnings that in the end it would inevitably lead to the break-up of the Empire.

The classes they represented were only a small minority of the population of the Empire, and they were, of course, well aware that their position was not altogether secure, and they therefore felt that they could maintain the status quo, i.e. perpetuate the dynasty and maintain the Empire, and the privileged position of the German-speaking element within it, in face of the constant attacks being made on it both from within and without, only with the fullest support of their powerful German ally. This proved a mistaken policy which in the end cost the Habsburgs their crown and led to the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with the resultant loss of their privileged position and their prestige by the German-speaking government parties and the German national bourgeois elements they represented.

A fruitful cause of the extremism of the German bourgeois youth under Konrad Henlein, and of their willingness to co-operate with the National-Socialism of Adolf Hitler twenty years later, was the nostalgic memory of the favoured position lost by their fathers, the German-speaking bourgeoisie, in 1918, and their fervent desire to regain it with the assistance of Hitler's Third Reich, as their fathers had secured and held it up to 1918 with the assistance of the "Second" Reich.

The German-speaking population enjoyed a disproportionately large share of the higher educational facilities of the Empire, whilst the other nationalities were at a corresponding disadvantage. However, the effect of these privileges was not entirely favourable to the German-speaking section of the population, and in consequence its social development, in particular, was lopsided, the power and influence of its bourgeoisie being out of proportion to the numerical strength of the German-speaking elements throughout the Empire. Vienna, as the seat of the Imperial Government and the centre of industrial and commercial life, was a privileged preserve for the German-speaking bourgeois youth of the Empire in search of careers, and their happy hunting-ground extended throughout the territories of all other nationalities.

Furthermore, the official language of the Danubian Monarchy was German, and this fact alone is sufficient to indicate just how favoured was the position enjoyed by the German-speaking minority of the Empire, and how great was the loss of its privileges when the "Old Order" came to an inglorious end in Austria in 1918. Their subsequent position was made still worse by the fact that when they were in the saddle the great majority of them had resolutely refused even to consider the claims of the other nationalities in the Empire for equal rights and for an equal say in its councils. In the same way they had refused to consider the use of any language but German for State affairs, and they rejected with scorn the idea that they should learn another tongue as well as their own.
There were no serious internal convulsions and even almost no friction when the Czechoslovakian Republic was founded in 1918. It was plucked like a ripe fruit from the old and feeble tree of Habsburg Absolutism. In the revolutionary, or rather evolutionary, period of social and political reform which followed, the leadership of public affairs was taken over by the masses of the people, and, in particular, by the working class, through the political and trade-union organizations, and by the representatives of the middle-class farmers and small peasants.

In the German-speaking districts they took over from the old German nationalist bourgeoisie, which was compelled to resign its political leadership when the magnitude of its political defeat became obvious. A last-minute attempt to maintain its untenable position by unexpectedly appealing to the “right of self-determination for small nationalities” (a right which up to then its representatives had never taken seriously, and certainly never dreamt of supporting) to secure the Anschluss of the German-speaking districts of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia to the German Reich, came to nothing, as this scheme met with no support of any consequence from the masses of the German-speaking people in Czechoslovakia, and their lack of enthusiasm also caused the supporting action of the German Republic, organized by its Reichswehr Minister, the Social-Democrat Gustav Noske, to misfire, and, as a result, the raising of so-called “Sudeten-German Legions” equipped by the German government and stationed in Reichswehr camps along the Czechoslovakian frontier met with no response of any magnitude.

The masses of the German-speaking workers and peasants in particular refused to have anything to do with such irresponsible and reckless plans. Generally speaking, they had remained untouched by the nationality squabbles and hates of the past, and their sound common sense and realism soon led them to adopt a positive attitude towards the new State, and to establish the necessary contact with Czech circles more or less of their own way of thinking.

Among the 73 German-speaking Deputies elected to the Czechoslovakian Parliament in 1920 were 12 representatives of the German-speaking nationalist bourgeoisie and five representatives of the National-Socialist Party. These deputies stubbornly opposed the new State, and later formed what was known as the “Negativist” bloc. The Social-Democrats with their 31 seats were the strongest German-speaking party, whilst the Farmers’ League, with 13 seats, was next in strength.

As far as the great majority of the German-speaking population was concerned, the new State, and the social and political changes it brought about, now seemed securely based. However, there was still a group among the German-speaking populace which refused to accept the existing conditions, and was not prepared to recognize the existing Czechoslovakian State. In fact, its attitude was so
fiercely uncompromising that it violently accused those German-speaking parties who were prepared to accept the new situation and to co-operate loyally with the Czechoslovakian authorities of “treason to the German people”. This recalcitrant group also did its utmost to arouse public opinion with constant allegations of national oppression and unfair treatment on the part of the Czechoslovakian authorities towards the German-speaking minority. These complaints were, of course, avidly taken up by the reactionary nationalist press in Germany, but they made little impression on Czechoslovakian or international public opinion. Both their baselessness and their ulterior motives were equally obvious.

In 1922 one of the Deputies of the German National Party in Czechoslovakia, a certain Dr. Baeran, began to intrigue with the nationalists in the Reich against the integrity of the Czechoslovakian Republic. At his trial for espionage on behalf of a foreign power he was found guilty of collusion with the German Reich’s military bodies on behalf of German nationalist extremist circles in Czechoslovakia, and sentenced, though with the German Reich’s assistance he was enabled to flee the country.

It was about this time that Berlin began to interest itself actively in the affairs of the German-speaking minorities, and the so-called “Sudeten-German Home League” (Sudetendeutscher Heimathbund) was then founded in Berlin, with the support of the Wilhelmstrasse, as one of the first links in the widespread network of organizations catering for “Germans Abroad”, which was subsequently exploited so thoroughly and systematically, and with such cunning, by Hitler.

It is interesting to observe that the political expression “Sudeten-German” was coined in Berlin and first came into public prominence in connection with this “Sudeten-German Home League”, amongst whose founders was the fugitive Dr. Baeran, and a number of other similar “emigrants”.

The foreign policy of the German government made full use of the “Germans Abroad”, and it was actively furthered by a number of organizations closely connected with and financed by the Wilhelmstrasse, such as the Deutscher Schutzbund, the Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland, the Deutsches Institut in Stuttgart, and the mysterious Deutsche Stiftung, which had considerable funds at its disposal for use abroad. In addition there were a number of camouflaged commercial undertakings, or “Holding Associations”, in Holland and Switzerland, such as the notorious Ossa Ltd. and Pontus Ltd. The only support for Germany’s foreign policy available in Czechoslovakia came from the “Negativists”. However, despite all the direct and indirect support given to them by Berlin they succeeded in obtaining only a small minority of 17 seats at the next parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia out of a total of 73 seats won by German-speaking candidates.

Opposed to this “Negativist” group was the so-called “Activist” bloc, which consisted of German-speaking farmers, Social-Democrats and the Catholic Christian-Socialists, who together held 53
seats in parliament. In various combinations between 1926 and 1938 this bloc took part in all the Prague governments. Its members and their followers unreservedly accepted the Czechoslovakian State, supported the Czechoslovakian government, and worked for an understanding and final reconciliation between Germans and Czechs on a joint democratic basis.

The Negativist opposition continued to reject the Czechoslovakian State, and to condemn every form of co-operation with the Czechoslovakian authorities as “treason to the German people”. It held fast to its pan-German ideals, and, together with the extremist reactionary elements in the Reich, it hoped for a “German Re-awakening” which would lead to a strengthening of Germany’s position in Central Europe and offer the welcome prospect of political intervention in its favour on the part of the German Reich, whose government would then pursue a more vigorous foreign policy.

It was emigrant Sudeten-Germans who first succeeded in convincing the German government and German public opinion of the favourable chances which could be opened up by the political exploitation of the German-speaking minorities in Central Europe in order to further Germany’s foreign policy of “penetrating” and later dominating Central Europe, and making it into “Germany’s Living Space” as “a defensive economic unit”.

As early as 1915 Heinrich Herkner, of Liberec (Reichenberg), then a Professor at Berlin University, supervised the drawing-up of a number of expert reports through the “Association for Social Policy” (Verein fuer Sozialpolitik) concerning the possibilities of an economic rapprochement between the German Reich and Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, which were at that time its allies. It was pointed out even then that the German-speaking minorities could play a very important part in the task of penetrating and dominating these aforementioned territories.

In a Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy, published in Germany in 1923, another Sudeten-German, Professor von Laun, of the University of Hamburg, once again impressed on German public opinion the important role which could be played by German-speaking minorities living abroad in any active German foreign policy. In a chapter devoted to “The Right of Self-Determination” we read:

“Just as the middle of the nineteenth century was overshadowed by the achievement of national unity in both Germany and Italy, and the following years, up to and including the world war, by the national dissolution of Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Russia, so in all probability the coming years will be marked chiefly by the unification of Germany with her 12 million co-nationals living abroad, and by the break-up of those four vassal States of the Entente, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia, into their national component parts.”
German public opinion had previously paid little or no attention to the question of German-speaking minorities living in other countries, but now its attention was systematically drawn to the subject. The “Association for Germans Living Abroad” (Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland), which had fewer than 50,000 members before 1914, now increased its membership to well over two millions.

The Sudeten-Germans, and, in particular, the “Negativists”, did much to further this development, and in this respect the position of the Sudeten-German group differed materially from that of the other German-speaking minorities abroad in that it was really an independent movement. It propagated its own pan-German programme, and had done so previously for many years under the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Thus, this Sudeten-German group was more like a junior partner of the nationalist reaction in Germany proper than its mere tool.

The same thing also applies to its financial relations with Berlin. It is true that two German banks in Czechoslovakia had come under the influence of the Wilhelmstrasse by way of a shareholding floated by the Prussian Central Co-operative Bank. These two were the Kreditanstalt der Deutschen, which later became notorious as the National-Socialist Central Bank, and the Agrar und Industriebank. The secret press organization for the “Germans Abroad”, run by Max Winkler, of Berlin, also succeeded in obtaining a foothold in three Sudeten-German newspaper companies. Curiously enough, one of them was in Activist hands. However, despite these things, on the whole the German Reich’s shareholding and subsidies never succeeded in obtaining the same power and influence for the Reich in Czechoslovakia as they did in other countries where there were also German-speaking minorities. To a large extent the Sudeten-German group was economically, financially and organizationally independent.

The Activist groups in Czechoslovakia set their faces against Berlin’s policy of interference and intervention, whilst the Negativist groups, which supported it, continued to lose influence despite all the assistance given by Berlin, until in the 1929 elections they were able to obtain only 15 seats in all, or about 20 per cent of the total seats won by German-speaking candidates. It began to look, therefore, as though Berlin’s attempt to win the German-speaking minority in Czechoslovakia for an aggressive German foreign policy in Central Europe—Stresemann’s famous “Free Hand in the East”—was doomed to failure.

However, within the short space of a few years the situation was fundamentally changed by the appearance of two new factors, and, in the end, the German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia was harnessed to the wagon of Germany’s foreign policy and made into a mere pawn of Germany’s imperialist interests. These two factors were the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler and his National-Socialist Party in Germany proper, and the resurgence, under the leadership
of Konrad Henlein, of the German nationalist bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, which had been forced into the political background after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918.

1933-38—Konrad Henlein and the Sudeten-German Party.

The political movement which developed under the leadership of Konrad Henlein, and which later became known as the Sudeten-German Party, and now boasts that its connections with the National-Socialist Party of Germany go back more than ten years, represents one of the strangest political phenomena of our day.

At least up to May 1936, when its final capitulation to the German National-Socialist Party took place, the Henlein movement was an independent organization with a character of its own, having its own programme and its own methods. At its head was a so-called “Leader Group”, whose members were very thoroughly and systematically trained, both practically and theoretically, for their tasks. This “Leader Group” was founded soon after 1918—at that time it consisted chiefly of students—and for fifteen years it prepared itself in the background to “take over power”. Throughout this period of preparation it kept itself aloof from the political struggles of the day, and avoided compromising itself in any way with the existing political parties, which it contemptuously condemned as “unorganic mass formations”.

The members of the group almost all came from the ranks of the German-speaking national bourgeoisie of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and at the same time they were members of the Wandervogel, a nationalistic bourgeois youth organization. Their social origin caused them to regret the disappearance of the old Empire, and, naturally, the political defeat of their fathers in 1918 rankled deeply, all the more so as it very adversely affected their professional and political future. Their study of the problem had convinced them that this defeat was due primarily to wrong political leadership on the part of their fathers and to the inadequacy of the old State, which was, in their eyes, inorganic and faulty structurally. In addition there were the evil effects of the class struggle and of an uncontrolled economic system.

Such ideas are, of course, very familiar to us today, and they would undoubtedly have led these young men straight away into the ranks of National-Socialism but for the fact that in Professor Othmar Spann (a Sudeten-German Lecturer on Economics and Sociology at the University of Vienna) they found a leader who, with his book The True State, won them over for the idea of something he called an “organically constructed Folk Commonwealth”. They accepted this ideal with enthusiasm, and set to work to train themselves systematically to take over the leadership of such a State once their efforts should finally have brought it into being.

They studied the teachings of both ancient and modern sociologists and philosophers, and under the leadership of Dr. Walter Heinrich, of Northern Bohemia, the most talented of Professor
Spann’s pupils, they formed study circles to apply the theoretical knowledge they obtained at the University and in their seminar to the political reality around them and to the tasks they were quite certain they would be called upon to perform at a later date. Meanwhile, remaining in the background, they soberly and critically analysed the political events of the day, occasionally using them as material for careful experiment.

The first definite organizational form adopted by the group was known as the Freischar Paedagogische Gemeinschaft, a sort of independent study circle. This body was formed in 1923 in Prague, and although its founders were ardent young nationalists they deliberately avoided the adoption of any such name in connection with it as Luetzow, Fichte or Arndt, or any similar names of the heroes of Germany’s student youth. For one thing, the omission stressed the sober character of the work they had set themselves to perform, and for another it gave the authorities no grounds whatever for suspicion.

Many of the members of the organization came from well-to-do bourgeois families, and it was therefore in a position to send its representatives throughout Europe for the purposes of study. Thus they were enabled to stay in other countries as long as it suited them and to study on the spot whatever political events they found of interest. In this way Fascism, National-Socialism, the political life of Germany, Austria and Switzerland, the organization of the economic system of other countries, the various means adopted to control the masses, the organization of the press, etc., were carefully studied, critically analysed, and the lessons obtained passed on to the whole organization at special internal meetings and conferences.

The experience gained by the representatives of the group in the course of their political observations convinced the head of the organization, which was now known as the “Rutha Circle” from the name of its head or the “League of Comrades”, that a reliable body of subordinate officials trained to follow and obey its head in blind loyalty and military discipline was essential.

The group considered none of the existing political parties to be suited to its purposes, and as it was unwilling to run the risk of establishing a political party of its own it decided to turn its attentions first of all to the German Gymnastic League (Deutscher Turnverband), and a gymnastic training school was founded in Asch under the leadership of Konrad Henlein. From this school teachers were sent out to the various branches of the League throughout the Czechoslovakian Republic. These young men were not only well-trained gymnasts, but, and above all, they were political missionaries for the cause, and their task was to obtain complete control of the League.

The nature and achievements of their gymnastic training were primarily collective. The attainments and skill of the individual were subordinated to the team spirit and the team achievement, and this was exactly the spirit the group wished to cultivate. In this
way a disciplined body of gymnasts was formed to serve both as the nucleus of a political movement and as the basis for a future military organization.

This was the situation in and around 1930, by which time the failure of the Negativist parties to win a majority of the German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia for a pan-German policy in the interests of German imperialism had become very apparent.

The Sudeten-German group, which had by now become generally known through the spread of the gymnastic movement as the Henlein movement, now began to prepare itself to take over from the Negativist parties, whose role was more and more obviously coming to an end. Thanks to the good services of powerful German industrialists like Thyssen, and influential aristocrats like the Prince of Coburg, the movement established close connections with the German Reich’s conservative circles and sought to win support for its scheme of a German “Mission in South-east Europe” to be based on the various German-speaking minorities.

In this way it was not long before the Henlein movement had established excellent relations with Berlin, and some of the members of its inner circle were sent to Germany as its permanent representatives. They functioned in Germany as the “Ambassadors” of the group and sought to establish the closest contact with the corresponding “political élite” there, for it was a “political élite” they fancied themselves to be.

In the course of their intrigues in Germany they came into very intimate relations with the Berlin Herrenklub circle, the von Papen group, and with the Thyssen group of powerful heavy industrialists, and they shared the contempt of these people for the National-Socialist Party organization—rather too openly as it transpired. As a result they came into fierce and personal conflict with Robert Ley. This course subsequently proved to be a fatal mistake, and it cost some of them their lives and others their influential positions.

Meanwhile, however, internal political happenings in Czechoslovakia gave the group an easy political start. The two Negativist parties, the German National Party and the National-Socialist Party, were both threatened with imminent suppression owing to the fact that their illegal connections with Reich’s German bodies hostile to the Czechoslovakian State had become increasingly obvious, and to the fact that their efforts to form secret paramilitary organizations under the guise of sports leagues (Volks-sport) had been discovered.

The day before these two parties were officially suppressed Konrad Henlein seized his opportunity and sprang into the breach with a proposal for a “non-party” movement. It was, of course, an easy matter for him to make arrangements with the leaders of the two old parties behind the scenes to rope in their former followers in return for a promise to preserve their interests and, as far as practicable, continue their previous political line with such caution
as the changed situation demanded. With this arrangement a new chapter in Czechoslovakian domestic politics began.

By means of unscrupulous propaganda, terrorism on an organized scale, threats and intimidation, lavish promises, and, above all, by growing pressure on the part of the Reich’s government, the majority of the German-speaking people of Czechoslovakia, after a fruitful period in which much was done to bring about a final reconciliation between Czech and German, were now forced back into the black past of fierce national wrangling with all its evil and hatred, until finally they became the organized advance guard of armed German imperialism in its struggle to dominate first Central Europe, then Europe as a whole, and, finally, the world.

In the beginning, however, Henlein’s movement nourished ambitions of its own which went beyond this subordinate role as a tool of pan-German imperialism, and after Hitler’s rise to power in Germany its leaders even thought for a while that an opportunity had now opened up for them to influence German policy as a whole and to carry out their own scheme for an “organic folk organization” on the grand scale. Thus in the autumn of 1933, with the assistance of Goering and Thyssen the so-called Staendeinstitut was founded in Düsseldorf. According to later statements of Thyssen, the aim of this institute was to train an “élite” which would be a reservoir from which the party, the economic organizations and the higher civil service could draw its replacements. The control of the institute was placed in the hands of Dr. Walter Heinrich, the spiritual rector of Henlein.

The scheme failed because the party organization of Robert Ley proved stronger, and at the Nuremberg Congress of the National-Socialist Party Ley described triumphantly how he had scotched it and secured the removal of Dr. Heinrich from the institute.

Despite this check to their plans in Germany, Henlein and his friends still thought that they could do as they liked in the Sudeten districts. No one was in a position to over-trump them in rabid nationalism, their organization was prepared down to the final detail quite as efficiently as the National-Socialist Party itself, and they were sure of continued support from the Wilhelmstrasse and from the Reich’s leadership of the German National-Socialist Party, and, in particular, from its Foreign Political Department.

The connections which Henlein and his friends had established in earlier days with Austrian circles now also proved to be very valuable. It was Henlein and his friends who first put Seyss-Inquart, Rintelen and the others in touch with Berlin. With the assistance of their friends in Vienna, Dr. Flohr and Hammer-schmidt, and their confidant in Bratislava, Karmasin, they were able to keep the so-called “Slovakian Independence Movement” supplied with material, money and political instructions. And, in addition, thanks to their traditional connections with German-speaking minorities in South-east Europe, they were able to render German imperialism invaluable assistance in its efforts to penetrate
into this area with a view to opening it up as part of Germany’s “Living Space”.

Berlin now willingly placed the organization of the “League of German Folk Minorities in Europe” (Verband der Deutschen Volksgruppen Europas), which was founded and financed by the Wilhelmstrasse, at the disposal of the Henlein movement, and its leadership was now taken over by Heinrich Rutha and Max Richter.

The essence of their aims was to achieve the unification of all the German-speaking minorities around a joint “Folk-German” programme, to build up a uniform political organization, to secure domestic autonomy, and, finally, to secure the secession of these autonomous units from whatever countries were concerned to the German Reich.

Today we know how far they succeeded in carrying out this policy. They proceeded step by step, and their tactics were always the same. First of all they made a great to-do about securing governmental recognition of more or less obvious principles. When they succeeded they trumpeted these “concessions” abroad as a triumph for them and their movement and a defeat for their enemies. In this way they whipped up their followers, particularly in Czechoslovakia, to a pitch of increasing frenzy, leading them on to support more and more radical demands. In Czechoslovakia their aim was, with the support of the Wilhelmstrasse, which was now preparing to intervene if necessary, to bring about the internal weakening and final destruction of the Republic.

Every chance, no matter how slight, of arriving at a fair agreement with the Czechs was deliberately ruined by carefully arranged “incidents”, and, similarly, no opportunity was let slip of widening the breach between German and Czech. In this way the followers of the Sudeten-German Party, most of whom had originally joined Henlein’s “non-party” movement with quite different intentions and in quite different circumstances, were dragged along in a fierce whirl of excitement deliberately whipped up in order to leave them no time for sober thought.

Henlein’s Sudeten-German Party won its first big success at the parliamentary elections of 1935, when it secured a total of 44 seats out of the 72 seats won by German-speaking candidates. Henlein now claimed the absolute leadership of what he called the “Sudeten-German Folk-Group”, or, in other words, the German-speaking minority in Czechoslovakia.

Soon after this he found himself in conflict with Berlin. His “Ambassadors” in Germany, and in particular Dr. Brandt and Dr. Heinrich, were too closely connected with Herrenklub circles for the liking of the Nazis, who now demanded their resignation and disappearance from the political scene. At first Henlein attempted to shield them and maintain them in their positions, but a peremptory ultimatum came from Berlin, and he was compelled to knuckle under. This surrender was tantamount to the final recognition of the German National-Socialist Party’s sole right to leadership. It
had already established that right in Germany proper, and Henlein now toed the line in Czechoslovakia, and his movement reluctantly abandoned its own special plans and ambitions to be henceforth the pliant tool of Germany.

The period which followed was marked by repeated political manoeuvres with the German-speaking minorities. Minority statutes along the lines proposed by the Austrian social-democratic theoretician and Deputy Dr. Karl Renner had been adopted in one or two of the Baltic States, whose German-speaking minorities were granted some degree of autonomy in educational matters, trade and commerce, public hygiene, and, to a limited extent, even local taxation.

This system, evolved by Democrats for use in a Democratic society, was now, under a newly invented “Folk-Group Law”, to be the basis for a compulsory organization of the whole German-speaking minority in Czechoslovakia, and far-reaching administrative autonomy, local taxation rights, sole control of the educational system in the German-speaking districts, sole control of the local police, and similar concessions were demanded.

It is not necessary for us to examine these proposals in any detail on their merit for the simple reason that they were never taken seriously by Henlein and his friends even as the basis for further negotiations. They were put forward solely as a means of whipping up nationalistic agitation and bringing about an internal weakening of the Czechoslovakian Republic and encompassing the final destruction of the strongest barrier to German imperialist expansion across Central Europe. An incidental aim was to undermine the influence of those political parties of the German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia which still resisted Henlein and his plans.

Henlein’s preliminary moves, which were of a very general nature, were only slightly opposed by other German-speaking parties, possibly with the mistaken idea of forestalling the much-feared reproach that they were “not interested in the National Cause”, or even “National Traitors”. When it became more and more obvious that some of the other German-speaking parties in the Czechoslovakian Republic were beginning to follow, even hesitantly, the nationalistic lead of the Sudeten-German Party, and when “revolts” took place in the Activist parties bringing so-called “Young Activists” into the leadership, who felt it was up to them to show that they, too, were “staunchly national” and prepared to go at least part of the way with Henlein, and even to put forward “national demands” on their own account, the floodgates of National-Socialism were flung open and the storm let loose over the heads of those incautious “Young Activists” who had been foolish enough to venture on to the acknowledged territory of the enemy.

“Give the Devil an inch and he’ll take an ell” was a proverb much taken to heart by Henlein and his accomplices, and systematically used by them as a recipe for action. It once again brought them complete success. Once the other parties had foolishly let
themselves be caught up in the whirlpool of “national struggle” whipped up by Henlein and his followers it was inevitable that the extremist Sudeten-German Party must obtain the leadership, because the masses, led over the brink by their incautious leaders, were swept away more and more by the increasing speed of events and by the increasingly reckless demands of the most radical group.

The aims of the Sudeten-German Party, or, as it now calls itself openly, the National-Socialist Party, were obvious: the incorporation of Czechoslovakia in Hitler’s planned world empire, with the Czechoslovakian people playing the role of an “inferior breed” as hewers of wood and drawers of water for the German people, “the chosen Herrenvolk of history”, who were to lord it over the whole continent and over all the other peoples of the continent for the next thousand years at least. After the fall of Austria Henlein’s preparations to bring about a political decision were far advanced.

Up to this time the Republic of Czechoslovakia had succeeded in warding off all the attacks made on it both from within and from without, and in the crisis of May 1938 the firm attitude of its government foiled Henlein’s plans to bring about the Anschluss of the Sudeten districts to Hitler’s Third Reich by means of a coup d’état.

And again, in the second great crisis which came to a head in September 1938 and culminated in the now notorious Munich Agreement, the inner strength and cohesion of the Republic of Czechoslovakia was the one bright spot in a very dark and confusing picture. Without hesitation the government of Czechoslovakia issued the order for general mobilization, and it was obeyed promptly by the majority of German-speaking citizens, who rallied to the colours of the Republic, prepared to defend its unity and independence in the ranks of the Czechoslovakian army. By this time Henlein had fled to the Reich, where his appeal for volunteers to join the “Sudeten-German Free Corps”, founded on the basis of his gymnastic organization, was answered by only a very small percentage of his former hundreds of thousands of followers.

The dictates of the Munich Powers enforced the carving up of the Czechoslovakian State in Germany’s interests, and involved not only the surrender of German-speaking districts to the Third Reich, but also of indisputably Czech territory where the leaders of Nazi Germany considered it of sufficient strategic importance.

Six months later German armies invaded and occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia. The loss of strategic territory and militarily defensible lines had rendered successful resistance impossible.

The role assigned to the German-speaking students in this last phase of the drama was once again characteristic. At the orders of Nazi Germany they returned to Prague in order allegedly to complete their studies at the university which had to remain there—in the capital of a country in which, after the seizure of the German-speaking districts, only an infinitesimal proportion of German-speaking people were now living. In reality, of course—as very
soon became apparent—they came back as the advance guard of the German army of invasion and occupation. Once again it was primarily the national bourgeois youth who gladly took upon their shoulders the main responsibility and the main guilt for the complete subjugation of the Czech nation and for the seizure by Germany of what remained of its territory.

In a speech delivered to an assembly of these students in Prague on March 13, 1942, Konrad Henlein, by this time Reich's Governor and Gauleiter of the Sudeten-Area, openly boasted of the role they had played at his instigation as instruments of pan-German imperialism:

"The upshot of St. Germain seemed to have buried all hope of a Greater-German future. The territory of Bohemia and Moravia, with its central point, Prague, was forced into the jumble State of Czechoslovakia, and seemed lost for Germany politically, economically and culturally. Indeed, it seemed even to have become a source of increasing danger. But in just such an epoch the Sudeten-German students grasped the dangerous situation still more sharply and rose up against this contemptuous disregard of European order. They placed themselves at the head of the Sudeten-German youth, and inserted the lever at the decisive point of this country, in Prague, and finally helped to conquer this town decisively on March 15, 1939."

The crime of which Henlein boasts is clear through all the feeble flamboyance of the language, and it is clear that in a Democratic Europe, whose institutions are based on mutual respect between the nations, and on a general regard for the personality of the individual, for the rights of all nationalities and races, for religious views and political opinions, there can be no room for peoples or groups of peoples who imagine they can arrogate to themselves with impunity the right to lord it over other peoples or races, to impose their views on others, and to establish their rule by cunning, fraud and violence.

In the interests not only of the future domestic security of the Czechoslovakian Republic, but also in the interests of European peace, a very close scrutiny of this problem of the German-speaking minority in Czechoslovakia is essential. In the first ten years of its existence the new Republic succeeded in winning the support and co-operation of the great majority of its German-speaking citizens, who acted as loyal citizens of the new State and willingly supported the so-called "Activist" policy of recognizing and accepting the Czechoslovakian State and co-operating with the Czechoslovakian authorities. Later on, however, they let themselves be caught up in the snare of pan-German imperialist plans for world domination, and, under the leadership of Konrad Henlein, they degenerated into base tools of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich.

Apart from the just punishment which must naturally be meted out to all those responsible for the events we have described, and for the brutalities and crimes still being committed today, we must
demand, at least, that effective measures shall be taken to make quite certain that that part of the German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia which has been responsible during the past decade for so much harm to the Czech people, naturally tolerant and democratic in their spirit and tradition, and not only to them but also to those democratic German-speaking citizens of the Czechoslovakian Republic who were unwilling to submit to the leadership of pan-German imperialism, shall never again be in a position to play that base role and bring so much evil to the peoples of Central Europe.

A political or social group brought up so steadfastly in the tradition of German imperialist domination at all costs, and imbued with the idea that, come what may, they are members of a Herrenvolk, a higher race born to lord it over their fellow human beings of other races, a political or social group representative of those elements who once enthusiastically supported the Habsburg Monarchy, and, in our own day, equally enthusiastically supported Konrad Henlein and his “Sudeten-German” conception, will be a potential danger to any democratic State for all time, and a constant threat to harmonious co-operation and peace between the peoples.

This particular German or Sudeten-German group has been granted a special and most appropriate position by the German Protectorate Law of March 16, 1939. Belonging to the German Reich, it is at the same time the hangman and gaoler of a foreign people with whom it has lived and worked side by side for centuries within the framework of one State. This group has loaded a burden of guilt upon its shoulders whose atonement will weigh as heavily as the accumulation of its endless misdeeds.

HUNGARY

By András Mátrai

The history of Hungary is closely linked up with that of the German race. Prior to the conquest of Hungary, Teutonic tribes, who had been driven out by the forerunners of the Hungarians, the Avars, had settled on the Western side of the Lajta. About 100 years after the invasion of the Magyars from the East, their King, St. Stephen, who was married to a German Princess, settled many of his relatives on the land. These Germans got entirely assimilated. Later in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, several groups of Germans arrived, of which only those who settled in the towns (Esztergom, Szekesfehervar) got assimilated. The rest drew to the frontiers, where they kept their privileges and their national peculiarities. We can consider these as the first actual German settlements. The primal traces of the German Drang nach Osten are to be found in an ancient song of the German Knights, which
starts with the line: Nach Osten wollen wir reiten. . . (Towards the East we will ride). Later in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Magyars, placed in an unfortunate position between the Germans and the Turks, had to take advantage of the former to control the latter and vice versa. The defeat of Mohacs in 1526 offered the long-awaited opportunity for the Habsburgs to get their hold on the country. The Kings of France, who for a century and a half had dominated Europe, looked with apprehension towards the increasing power of the Habsburgs, and thought to find in the Ottoman Empire an ally against them. With the help of the French, the Turks started their attack on Hungary, and although they made the Magyars understand that their attack was not directed against them, Hungary sided with the Christian monarchy of the Habsburgs against the Turks. This attitude, although mainly due to the Christian ideology, brought Hungary definitely into the orbit of German influence. By his marriage and the help of the Parliament, who elected him King, Ferdinand of Habsburg definitely assured his position on the throne of Hungary. At the same time he secured the Czech crown, and from this time the fate of the Hungarians and that of the Czechs was similar. Both nations were accordingly used against each other as far as these manoeuvres would favour the cause of the Habsburg dynasty. From this time on, German influence established itself, and the task of assimilation got more difficult. The reason for this was twofold. First, the Austrian monarch was all-powerful; second, after the long rule of the Turks the resistance of the Magyar race was weakened. The next steps in German influence were the consent of the Magyar oligarchs to the succession to the throne of the male line of the Habsburgs in the year 1687, and the Pragmatic Sanction in 1723, in which the succession was extended to the female line as well.

At the end of the seventeenth century the period of the German settlements started. They were most successful on the Western side of the Danube. In the parts most damaged by the Turks, and which had been abandoned, Eugene of Savoy and Count Marcy started new settlements. The eighteenth century saw the settlers from Hessen take up their abode in Tolna, Baranya and Somogy. Following the instruction of the Court of Vienna, the Chancellor Kraussen ordered colonization. In 1937 the Schwabische Heimatbuecherei wrote as follows about the period of colonization: "The great historical event of the colonization has become the cornerstone of German national consciousness." Impoverished Germans from Elsass, Pfalz, Koln, were invited. Between 1722 and 1725 fifty-two villages were built. Between 1742 and 1780 new settlements followed, the last being those of Joseph II. Franz Rakoczy at the end of the seventeenth century tried a new orientation towards the West so as to liberate the country from German rule. The Habsburgs represented the Germanizing factor. Again, under Joseph II, the majority of the nobility turned against the monarch, not only for the previous reason, to liberate the country from
German rule, but speciall for his liberal tendencies, fearing the loss of their privileges. Their main concern was to safeguard their feudal rights and then turn pro- or anti-German according to how their interests were affected. Although the feudal lords adopted the ideas of the French Revolution as far as "liberty" in relation to Austria was concerned, they refused to follow the principle of equality towards their own nationalities. The year 1848 saw the start of Hungarian nationalism.

In the nineteenth century pan-Germanism appeared in the world of thought and it was actually the Habsburgs who carried this theory into practice. The Austrian monarchs resented the disinterestedness of the German government in the fate of the Germans outside their own boundaries, demonstrated by the refusal of William I to receive a deputation of the Saxons, and Bismarck's refusal to receive the Balts. It was the Habsburgs who were the determined banner-carriers of the German idea and it was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that we hear of the historic role of the pan-German Treitschke, of Lagarde, in philosophy and William II in politics. At the same time the compromise of 1867 fixed the relationship between Austria and Hungary. The German minority was given their rights although the Hungarian government did its best to assimilate them, and was fairly successful.

In pre-war Hungary there lived 2,000,000 Germans (in the Banat, in the Burgenland, in Transylvania, in the mountains and valleys of Buda and Pilis, in the vicinity of Budapest, in the county of Tolna and Baranya which was called the Swabian Turkey, along the Budapest-Tata railway, on the upper borders of the Danube and in the Szepes).

In the highlands they were called the Zipszers, on the right shores of the Danube the Swabians, in Transylvania the Saxons. The language of the Swabians is an Austro-Bavarian dialect, which the Magyars liked to ridicule. In general they looked down upon those who kept their Swabian character, and they resented it when on the trams the Swabian market women talked their dialect; on the other hand, they accepted with pleasure any endeavours at Magyarization. Those who became Hungarians had every opportunity open to them, of which they took full advantage, and many Hungarians of Swabian origin were found in responsible posts. They were the most nationalistic and the most dangerously reactionary in all respects. They tried to appear 100 per cent Hungarian. The great poet Endre Ady writes with bitter irony: "To the Swabians turned Magyars, am I not Magyar enough?"

At the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of this one it was the fashion to Magyarize German names. The well-known flag-waving writer Franzis Herczeg was originally Herzog; Gyula Gombos, ex-prime minister, also of Swabian origin, was the first propagandist of the racial theory in Hungary and proclaimed himself a 100 per cent Magyar. The writer Gardonyi had been previously Geza Ziegler, and Eugene Rakosi, editor of the
biggest die-hard newspaper, *Pesti Hirlap*, who advocated a Magyar Empire with a population of 30,000,000 Hungarians, was called Kremser. (This figure was put forward on the basis of the Magyarization of all nationalities, and including the Dalmatians, Bosnians, and so on.)

It is a strange fact that, although the Germans were easily assimilated, they were at the same time the unconscious bearers of German culture, and the Hungarians could not free themselves from their influence in politics, philosophy, national economy, literature. In general, they were saturated by the German ideology. Of course among the élite there were some exceptions (the poet Ady, mentioned before; the Westerners, who were the collaborators of the periodical called the *West*; Count Karolyi, Prof. Jászi, Julius Justh and Count Batthyany were always anti-German and in sympathy with the democracies of France and England.) The working class was under the influence of the German method of approach towards socialism and their masters were Bebel and Kautsky and not Jaurès or the Webbs.

On the other hand, before the last war, the Germans living in Hungary identified themselves completely with the political aspirations of the Hungarians. They were satisfied at being able to use their language freely and to enjoy economic security in the given circumstances. They had no political aspirations, and did not care if the laws concerning the minorities were being carried out.

The least conformist Germans were those of Transylvania. Treitschke was satisfied with them and with the protestant Germans of Bâcska. About the others he writes as follows: “As to the other Germans, mostly catholics, they are most wretched examples of the German race. Their abasement and demoralization is simply repulsive. The more so as the Germans in Hungary have been from all time the bearers of culture.” Here we find the start of the *Volksdeutsch* propaganda. The modern *Drang nach Osten* threatened the small States and considered the German minorities under a new aspect. The Hungarians realized the German danger, but resistance was slack, as the feudal interests happened to coincide with those of German heavy industry.

Treitschke dropped the idea of Bismarck’s *Staatsdeutsch* and we find in him the forecast of Hitler’s *Volksdeutsch* (*Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Führer*). Dissimilation replaces assimilation (one of the basic ideas of the French Revolution). Although it had not yet adopted its definite Hitlerite form, we can find the same tendency in the Imperialist policy of the Berlin-Bagdad scheme, and in Naumann’s *Mitteleuropa*, which does not take into consideration the sovereignty of the small States. The German minorities, who until then had been loyal and had assimilated themselves, had suddenly (during the last war) discovered contact with the Germans of their fatherland. They were proud of the German military successes, they got to know them in the trenches, and experienced
their kinship on the battlefields. This change was especially noticeable in our minorities, at the time when General Mackensen and his army crossed Hungary. Not only in the Banat and Bacska and in Transylvania, but also around Budapest, did the effect of the war make the German minorities take up a changed attitude.

After the last war, when the frontiers of the States collapsed, the feeling of unity between the races and peoples got stronger, an attitude which was exploited by the rulers. Even the Weimar Republic adopted the idea of German racial community and in Stuttgart the Auslandsdeutsche Institut was founded. In the meantime the German minorities in Hungary underwent a great change. At the end of the war they were represented by two different groups:

1. The German People's Council, where the president, a Saxon from Transylvania, an extreme nationalist, Dr. Brandsch, demanded full autonomy. This group proclaimed, even at that time, the Zusammengehörigkeit (the belonging together) of the German people wherever they were situated geographically.

2. The German-Hungarian People's Council, was more moderate and loyal. Their President was Jakob Bieyer.

At the time of the October Revolution of 1918 Hungary had to suffer the consequences of her unfortunate policy in the past towards her minorities, especially towards the Slavs and the Roumanians, which she had oppressed. Now that Hungary had lost the war on the side of Germany, they turned against her and demanded their complete independency. The German minorities, fascinated by the thought of a greater Germany and ignoring the defeat of their fatherland, claimed that the Burgenland (the Western part of Hungary) should be annexed to Austria. On January 20, 1919, at a meeting in Sopron, their demand was reinforced. This brought the young Hungarian Republic into great difficulties, as this new nationality problem strengthened the Hungarian chauvinist elements.

On January 27, 1919, the government proclaimed the autonomy of the Germans in those parts of the country which were purely German and offered them complete legislative and administrative autonomy. Their official language was to be German, and they had the liberty to choose their own national councils. The country now had five German districts: in Transylvania, in the North, in the South, in the West and in the Centre. A place in the Cabinet was reserved for one of their representatives, who was responsible to the Hungarian parliament and to the German national council. Their representatives of each of these German organizations were sent to the national council. The Hungarians did their best to prevent this law from actually being carried out. The régime of Bela Kun accepted it. When the Horthy régime
established itself the rights of the minorities were abolished. In 1920, on November 14, the Austrians seized the Burgenland, and thus Hungary was freed from a great number of Germans, although the plebiscite of Sopron (the only place in which there was a plebiscite) decided in favour of Hungary. After the peace treaty Hungary had only 500,000 Germans left.

Horthy's government made the following distinction as regards education of the Germans:

1. Those who could not speak Hungarian were permitted to carry on their studies in German.
2. Those who understood the language, but did not know it well enough, were obliged to read, write and count in Hungarian, but might study the more difficult subjects in German.
3. Those who were of German origin, but spoke Hungarian perfectly, were to be completely assimilated.

The new Ministry of Minorities was divided into three parts, August 21, 1919: the Roumanians, the Slovaks and the Germans; but after the death of the Roumanian Minister, and the controversy of the German Minister with the loyal Bleyer, the Ministry ceased to function. The law was never actually carried out. In 1923 two decrees appeared, which conformed to the laws of 1868. Three sorts of schools were founded:

a. Those in which German was taught, and Hungarian was a compulsory subject.

b. Those in which easier subjects were taught in Hungarian, the rest in German.

c. Those in which teaching was entirely in Hungarian and German was only one of the subjects, but pupils must be able to read and write in both languages.

In 1928, 49 A schools, 98 B, and 316 C were in existence. Even under the Weimar Republic the Germans were not satisfied, and Berlin and Stuttgart started their activities in Hungary. Vienna took a large share in this work.

The Hungarians instinctively felt that the German problem was no longer a simple one of the rights of minorities, but more than that: it was a real danger. The activities of the Auslandsdeutsche Institut, the different German books and pamphlets, show clearly that Germany was following a decided policy in Eastern Europe, which at the given moment they would use against the small nations. The policy of the Hungarian ruling class followed the German aspirations, and their main concern was to agitate against the Czechs, Serbs and Roumanians, instead of building up with these nationalities a safeguard against German penetration and expansion. Count Bethlen advocated in 1934 the necessity of an alliance with Nazi Germany and gave a series of lectures on this subject in Germany. Bethlen, who was mentioned as a possible Darlan in the House of Commons, is one of those leading Hungarian statesmen who was responsible for the spreading of German influence in Hungary, and who for this same reason is kept in
storage for the future. The word "axis" was invented by another Hungarian statesman, the ex-Prime Minister Gombos, of Swabian origin, and the present government makes a special claim to this. Gombos also surreptitiously gave refuge to the murderers of Erzberger on his estates.

Some isolated Hungarians, like Desider Szabo, the author, and Andrew Bajcsi Zsilinszky, a deputy, showed up the danger, but found no response.

Under the Weimar Republic nationalist German circles made calculations that the Hungarians would fall in line with them. In 1932, in September, the Magyar Szemle, periodical of Count Bethlen, wrote as follows: "In nationalist German circles, Hungarian patriotism is regarded with enthusiasm, and as an example to follow. They are impressed by the resistance of Hungary (against Trianon), by the pomp of its national representation, by its aristocratic traditions, by its energetic suppression of the progressive elements." Hungary means for the Germans, before all, the large wheat fields, splendid horses, the big bubbling pots, the luscious food. Count Hermann Keyserling, the drawing-room philosopher, saw in the Hungarian aristocratic form of life the last refuge. He called Hungary, in his Spectrum of Europe: "The land of excellences." Long before Hitler, he used, when speaking of the Hungarians, the expression "Herrenvolk".

While flattering the Hungarian ruling classes, the Germans continued their fight against the people of Hungary. Their propaganda was eager to prove that the Hungarian composer, Liszt, or the famous doctor, Semmelweis, the expert on childbirth, had been German. In general they stressed the point that the Hungarians owed everything they had to the Germans. Otto Albrecht Isbert, an investigator of Deutsehtum, wrote that the discovery of the Hungarian-Germans is a vital and new Volk experience. Specially formed study groups investigated the origins, the history and the peculiarities of the Swabians. The moderate elements, under the influence of Bleyer, wrote in a more subdued tone, although the Sonntagsblätter which made its first appearance in 1921, frequently mentions the awakening of the German consciousness. In 1925 they founded the "Hungarian German People’s Cultural Society", the aim of which was to lay stress on the Sprach, Volks und Kultur Gemeinschaft. The Hungarian authorities tried to resist, but as their ideology was similar and their aims of revenge and domination much the same, they were bound to fail. Only a campaign launched in a democratic and progressive spirit, with the support of the masses, would have been able to take up the struggle successfully.

The claiming of Germans outside Germany started at the time of Streseman. Streseman made a personal appearance of the Auslandsdeutsche Institut in Stuttgart, and thrust the great idea on to the world. Instead of realizing the danger, the Hungarians
followed the German example and formed the “World Association” of the Magyars. Bleyer, to reassure the Hungarians about the activities of Stuttgart, called it but a temporary caprice of the public spirit, and explained: “These people are not German nationalists as far as territories are concerned; it is only spiritually that they belong to the German community.”

In the succession States there was also a great change. The Saxons from Transylvania published a work of several volumes in which they proudly claimed to belong to the German community for 700 years. They belittled, or simply omitted in their books, the period of the Transylvanian-Hungarian Princes, as well as all Roumanian influence. Although the book was attacked by the Hungarians, the official Hungarian policy continued its German orientation and its agitation against the neighbouring States. Even those Germans who until then felt themselves to be Hungarians, in their hatred against the Chechs were ready to dig their own graves.

Gustav Gratz, a Hungarian of German origin, admits this in his book Deutsch Ungarische Probleme. The Hungarian Institute at the University of Berlin was of great help to the German aspirations. They constantly emphasized the spiritual affinity between the Hungarians and the Germans, and tried to erase all Western influence. The Deutsche Zeit schriften der Ungarkunde was silent about the activities of Stuttgart. On the one hand they flattered Hungary; on the other they collected the facts of the injustices suffered by the German minorities. They endeavoured to prove that Hungary should return to the status quo ante 1867. In the past the Hungarian-Germans enjoyed their privileges as an urban population. (This was abolished by the national spirit of 1848.) “Today their highest requirements are but linguistic and cultural,” wrote the moderate Bleyer in 1929. “These demands,” he continued, “refer to those linguistic rights in the domain of the school, the church and the law, which in the past were already the possession of our people.” The moderates talked about the German people and recalled the time of the Habsburgs, when the Germans were the dominant factor. Isbert, the anti-Magyar, called Hungary “the mass grave”, and wrote that without the help of Germany no scientific enterprise could have been achieved.

A great number of German scientists started to look into the matter of the German minorities: Feszler, Engel, Glatz, Schedius, Schwartner and others. “It is enough to cast a glance at the German scientific and political periodicals, at the new publications of the book market,” wrote Moravek in the Magyar Szemle, “to wonder at the vigour, at the consequent planning and energetic organization with which German science endeavours to expose the political, cultural and ethical past of the Germans.” German propaganda dealt with three different types of Hungarian assimilation: (1) Those who willingly concealed their Swabian origin (the go-getters, like Tibor Eckhardt). (2) Those who admitted it, and agreed to be assimilated (mostly the ones who had learnt Hungarian).
These had a chance to be saved as they were not attached by personal interests. (3) Those who complained that although they had economic equality socially they were not considered as such (the small landowners).

They continually advanced that only the isolated peasant villages were really German, but proof of that could only be found in the German inscriptions in the cemeteries. The Swabians, especially in Trans-Danubia, were unsafe, their geographical position was disturbed by the neighbouring Hungarian villages, their territories were disunited in contrast with the Germans in Czechoslovakia. The idea of the supremacy of the Volkstum over the State made headway. In the publication of the Stiftung für deutsche Volks-und-Kultur-Boden-forschung there was much talk about the Swabians. The Viennese Professors W. Bauer and W. Winkler urged the collection of this material. Isbert, in his disreputable book, wrote lengthily about the history of the Swabians. He asserted that the Swabians had been settled by the Hungarian lords, that it was they who gave them the land and that on various occasions they got the lands of those Hungarians who were chased away on account of their protestant religion. “The ancient German language was kept in its entire purity.” “The villages are immaculate, the lands well cultivated, and all this is the product of German diligence.” “The collective spirit of the Germans remained among an alien people, in contrast to the individualistic Hungarians.”

Falsified maps appeared which depicted the Trans-Danubian country as united German territory, and although in their publications they continued to complain about the disadvantages of their geographical position, on these new maps they depicted the Slovak settlements as German ones, so as to link the Germans together.

The Deutsche Ungarische Heimat Blätter, which was edited for a long time by the moderate, Bleyer, and corresponded with the intentions of the government, was transformed after the death of the editor in 1935 into the Neue Heimats Blätter and run by the extreme Dr. Huss, professor of the university of Debreczen. At this time Hitler had already taken over what Weimar had prepared for him. In 1939 the quarterly adopted the name of Deutsche Forschungen, turned anti-Magyar, and became the conscious propagator of Nazi pseudo-science. The completely impotent Hungarian administration was obliged to give way, and thus reaped the consequences of its own disastrous policy. From Hitler’s rise to power this tendency became sharper and the methods to obtain the desired aim altered as well. The theory itself got bolder. “If the historically formed and contradictory Hungarian theory of administrative boundaries disappears, the new administrative districts will develop along the lines of popular groups,” proclaimed Basch, “and the Germans will have already worked out the territories and the boundaries of their north Trans-Danubian cantons, in which they will assume leadership of the new self-government.” The Hungarian villages in the neighbourhood of
German territory were considered as minority settlements. For example, in the Bakony, the Hungarian Szentgal village, surrounded by Swabian villages, was regarded as a minority village. But they had other tricks as well. According to them the language was not sufficient to decide the nationality of the people. It was the agrarian, small landowner who decided the character of the settlement. The farm workers were not taken into consideration. That was the way to develop the leadership of the Swabian peasant. On the farms and on the *pusatas* (steppes) the contract labourers were Hungarians. The Swabians lived in the villages and were liberated from serfdom at the time of the revolution of 1848. In the village of Herzegfalva, in the county of Feher, the population showed, in 1926, a figure of 9,191, of whom 6,967 were Hungarians, 2,210 Swabians and 14 of different nationality. But as the majority lived on the farms, and according to the Germans only the population of the villages counted, they reduced the figures to 2,750, out of which 1,000 were Hungarians and 1,750 Germans; therefore the village was declared German. The practice also reflects the theory. The fight which at the beginning was permitted and subsidized through the *Ungarländische Volkbildungs Verein* gradually deviated and became a Nazi organization. At the start the government controlled it. The President, as well as the Executive Committee, was nominated with the consent of the government. Up to 1931 the association was composed of 175 local organizations; The *Sontagsblätter* was directed by the same organization.

They started a violent campaign in favour of the reformation of the system of secondary and seminar education. The government tried to resist, and during the Weimar era it succeeded in this up to a point. The members of the organization were prohibited from carrying on their propaganda, but the citizens of the Reich were permitted to interrogate the Germans in Hungary. In 1931 the Hungarian government started a new campaign in favour of the Magyarization of German names and decided that 70,000 should be converted into Magyar. In 1933 Minister Gombos decided that instead of 70,000, 100,000 should change their names. Nevertheless this outward assimilation had no practical effect considering that at this time Gombos was publicly proclaiming the Axis and giving free rein to Hitlerite influences.

Even in the days of the moderate Bleyer this organization was waging a violent fight. After his death, in 1935, there was a split in the party, for the government tried to purge the organization of its extremists. The *Sontagsblätter* was banned, and the editorial staff reconstructed. They did not cease to demand seminars, and all they could achieve was permission to set up summer courses for the Swabian school teachers. Law 12, paragraph 23, passed in 1935 certain concessions in the education of the Swabians. The B type was accepted generally, to the disadvantage of the A and C categories. But Basch drew up his demands as follows:

(1) Setting up of German kindergartens.
(2) German church service for children.
(3) Setting up of clubs for German University students.
(4) Freedom of action for German societies.
(5) Operation of the law which stipulates the use of the official language.
(6) Prohibition of the Magyarization of the German names.
(7) Formation of a separate body entrusted with adjudicating on minority problems.
(8) Cultural autonomy and official recognition of the German party.

For a certain time the situation was tense. Nevertheless the Hungarian government did not dare to be energetic, for the simple reason that it was permanently complaining over the fate of the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia, and was trying to obtain, in this connection, the help of the Germans.

At the same time Germany launched a powerful economic offensive against the small States of Eastern Europe. In his book entitled The Bloodless Invasion the author, Paul Einzig, describes how the Nazis conquered these countries. Hungary was one of their complete victims.

(1) Germany deliberately contracted large debts. From 1931 to 1932 there was an exchange clearing agreement between Hungary and Germany, which meant that no foreign exchange need be used in payment between the two countries. From 1933 on the Nazis adopted a policy of buying the largest possible quantity of goods from the small East-European countries. In this way they were bound through their claims to Germany.

(2) Germany absorbed the markets of the small countries, reselling abroad at a very low price for cash the commodities which they had acquired from them and for which they had not paid. In this way they ruined the markets for Danubian and Balkan exports. This was how Germany, herself far from being self-sufficient in wheat, exported substantial quantities of wheat to other countries.

(3) In exchange for their commodities Germany in several cases supplied them with arms. Even though the war material they offered was second hand it was better than nothing. With German arms deliveries their influence naturally got stronger.

(4) The long-term credits offered to the purchasers of these countries were done so on extremely liberal terms. The German business men themselves were subsidized by their government. Germany could offer long-term payments, for, as they were repaid in kind under the exchange clearing agreement, they could wait. In this way they were lending the borrower's own money back to him. And as Einzig points out: "The accumulation of a large frozen German debit balance is in itself helpful to German politico-economic penetration."

(5) The overvaluation of the reichsmark in the clearing agreements had the effect of obtaining higher prices for the imported
articles to Germany, although it was only a fictitious price. This was how Germany was able to buy up the Roumanian oil. Already in 1937, 50 per cent of the Danubian States was in their hands.

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<th>Imports from Germany to Hungary</th>
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<td>1929</td>
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<td>20%</td>
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<td>1938</td>
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<td>48%</td>
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Needless to say that since the war the percentages are higher still. Hungary became, economically, completely dependent on Germany. For any possible advantage she could gain out of the transaction Hungary had to give political concessions such as more independence for the German minorities, and pro-German orientation; in a word, the strengthening of the position of the Hungarian Quislings. As economic advantages were linked closely to the German policy, many were tempted to follow it. Although the government itself was pro-German there was an additional need for an organized German Volkstum, controlled by demagogic Quislings.

The Hungarian feudal interests were linked closely to those of the Germans. They hoped to satisfy their dreams of a greater Hungary by siding with the restless elements of Europe (the common fate of the losers of the last war). Through National-Socialist catchwords and German money other Quislings were created, who corresponded to the Doriots and the Deats in France. The propaganda of Goebbels did not spare any expense to gain influence and hold Hungary under its thumb. The press was bought up and free copies distributed among the people. Ambitious politicians who until then had no hearing whatever were helped to play a role, and all over the country leaflets printed in Germany were being circulated. The Hungarian government did nothing to resist. General Gombos, who nourished great sympathy towards the Fascist ideas, helped their aims. Daranyi, his successor, imitated the Nazi methods and framed the first anti-Jewish laws. They were carried out by Bela Imredy, who was partly of German, partly of Jewish origin. When this was proved, Imredy collapsed at an audience with Horthy and resigned. The 500,000 Germans in Hungary were the actual Fifth Column, who prepared the ground for Hitler, as Heinlein did in Czechoslovakia. After the general elections in 1939 the Hungarian Nazi parties got 25 per cent of the entire votes. Out of a total of 260 in parliament they had 51 Nazi members.

Since the war Basch and his followers have come to be the masters. He speaks for about a million Germans (although there are, as we know, only 500,000) and he openly proclaims Hitler as his Führer. He has tried to bring all of German origin back to their German nationality, even those who have completely forgotten the German language. To accomplish this work the Nazis have resorted to every means. The following story is typical:
Near Pécs, in the county of Baranya, lived an artist of German origin who spoke no German. One day an agent came up to him and asked him to paint a house in the village, which had a German design on it. To his surprise, he got a very high fee for this work, which he never expected. Soon after he was asked to paint all the houses in the village which had German designs. Afterwards he was told that he would receive payment only if he would drop his Hungarian name and take up his previous German one. Soon afterwards his pictures were published in a review proving that the village was German and he himself was referred to as a German artist. Hungarian subjects of German origin who had no means to pay for the education of their children had facilities to send them to Germany, where they were educated free of charge. In most cases the condition was that they should change back to their Swabian names. Of other conditions we are not informed, but we can guess them. These and other methods made out of 500,000 Germans a million. Today all the demands of the Basch group have been realized.

Actually, the German minorities have increased by about 100,000 through the new annexations; the best propaganda for the German cause. The fight of the Hungarians against the Germans is a hopeless one, for the doctrine of the Herrenvolk, based on the Volksgruppe, is the same as the Hungarians have followed for centuries. Every Hungarian believes that he is a natural master over his neighbour, and on this common basis they meet. Jew-baiting, the persecution of Marxists and Liberals, the intervention of the Church in politics, is much the same in both countries. It has become the fashion to speak German in Hungary now, and always more and more German names appear in Hungarian public life. Those who had their names Magyarized have returned to their original Swabian ones, as, for instance: Edward Kelevez changes into Edward Keller, Anton Tábori into Anton Fisher, Dévényi into Deigner, Perlaki into Peller, and it is extended to their children as well.

In 1942 two German high schools and seventeen popular schools were founded. In Buda they opened a German kindergarten. On November 15, 1941, the Ministry of Education ordered the new list of those districts in which the teaching had to be completely carried out "in the mother tongue", which means in German. With the exception of Transylvanian territory and that newly annexed, altogether there are 372 such districts. The use of the Hungarian language is prohibited.

The International Federation of Trade Unions wrote on November 6, 1942, in its Bulletin:

"As so-called National Groups under their own autonomy, they now form within the countries concerned units of the German Reich. Of such foreign Germans there are now living in Hungary 1,250,000. . . . In Hungary, which has the
majority of them, they form 362 recognized local groups. Wherever they constitute 20 per cent of the population, place and street names must be Germanized and German is the language of official and private relations. They are provided with special schools and administrative privileges and with every imaginable advantage which may strengthen their influence in the resettlement of these areas. Often these ‘Germans, by compulsion’ have only been forced by the most brutal terrorism into ‘collaboration’. It is characteristic that the German press compares this ‘area planning’, as they call it, with the race migrations of antiquity.”

German agricultural co-operatives were founded. There exists in Budapest a Central Bureau, and a special wireless service and broadcasting programme for the Germans was set up. As a matter of fact the Germans comprise at the present a State within the State. Until now the Germans had only two deputies in the House of Commons and one in the House of Lords. Now Dr. Basch claims twenty-five. Basch and his followers do not accept the Hungarian censorship. A German scientific institute has been founded in Budapest; also one belonging to the German Reich. The daily paper of the minority, the Deutsche Zeitung, carries on open Nazi propaganda, and is anti-Hungarian. The German soldiers crossing the country have the right to pay with marks, which the national bank cashes after identification. On the other hand, as the need for workers in Germany is great, the German authorities do their best to entice Hungarian labourers, with fantastic promises, to work in Germany, and they do not worry about illegal ways of obtaining their aim. For this purpose they have installed secret smuggling societies. The Germans of the Banat have the right to join the S.S. Many Swabians refuse to serve in the Hungarian army, and escape to Germany. In 1941, on October 19, an order was issued that the Hungarian Treasury was responsible for damage to the German army in Hungary. All this does not add to the popularity of the Germans, and although their propaganda continues to proclaim that Hungary will play a leading role in the Danube basin, the Germans are more hated than ever, and the people whisper the lines of Josef Attila, the greatest of our poets between the two wars: “And let us not be a German colony.”
A. The Germans in Poland before the rise of the Third Reich.

The Germans came to Poland as settlers. They generally came from the central and western provinces of Germany as colonists, seeking not only livelihood but also personal freedom. Many of them were exiles, who had to leave their country owing to the ruthless religious persecution which was never practised in tolerant Poland. No wonder that such colonists were soon completely assimilated and absorbed by the Polish nation.

This first type of emigration of Germans to Poland occurred in the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. A second type was encouraged by Prussia (Frederick II, Bismarck) and Austria (Joseph II) in modern times.

The colonization of East Prussia, carried out by the Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, had a definitely hostile and Germanizing character. Many of the Germans who came to Poland in the nineteenth century, on the other hand, were not political agents, but simply business men. Many of the descendants of these German immigrants of relatively recent date refused to declare themselves German when the Gestapo requested it after the invasion. Some of them gave their lives for the Polish cause.

Of the 765,000 Germans resident in Poland, according to the last census of 1931, 412,000 lived in the western provinces of Silesia, Poznan and Pomorze. These Germans were mainly the remainder of the settlers deliberately sent to those provinces before 1918, when they were under Prussian rule. Before the first world war, every German official and officer stationed in the Polish provinces received a special allowance (Ostmarkenzulage). The German government paid an annual premium of 1,800 marks to every German doctor or lawyer who took up residence in the Polish provinces. In the 1886–1918 period, during the activity of the Colonizing Commission, the Reich spent over 500 million gold marks on subsidies designed to increase the number of Germans in the Polish provinces.

Nevertheless, the Germans failed to alter the ethnographic structure of western Poland. In 1931 the percentage of Germans in the province of Poznan was 9.5 per cent, in Pomorze 10.1 per cent, in Silesia 7.7 per cent, and in the whole of Poland only 2.4 per cent. German propaganda sometimes asserted that the small number of Germans in Poland was due to the exodus of “millions of Germans” driven out of the country in 1918. This allegation is totally unfounded. In folio 451.1 of the Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, we read:

"The period 1910–1925 had a special character. Many events of the war and of the post-war period, mainly the return of Germans from the lost territories and from abroad, were
responsible for an excess of immigration over emigration amounting to 330,000 persons."

Between 1910 and 1925 about 320,000 Germans left Europe as emigrants. The Germans returning to the Reich came not only from Poland, but also from many other countries. It is therefore obvious that if the net total of immigration was 330,000, the story about the "flight from Poland of millions of Germans" is pure fiction. In spite of their limited numbers, the Germans in Poland started immediately after 1918 an energetic activity. A leading part was played by the German centres in western Poland, which continued to act as an advance guard of Germanism. The privileges of the times of the German Empire were not forgotten. Secret subsidies were granted from Berlin and, besides, the Germans continued to enjoy the favoured economic position which they had obtained before the first world war.

The colonizing policy of the German Empire endowed the German minority in Poland with a wealth of landed property. After years of expropriation of Poles in favour of Germans, and of subsidizing German landowners, 26 per cent of the arable land in the province of Poznan was in German hands, although the Germans formed only 9·1 per cent of the population of that province. In Pomorze there were districts in which 90 per cent of the land was owned by Germans, who accounted for only 11 per cent of the population. In Silesia the Germans held the controlling positions in industry. Moreover, they had a well-developed system of agricultural, dairy and credit co-operatives.

All the German leaders in Poland were either rich landowners or industrialists. Their political sympathies were conservative and nationalist.

They wielded an important political weapon in the form of the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities, signed by Poland in Versailles on June 26, 1919. The "Geneva Convention" also contained some minority provisions concerning Silesia. Every decision of the Polish authorities, however trifling its object, could be brought up before the League of Nations. It sometimes looked as though the leaders of the German minority were interested not in protecting its rights, but rather in spreading in international circles criticism of the Polish administration. A similar purpose was also served by the so-called "Minority Congresses" held in various European countries, which were obviously inspired and subsidized by official German propaganda agencies.

Within Poland itself, the German minority, acting under orders from Berlin, was busy mobilizing all its forces against the Polish State, determined to prevent normal and peaceful relations between Poles and Germans. This policy was pursued also by the German press in Poland. All the German minority organizations dealt out severe penalties to those of their members who had any dealings with Poles.
The principal German minority organization in the province of Poznan and in Pomorze from 1923 was the Deutsche Vereinigung. It was ostensibly the club of the German senators and deputies in the Polish parliament. Its actual influence was far greater than appearances might suggest. Its instructions were obeyed not only by the German co-operatives, not only by the German conservatives and socialists, but also by the German protestant and catholic clergy. The methods of that body were exposed in 1930 in the course of the lawsuit brought by its chief, deputy Graebe, against Leopold Kindermann, who dared to found an independent political group, the Deutsche Bürgerpartei. It was revealed that any German who refused to obey the leaders of the Deutsche Vereinigung was boycotted by all the members in social and business life. The activities of the Deutsche Vereinigung disclosed during the trial were obviously subversive and aimed at the overthrow of the Polish State.

A similar part was played in Silesia by the Deutscher Volksbund für Polnisch Schlesien. Its intricate organization had departments dealing with personal, political, educational, social, legal, migration and other problems. One of the main objects of this Volksbund was a consolidation of all the other German organizations. This aim was achieved to a large extent and the first cracks did not appear until 1932, when news about the growing influence of Nazism in Germany caused some dissension.

These German organizations of western Poland governed the policy of all the Germans in Poland.

The nationalist German policy of these organizations did not influence at first the attitude of the smaller groups of Germans in central Poland (Lodz) or of the old German settlers in southeastern Poland (in the provinces of Wolyn and Stanislawow). The Germans in those provinces which had never been part of Imperial Germany remained loyal to the Polish State, while they enjoyed the wide cultural freedom to which they were entitled under the constitution of Poland.

B. Full Mobilization.

The Polish Constitution of 1935, like the former constitution of 1921, guaranteed the freedom of national life of all the national minorities.

Articles 9 and 110 of the constitution specified civic rights:

Article 9: "Every citizen has the right to keep his nationality and to cultivate his language and national customs. Special laws will guarantee to the minorities in the Polish State the right to promote their national culture openly and freely through autonomous minority associations, which will have a legal position within the general system of local government."

Article 110: "Polish citizens belonging to national, religious or language minorities have the right, as well as other citizens, to establish, control and maintain at their own expense philanthropic,
religious, social and educational institutions, using their own language and adhering to the rites of their religion."

The German minority enjoyed the benefit of several special language laws, regulating the use of its language in the courts, in dealing with administrative authorities and in schools.

Thanks to this liberal legislation, the German minority in Poland had, in 1939, the following schools: 49 kindergartens; 6 vocational colleges; 394 elementary schools, 15 high schools and 13 high schools for girls, using the German language, but maintained at the expense of the Polish government, and 203 private elementary schools. There were, moreover, 203 elementary schools using both German and Polish and 78 schools in which German was taught for the benefit of German children. Nearly 90,000 German children in Poland received instruction in their own language.

The German minority in Poland had wide opportunities for cultural activities of all kinds. The *Ausschuss zur Pflege deutscher Geisteslebens in Polen* supervised the work of many German learned societies, which published numerous monthlies and periodicals. The *Historische Gesellschaft* of Poznan was among the most active of these associations. It was directed at one time by Hermann Rauschning, later Hitler's intimate friend, who eventually quarrelled with his master. There was a German Science Society, a theological society and many artistic organizations. Besides numerous German amateur theatres there were two permanent German theatres (in Bielsko and in Lodz) subsidized from Polish public funds.

The German students at the Polish universities belonged to the *Verband der Vereine Deutscher Hochschüler Polens*, which was directly controlled by the central students' organizations of Germany. The German minority had also many musical clubs, choirs, sports clubs, philanthropic societies and no less than eight tourist societies. The latter were suspected of carrying out topographical surveys for purposes of espionage. These suspicions found full confirmation in the course of the Polish campaign of 1939.

The prosperity and independence of the German minority in Poland was based on its system of co-operatives, which had 795 local branches, all of them well equipped and provided with funds.

It might appear that the Germans, living in such favourable conditions, would establish normal and friendly relations with the Polish population. The force of German nationalism, however, was too strong to allow any peaceful collaboration. The Germans of western Poland propagated anti-Polish feelings among the hitherto less aggressive Germans of central and south-eastern Poland. They were assisted in their work by Berlin and they carried out its orders scrupulously.

1933 was the turning-point for the German minority in Poland. National-Socialism came to power in the Reich. In Poland the German minority was increasingly influenced by the *Jungdeutsche Partei*, which was directly inspired by the Nazis. It aimed at the
complete control of all the German organizations in Poland. It therefore opposed the leaders of the other groups, who were mostly landowners and industrialists sympathizing with German conservatism. These old, well-established German leaders were violently attacked by the dynamic Jungdeutsche Partei. They were described as sharks, mandarins, bloated capitalists and liberals. The Jungdeutsche Partei sent its storm troopers to the meetings held by the more conservative organizations and many people were clubbed to death.

The “elders” made determined efforts to resist the onslaughts of their young rivals. The competition between different parties resulted in a tremendous revival of all German minority activities. Meetings were held one after another. As the number of Germans ready to attend them was usually scarce, partisans and supporters were sometimes brought in cars over distances of a hundred miles or more. The fact that such artificially expanded meetings were allowed testifies to the liberal attitude of the Polish authorities.

The “elders” were resisting their younger rivals, but they were not opposed to Nazism. On the contrary, they declared themselves as good Nazis as the Jungdeutsche Partei. The struggle between German parties in Poland was mainly a competition in Nazi orthodoxy. The favourite weapon of political rivalry was an allegation that one’s opponents were of Jewish origin. The Ahnentafel were introduced to prove purity of German parentage. Both the “old” and the “young” German organizations swore solemn oaths of loyalty to Hitler. No member of the German minority in Poland could escape the organized pressure forcing all Germans into the ranks of the Nazis.

The open war between the “elders” and the “young” did not affect adversely the strength of the German minority as a whole. On the contrary, the position of the German minority in Poland was strengthened by the appearance of an apparently radical movement. Those who did not relish the leadership of the old junkers could join the ranks of the radical nationalists, led by people of lower extraction. Thus the German movement in Poland, which had been mainly in the hands of the wealthy upper class, became a universal, more vigorous mass movement.

Ideas of social reform had been advocated only quite timidly by the German Social Democrats, who—in Poland at any rate—were as faithful to the Imperial tradition as the junkers and industrialists themselves. The Social Democrats in the Polish provinces held by Germany were also representative of the privileged Herrenvolk and they were the heirs of those Social Democrats who had voted all the military credits in the Reichstag after 1914. They had remained in Poland as champions of the German national cause and they sacrificed their socialist ideals for the sake of German interests, collaborating with the Nationalliberalen and the conservatives. At election times they supported the junkers and German reactionaries, securing seats in parliament for them. Their
press was notable for such statements as that made in the September 1927 issue of the German socialist organ *Volkswille*, declaring that no German, except mad pacifists, would ever dream of recognizing the western frontiers of Poland. The combination by the *Jung-deutsche Partei* of social radicalism with violent nationalism attracted many of the German socialist leaders.

The struggle between the organizations of the "elders" and of the "young Germans" resulted in a full mobilization of all the German minority forces in Poland. The German political movement in Poland was revitalized and the influence of the increased activity of the German minority in western Poland soon made itself felt also in other parts of the country.

Only a superficial observer could be deceived into believing that the friction between the "old" and "young" Germans was a symptom of chaos and disorder. The Berlin and Stuttgart chiefs of the whole movement understood the situation perfectly. They calmly looked on the spectacle of quarrels, bickerings and mutual insults, as a chemist looks on bubbles in a brew he is fermenting for a special purpose. They allowed the violent struggle to continue, hoping that it would bring to the surface the strongest fighters and engage the attention of the wide masses. They took good care, however, to keep the main line of the rival movements under control. They were glad to see that the process of fermentation led various governments—including the Polish one—to believe that the German minority was weakened, while the contrary was the case.

The German consuls in Poland supported equally the "old" and the "young". The leader of the "elders", Senator Hasbach (member of the Polish senate), was invited by Hitler to the Party Days at Nuremberg together with the leader of the "young Germans", Senator Dr. Wiesner. Both groups received secret subsidies from various official German funds, either through American and Dutch banks or through Danzig.

Danzig played a particularly important part in the life of the German minority in Poland. It belonged to the Polish customs area, but it had political autonomy and was governed by a Nazi senate. The German leaders from Poland could go there without passports or visas and it was the ideal meeting-place for conferences with emissaries from Berlin or Stuttgart. Training courses for Fifth Columnists were organized there and millions of marks were in Danzig banks at the disposal of the politicians of the German minority in Poland.

In 1935 the "old" parties amalgamated. The fusion included the *Deutsche Vereinigung* of Poznan and Pomorze, the *Volksbund* of Silesia and the *Volksverband* of the Germans scattered in other parts of Poland. These organizations combined under the "German National Council" (*Rat der Deutschen in Polen*). Its statute set out the following aims of the association:

"The German National Council in Poland shall promote the unity of all the Germans in Poland, defend their cultural,
economic and political interests and determine the general policy of the Germans in Poland, in agreement with their parliamentary representatives. The German National Council in Poland will represent the Germans of Poland in the Verband der Deutschen Volksgruppen in Europa, appoint delegates from Poland to German and international congresses, as well as giving them suitable instructions.

The Jungdeutsche Partei, however, did not join the Council. Its leader, Senator Wiesner, selected the psychological moment after the Anschluss of Austria, when all the Germans in Poland were full of sanguine hopes, to launch his final appeal. He called upon all the Germans in Poland to join his party, as the only genuinely Nazi organization. He added that the list of membership would be closed on July 1, 1938.

The leaders of the National Council replied by proclaiming, on April 25, 1938, a new supreme organization—the Bund der Deutschen in Polen.

The Germans in Poland were fully mobilized and sworn to loyalty to Nazism, although they followed two different paths. Immediately after the invasion all the prominent personalities of both the "old" and "young" groups were appointed to high ranks in the S.S. organization. They did their Fifth Column work well and they had deserved reward.

C. Subversive Activities.

At the annual meeting of the Deutsches Auslandinstitut in Stuttgart in 1938 the president of that organization strongly opposed the view of certain foreign newspapers, which described the Institute as a "headquarters of political espionage", "section of the German General Staff", "department of the Gestapo" or "organization of economic espionage".

His denial, however, was unconvincing. In 1936 a group of young Germans, Polish citizens, were tried by a Polish tribunal of Katowice, in Silesia. They were charged with conspiracy against the State. They belonged to the secret organization National Sozialistische Arbeiter Bewegung Kampfbund, which maintained contact with the legalized German organizations. Thirteen members of that secret organization were convicted and in summing up the judge stated: "... although the German minority in Poland enjoys all possible liberties and rights, the hostile propaganda of the Auslandinstitut, the Bund Deutscher Osten (a nationalist organization founded by the Germans who left the western provinces of Poland in 1918. It had been publishing for twenty years in Berlin the fortnightly Ostland, devoted mainly to anti-Polish propaganda) and of the German press prepared the psychological ground for the N.S.A.B. The members, whose numbers could not be ascertained (one of them committed suicide) were sworn to secrecy and absolute
obedience to Chancellor Hitler. They punished with death any breach of the rules of the secret society. Before taking the oath they were informed that the aim of the society was the incorporation of Upper Silesia in Germany."

This case, one of many of the same kind, shows what "practical interests" were served by the *Deutsches Auslandinstitut*.

The more experienced leaders of the German minority controlled their organizations carefully and prevented premature disclosures. The younger Germans, on the other hand, sometimes acted more rashly. The German leaders occasionally damped their fervour, although they entirely approved it in principle.

The attitude of the Polish citizens of German nationality towards the Polish State was very peculiar. Most of them lived on memories of the time when the provinces of Poznan, Pomorze and Silesia belonged to the German Reich. The Poles then, although they were admitted even by official German statistics to be the majority, were treated as second-class citizens. They had no schools in their own language. Special laws limited their ownership of land and prohibited its purchase. They could not be civil servants. Their liberties were severely curtailed.

After 1918 the Polish State granted to the German minority full rights of citizenship and full minority rights. It did not treat the Germans in the way in which Poles had been treated in the German Empire. However, the tradition of *Herrenvolk* status dominated the psychology of the Germans living in Poland. They never recognized the frontiers of Poland, nor indeed the very existence of an independent Poland. This attitude, at first prevalent only among the Germans of western Poland, was later adopted also by those living in other parts of the country—as a consequence of the activity of the German organizations in western Poland.

The Nazi doctrine, which is a compilation of all the pan-German and imperialist ideas professed in Germany for many years, provided these Germans with the political background they wanted. It proclaimed the primacy of German national solidarity (*Volkstum*) over loyalty to the Polish State. It recognized the principle of double nationality: a formal nationality resulting from residence in a foreign country and an actual nationality based on race. It declared that land inhabited by Germans, however few, belongs to Germany. It asserted the absolute supremacy of the German nation, as the nation chosen to lead all the other nations of Europe, particularly of Central and Eastern Europe. It claimed complete devotion and obedience to Hitler, as the leader of the German nation and the chief of the German State.

The Nazi theory gave back to the Germans in Poland, who were formally Polish citizens, the consciousness of being a race superior to the Poles and destined to rule them, as they did before 1918. One might have supposed that the Nazi appeal would cause an inner conflict in the minds of Polish citizens of German nationality, that they would waver between loyalty to Poland and racial solidarity.
enforcing obedience to orders from abroad. There was no evidence of any such mental conflict.

The Polish citizens of German nationality, sworn to obey the head of a foreign State, started a large-scale propaganda campaign. They wanted, first of all, to isolate the German community from any Polish influence and to safeguard it against the attraction of Polish culture. The popular German publications, like the Heimathbote Almanach, appealed to their readers to avoid the company of Poles, to prevent marriages with Poles and to despise Polish culture. German students made tours of all the German settlements in Poland and visited every house, in order to find out whether these instructions were strictly obeyed. They also distributed "handbooks of old German customs".

It is obvious that the Germans, being a small minority (2.4 per cent)* in a population of 33 millions, had to mix with Poles in their everyday life and could not help learning the language. German children played with Polish ones and learned their songs and games. This was what the German leaders wanted to stamp out at any price.

Any member of the German minority who disregarded these orders was punished by social boycott, expulsion from the co-operatives and various other reprisals, including expulsion from the German Church, no matter whether it was a protestant or a catholic one.

Another line of German activity in Poland was the publication of allegedly scientific works purporting to prove the superiority of Germans over Poles. All the German periodicals published in Poland propagated that view and the monthly Der Deutsche im Osten, founded in Danzig in 1938, was exclusively devoted to proving German superiority over all other nations and the Poles in particular.

The Deutsche Monatshefte in Polen, published in Poznan, included scores of articles stressing the "German character" of Polish territories, which were invariably described as Deutscher Siedlungsraum. If the Germans discovered that a Polish scientist or writer attended, even for a short time, a German university, they immediately claimed all his work to be "an achievement of German culture". German scholars tried to discover German influence in Polish proverbs, folk dances and even in the embroidery patterns of Polish peasant women. German newspaper reporters travelled all over Poland, and the principal purpose of their journeys was to discover German "influences" everywhere and to try to prove that all civilization in Poland had its origin in Germany.

Such "scientific research" was dangerous, for it served certain definite plans of aggression. It fitted in with Penck's theory of Deutscher Kulturraum, on the basis of which general Haushofer

* According to the census of 1931. In 1939 the total population of Poland was estimated at over 35,000,000 and the proportion of Germans at 2.1 per cent. The decrease in the percentage of Germans was due to their lower birth-rate.
built his plans of including various foreign countries within the Greater Reich. It was in accordance with Grothe’s notion of the Kulturdeutscher, that is people of non-German origin, who become Germans through being subject to German cultural influence. The Viennese professor Lendl, a National-Socialist, added the term Volkslandgewinn, by which he described the settlement of German colonists on new lands as an intermediate stage leading to their eventual annexation by the Reich. It meant the extension of the German national territory before the actual extension of the territory of the German State. The existence of all these theories and terms proves that German imperialism has had in view for a long time two distinct methods of expansion, which were later theoretically defined by German scholars:

1. The territorial expansion of the Reich by political annexation of neighbouring territories.
2. The extension of the sphere of influence of the German nation, which may reach far within the boundaries of other countries. The second method is as dangerous as the first, for it is only a transitory stage on the way to annexation. The National-Socialist doctrine fails to discern any difference between the German nation and the German State. A minister of the Interior of the Third Reich wrote, long before the war:

“The Third Reich, as the embodiment of the German national idea, cannot be looked upon as a separate organism, as an abstract State entity superior to the nation. It is simply the political organization of the national unity. The politically formed and legally organized nation is the State.” (Dr. Wilhelm Frick, Vier Jahre Aufbau des Dritten Reiches.)

National-Socialism is, therefore, aiming at achieving the political unity of the nation by the incorporation in the Reich of all foreign territories with a German minority, or territories declared to be Deutsche Kulturraum. Other territories are prepared for future incorporation by means of the Volkslandgewinn method.

The short sociological study of Rudolf Heberle, Auslandvolkstum-Soziologische Betrachtungen zum Studium des Deutschtums im Auslande (Leipzig 1936), proves that the use of the imperialist “scientific method” of Germany is not confined to Europe alone. The same means of penetration, actuated by similar motives, are used also in the United States of America.

Hugo Grothe (Die Deutschen in Uebersee, Berlin 1932), declared his belief that the American Germans would in the future serve not only the German nation but also the German State.

This pseudo-scientific activity, preparative for war, had one of its principal protagonists in the German historian Dr. Kurt Luck, resident in Poznan, in Poland. His two major works, Der Mythus vom Deutschen in der polnischen Volksüberlieferung und Literatur, and Deutsche Aufbaukräfte in der Entwicklung Polens, 1934, were
calculated to prove how much Poland owes to Germany and how the Poles hate Germans. They were both based on false data and their conclusions were untrue. They were thoroughly dealt with by Polish authors. One of Luck's books was prefaced by Hermann Rausching, conservative, then Nazi, now a leading German in America.

All these activities had, of course, an adverse effect on the relations between the German minority and the Polish majority. The Germans in Poland obeyed strictly all orders from Berlin.

At the congress of German teachers held in Chorzow, in Polish Silesia, on January 3, 1939, the assembled teachers resolved to demand for the German schools in Poland the same curriculum as that used in Nazi Germany. The resolution claimed for the children of Polish citizens of German nationality teaching based on the following principles:

1. The aim of a German school in Poland is to bring the children up to be Germans.
2. The principal subjects taught to children should be German history and German culture.
3. The children should be encouraged to follow the example of persons that played a decisive part in German history.

All these facts caused deep resentment among the Poles, who saw the frustration of all hopes of securing normal relations between the Polish and German citizens of the Republic. The German minority became an organized Fifth Column, determined to disrupt the country from within, acting under orders from abroad. Its activities were highly dangerous, for they provided the German government with opportunities for applying pressure from outside. The events of September 1939 proved that the suspicions concerning the espionage and sabotage work of the German minority were fully founded.

The Fifth Column.

The Polish government, following the trend of policy of the western powers and sharing many of their illusions concerning the usefulness of appeasement, concluded on January 26, 1934, a pact of non-aggression with Germany. The pact was based on the principle of conciliation in all controversies between the two countries. On the Polish side there was a genuine desire to avoid anything that could cause friction in its relations with Germany. The Reich, on the other hand, observed the agreement only to the extent in which it helped to camouflage the real intentions of Germany.

Since 1934 Berlin has varied its methods of dealing with Poland, from appearances of courteous respect for her vital interests to the brutal ruthlessness with which it started the present war and the inhuman cruelty with which the population of occupied Poland is now being persecuted. Between 1934 and 1939 the German minority in Poland was the principal instrument of political blackmail and of German pressure.

The German minority perfidiously declared its loyalty to Poland.
throughout the period of its consolidation and of the National-Socialist propaganda campaign. As soon as the entire German community in Poland was closely organized and subordinated to Nazi direction, it changed its tactics. The Polish citizens of German nationality opened a political campaign against Poland, no longer concealing their aims. They began by demanding a revision of their legal status, which they alleged to be unsatisfactory. The problem of the estates of the big German landowners played an important part in their campaign. Under the existing law of agrarian reform the Government published every year, from 1926 onwards, a list of the estates which would be subject to apportionment, with full compensation for their owners. Usually a portion of these estates was divided among the peasants, in order to provide them with adequate farmsteads. Since German landowners controlled in some districts of western Poland as much as 26 per cent or even 90 per cent of the arable land, the law of agrarian reform had to be applied to them. The Germans were determined to keep their estates, which gave them numerous advantages. Besides making the owners financially independent, the estates gave them control over large numbers of Polish labourers, tradesmen and farmers. The Germans protested against the apportionment of their estates. The Polish government frequently gave way to their demands, believing that such concession might help to improve the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Actually the concessions did not improve Polish-German relations in the least, but merely placed the German landowners at an advantage over the Polish squire, who was subject to the agrarian law.

The German minority continually pestered the Polish administration and government with all sorts of complaints and demands. Although most of them were not genuine, the Polish government agreed to discuss the general position of the German minority in Poland through diplomatic channels. It did so because it was anxious to secure reciprocity of treatment for the Poles in Germany, of whom there were 1,500,000—living in compact groups in the eastern provinces of Germany, especially in East Prussia and Opole Silesia. This was an error on the part of the Polish government, for it provided Germany with an opportunity for interference in internal Polish affairs, while Poland—as the weaker country—could not compel Germany to stop the persecution of the Polish minority in Germany.

Unlike the German minority in Poland, the Polish minority in Germany had no rights whatsoever. Under the Weimar Republic the Poles could, although without any hope of practical results, invoke Article 113 of the German Constitution, which stated that:

"The part of the population speaking non-German languages cannot be restricted, either by legislation or by administrative measures, in its free development and notably in the use of its native language in teaching, in administration and in the courts."
When Hitler became Chancellor, the Constitution was no longer respected. The German citizens of Polish nationality were forced into a totalitarian system of nationalism, under which all civic rights are conditional on race membership. The Poles were disfranchised; they could not even be craftsmen, for the guilds required “pure German origin”. Under the law of hereditary agricultural holdings (Reichserbhofgesetz of September 29, 1933) a Pole could be expropriated, for the law admitted to land ownership only persons of “pure German blood”. In fact all the rights which the Polish laws and Constitution guaranteed to the German minority in Poland were expressly withdrawn from the Poles in Germany, under the decrees of National-Socialism.

In spite of such an unfavourable situation the Polish government proposed to adopt the principle of reciprocity of treatment of their respective minorities by Germany and Poland. On November 5, 1937, the two governments made a minority declaration which was communicated, in identical terms, by Chancellor Hitler to a delegation of Poles of Germany and by the President of Poland to the representatives of the German minority. The declaration stated:

“The Polish government and the German government . . . declare that it is their belief that the treatment of these minorities has a capital importance for the further development of friendly neighbourly relations between Poland and Germany, and that the satisfactory situation of these minorities in each country can be guaranteed more effectively if there is an assurance that the other country will apply the same principles.”

Just as the pact of January 26, 1934, did not bring about a real improvement of Polish-German relations and did not restrict Germany’s aggressive designs on Poland, so the minority declarations of November 1937 did not benefit the Poles in Germany at all. On the contrary, soon after the declaration the Germans began to expropriate Polish farmers in East Prussia and Silesia, evicting them from farms which had been, in some cases, in the hands of the same family for three or four hundred years.

The German minority in Poland, on the other hand, claiming the application of the Polish-German agreement and supported by the German embassy in Warsaw, demanded no less than full organizational autonomy. Similar demands had been already made in the past, but they were then merely a demonstration. In 1937 they became the expression of a practical political plan, designed to disrupt Poland from within.

Article 109 of the Polish Constitution, which deals with the cultural autonomy of national minorities, makes provision only for a limited autonomy, within the general system of local self-government, subject to government supervision. The German minority

* In Poland, on the other hand, there were German representatives in every Parliament.

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claimed something quite different: full autonomy of organization for all its communal activities. One of the leading German writers in Poland, Victor Kauder, formulated this demand, in 1936, under two headings:

(1) The Polish majority should permit the Germans in Poland to organize their own National-Socialist community (Völkischer Sozialismus).

(2) The Polish government should permit the Germans in Poland to form a single, compulsory Nazi organization, based on the Führerprinzip.

Such demands could never be accepted by the government of any independent country. They aimed clearly at the establishment of a State within the State. It would have to be, moreover, a totalitarian State within a constitutional, liberal system. It would also mean granting to the Germans, who formed 2.4 per cent of the population, a clearly privileged position. Finally, since all the Germans in Poland had at the time already sworn obedience to Hitler, through their organizations, they were at the service of the head of a foreign power, whose plans of aggrandizement at the expense of Poland were barely concealed.

The annexation of Austria, the Sudeten affair, the march into Prague, the military occupation of Slovakia and the incorporation in the Reich of the Memel territory brought the German minority in Poland to a state of extreme tension. The Polish authorities discovered among the Germans a large number of plots aiming at the overthrow of the Polish State. The Germans even organized in various parts of Poland secret camps for the military training of youth. All the German organizations were engaged in espionage work. Members of the German minority went to Germany and to Danzig for military training courses. The Germans did their utmost to cause incidents, offering strong provocation to the Poles, especially in the frontier districts. Such incidents were exaggerated in the reports of the German press in the Reich, which declared that Germany was willing to "protect" her sons in Poland, as she protected those of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel. It was clear that Germany was preparing an attack on Poland.

Writing in the January 1939 issue of the Deutsche Monatshefte, Victor Kauder openly threatened Poland. He began by describing the political and military power of the Reich and then added that Britain and France were too weak to influence the situation and to defend their allies. Finally he wrote:

"Whoever wants peace in Eastern Europe instead of destruction, should see that satisfaction is given to the minority groups in the countries concerned."

It was perfectly clear by that time that the German minority in Poland was a Fifth Column, charged with weakening the country from within, exerting—together with Berlin—pressure on the Polish
government, and finally delivering Poland to the Reich without any military opposition. The conclusion of the Polish-British alliance was greeted by the German minority in Poland with rioting in the streets. There were attempts at armed action. The invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, was the culminating point of the long campaign waged by the Germans living in Poland against that country. The Polish Ministry of Information published* an account of the activities of the German minority immediately preceding the German invasion and of the assistance which it gave to German troops during the few weeks' fighting. There is no need to repeat it here.

All the Germans in Poland, without exception, served the interests of the Reich, against those of the country of which they were citizens. They completely betrayed Poland and broke all the formal bonds between that country and themselves.

ROUMANIA

By B. M. Niculescu

The Germans of Transylvania

... "When the Pied Piper of Hamelin had gathered all the children of the town around him, he led them into a hole in the mountain. And after a long journey, they arrived in a country which was fair and rich, and which the people called Transylvania. Thus the children the Piper had bewitched became the forefathers of the Germans settled there today...."

So runs the legend, which goes back for hundreds of years. History also goes back for hundreds of years. The first German settlers—the "Guests"—were brought from various parts of Germany by the Hungarian Kings who, from the Hungarian plain, broke into Transylvania which had been peopled by Roumanians since the days of the Roman Emperor, Trajan. Miners from Saxony were settled in the north-east and in the west, to mine gold. Flemish settlers were brought to improve the low marshlands. German Knights were called upon to guard the mountain passes, the gates of the young Hungarian Kingdom; but, as the Kings did not like competition, were ousted again when they began to extend their power beyond the mountains into the Danube plains and to build heavily fortified stone strongholds which could have resisted even the armies of the Kings.

But only after the great Mongol invasion of the first half of the thirteenth century was the bulk of the settlers brought from

* The German Fifth Column in Poland, published for the Polish Ministry of Information by Hutchinson & Co., London
Luxembourg and the Rhineland to form a reliable backbone of towns at the service of the Hungarian King. Under the terms of their agreement they were obliged to provide heavily armed men whenever they were called upon. As inhabitants of fortified towns and as skilled workers they were also best fitted to provide shelter and arms for the King's soldiers in cases of invasion or uprisings. Their settlements were spread out across the country so as to guard the main roads within the country and the passes leading into it from the outside. It is interesting to note that their main obligation for military help was for internal needs against the Roumanian subjects or possible ambitious Hungarian nobles, which really made of them a kind of police force at the service of the King.

In return for these services, special privileges were given them. They were autonomous, could elect their own judges and their own priests and had certain monopolies. They formed the “middle class” between the Roumanian and Hungarian peasantry and the Hungarian nobles, but a middle-class entirely separated by its customs, traditions and language and by its religion from the rest of the inhabitants and directly responsible only to the King, with whom they had treaties delimiting their rights and obligations.

They were soon known as “Saxons”, possibly because some of the first settlers were Saxons, but more likely because their legal status at the beginning was similar to that of the settlers in the Duchy of Saxony.

The “Union of the Three Nations”

The Hussite influence, the poverty and lack of freedom of the peasants and the accidental fact of the arming of some of them for an abortive crusade, led, in 1437, to a fierce uprising. The imperilled middle and upper classes immediately came together and a Union of the Saxons, the Szekels (an autonomous branch of the Hungarian family) and the Hungarian nobles was formed to keep the, mainly Roumanian, peasantry down. “The Three Nations” formed a “Brotherly Union”. In 1526, when the Hungarian Kingdom was smashed by the Turks, Transylvania became an autonomous Principality, and in 1542 the Union was given its final shape as a Diet-electing, ruling minority in that province. According to the conception of the Middle Ages, this minority called itself “the nation”, the rest being only “the people”, with duties, but without rights, and henceforward and except when one of the western Churches felt it its duty to find new adherents the position of the Roumanian peasants was officially seldom taken into consideration.

In 1699 Turkey lost the greater part of Hungary, including Transylvania, to the Habsburgs. But sometimes the members of the “nations” quarrelled, and then the Roumanians were brought again to the fore. Thus in 1842 the leader of the Saxons, Stephan Ludwig Roth, who was destined to become a national hero, was driven to frenzy by the
attempt of the other two "nations", the Magyars and the Szekels, who both spoke Hungarian, to impose it as the compulsory language. He pointed out in a famous pamphlet entitled The Language fight in Transylvania that:

"... there is no need to declare a language as the language of the country. Because we have already a language of the country. It is not the German, but neither is it the Hungarian; it is the Wallachian (Roumanian) language. We, the nations, may do whatever we like, but we cannot get away from it... Everybody knows Wallachian."

From the conquest of Hungary by the Turks in 1526 (from whom the Habsburgs conquered it in 1699), until the incorporation in 1867 of Transylvania in the new autonomous Hungarian Kingdom, formed the same year within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Transylvania remained an autonomous Principality under the suzerainty of one or the other of the more powerful States around her. Throughout those years it preserved its internal structure more or less intact.

The Germans in the rest of the country

In the seventeenth century the Turkish flood began to be pushed back by the Austrian Empire. In the eighteenth century German Catholic settlers from Swabia were brought by the Austrians into the Banat, where the population had been much thinned out by the continuous fighting on that territory and by the Turkish domination. It was intended that the Swabians should provide both an increase in the economic productivity of the country and a stronger defence for the frontiers of the Empire. Special rights were given to them and to the Roumanians and Slavs inhabiting the outskirts of the Empire, who were formed into "Frontier Regiments". A similar but smaller group of Swabians was also settled in the north-west of Transylvania.

In 1775 Austria managed to get Turkey's permission, as suzerain power, for the annexation of northern Moldavia, which henceforth was known as Bukovina and where soon an Austrian middle class was formed.

In 1812, on the eve of Napoleon's Russian campaign, Russia contrived to annex the eastern half of Moldavia, now known as Bessarabia. Western colonists, among whom were many Germans, were encouraged by the Russians to settle there by the grant of special privileges.

The number of the German settlers in Roumania (census of 1930) amounted to some 750,000 for the whole country, some 320,000 living in Transylvania, 225,000 in the Banat, 82,000 in Bessarabia, 75,000 in Bukovina and the rest spread throughout the country. About 550,000 lived in villages and about 200,000 in
The variety in their origins, in the reason for their settlement and in the epoch of their coming, could only create gulfs between the various groups. What is more, until 1918 they were subjects of three different poly-national states: Austria, Hungary and Russia, if the few Germans in the Dobrudja and in other parts of Roumania, who never played an important role, are omitted, and had never been under Roumanian rule for any but the shortest periods. The only thing most of them had in common was that they possessed special privileges compared with the Roumanian population.

The Germans and the Roumanian State

The first reaction of the most numerous homogeneous German group, that of Transylvania and the Banat, to the changed situation brought about by the defeat of the Central Powers, was to adhere to the declaration of the Roumanian National Assembly of Transylvania of December 1, 1918, by which the Union of Transylvania to Roumania was decided. Henceforward, whatever their activities, they felt they could claim to be willing and loyal subjects of the Roumanian State.

Roumanian rule had three immediate results: (1) The land reform, which, by destroying the big estates, affected to a large extent the holdings of the Universitas Saxonum, a body providing funds for the cultural and educational need of the Germans. An annuity was given it in place of its lands; (2) The end of the attempts at Magyarization which had been strongest among the less well organized Swabians; and (3) A change in the political structure of the country caused by the introduction of the universal suffrage, whereby the Hungarians, the Germans and the Russians lost their local predominance to the Roumanian majority.

Preparing the ground

The progress of the German minority under Roumanian rule has been extraordinary, as can be seen from the tables set out below, which give comparative data for its press, its banks and its schools, immediately after their incorporation into Roumania and some years later:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1933</th>
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<tr>
<td>Daily papers</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other periodicals</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27</td>
<td>120</td>
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57
What were the reasons for this amazing progress? The advance in education might be partly explained by the general policy of the Roumanian governments, which, faced with a big inheritance of illiteracy, did their utmost to wipe it out as quickly as they could. State Schools were therefore set up and subventions given to all the schools which were not State Schools (i.e. wholly kept by the State). But this accounts only for part of the progress of the German minority, even in education.

To understand the whole of the changes outlined, and especially those in the economic sphere, one must look beyond the Roumanian frontiers.

In 1867, when Transylvania's connections with Vienna were severed in favour of Budapest, the Saxons began to look to Berlin. Their connections with Prussia were rapidly strengthened and with the collapse of the Austrian Empire were to become almost exclusive.

The conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles and the minority clauses imposed on the small nations, with the best humanitarian intentions, showed the leading circles in Germany the best way for the preparation of future strong allies in the various neighbouring States and at the same time for the disruption of those States and of the whole Versailles system of security in an outwardly legal manner. The conception of "protected" minorities was not only the ideal Trojan horse for Germany; it was a great improvement on the original. Almost none of the countries against whom it was going to be used dared protest against it, as its constructors, the great Allied Powers, would naturally have taken any protest either as a personal insult or as a sign of bad faith.

The first open steps Germany took to organize the Germans abroad were to enter into "cultural relations" with them. She
knew she could not only do this with impunity, but that all those not directly affected would applaud her action as imbued with the new democratic feeling based on national independence and therefore, it seemed evident, also on national relationships which knew no frontiers. And, putting the emphasis on national, Germany made full use of this logic pushed beyond the reasonable.

In full harmony with the German love for organizations, a Kulturamt des Verbandes der Deutschen in Grossrumaenien (Cultural Office of the Union of the Germans in Great Roumania) was founded on March 1, 1922. Its official aims were:

1. To uphold the cultural interests of Germans in Roumania;
2. To foster a sentiment of solidarity between the Germans in Roumania and to bring about their cultural equality and harmonization; and—the most important—
3. To establish and maintain close relations with the “fatherland”, with Germany.

For the fulfillment of these three aims the Office, whose creation was going to be called by the Germans in the years to come “the most important cultural step of Germandom in South-East Europe after the Great War”, got immediately in touch with all pan-German organizations in Germany. Of these the Central Institute of Education and Instruction, in Berlin, provided books and pamphlets in large numbers and helped to organize each year many lectures and courses with lecturers from Germany. The importance of these activities can be judged by the fact that thousands of the Germans in Roumania went to the lectures. In 1926, for example, the official reports of the Office mention that 60 per cent of the German teachers attended the courses. Many other outstanding German intellectuals besides those the Berlin Institute was sending were invited by the Office. Writing about these courses, the Berlin daily Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung wrote on October 16, 1927: “Their importance is the greater because the Germans from Germany and those from beyond the German frontiers meet there. There, the new German ideal is being created: the fusion of all into the indissoluble German unity. The German life current flows strongly between the German fatherland and its sons dispersed in other countries.”

Besides the Office other organizations of the German minority took part in these exchanges. The professional organizations held regular courses for the improvement of their methods. “Specialists” from the Reich came year after year to teach modern developments in the arts of hair-dressing, tailoring, shoe-making and every other branch of trade and industry. The German minority’s craving for perfection in its work—which, it seemed, could only be reached by close contact with its co-nationals from the Reich—was really amazing.

Another pan-German organization in Germany, the Verein fuer das Deutschum im Auslande (Union for Germans abroad), delegated various provincial branches to “adopt” the Germans in
the different Roumanian provinces and encouraged large-scale reciprocal visits for the establishment of close personal relations. Besides, it invited each year a number of Germans from Roumania for a prolonged stay in Germany, to "learn to know their fatherland".

Many other pan-German associations could be mentioned which took a very active interest in the German minority in Roumania, like the "League of Germans from abroad", the "League for the defence of Germans", the "Institute for Germans abroad", and so on.

Close relations were also kept from the point of view of the press. The German press-telegrams were sent free of charge to the approved German papers in Roumania, and the Office had close connections with some 250 publications in Germany, besides maintaining a press-department whose duty it was to provide information for the foreign press. Through these channels, and for intimidation purposes, the smallest differences which individuals of the German or any other minority had with the Roumanian authorities were immediately presented to the world as a national persecution. These methods have since become world-famous.

The press of the German minority, of course, also took part in such campaigns. Reich Germans wrote regularly articles for its benefit, and periodicals sometimes expressed openly the aims of the most outspoken of them. Thus the August 1927 number of the Ostland of Sibiu (Transylvania) reproduced a lecture given by Professor Hermann Onken, of Munich University, before the general assembly of the German Academy which had met in Cologne, in which he expressed the view that, as the Austrian Empire had disappeared, it was the duty of the various German communities at present living in other States to keep alive the flame of Germanism. Professor Onken finished his lecture with the famous sentence of Friederich List: "In the background of all my plans is Germany". He could hardly have made it more clear.

Members of the German minority wrote in the same vein. Even in their complaints, Germany was always put forward as the most perfect nation. Even Rudolf Brandsch, for a long time the leader of the minority and a "moderate", after complaining in an article written in 1929 of the measures taken in all the countries, including Czechoslovakia and Denmark, against the German minority (the Roumanian laws he considered among the most satisfactory), compared them unfavourably with the Prussian laws, which "give the Danes and the Poles the full possibility of building up their own schools with the help of the State". In the next sentence he innocently concluded that those minorities "had shown no desire" until then to take advantage of that great opportunity. He added that the problem of the minorities "is a deep moral problem which calls to action all the noblest instincts of the human soul, like freedom, justice and love for humanity". Six years later he was to
declare the Hungarian minority in Transylvania a “second-rate minority”.

Already in 1928 it was possible for Bishop Glondys, now the head of the German Lutheran Church in Roumania, to declare in a speech in Breslau (Germany), where he had been sent as the representative of all the Lutheran Germans in Roumania, that this cultural work of the German minority, together with its other activities, was making of the minority “a unified German nation in the midst of a foreign State”. As a recognition of these great achievements, the order of the “German Ring”, which, it seems, had up to then only been awarded to Marshal von Hindenburg and to Stresseman, the Reich’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, was given in 1928 by the “Institute for the Germans abroad” to the most representative figure of the German minority in Roumania, at that time Bishop Teutsch.

Where did the money for these activities come from? Collections were sometimes organized in Germany to help the Germans in Roumania—though they were really much better off than the Roumanians, who had still a good way to go before catching up with the members of the former ruling class. But neither the sums thus collected nor the contributions of the minority, heavy though they were, could provide for more than a small part of the “cultural” expenses. The bulk of the money was put at the disposal of the office and of the other organizations involved by the “Limited”, the “Ossa”, G.m.b.H., which, there is good reason to believe, spent between 1920 and 1935 at least 20 to 30 million goldmarks yearly (about 1.5 to 2 million pounds sterling) to strengthen the German minority in Roumania. Some put this figure as high as 150 million goldmarks. Where exactly the money came from is difficult to prove, but the “Ossa” was commonly known as an enterprise backed by the German government. Some of the names of the people on the board of directors are known. The chairman was Buergermeister (Mayor) Winkler, who travelled much and whom Goebbels learnt to appreciate enough not only to keep him on after Hitler’s arrival, but to give him delicate missions of various kinds. In the late ’30’s Winkler arranged the blackmailing of many newspapers into submission and integration in the Nazi pattern of Dr. Goebbels, and for this and other purposes was often a visitor to his kinsmen in Roumania. Other members of the board were Dr. Deitrich, a Democrat M.P., Mr. Stuecklen, a Socialist M.P. and various representatives of industrial and other interests. On the whole, a happy and united family.

With the money at its disposal, the “Ossa” also subsidized the German co-operatives in Roumania. Those co-operatives, built up on the German model called “Raiffeisen”, and whose progress was as striking as that of the Banks, contributed their full share to the formation of what Bishop Glondys had called “a unified German nation in the midst of a foreign State” by intensifying the economic ties between the members of the minority.
and, at the same time, limiting to the minimum their economic relations with the rest of the population.

Different means were used to help the banks of the minority. Though a certain amount of capital certainly found its way from Germany into those banks, it is difficult to say to how much it amounted and what proportion of it had been sent at the request of the German authorities. The whole banking business in Germany was really not at all done on a State basis until the arrival of the Nazis. Private arrangements were very effective and much less obvious to outsiders. One of the most effective among them was the provision of an unlimited discount market for all the operations of the minority's banks. Any shocks which those banks might incur were safely absorbed by the incomparably vaster structure of the German banking system. In the darkest days of the 1929–33 crisis, when Roumania, as an agricultural country, was suffering particularly badly, the German minority's banks seemed hardly to be affected. The lack of capital just did not seem to bother them. They even extended their business in other areas, as in the Szekler districts, where they were able to dump on the market a comparatively large amount of loans in a short time, reaching almost 40 million lei for the first two weeks of their drive. And throughout their history since their incorporation into Roumania they took a great share in preserving all property already in German hands and in continuously making profitable—or even not so profitable—investment in capital goods which concerned directly the improvement of the economic position of the German minority as compared with the rest of the population. To be able to understand this attitude it must be borne in mind that the banks were not run on the usual profit basis. They were really community banks with enough backing and facilities from outside to be able to concentrate on whatever seemed to profit that community most, and where all integrated in a Revisionsverband which exercised once a year a rigid control of their activities.

*Hitler seizes power*

When Hitler, who was still to a great extent an unknown quantity, became Chancellor in 1933, the Germans in Roumania immediately split into Conservatives, under Dr. Hans Otto Roth, and Nazis, including mostly young people. The following year the German Nazi party was dissolved by the Roumanian government as a first measure in a common all-out drive against Nazism, which, following the political journey of the French Foreign Minister Barthou, through the Balkans, the government hoped was going to be launched by some of the States interested. In 1935 the “ideological” differences between the Germans in Roumania were put in a secondary place and the members of the two parties united. It was at that moment that Rudolf Brandsch, on adhering to the new party thus formed, declared the other large minority in Transylvania, the Hungarian, which was numerically stronger than the German, to
be only a "second-rate minority". Though the party was supposed to be moderate, the "racial superiority" and "Herrenvolk" doctrines were already being put into practice by one of its members, well known as a democrat.

At the beginning of 1936 the minority announced its intention of holding an anti-Marxist and pro-German plebiscite among its members. That plebiscite was in spirit, if not in form, a declaration of loyalty to a foreign State, and as such it was immediately interdicted by the Roumanian government as an unconstitutional measure. Almost at the same time began an internecine fight between Fabritius, Gust, Bonfert and Brandsch for the leadership of the party, which again split in two. The fight became extremely bitter and even economic relations were broken off between the contending parties. On pressure from Berlin, which could not accept the weakening of its latent Fifth Column, the split was slowly healed and the two surviving leaders, both Nazis, Fabritius (Saxon) and Bonfert (Swabian), had to agree to share in the position of leadership, with a slight predominance for Fabritius.

Strong again, following the cessation of the internal fights, in 1938 the party made, through its leader, Fabritius, official demands for autonomy on the Prime Minister of Roumania, Miron Cristea, Patriarch of the Roumanian Orthodox Church. The pressure put on the government coincided with that which was being put on Czechoslovakia with the help of Henlein and the Sudeten-Germans, and to strengthen it the Hungarian minority was again elevated by the Saxons from the second-rate role assigned to them by Herr Brandsch to that of a full ally. Since 1937 great changes had been made in the position of the minorities in Roumania, and very many of their earlier demands had been granted, including complete supervision by them over the State schools provided for them, even to the extent (in the German case) of the appointment of German teachers of Roumanian. As the Saxon press pointed out, those changes really amounted to the recognition of the German minority as a "corporate body". But, though the Patriarch, as he openly declared, was aware that in case of rejection this last and sweeping demand was likely to be used by Germany as a means of pressure on Roumania for economic and political ends, he refused it, as it amounted to the creation of a State within a State.

At the beginning of 1938 a coalition of all political parties in Roumania, from socialists to the right wing, was formed under the name of "Front of National Regeneration", in an endeavour to check the Roumanian extreme right, which was getting potentially very dangerous following the increased aggressiveness of Germany. On February 10, 1939, the "Front" was joined also by the minorities (the Bulgarians, the Hungarians and the Germans). Seats were allotted them on the Council of the Front, but the German minority refused to accept them until the Jews were thrown out. Ștefănescu, then Prime Minister, refused this impossible demand and expressed his hope that, once they found the advantages of being on the
Council, they would prefer to give up their demands and take part in its work. Unfortunately, this proved to be only wishful thinking.

The new elections, held in the summer of 1939, proved rather disappointing both for the Hungarians and the Germans. A large proportion of the rank and file seemed to prefer to give their votes to Roumanian candidates instead of those nominated by their national parties. To make up for this “lack of balance” in the proportional representation of the nationalities the King nominated more Senators from among the minorities than would have been the case on a proportional representation system. (Following the new Constitution of 1938, the King had the right to appoint one-third of the members of the Upper House.) At the same time further changes were announced relating to the special rights of the minorities, including the granting of the right to use their own language even before the highest Court of Justice of the country.

The shock to Calinescu was therefore the greater when he discovered that, following the British guarantee to Roumania, the members of the German minority had been hastily armed with weapons smuggled in from Germany, through Hungary, in large quantities and had been allotted tasks of sabotage and of destruction of communications according to a minutely-worked-out plan, to be put into practice immediately Roumania was at war with Germany or one of Germany’s allies. The strategic position of the minority’s settlements across the internal highways and the mountain passes made their Fifth Columnist potentialities enormous, and their great numbers and thorough organization as well as their knowledge of the land could make of them deadly guerrillas.

The War

Roumania’s position after the conclusion of the German-Russian pact and the fall of Poland, her ally, became extremely difficult. Another of her close allies, Czechoslovakia, had already disappeared, and the government of her third neighbouring ally, Yugoslavia, was, under the guidance of Prince Paul, openly flirting with the Axis. The German minority in Roumania began to discuss its future as if the German supremacy in that area was certain.

The fall of France and the German-backed Russian ultimatum to Roumania (June 26, 1940) sealed the fate of Roumania as an independent State. Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were taken over by Russia. The German minorities there were allowed, following, it seems, the German-Russian treaty of the previous year, to leave and were settled in Styria and the Polish Corridor. The Germans of the Dobrogea followed suit. This marked the end of the three youngest of the German settlements in Roumania.

But the remaining Germans went all out, with a vengeance, to get power. When the Hungarian minority threatened (August 20, 1940) the starting of a massacre in Transylvania, with the
implied consequence of an attack by the Hungarian and German armies, if the Hungarian demands for that province were not satisfied, the German minority kept “neutral”, but presented at the same time demands of its own. It asked for exemption from military service and from requisitions for the army, which were both compulsory for all Roumanian citizens. It also asked for permission to create a Selbstschutz, an armed military formation similar to the S.S. On August 30 an official delegation of the German minority, made up of five members, was in Berlin asking for German intervention. At the same time the minority renewed its demands to the Roumanian authorities for permission to arm, while anti-Jewish incidents, under the open leadership of known Saxons, were taking place in German-inhabited towns, like Sibiu. Public “collections” of brown uniforms were ostentatiously arranged by the minority in expectancy of their official recognition by the government as a State within the State.

With the German-engineered Iron Guard revolt of September and with the assumption of power by the Antonescu-Horia Sima combination and the entry of the German troops in Roumania, all restrictions were wiped away. The strategic position of the German settlements across the main roads and their secret arming during the preceding years had played their role in forcing the weak Roumanian government of King Carol to agree to cede half of Transylvania to Hungary, as imposed by Germany and Italy at Vienna on August 30. Now there was no more question of what was or was not within the law, but only of what the German minority thought should be done.

It immediately put into full effect the doctrine which certain Germans had propounded for decades, of the subordinate relationship between the Volksgemeinschaft and the Staatsangehoerigkeit. The Volksgemeinschaft, the “people’s community”, is, according to this doctrine, something sacred, a mixture of common blood, common Kultur and common destiny. Whoever rejects it is a traitor to the German nation and a monster. As a matter of fact the Volksgemeinschaft cannot disappear even if rejected, because it is a biological fact and therefore beyond the powers of a human being to reject.

The Staatsangehoerigkeit, the “citizenship”, on the other hand, is just a convention, entered into by the fact of the accidental place of birth or for convenience’s sake and can be rejected at any moment. If there should be any conflict between it and the Volksgemeinschaft it just ceases to have any binding power on the good German.

And so, the Germans in Roumania being good Germans, they were formed into a Berggau (“mountain province”) under a gau­leiter, appointed by Hitler in the person of Andreas Schmidt, and they swore loyalty to the Fuehrer and, as an afterthought, also to the Roumanian State. They immediately established their own police and their own army, took over all the State schools with pupils of German nationality and shortly afterwards received
“permission” to appoint teachers of German in the Roumanian schools. The capital of the German minority’s banks in Roumania rocketed from 500 million lei in 1938 to 3,700 million lei at the end of 1941 and to 4,400 million lei by the summer of 1942. But the two things which the minority tried as hard as possible to get into their own hands were the German-Roumanian trade and the internal trade of Roumania, both of which had been to a large extent in Jewish hands. As early as 1939 the minority’s demands to the Reich for the transfer of all the agencies of German firms in Roumania from Jewish to German hands had become extremely pressing. The German Commercial Attaché in Bucarest, Klugkist, had to tell the Saxons, in a public speech in the summer of 1939, that Germany could not yet dispense with the Jewish help in her trade with Roumania and that they must be patient. According to official figures, 21.4 per cent of the country’s industrial undertakings and 32.7 per cent of the commercial were Jewish. It was too tempting. The German minority felt their time had now come. The “Aryanization” of the economic life was imposed. The problem of finding the necessary capital for buying the Jewish enterprises, which was insoluble for the Roumanians in their capital-starved country, gave no headache to the German minority, which proceeded to step with gusto into the shoes of the Jews.

Then, as a second step, the leaders of the minority made public declarations outlining their future role as a “link between the Greater Reich and the people among whom they lived”. Their professional and trade organizations expressed their conviction that “their organizational gifts would prove useful to the Roumanian State”, and the German Association of agricultural organizations and co-operatives stated that in the near future it would be able to deal with all the exports to Germany of industrialized and specialized agricultural products. The minority felt that, for these reasons and also because of the need for a reliable military police force in case of “emergencies”, they must conserve their members. Therefore, when the Roumanian armies were marched, under German command, against Russia, the German minority sent, as their whole contribution, 80 “volunteers” to fight with their “Roumanian allies”; among them was Andreas Schmidt, who was duly decorated after two months’ fighting and then came back to tell of what he had done.

It was a heavy decision Hitler had to take when, after his first winter defeat in Russia, he had to ask his faithful followers in Roumania to agree to be called to the colours and to be incorporated in the Roumanian armies.

But even these defeats changed nothing in the minority’s behaviour, which was so bad that M. Iuliu Maniu, former Roumanian peasant Prime Minister and one of the leaders of the opposition in Roumania, found himself obliged to write on February 22, 1942, a long letter to Mihai Antonescu, the pro-Axis acting-Prime Minister, in the hope that it might rouse him to a sense
"The German population," wrote Maniu, "enjoying exceptional treatment compared with that applied to the native Roumanian element, has succeeded in organizing its own national life, which is not only entirely separated from that of the Roumanians but also independent of our State and with evident tendencies of becoming a State within the State. The right given to our citizens of German origin of forming themselves into political organizations, a right which is at present denied to the Roumanian population, the rights they alone have of holding political meetings without any authorization, of organizing para-military formations, of having uniforms and of bearing arms, of undergoing training in organized units, put the German population in a position of political and moral superiority to the Roumanian population." This creates a danger, which is "the more serious as the German population has severed all moral ties with the Roumanian State and openly recognizes that it takes orders from the German Reich and its Fuehrer". And as a proof Maniu included "an appeal by Hermann Jekeli, of Brasov, the commander of the organization Deutsche Mannschaft (German troops), which appeared with the consent of the Roumanian censorship in the daily Suedostdeutsches Tageszeitung, the central organ of the Germans in Roumania. In this appeal he affirms, clearly and with emphasis, that 'We, National-Socialists, believe in the Fuehrer and in the Great German Empire of the Future.'

"Further on Herr Jekeli affirms that the Roumanian citizens of German nationality are under an obligation to fight in the Roumanian army because of the Fuehrer's orders, implying that this obligation comes from the obedience owed to the Fuehrer and not from the authority of the Roumanian State. Therefore he appeals to the Germans of Roumania to enter the Roumanian army: 'Though another solution could seem more favourable, the Fuehrer's order constitutes for us the most sacred duty and gives us the power of making the greatest sacrifice for Germany!'

And to make the arrogance more complete, the appeal ends: 'On the front of the armies as well as on the front of the Fatherland the name of our love is Germany, of our attitude, submission, of our faith: Adolf Hitler.'

"Not a single word about the Roumanians, about our King, about the Government of the country.

"This appeal could have been made anywhere in Germany but not in Roumania. Unfortunately the Germans in Transylvania and the Banat already regard these Roumanian provinces as belonging to Greater Germany and destined to play the role of 'Ostmark' of the Ancient Austria.

"As a matter of fact our German minorities speak openly of the project of constituting after the war a 'Donauland', a 'Land
of the Danube' comprising Transylvania and the Banat, which would be torn from our country and put under the command of the German minority and under the protection of the Great German Empire. Seen from this point of view, the civilian and para-military organizations as well as the manifestations of our German minorities constitute a beginning towards the realization of these projects.

"The army is at war alongside Germany and under the German supreme command. The economic life, industrial and commercial, to a large extent Germanized, our foreign trade almost entirely at the disposal of Germany, the German minority a State within the State, free to do what they want and having the liberty of declaring openly that they submit to the orders of the leader of a foreign State—this is the situation in which our country finds herself.

"What is happening with regard to the Germans in our country is a humiliating renunciation fraught with dangers for the future.

"It is not our humiliating position, though, which made me send you these few lines of information. To strike a poor soul, tied hand and foot, is humiliating really not for him, but for those who strike him. What makes me write to you is the danger which this state of things creates for the future. It is the duty of the Government to shield the country from this danger. If only the leaders possess all the details of the problem, we, who are outside, can see better that the situation has become intolerable.

The "Donaustaat"—the "Danube State"—this dream fore-shadowed by the old fighter for a Greater Germany, the Austrian Steinaker, who, in 1927, told the Saxons in Roumania that it was their mission to bring about its fulfilment, has become a creed with them. Based on Transylvania, the Banat, northern Serbia and southern Hungary, this State was going to dominate the main roads across the Continent, from the ‘raw-material-producing’ plains of Russia in the east to the industrial west, and from the Scandinavian countries in the north to the Aegean and the Mediterranean in the south. It was going to be the guardian of that most important European traffic-artery, the Danube, and of the shortest way to India. The small German groups scattered throughout the area, which had proved their worth as stepping-stones to German domination, were going to be welded into a mighty whole and dominate for Germany the area they had helped her to win. It was with pride that they assumed the role of the first of the ‘German masters among alien races’ whom Hitler has mentioned in Mein Kampf.
YUGOSLAVIA

By Dr. Miho Krek

(1) The origin and number of Germans in Yugoslavia; their part in the life of Yugoslavia before 1938.

The last official census of March 31, 1931, established the following numerical strength of the German minority in Yugoslavia:

There were 499,969 Germans in Yugoslavia, i.e. 3.59 per cent of the entire population of the State.

This German minority was distributed mainly in the Banovinas or provinces:

(1) In SLOVENIA there were 25,054 Germans, i.e. 2.19 per cent of the whole population of the province;
(2) In the SAVA Banovina or province (part of Croatia) there were 70,922 Germans, i.e. 5.00 per cent of the whole population.
(3) In the DUNAV Banovina or province there were 341,341 Germans, i.e. 13.33 per cent of the population of the province. The German minority of this province lived mainly in three areas, viz.:

In the Banat 119,932,
Baranya 15,548 and
Bačka 135,516.

There are only three political districts in the whole of Yugoslavia where the Germans were in the majority, viz. Bačka Palanka, Odzaci and Kula.

The most important German settlements are in the former Southern Hungarian provinces, mainly in the Vojvodina. They trace their origin back to the time when the Turks were finally driven out of Central Europe. Vienna was liberated in 1683, and the Austrian armies pushed the Turks slowly down the Danube until, finally, Hungary was free again. The wars with the Turks devastated vast areas to the right and to the left of the Rivers Danube and Tisa. The Austrian government were anxious to populate these districts again, and they brought German settlers from all parts of Germany, but chiefly from the Western Marches and from Swabia. Under the Emperor Charles VI and the Empress Maria Theresa the great settlement of Germans in these districts took place. In the second half of the eighteenth century the flow of the German streams ceased and thereafter there were hardly any further arrivals.

This might serve as a proof that the German Drang nach Osten is not of recent origin, and that the German rulers in by-gone centuries—ruling at that time from Vienna—were interested even then in carrying the Germanic race and the Germanic living-space towards the East.

The German “island” in Slovenia called Kocevje (Gottschee) is a product of the fifteenth century. Germans arrived there with the
German lords when they were granted feudal rights in these lands. These counts and barons settled German colonies round their feudal castles to be their special protection in case of need. The Austrian census of 1910 numbered 16,313 German inhabitants of the Kocevje "island". But even this small number is an exaggeration of the real state of affairs. In Yugoslavia this community had dwindled, and did not exceed 12,000. In old Austria they were divided administratively amongst three districts. After the creation of Yugoslavia, this division remained. In none of the three districts had the Germans a majority. In the district of Kocevje they numbered 13,291, in the district of Novo Mesto 2,274 and in the district of Crnomelj 748.

In the Styrian part of Slovenia the German element, insignificant in numbers, is scattered all over the province. The following considerations must be borne in mind: the Austrian government did not conceal their intention of Germanizing Styria by various methods. The Austrian census of 1910 reveals that the population of Styria had increased over that of 1900 by 6.2 per cent. The German increase is put down as being 8.97 per cent, whilst the Slovene increase is given as only 0.04 per cent. As a matter of fact, it is well known that the natural growth of the Slovene population is far higher than that of the Germans. On the other hand, there was no Slovene emigration from Styria, except from the land to the towns and to the industrial and mining areas. Which means that the natural increase of the Slovenes was swallowed up by the Germanizing policy, and went to constitute the German increase. The towns in Styria had, under Austria, outwardly a German aspect, but their inhabitants all came from Slovene stock in the first or second generation. There is only one exception: Maribor. In this town on the River Drava there is a numerically insignificant old German stock. In the whole of Yugoslav Styria the Germans formed a majority only in the small parish of Apace on the northern border, where, for instance, the religious services on Sundays were in German.

The Germanization was carried out in the Civil Service, in the staffing of the railways, and in the schools. Thus the entire State administration was German, which fact gave to the Germans or would-be Germans a special higher social standing in the eyes of the administered local population. The railways appointed only German or pro-German staff. The stations had a German-speaking staff, the guards along the railway line had to know German, the workman who was looking for a job on the railway had to know German, or else he was put aside for the lowest possible type of work. The language of the railway administration was German. The railroads became just so many inroads by which Germanism penetrated into the country. The schools did the rest. The teaching staff had to be composed of people who were trustworthy from a German point of view. The head masters were all Germans, and German was the language in which teaching was done, with
Slovene treated as a quite secondary and second-rate and unnecessary bother. The Germans behaved as the Master-Race, and the avowed intention of this policy was to give the Slovenes an inferiority complex which would make them wish to become Germans as quickly as possible.

The Germans enjoyed the fullest freedom, and their part in the life of the Yugoslav State was far greater than their numerical importance would have justified. On the economic side of the life of Yugoslavia the Germans had not only lost nothing of the activities which they pursued before 1919, but had in many ways increased the scope of their participation and the weight of their capital. Thus in Slovenia the heavy industry, with the ironworks in Jesenice and in Gustanj, was in the hands of the Germans. The coal industry in Trbovlje became almost entirely German-controlled, the ironware trade was chiefly in German hands and the newly-established textile industry was run partly by Germans from Austria and the Sudetenland and partly by nationals with heavy German capital participation. The German capital in the banks in Yugoslavia had not decreased, but increased, since 1919. The important position held by the Germans in the trading business in Yugoslavia was steadily growing in all parts of the country. This caused the greatest concern to all national-defence organizations, but, in order to avoid unpleasant reproaches, the Yugoslav government did not enforce any restrictions.

With the economic depression beginning in 1930, and the Western Powers showing no interest in the Eastern, the German influence began to grow out of all proportion, and in 1938 nearly half the import and export trade of Yugoslavia was in German hands.

(2) Rights granted to the Germans in Yugoslavia and their struggle for additional privileges.

With the Convention on the protection of minorities, signed in Paris on December 5, 1920, Yugoslavia undertook “to grant full and complete protection of life and liberty and property to all its inhabitants without consideration of origin, nationality, race or religion” (Art. 2). It accepted the claim that all the inhabitants of Yugoslavia “should be equal before the law and should enjoy the same civil and political rights, without consideration of race, language or religion” (Art. 7). Yugoslavia also agreed “not to lay down any sort of restriction in the use of any language whatever by the subjects of Yugoslavia in their private or commercial relations, in the free exercise of their religion, in the press or writings of any kind, or in public meetings”.

The Yugoslav subjects who formed a minority from the point of view of their race, religion or language had the benefit of the same laws and guarantees, de jure and de facto, as the other subjects of the State. They had, in common with them, the right to create at their own expense charitable institutions, religious and social
organizations, schools and other educational establishments, to direct and to supervise them, to use their own language in them, and to practise their own religion in complete liberty (Art. 8).

Yugoslavia, moreover, undertook, with regard to education, that in localities or in entire districts inhabited to a considerable degree by subjects who speak a language of the minority, the State would open up all facilities, so far as was convenient, to give the children of the minority their primary-school education in their own mother tongue, maintaining, however, the right of the State to introduce the official language as a compulsory subject of teaching. A fair share in the distribution of all public funds intended for educational, religious or charitable ends was promised to the minorities in towns and rural districts (Art. 9).

Yugoslavia has fulfilled all these international obligations in its legislative measures as well as in practice.

(a) LEGISLATION: The Constitutional Law of June 28, 1921, gives a solemn character to the stipulations accepted in the Convention of Paris. It gives full security to the status of the minorities. Embodied in the Constitutional Law, the provisions made for the minorities could not be altered by any subsequent ordinary parliamentary vote. Alterations in the rights accorded to minorities had to be made in the same way as the alterations in the Constitution itself, and a two-third majority of parliamentary votes is required for such alterations. Art. 4 of the Constitutional Law establishes equal right before the Law for all citizens without distinction. No right or privilege is granted by birth. Art. 10 guarantees that no citizen can be exiled or forced to leave his place of residence and settle down elsewhere. Art. 12 guarantees freedom of religion and conscience and, moreover, makes the provision that "funds provided for the uses of churches shall be distributed amongst the various recognized religions in proportion to their numerical strength and their ascertained needs. Articles 13 and 14 guarantee the liberty of the Press and the rights of association and public and private meetings. Art. 16 gives all citizens the right to elementary education in their mother tongue within certain limits which are subject to special legislative provisions in the case of national minorities. Art. 19 stipulates that the Civil Service and all other posts in the State administration, as well as in the local administration, are open to all citizens on the same conditions alike for all. Articles 69 and 70 make the necessary provisions for the representation of minorities in Parliament. The right to vote is universal for all citizens by birth or naturalization who have attained the age of 21.

The stipulations of the Constitutional Law have not remained a dead letter. They have been put into practice, so that it might be said that the conditions of the national minorities in Yugoslavia corresponded in every way with the liberal democratic traditions which the Constitutional Law expressed.

(b) IN THE SCHOOLS: The provisions of the Public Education Act
lay down that if 30 pupils in any district come forward with the demand for the establishment of an elementary school, it must be granted, and the teaching has to be in the mother tongue of the children. Thus, the following number of German primary schools were created by the State:

(1) In the Vojvodina (Bačka, Banat, Baranya), for 26,091 children, in 1931, there were 193 German elementary schools, with 561 classes in all.

(2) In Croatia and Slavonia (Sava Banovina) there were 11 German elementary schools for a small number of Germans, i.e. a school in every district where there were more than 30 pupils.

(3) In Slovenia, where the German element represented 2.19 per cent of the total population, there were 11 German elementary schools where the teaching was entirely in German, and 18 elementary schools where the teaching was conducted in German and Slovene. This means that the German minority had 3.6 per cent of the existing elementary schools at its disposal. The total number was 806.

All these minority schools were State institutions, maintained by the State and with a staff appointed and paid by the State. The State, in its care for the German minority, went far beyond its duties, as it created, besides the elementary schools, a number of German "kindergarten" schools (in the Vojvodina 64 in all) for the children too young to go to the elementary school.

The German minority had furthermore 8 higher schools, which were attended by 1,971 pupils. These schools prepare pupils for professional careers and fulfil special local economic and industrial requirements of the population.

Four secondary schools were at the disposal of the German minority, one of them with the full 8 years' course, the others for 4 years only. It is interesting to note that in the Vojvodina, which before 1919 belonged to Hungary, not a single elementary school—not to speak of higher schools or secondary schools—existed for the German minority there.

(c) CHURCHES: In the Vojvodina the German minority had 21 German parishes where the religious services were held exclusively in German, and 36 parishes where the religious services were alternately in German and in the national tongue.

In Slovenia there were 21 parishes with German religious services and 16 where the language was mixed.

(d) GERMAN ORGANIZATIONS: The Germans developed various associations for social, economic, educational, charitable and sporting purposes.

The main organization was the Deutscher Kulturbund, which at the beginning operated only in the Vojvodina, but later on became the central organization for all Germans in the State, until it was made compulsory as a Fifth-Column organization when the Nazis started the propaganda drive in Yugoslavia (1938). At its foundation the President said that the German minority “after 200 years
of bondage has found its Fatherland again in Yugoslavia”. At its conclusion, after 20 years, the last President, Mr. Hamm, said that this organization “defended the German rights as trustee of the German Reich” and that “as trustee of the German nation it now hands over the Germans to the protection of the Fuehrer”. At its foundation the President said that “the Kulturbund prides itself on having a new Fatherland, and institutions which, for the first time after so many hundred years, give it the chance of developing its economic and social resources and collaborating with the rest of the country for the common well-being of the country”. At its conclusion 20 years later the President said that the Kulturbund prided itself on having kept the closest contact between this German branch and the German Fatherland and having thus contributed to the well-being of the common German home. A telegram sent on the day of the foundation of the Kulturbund, June 20, 1921, to King Alexander of Yugoslavia says that “the Statute, for the first time in history, gives the German population in this province the chance of developing socially and economically”, whilst 20 years later its President, Mr. Hamm, said that the Kulturbund had never enjoyed the freedom of development, and in his first telegram to Hitler pointed out the loyalty of the Germans on their home-coming.

The activities of the Kulturbund were various and were carried out with energy and with success. Affiliated societies were founded in 114 districts of the Vojvodina and, after the Austrian Anschluss, in 29 districts in Slovenia. All these societies worked freely. Membership reached the figure of 64,000 in 1938.

Besides this Kulturbund 44 other German societies, local in character, worked in the Vojvodina. No hindrance was put in the way of their work.

In Slovenia, in addition to the 29 societies affiliated to the Kulturbund, as stated above, 31 other German societies functioned. Some of them had to be suppressed, as they became entangled in political questions and were engaged in work contrary to the integrity of the State and were working with centres in Germany or in Austria. But the State never put any obstacles in the way of Societies which did not seek support abroad and did not insist on maintaining connections with the German authorities or German centres abroad.

The Germans also had their own political party, the “German Party”. In 1929 the Germans had five members in the Parliament; in the previous one they had eight. The activities of the German political party were quite free. It cannot be said that these members of Parliament always restricted themselves to working for their minority.

(e) The Press: The German minority had at its disposal numerous and powerful newspapers. Apart from the Agramer Zeitung, a daily, which was intended for foreign information, the Germans in 1938 had six daily newspapers and 17 weekly publications.
(Under the Hungarian régime this same minority did not possess one single paper). The *Deutsches Volksblatt* had a circulation of 18,000. Three of the six German daily newspapers were published in Slovenia.

(f) **German Co-operatives**: Within the scope of the *Kulturbund* the German minority in the Vojvodina developed a powerful co-operative organization which concentrated in German hands most of the economic activity of the minority. Powerful producing and selling co-operative groups regulated the agricultural life of the minority. Savings and Loan Banks, grouped around a Central Co-operative Bank, dealt with the needs for credit and for new investments. The mill industry in the Vojvodina was almost entirely controlled by the German minority.

For all this freedom the Yugoslav State simply asked the German minority to be loyal citizens and to do their duty in the same way as all the other citizens of the realm. It was only when they forgot these duties, or overstepped their rights, that they had to be reminded that they were in Yugoslavia and not in Germany.

It is interesting to note that the German minority sent no complaints to the League of Nations, and that even Hitler, in an interview with the correspondent of the Belgrade *Vreme* in 1938, said bluntly that “the German minority is nowhere better off than in Yugoslavia”.

It must be pointed out, however, that a group of the German minority permanently put in claims for new rights and new privileges. They were working in collaboration with centres inside Germany. But they were a minority within the minority. The large body of the German minority in the Yugoslav State tried to be loyal. It became worse when Nazism came into power in Germany and when Austria had been swallowed up by Hitler-Germany. From then on the “clamouring” part of the minority grew, whilst the loyal Germans, though putting up a brave fight inside their own organizations, had slowly to retreat and leave the ground to the pan-German-minded, who, being the true Fifth Columnists, made all the preparation for the final onslaught of Germany on Yugoslavia.

(3) The speech of the Leader of the Yugoslav-Germans, Hamm, in the Yugoslav Parliament: the request for full autonomy, fully supported by pressure from Berlin.

The speech made in Parliament by the leader of the Germans in Yugoslavia, Hamm, is unfortunately nowhere on record. It is impossible to reproduce it from memory. The important part of this speech, the one in which the German leader submitted the request of the German minority to be given full “autonomy” as a racial entity (*Volksgruppe*), and the points that were submitted cannot be reconstructed. But it can be safely said that the “Hamm Programme” was very similar in words and in meaning to the
famous Points laid down by Henlein when he formulated his first programme in Czechoslovakia, or to the Minority Statute granted to the Germans in Roumania after the Vienna Protocol in 1939. The Hamm Programme, as in the case of the Henlein Points or the Roumanian Statute, claimed not only “cultural” but also political autonomy for the Germans considered as one unit. The German government accompanied this “awakening” of the German Volksgruppe with a steady pressure upon the Yugoslav government. The pressure was exercised directly by written memoranda, or by protests against “bad treatment of the German minority”, or by a growing pressure in the press. This pressure became absolutely insupportable at the beginning of the war. The German consuls were instructed to count the lines published from German sources and in sympathy with Germany and compare them with the number of lines published from non-German sources and in sympathy with the Allies. The German consuls had to protest every week with the responsible authorities. This was done to induce the government to bring pressure to bear upon public opinion to sympathize with Germany and to accept further privileges being granted to the hated Germans. When the government gave in to this pressure, and went even further and granted the German language new privileges in the secondary schools, the Germans were not satisfied, but claimed more. At the same time the German press in the Reich started with the publication of articles on the “Germanic culture” in Yugoslavia and on the German-influenced Kulturraum in all the Danubian lands.

(4) The Fifth-Column activities of the German minority, leading to the break-up of the Yugoslav State.

The Fifth-Column activities were the same in Yugoslavia as elsewhere. Perhaps they were not so violent at the beginning, as it was hoped in Berlin to bring Yugoslavia into the Axis by means of “cold treatment”, after which the Fifth Column would start the proper work of breaking up the “Axified” Yugoslavia from the inside. The plans were to some extent the same as those for Czechoslovakia: first “Axification”, then the granting of extensive rights to the German group, thirdly Fifth-Column action to work up the Serbs against the Croats and the Croats against the Serbs, or to intrigue in Macedonia and to provoke unrest in Slovenia; fourthly, to break up the State into several portions and to Nazify them separately, one after the other. The revolt in Yugoslavia upset this time-table, and the Fifth Columnists, who were quite ready to do their job, did not have the same opportunity as they had had in the northern States to work out their plans one stage after the other. They were suddenly faced with a Yugoslavia at war, and had to speed up their task, which after all simply consisted in introducing the German army into the country and taking from the German army the first orders for radical Nazification.

In connection with the activities of the Institut für das
Deutschtum im Auslande in Stuttgart, and concurrently with the help of the Auslandsektion of the N.S.D.A.P. in Berlin, which latter worked in closest collaboration with the powerful "private" institutions such as, for instance, the Deutscher Volksverein (with a centre in Berlin with 945 officials and 26 provincial centres all over Germany) and the Ost-Verein, which had practically unlimited financial resources at its disposal, a systematic economic penetration policy was carried out in Yugoslavia too.

During and after the agrarian crisis in Yugoslavia from 1930 onwards, the Germans, using screen names, or openly, began to acquire landed property, houses and industrial and commercial control, principally on the northern borders of Yugoslavia, and on the land, railways or canals. Thus the Germans bought during this crisis 1,484 properties from peasants whose land was put up to auction because they could not pay the rates and duties to the State. The Germans were ready, with money to buy the land from which the national authority had driven out the national owner. Thus it happened that the Germans, with unlimited financial means at their disposal, bought up nearly two-thirds of all the lands on both sides of the Danube from the Hungarian border down to Belgrade, in the years from 1932 to 1937 alone. A great part of the landed property and of houses along the railroads through the Vojvodina and the Srem provinces was systematically bought up by the Germans or their agents.

When the Yugoslav peasants all over Yugoslavia were so heavily pressed by the agrarian crisis, the German peasants, on the contrary, had no difficulties at all. They had plenty of money, and mysterious credits were always at hand. Not a single peasant in the poor Kocevje district in Slovenia is known to have suffered from the crisis. Not a single German during all this time sold a single square yard of his land, and when he got into difficulties, for any reason whatever, he was mysteriously put on his feet again.

The Savings Bank in Kocevje is known to have had a special credit opened for its use at one of the big banks in Berlin.

The Kreditanstalt, with its numerous branches all over Yugoslavia, had open hands for German financial needs, supplied as it was by the Deutsche Bank on evidence given by the German organizations in the country.

In the Central Offices of the Ausland-Sektion of the N.S.D.A.P. and of the Deutscher Volksverein in Berlin, there were specially staffed sections where legal and financial advice was given to all who applied for it. The Yugoslav Section filled an entire floor of a big building.

In 1937, when Dr. Korosec, the then Minister of the Interior, realized by means of an enquiry carried out all over the country how far the German intrusion had already penetrated by buying up land and industrial properties in the Vojvodina, he set up a special Administrative Commission which was empowered to invalidate any change of land or house properties in border areas, if the
permission for sale and for acquisition had not already been granted. Thus the German drive was temporarily stopped, and there were most energetic protests from the German consuls. In the same year the Director of the State Agrarian Bank, Stepan Baric, also stopped the incredible practice of this State Institution of granting, indiscriminately, financial credits to Germans, if they applied for credits for the acquisition of land or houses.

The Fifth Columnists were prepared intensively and over many years for their job. It is known from a long report presented to the government in 1939 that the Institut für das Auslanddeutsch­tum in Stuttgart had finished with the registration of all the 33 millions of Germans living abroad and that 37,000 maps had been made to show the territories where Germans lived abroad and how they worked. Yugoslavia, as in the case of all other countries destined to play a part in the German conquest of the world, was "mapped out, photographed inside and outside", writes this report, "and the German Propaganda Centre in Stuttgart knew of every German in Yugoslavia, had worked out the most detailed plan for the taking over of the administration from the top Services down to the bottom, and had all the personnel trained and ready to step in, when the country would be put under the rule of Germany".

The report gives interesting details of this preparatory work. The writer of the report asked the Director of the Institute of Stuttgart to show him, in the files of the Institute, the registration of a German whom he named. In a few minutes' time the registration was produced, and it contained every detailed item in the life of that particular German. He enquired furthermore whether he could see in the files the registration of the Germans living in one locality which he named. At once the file was forthcoming, with all the names of the Germans, or German sympathizers, written down, neatly and exactly, with qualifications and job, for possible use in the future.

From the same report evidence is given that a stream of German "commercial travellers", or "students", or "simple tourists" flowed steadily down into Yugoslavia, and that all of them had to go through a few weeks' course in Stuttgart before they were allowed to go on their particular mission. Furthermore, it is known that Yugoslav boys and girls, either of German origin or likely to be influenced by direct contact with Germany, were secretly drawn into Germany, where they were given all the facilities to "see" Germany and to pass a training course in Stuttgart or in other places arranged for that purpose.

On the other hand, the German Fifth Columnists had secret training centres in Yugoslavia, where young people were invited to come and listen to "casual German tourists" coming from Germany.

It was interesting to find that "commercial travellers" always followed the same route, entered Yugoslavia at the same place, saw the same persons, stayed at the same places, behaved in the
same way, and followed the same direction. This meant that the German missionaries had to visit their established stations, where they met the potential chiefs of the Fifth Column's action, when the time for action was ripe.

The planning of the Fifth-Column activity was therefore perfect. The sudden developments of the Yugoslav policy, however, prevented the Fifth Columnists from going through all the stages, as they were called upon to jump within a couple of days from the first stage, i.e. propaganda work, to the last stage, i.e. taking over the administrative posts for which they were prepared by Stuttgart and the Foreign Section of the Nazi Headquarters in Berlin (*Ausland-Sektion* of the N.S.D.A.P.).

It might be added that the carelessness of the Yugoslav authorities was very helpful to the Nazis in their preparatory work. Notorious Nazis were left in important administrative posts or in control of important economic units. They had all the information at their fingertips. Under cover of their position they could carry on with their Nazi work. There were many German officers in the army. And many German Reserve officers were called up on the day of mobilization. They all knew what was going on and had full information about the movements of the troops. What happened, for instance, in Maribor in 1939 is significant. On the occasion of a test of general mobilization, a German Reserve officer was put in command of the detachment guarding the most important bridge across the River Drava!

The Germans were absolutely convinced that Yugoslavia would collapse very quickly, once attacked. It is significant that members of the German colony (German citizens)-who were evacuated in the days of March 30, March 31 and April 1, 1942, were told by the German consuls not to take their belongings with them, as "they would certainly be back again in 10 days or so". Up to the last day the Germans were sitting in key positions in various industries important for the war effort. Westen was in control of the big ironworks in Jesenice in Slovenia, and had full contact with the government departments in Belgrade. The Germans were running the biggest ironworks in Yugoslavia, the Zenica works, which were built by Krupp. They had their representatives even in the arsenal of Kragujevac.

The most concentrated preparatory activity of the German Nazis was in the Vojvodina, where the Germans had their military training according to instructions received from Berlin.

(5) *The actual position of the Germans in Serbia and Croatia.*

In the Quisling State of Pahlen the Germans were given practically the same Statute as in the Quisling State of Slovakia. They are a racially separated, politically autonomous body (*Volksgruppe*), with their own jurisdiction. They have one representative in the Quisling Cabinet. He is at the same time the leader of the *Volksgruppe*. 
Serbia is a country under military occupation, where the local Quisling Government is responsible to the C.-in-C. of the German occupying army. The Vojvodina has been set apart and the Quisling authority is still more restricted there. The Vojvodina is practically run by the Germans, who are transforming it into a purely German-settled province.

(6) The problem of the German minority in Slovenia and its role in preparing the destruction of the Slovenes.

The problem of the German minority, representing, as stated above, only 2.18 per cent of the total population of Slovenia, has been brutally solved. By order of Hitler, embodied subsequently into a “Law of the Empire”, the Slovene territory occupied by the Germans (with a population of 880,000) has been proclaimed “racially German” and has been annexed to the Reich. The Slovene language is forbidden in public speech, office, school, church, correspondence and print. Up to the end of August 1942 several districts were entirely cleared of the Slovene population, which was transplanted into Germany, chiefly to the Württemberg, Rhineland, Ruhr and Silesian areas. The total number of those deported is 85,000. 31,000 were deported to Serbia. The Slovenes who escaped into the Croat Quisling State number 8,000. Slovenes who escaped into the Italian-occupied area number 30,000. 12,000 children aged 2–10 disappeared, having been deported to unknown places in Germany. 1,468 hostages have been shot, and about 2,000 fell during “operations against Communists”, i.e. against the revolting patriot forces. Thus about 20 per cent of the Slovene population have been removed from Slovene territory. The rest are being furiously Germanized. The former German minority formed the kernel of the Germanizing policy, and became the instruments of Germanization in the hands of Austrian or Prussian Nazi bosses who occupy the leading positions in every field of public activity. Germans from Kocevje and from Bessarabia have already been settled in the evacuated areas.
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