POLISH-SOViet RELATIONS
1918-1943

Official Documents

ISSUED BY THE
POLISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
BY AUTHORITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
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Introductory Note
THE POLISH nation's struggle for liberation from Russian rule lasted for one hundred and twenty-six years. It ended with the Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, between Russia and the Ukraine on the one hand, and Poland on the other. Despite Poland's victorious defence in 1920 this treaty was based on a compromise. To establish a true peace in Eastern Europe and bring about complete understanding and good neighborly relations with Soviet Russia, Poland advanced no claims during the peace negotiations that might have been difficult of acceptance by the other party, and took no advantage of the defeat of the Soviet forces on the Vistula and the Niemen in 1920.

That the Treaty of Riga was a compromise, found official expression in the preamble which reads: "Poland on the one hand, Russia and the Ukraine on the other, being desirous of putting an end to the war, and of concluding . . . a final, lasting and honorable peace based on a mutual understanding, have decided to enter into negotiations . . ."

In their speeches after the signature of the Treaty of Riga, the Chairmen of the Polish and the Russian Delegations laid great stress on the peace being a compromise peace, based on mutual understanding, and not a peace imposed by force. Mr. Jan Dabski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Polish Delegation, said:

"By common agreement we have traced the frontiers and have decided that neither party shall interfere in the
internal affairs of the other; we have granted every privilege to national minorities; we offer the greatest possible facilities for the choice of citizenship; we have come to an understanding on many complicated questions concerning economics and the settlement of accounts; we have laid the foundations for future relations both economic and political; we have endeavored to solve all questions in a fair and just manner; we have each made concessions, not only in order to reach agreement, but to render our future relations easier.”

Replying to this speech Mr. Adolf Joffe, Chairman of the Russo-Ukrainian Delegation, an experienced diplomat who had previously negotiated the treaties with the Baltic States, spoke in similar terms:

“I have already experienced the importance to any peace negotiations of the atmosphere in which they are carried on. I should like to emphasize that although international conditions changed several times during the Polish and Russo-Ukrainian Peace Conference, the atmosphere in Riga was invariably one that favored the carrying out of negotiations and rendered it easier to reach a satisfactory conclusion.”

The conciliatory character of the Treaty of Riga found expression in the practical solution of a number of complicated Polish-Soviet matters, first and foremost in the way frontier and territorial problems were settled. Poland’s concessions in this field went very far indeed, it being her sincere desire that the Treaty should provide a basis for good neighborly relations between Poland and Soviet Russia, and not be merely a temporary armistice to be followed in the more or less distant future by retaliatory action or another war. Throughout the world war, the independence of Poland was the principal aim of the subjugated Polish nation, which was firmly resolved to regain its independence. This was recognized by the great Powers taking
part in the war. Already in 1916, the Central Powers adopted the principle of independence for Poland, which was taken up by Prince Lvov after the fall of the Czarist régime. It found its final and most realistic expression in the thirteenth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. At that time the Communist Party, struggling for power in the territories that formerly constituted the Russian Empire, also included in its programme the liberation of all subjugated and enslaved peoples after the world war.

On August 29, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic, under the chairmanship of Lenin, issued a Decree annulling forever all agreements and acts concluded by the former Russian Empire with the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire concerning the partitions of Poland, as being inconsistent with the principle of the self-determination of nations. This Decree, published on September 5, 1918, in No. 191 of the Izvestia and again on September 9 of the same year in No. 64 of the Official Journal of Laws and Decrees recognized the indisputable right of the Polish nation to be independent and united.

The repudiation by the Soviet Government of all the partition treaties and its formal notification to the Governments of Germany and Austria, constituted as far as Russia was concerned a legal and political return to the status quo ante of Polish-Russian territorial relations, that is to the frontier which existed before the first partition of Poland, in other words the frontier of 1772.

But the Polish Government never claimed this historical frontier of Poland, either during the Polish-Soviet war of 1918-1920, or in the course of the peace negotiations at Riga. Poland's territorial claims were exceedingly moderate and restricted to territories essential to safeguard her economic and strategic independence, to territories where Poles had lived for centuries in close harmony with other peoples, notably Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Jews, Lithuanians and Tartars, amongst
whom the Poles had always formed a numerical majority. Polish culture, based on the concept of individual liberty, always predominated and still predominates in those regions and in such centres as Lwów, Wilno, Nowogródek, Krzemieniec, Pińsk.

The Eastern frontier of Poland as agreed upon in the Treaty of Riga, left to Soviet Russia 120,000 square miles of land which belonged to Poland in 1772. According to Soviet statistics 1,500,000 Poles remained on that territory, the descendants of families who had lived there for centuries as farmers or craftsmen. These Poles were deeply attached to their traditions, faith and language, and had fought for more than 100 years against the policy of russification pursued by the Czars, who spared no pains to stamp out their nationality. The number of Russians on Polish territory did not exceed 150,000; they formed an alien element composed mostly of former Czarist officials and their descendants who, after the fall of the Russian Empire, preferred to remain in Poland rather than return to their own country, although they had the right to do so.

Finally the frontiers agreed upon in the Treaty of Riga were more favorable to Russia than those proposed by the Soviet Government in their declaration of December 22, 1919 concerning peace conditions, and by the Council of People’s Commissars in their declaration of January 28, 1920. The latter gave unrestricted recognition to the independence and sovereignty of Poland and formally defined an armistice line which the Soviet forces would not cross. It added: “There is not a single question, territorial, economic or other, that could not be solved in a peaceful way through negotiation, mutual compromise or agreement.” However it left no doubt that the armistice line proposed by the Soviet Government was regarded by it as the future frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia.

In its North-Eastern sector this line runs from 60 to 90 miles and in its South-Eastern sector from 30 to 50 miles to the East of the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga.
That the Polish-Soviet frontier was settled in a spirit of mutual agreement and conciliation is plain from Article III of the Treaty of Riga, which reads: "Russia and the Ukraine abandon all rights and claims to the territories situated to the West of the frontier laid down by Article II of the present Treaty. Poland, on the other hand, abandons in favor of the Ukraine and White-Ruthenia all rights and claims to the territory situated to the East of this frontier . . ."

From the moment the Treaty of Riga was signed until Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, no territorial claim was ever made against Poland by Soviet Russia. On the contrary, the Soviet Government repeatedly declared that the Treaty of Riga, including Article III, constituted the foundation of mutual relations between the two countries. From 1921 to 1939 those relations developed normally and were gradually extended and improved. Thus, during the years that followed the signing of the peace treaty, a number of conventions were concluded in a spirit of good neighborhood. Railway, postal, consular and passport conventions were signed, as well as a number of commercial agreements. Various other agreements of a political nature were concluded with the object of strengthening the peace ties between the two countries, and maintaining peace in Central-Eastern Europe. On February 9, 1929, a Protocol was signed repudiating war as an instrument of national policy; on July 25, 1932, a Pact of Non-Aggression; on July 3, 1933, a Convention for the Definition of Aggression; on May 5, 1934, the validity of the Pact of Non-Aggression was extended until December 31, 1945. Both the Protocol of 1929 and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression were of multilateral character and signed not only by Soviet Russia and Poland but also by Russia's other neighbors, notably by the Baltic States and Rumania. Finally, on November 26, 1938, a joint Polish-Soviet declaration was issued to the effect that relations between the two States would continue to function with the fullest respect for
all agreements and treaties concluded by both parties and that commercial relations were to be extended. On the strength of this Protocol, a commercial treaty was signed on February 19, 1939.

On September 17, 1939, while the Poles were resisting the overwhelming onslaught of the German army, the Government of the U.S.S.R. unexpectedly declared that the Polish State had ceased to exist and, without declaring war on Poland, ordered the Soviet army to enter Polish territory, on the pretext of taking "under their protection the lives and property" of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian population. A deliberate violation of the Polish-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression.*

One result of the joint Soviet-German action against Poland was the treaty concluded on September 28, 1939 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Reich in which both contracting Parties implied that the Polish State was non-existent, by using the expression "former Polish State." They partitioned Poland's territory, recognized as final the frontiers drawn by them to suit their mutual interests, and declared that they would resist any interference by other Powers.

In a communiqué issued in Kuty, on Polish territory, on September 17, 1939, the Polish Government solemnly protested against the unilateral violation by Soviet Russia of the non-aggression Pact, against the entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory and against the motives advanced by the Soviet Government to justify its action. Subsequently similar protests were made by the Polish Government, forced to leave Polish terri-

* There is a striking analogy between the arguments employed by Catherine the Great who justified the partition of Poland in the XVIIIth century as necessary for the protection of followers of the Greek-Orthodox Church in Poland, and those employed by the Soviet Government which, although it condemned in 1918 the criminal policy of the Czarist governments regarding Poland and annulled the partitioning treaties, 21 years later endeavored to justify its action against Poland in the eyes of the world by putting forward a pretext similar to that used by the Empress of Russia.
tory by the advance of the Soviet forces, against the Soviet-German agreement of September 28, 1939; the cession of Polish territory to Lithuania by an agreement signed on October 10, 1939; and against various Soviet regulations introduced in occupied Poland for a census of the population, the forcing of Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens, elections to so-called national assemblies, conscription of Polish citizens for service in the Soviet army, all flagrant breaches of the general principles of international law, and specifically of the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907.

The Soviet Government must have been aware of the negative value of such an arbitrary extinction of a nation of 35,000,000 inhabitants, whose Government was fighting side by side with the Allies,—an act of violence against a nation which had a legal Government recognized by all world Powers except the Axis.

So now the Soviet Government seeks a new argument: the "freely expressed will of the people" to justify the incorporation of Polish territory in the Soviet Union. This has been extensively used in the Soviet press and set out in official notes to the Polish Government.

It is therefore necessary to throw light on the circumstances in which the people of Poland’s eastern territories occupied by the Soviet troops “expressed their free will.”

To provide an ex-post facto excuse and some semblance of justification in international law for the stipulations of the Soviet-German agreement, General Timoshenko, commander-in-chief on the Ukrainian front, and the members of the Soviet Military Council of the Ukraine, announced on October 6, 1939, i.e. eight days after the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, “the date of elections to the National Assembly” and the “date of the convocation of the National Assembly of the Western Ukraine.”

Pressed as it was for some legal excuse to justify in the eyes of the world the partition of Polish territory by Germany and the
U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government did not at first realize that the decrees of the military authorities of occupation, being of a strictly political character, — exceeded the limits of their authority and were _ultra vires_ in international law. When this was discovered, the search for a suitable legal excuse was renewed and it was finally decided to make it appear that the initiative for the elections emanated from the local population and not from the military authorities of occupation.

On October 11, 1939, _i.e._ four days after the promulgation of the “Decision of the Military Council of the Ukrainian Front on the date of elections to the National Assembly” and “the date of the convocation of the National Assembly of Western Ukraine,” the official organ of the Soviet Government, _Izvestia_, published a despatch of the Soviet Press Agency Tass dated October 10. It reported that “the Temporary Administration of the City of Lwów had issued a proclamation to the people of the Western Ukraine calling upon them to elect a People’s Assembly of the Western Ukraine by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage, to decide the problem of the existence of the Western Ukraine as a State.” On the following day the “Temporary Administration” of the city of Bialystok was also reported to have made exactly the same announcement to the people of Western White-Ruthenia.

Before any attempt to decide whether the proclamations of the “Temporary Administrations” of both cities, as reported by Tass, were a real expression of local public opinion, it must be stated that as soon as they had occupied Eastern Poland the Soviet authorities removed all members of the State and local government administrations from office, placed most of them under arrest and appointed so-called “temporary administrations” in their place, all in violation of the Hague Conventions. Contemporaneous reports published in the Soviet press show that these “temporary administrations” were in the majority composed of Red Army officers appointed by the military authorities, of
Soviet officials accompanied for the sake of appearances by so-called “representatives of the local working class”—not selected by that class but appointed by the Soviet military authorities.

The Soviets were also well represented on the two committees set up in Lwów and Bialystok “for the organisation and conduct of the elections.” According to a Tass communiqué, these committees approached the Presidiums of the Supreme Councils of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics with a request for delegates to these bodies. In response the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic sent as its representatives to the Lwów committee M. S. Gretchuha, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and A. E. Korneychuk, then member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, later appointed Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in February, 1944, appointed Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic was represented on the Bialystok committee by N. J. Natalevitsh—chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic, N. G. Grekhova, chairman of the Supreme Council of the White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic, and L. P. Pankov.

In the “Election Procedure” published on October 7, with no indication whatever of the authority responsible for its issue, the date of the election was fixed as October 22. Thus the whole election procedure, i.e.: the compilation of a list of voters in a war-torn country where part of the population had been mobilized and large-scale migrations had taken place,—the checking of this list and dealing with complaints of persons not included as voters, the organization of 11,967 electoral zones and 2,424 constituencies, the choice of candidates, the printing of election ballots, etc., etc. — was all accomplished in a fortnight, while in
peacetime any European country, where the political organization already exists, normally requires from six to eight weeks to prepare for an election. Yet despite the short time available, 96.71% of the total electorate was said by the Soviets to have voted in the election to the Assembly in Lwów, and 92.83% to the Assembly in Bialystok.

According also to Soviet sources, a total of 2,411 persons were elected to the two Assemblies, votes from thirteen constituencies not having been returned. As the number of candidates equalled the number of persons to be elected, the voter had no choice between several candidates and was obliged to vote for a single candidate officially accepted by the election committee.

Furthermore the names of all the persons elected were never made public by the Soviet authorities, so it has been impossible to ascertain how many of the “local citizens” elected were Polish and how many were Soviet citizens.

Despite the physical impossibility of compiling electoral lists in two weeks, the Polish Government is in possession of proof that Soviet citizens organized the elections, sat on all election committees and voted in the election. As a matter of fact Soviet citizens were actually elected to the National Assemblies in Lwów and Bialystok, as reported by the Soviet press.

On October 15, 1939, No. 286 of Pravda reported that among candidates for the National Assembly of Western White-Ruthenia were the following: Ponomarenko, a member of the Military Council of the White-Ruthenian Front, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of White-Ruthenia; General Kovalev, C.-in-C. on the White-Ruthenian front, and Gaysin, chairman of the Temporary Administration of Bialystok. The same paper on October 19, 1939, announced that in constituency No. IV, that is in Krzemieniec, the following were candidates to the Lwów Assembly: V. Molotov, chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and
K. Voroshilov, Marshal of the U.S.S.R. A Tass dispatch published on October 16, 1939, in the Soviet Voice reported that in a Grodno constituency, one of the candidates to the Bialystok Assembly was a woman, N. G. Grekhova, chairman of the Supreme Council of the White-Ruthenian S.S.R., and, as has already been said, delegate of White-Ruthenia to the Election Committee.

The above facts, emanating from Soviet sources, show the conditions under which the elections to the Lwów and Bialystok National Assemblies took place. They were carried out under the eyes of 700,000 Soviet troops who—as the Soviet press pointed out—took an active part in canvassing voters. Disregarding the illegality of this procedure in the light of international law, and in particular the flagrant violation of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, this is further proof that these elections were not “a free expression of the will of the people” as the Soviet Government would have public opinion believe. For these reasons the resolutions for the incorporation of the Eastern Polish territories in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as passed by the National Assemblies in Lwów on October 27, and in Bialystok on October 29, are null and void.

Since Germany's attack upon the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Soviet politicians and the Soviet press have frequently pointed out that the entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory on September 17, 1939 was an act of self-defence on the part of the Soviet Government, since it resulted in the German army establishing positions at a fairly considerable distance from the Soviet frontiers. Thus a sort of foreground was created for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which it was alleged would greatly facilitate fighting conditions for its troops, who would now be operating outside their own territory. This “foreground” thesis ultimately gave birth to the claim that to eliminate any danger from the West the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics must possess strategic frontiers and that such “security frontiers”
should follow a line considerably west of the Polish-Soviet frontier agreed upon in the Treaty of Riga.

These "foreground" and "strategic frontier" theories, intended to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union, were disproved entirely by the Russo-German campaign. Although very substantial Soviet forces and vast quantities of war material were massed in the occupied Polish territories, Soviet resistance in this area lasted but a few days and the Soviet army sustained serious losses in killed and prisoners.

When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the initiative for the re-establishment of relations came from the Polish Government on whose behalf the Prime Minister, General Sikorski, declared in a speech on June 23, that the Polish Government and nation were ready to forget the recent past and the injuries inflicted by the Soviets on Poland when the latter was engaged in a deadly struggle with the German armies. By this conciliatory move Poland contributed to the establishment and maintenance of a common front of all the nations united in the struggle against Germany, and thus helped to frustrate German efforts to represent the Soviet-German war as a war in defence of European culture and civilization threatened by communism.

The Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, concluded in London through the good offices of the British Government, restored diplomatic relations between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which had been broken off by the Soviets when their forces entered Polish territory on September 17, 1939.

Even before this Agreement between Poland and the U.S.S.R. was signed and political as well as military collaboration established, Soviet forces were hurriedly evacuating the Eastern territories of Poland under pressure of the German onslaught. The Polish-Soviet Agreement provided for friendly collaboration of the two States during the war, and for their political rela-
tions after the war. The Soviet Government recognized the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 concerning the partition of Poland as having lost their validity; the two Governments mutually agreed to render one another aid and support of all kind in the war, and furthermore the Soviet Government

1) undertook to release from prison and labor camps all Polish citizens, military and civilian,

2) agreed to the formation of a Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

As virtually the whole of Polish territory was in German hands when the Treaty was signed, the only stipulations of the Agreement that could be put into effect were (a) those affecting the masses of Polish citizens deported from Poland to the U.S.S.R., Polish prisoners of war and such Polish citizens as had been conscripted for service in the Red Army during the occupation; and (b) the formation of a Polish Army in Russia.

The Polish Government attached the greatest importance to a satisfactory settlement of these matters, to which the Prime Minister, General Sikorski, gave special prominence in the negotiations preceding the signature of the Agreement of July 30, 1941. The Polish Government also showed the utmost good will in facilitating the execution by the Soviet Government of the obligations it had undertaken. In spite of the war, the Soviet Government had it within its power to fulfill its obligations if it had sincerely desired to do so.

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The present publication is divided into two parts. The first contains six chapters dealing in detail with various aspects of Polish-Soviet relations after September 17, 1939. The second part comprises official documents, many of which have never yet been published, arranged in eleven chapters and covering all issues of importance that have arisen between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the quarter of a century from 1918 to 1943.
Part I
CHAPTER I

Mass Deportations from Poland by the Soviet Authorities

Soviet Forces entered Polish territory on September 17, 1939, and soon afterwards a Soviet administration was set up in the occupied districts. Its first and perhaps most important object was to deprive of their freedom such Polish citizens as the Soviet authorities looked upon with suspicion. A considerable number of persons were arrested during the first weeks, especially just before the elections to the so-called "National Assemblies" in Lwów and Bialystok, which took place on October 22, 1939. Those arrested were principally social workers and politicians of all shades of opinion, including the Left; civil servants and local-government officials, especially judges, attorneys and policemen; university professors, priests, businessmen and farmers. Relatively few of them were deported at once, except members of the Polish armed forces, demobilized officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks. In this initial period deportation occurred in the form of the forced recruiting of more than 30,000 men of the working class who were sent to the industrial establishments and mines in the Donetz Basin.

Mass-deportation of Polish citizens began on the night of February 8, 1940, and continued until the Autumn of that year.
It involved both the urban and rural population throughout the entire area occupied by the Soviets. In February, farm settlers, private and state forestry employees and members of the police force were chiefly affected. Not only men but also their wives and children were deported. The Polish Government is in possession of proof that during February 1940 alone, 70,000 persons from the three provinces of South-Eastern Poland and 30,000 persons from the province of Wilno were deported to Russia.

From some villages all the inhabitants without exception were deported, whether Poles or Ukrainians. This occurred for instance in Strzalkowice, Biskupice, Wojsztyce and Nadyma in the district of Sambor, Grzymalów and on the Rumanian border. Persons already imprisoned were deported as well as social workers, judges, public prosecutors, and local-government officials, who had so far been left at liberty. Between March 4 and March 6 there passed through the station of Baranowicze alone ten train-loads of these unhappy beings, torn from their homes and hearths to face an unknown and tragic future.

Again in April, the Soviet authorities organized mass-deportations from the entire territory. On this occasion the principal victims were families of persons who had gone abroad or were missing, of Polish prisoners of war in Germany and of soldiers, policemen, officers, workers, members of the educated classes, farmers and tradesmen previously imprisoned or deported. Former deportations had mainly affected Poles, but this time a number of Jews, Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians were also included. Although inhabitants of the towns were principally affected, the rural population was also involved in the persons of small farmers and laborers from confiscated estates. From Lwów and its neighborhood some 30,000 were deported, from Drohobycz 5,000, from Borysław 2,000, from Stanisławów 4,000. Large numbers were also deported from the city of Pinsk, from the whole of Polesie and from the district of Braslaw. Seven hundred families were deported from
Lida. In addition to the mass-deportations carried out in April, the Soviet authorities continued to arrest large numbers of the inhabitants of the territories under their occupation. In Lwów alone, some 25,000 persons were arrested in four days, from April 12 to April 15.

In May, the number of deportations was smaller than in the preceding months, and affected the North-Eastern regions, in particular the Bialystok, Lida and Grodno districts. Besides Poles and Jews, considerable numbers of White-Ruthenians were deported. During this period 250 high school boys were deported without their families from Drohobycz in the South-East.

In June and July 1940, a fresh wave of large-scale deportations took place throughout the entire territory under Soviet occupation. In addition to permanent residents, war refugees from other parts of Poland, who had sought shelter in the Eastern provinces, were also taken. The Soviet authorities had already carried out a registration of these persons and now deported 85,000 of them from Lwów and its neighborhood, other thousands from Volhynia and, following its reoccupation by the Soviet armies, further thousands from the city and district of Wilno. Here a very considerable number of small merchants, professional men and women, intellectuals and teachers were deported.

The fourth and last wave of deportations occurred just before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. It affected chiefly political prisoners and what social workers and educated persons had remained free, as well as children from summer camps and orphanages. Many train-loads of deportees left Wilno, Bialystok, Lomza, Czortków, Lwów and other stations throughout the entire occupied area. Eight hundred prisoners were driven on foot from Wilejka to Borysów. When so exhausted that they could no longer walk, they were shot by the Soviet military escort. Three hundred of them thus met their death.
To sum up, persons affected by the four mass-deportations may be classified as follows:

I. February 1940: From towns: civil servants, local government officials, judges, members of the police force; from the country: the forestry service, settlers and small farmers—Polish, Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian (several entire villages were thus bereft of their population).

II. April 1940: Families of persons previously arrested, families of those who had gone abroad or were missing, tradesmen (mostly Jews), farm laborers from confiscated estates and more small farmers of the three nationalities.

III. June 1940: Virtually all Polish citizens from Central and Western Poland who had sought refuge in Eastern Poland from the horrors of the German invasion; mostly Jews, small merchants, professional men and women, intellectuals, teachers, etc.

IV. June 1941: All of the above mentioned groups who had so far evaded deportation; prisoners; children from summer camps and orphanages.

Deportations ceased with the German attack on the Soviet Union, but that further deportations on a vast scale were contemplated is apparent from an article in the Russian daily Sovietskaya Ukraina No. 69 of March 23, 1941, which stated that the plan for deporting agricultural laborers from South-Eastern Poland to the interior of the Soviet Union would be carried out on a larger scale in 1941 than in 1940. Deportations were planned to the districts of Khabarovsky, Altay, Chelabinsk, Novosibirsk and Omsk in Siberia, and to the Yakut, Kirghiz and Kazakh Republics.

It is thus evident that deportation plans for 1941 had been carefully prepared. They were only frustrated by the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, and not by any change in the policy of the Soviet authorities towards the population of the occupied territories.
It is difficult to estimate the total number of people deported, but it undoubtedly exceeded 1,000,000, or more than 7 or 8% of the total population of that part of Poland occupied by the Soviet armies. Of those deported 50% were Poles. Deportation figures for the various Polish regions are estimated approximately:

1) from the provinces of Bialystok, Lida, Grodno and Wilno, more than 300,000 persons;
2) from Polesie and the province of Nowogródek, more than 200,000 persons;
3) from Volhynia, about 150,000 persons;
4) from South-Eastern Poland, about 400,000 persons.

Deportations were carried out under extremely drastic conditions. The victims were rounded up at night and allowed only one hour to collect such baggage as they could carry themselves. Transportation was usually in unheated freight cars crowded without regard to the number they could reasonably accommodate. In these circumstances many of the weak and ailing, especially children, died in the cars of exposure and starvation. Their bodies were removed from time to time by Soviet guards, either while the trains were standing in stations, or were simply thrown out on to the track, en route. When at long last the deportees reached their destination, some were placed in prisons, others in labor camps, the remainder in settlements that afforded them neither shelter nor work, or else on collective farms (kolkhozes) where they were housed in abandoned cabins with no stoves, no windows and no floors, or simply in sheds or stables, and compelled to labor long hours in return for most inadequate food. These people, torn from their homes, insufficiently clad, unaccustomed to the severe Russian climate, and forced to perform heavy work irrespective of their qualifications or education—died in vast numbers. The Polish Government has proof that the death-rate among the deportees and in particular among the children and the young amounted to at least 20%.
CHAPTER 2

Release of Polish Deportees in the U.S.S.R.

By the Protocol attached to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet Government undertook to "grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the U.S.S.R. either as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds." The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics complied with this obligation by issuing a formal Amnesty Decree on August 12, 1941.

Both the international obligation contained in the above Protocol, and the Soviet Decree of August 12, 1941, were of a general and unconditional character. They granted freedom to all Polish citizens deprived of their liberty by the Soviet authorities, the only requirement for the release of any given person being that the person in question was a Polish citizen, irrespective of the reasons for which such person had been deprived of his or her freedom. The Soviet Government acknowledged the general character of the amnesty and in a conversation with the Polish Ambassador on November 14, 1941, Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., declared that the amnesty granted to Polish citizens extended to all without exception.

The liberation of Polish citizens from prisons, labor camps and exile was begun at the end of August 1941. However, those who were then set free immediately drew the attention of the Polish Embassy in Moscow to the fact that the Soviet authorities were still detaining many Polish citizens in various camps and
prisons. In view of this and of the necessity to set up a suitable relief organization, the Polish Embassy asked the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs early in September 1941, to furnish a list of all Polish citizens still detained by the Soviet authorities, and to inform the Embassy each time a person was released. This request was renewed in conversations that the Polish Ambassador, Professor Kot, had with Mr. Vishinsky, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on September 20, October 7 and October 14, 1941. Despite a definite promise that this list would be furnished and reiterated requests, although Commissar Vishinsky assured the Polish Ambassador on November 2, 1941, that the Soviet authorities possessed lists of all Polish citizens, whether dead or alive, who had been deprived of their freedom, the Polish Embassy never received any such list.

In a Note of October 13, 1941, addressed to Commissar Vishinsky, the Polish Ambassador pointed out that Polish citizens, a list of whom was appended to the Note, were not being set free from the camps and prisons. Speaking to Commissar Vishinsky on November 12, 1941, Ambassador Kot returned to this subject and again received the reply that if for technical reasons certain persons could not be immediately located it might be advisable for the Embassy to supply lists of missing persons to be located and set free in the first instance. Such lists, containing the names of hundreds of prominent scientists, politicians, civil servants, judges and lawyers, priests and rabbis, social workers, artists, writers, journalists, whom the Polish authorities knew had been deported to the Soviet Union — were presented in vain to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on various occasions in September, October and November, 1941.

As the Polish Embassy in Moscow was never given this information concerning citizens detained or liberated, it was compelled to undertake the difficult task of collecting from those already released information about Polish citizens still deprived
of their freedom. On the basis of data thus obtained the Polish Embassy sent several Notes to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, giving the surnames and christian names of Polish citizens still under detention, the names of the camps or prisons in which they were detained and in some cases even the exact cell or hut within the prison or camp itself. During the first six months of 1942, the Polish Embassy intervened in this way in respect of 4,514 Polish citizens, but received replies in respect of only 1,547 persons, of whom, according to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 1,026 had already been set at liberty, although the date and place of their release were not indicated; 196 could not be traced and 325 were still detained. This last group included 286 Polish citizens mostly with Jewish names, whom the Soviet authorities claimed as their own citizens, refusing to acknowledge the Polish Embassy's right to intervene on their behalf.

Including interventions in individual cases in 1941, the Embassy approached the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in respect of 5,500 Polish civilians still detained. This figure does not include any of the 8,000 officers taken by the Soviet authorities in the Spring of 1940 to an unknown destination from the prisoners of war camps in Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov. The Embassy knew the names of 65 camps and prisons on Soviet territory, besides groups of camps and centres where Polish citizens were still detained. At a most conservative estimate, the number of Polish citizens deprived of their freedom and known to the Polish authorities by name, did not exceed 5% of the total number of Polish citizens detained.

The Soviet Government's unwillingness to execute the provisions of the Protocol attached to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and of the Amnesty Decree, found expression as early as November 8, 1941, in a note in which Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, informed the Polish Government that all Polish citizens who had been detained by the
Soviet authorities as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds had now been released in conformity with the Amnesty Decree. However, in later notes, sent in reply to Polish Embassy interventions, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs announced the liberation of a further number of Polish citizens in November and December 1941, and in January, February and March, 1942. Thus, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs officially disproved the statement contained in Mr. Molotov's Note of November 8, 1941.

However, even as late as 1943, Polish citizens are known to have been released from prisons and camps. The Polish Government has indisputable proof of this in the form of certificates issued by the Soviet authorities to the persons released.

Having failed to reach an understanding on the subject of a quicker and more complete execution by the Soviet authorities of the Protocol attached to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and of the Amnesty Decree of August 12, 1941, the Polish Embassy on May 19, 1942, summarized the results of its interventions in a Memorandum presented to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, emphasizing the failure of the Soviet Government to carry out their obligations in this matter. Besides arguments of a general nature, the Memorandum referred by name to 39 representatives of Polish learning and culture, 36 former senators, members of the Diet and prominent local government officials, and 84 high officials of the civil service and of the judiciary—who had not been set free by the Soviet authorities, and about whom these authorities had failed to supply any information whatever. The reply of the Soviet authorities, received on July 10, 1942, was purely formal and did not give the problem the attention it deserved. It threw no light upon the fate of any of those whose release the Polish authorities had so frequently demanded. In this memorandum of July 10, the Soviet authorities for the first time referred to the death in Soviet prisons and camps of some of the persons the Embassy was endeavoring to locate.
CHAPTER 3

Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

When the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, was signed and after the conclusion of the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, the Polish Government hoped to form in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a Polish Army of about 300,000 men.

This was based on the following facts:

1) According to figures published in the newspaper Red Star on September 17, 1940, there were 181,000 Polish soldiers in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps, including 12 generals, 58 colonels, 72 lieutenant-colonels, 5,131 regular officers and 4,096 reserve officers.

2) About 100,000 Polish citizens of the 1917, 1918 and 1919 classes, conscripted for the Red Army by the Soviet Government in the Spring of 1941, were serving with the Soviet Forces.

3) The Military Agreement provided not only for voluntary enlistment in the Polish Army, but also for conscription of Polish citizens deported to the U.S.S.R. This was to be carried out by Polish draft boards with the participation of Soviet authorities (Article 6 of the Military Agreement) and the numerical strength of the Polish Army was to depend solely on the manpower and supplies available (Article 4 of the Military Agreement).
When in August, 1941, the Soviet authorities began to discharge Polish officers and other ranks from prisoner-of-war camps, these men reported en masse to the Polish Army, then in the process of formation. The influx of volunteers, despite transport difficulties due to the vast distances in the U.S.S.R. and to the war, was so great, that before the end of October 1941 the number of officers and other ranks exceeded 46,000. Nevertheless as early as November 6, Major General Panfilov, in the name of the Supreme Command of the Red Army, informed General Wladyslaw Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the Soviet Government contemplated the supply of equipment and food rations for only 30,000 men, and that therefore all soldiers in excess of that number must be discharged. An identical declaration was presented to Ambassador Kot by Commissar Molotov.

Although Premier Stalin told Ambassador Kot on November 14, 1941, that the Soviet Military Authorities had no right to take such a decision, it remains an indisputable fact that the Polish Army in process of formation received a severe blow by the reduction of its food rations, which not only forced the Polish Military Authorities to stop voluntary enlistment for the time being, but also to discharge 16,000 men from the ranks of the Army.

It would have seemed that the problem of the numerical strength of the Polish Army was finally and definitely settled at the time of General Sikorski’s visit to Moscow, in December 1941. In the course of the conversation he had with Premier Stalin, the strength of the Polish Army to be formed on Soviet territory was established at 6 divisions, each of 11,000 men, with a reserve of 30,000 men, thus bringing the total to 96,000 men. It was moreover decided that 25,000 men would be evacuated to the Middle East to reinforce Polish units fighting in Libya and that 2,000 airmen and sailors would be sent to Britain. The
total number of Polish soldiers to be recruited on Soviet ter-
ritory was thus 123,000 men.

However, immediately after General Sikorski’s visit the
organization of the Polish Army encountered new and unfor­
seen obstacles. The Soviet authorities adopted the attitude that
Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish
origin from the Eastern half of Poland occupied by the Soviets
in 1939, were not Polish but Soviet citizens, and that only
persons of Polish origin could, by way of exception, be regarded
by the Soviet authorities as Polish citizens. This attitude of the
Soviet authorities restricted both the number of volunteers for
the Polish Army and the number of persons subject to con­
scription. Moreover several weeks later the Soviet authorities
acted inconsistently with the principle of Article 6 of the Military
Agreement by setting up, in certain districts, recruiting boards
composed of Soviet members only, excluding the Polish military
authorities—although Article 6 laid down that the Soviet authori­
ties were merely to “participate” in these recruiting boards. This
move provided unlimited opportunities to prevent the recruiting
of Polish citizens even of Polish origin for the Army on various
pretexts, as for instance physical unfitness.

Moreover, according to the Polish Government’s information,
many Polish citizens were called up for “work behind the lines”
and placed in so-called Labor Battalions.

In the Spring of 1941 the Soviet authorities had conscripted
for the Red Army the 1917, 1918 and 1919 classes of men on
the territory of the Republic of Poland. These men were taken
to the interior of the U.S.S.R. From the population of the
Polish territories occupied by the Soviet armies, it may be as­
sumed that these conscripts numbered more than 100,000 men.
In August and September 1941, part of the Polish citizens
recruited on Polish territory were discharged from the ranks of
the Red Army following an order of the Soviet authorities, and
transferred to these Labor Battalions.

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On August 16, 1941, General Anders approached Major General Panfilov, the Representative of the Supreme Command of the Red Army, with a request that all Polish citizens conscripted by the Soviet Government for military service be transferred to the Polish Army. On August 19, General Panfilov replied to General Anders that "wishing to satisfy the Polish Command, the Command of the Red Army is complying with its request for a voluntary transfer to the Polish Army of Poles serving with units of the Red Army."

However, from many letters received by the Embassy it was clear that the transfer of Polish citizens from the Red Army and from Labor Battalions was never put into effect, that repressive measures were even taken against soldiers who applied for transfer on hearing that a Polish Army was being formed in the U.S.S.R.

Thus, only a limited number of men, from the conscripted classes of 1917, 1918 and 1919, managed to get themselves transferred to the Polish Army. Moreover the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, clearly stated that Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin, were being retained in the Labor Battalions, which already limited the numerical strength of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Despite repeated oral and written representations by the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev on April 16 and May 4, 1942, and by the Polish military authorities on January 21, February 28 and April 13, this matter was never satisfactorily settled, although in its Note of May 14 the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs repeated its assurance that only Soviet citizens were enrolled in the Labor Battalions.

All these factors greatly limited the strength of the army in formation and moreover up to the middle of March 1942 the Soviet authorities had taken no steps to evacuate the 25,000 men
agreed upon in General Sikorski's conversation with Premier Stalin.

On March 18, 1942, Premier Stalin informed General Anders that on account of difficulties in providing supplies, the Soviet Government was obliged to limit the strength of the Polish Army to 44,000 men. This decision reduced the agreed strength of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. by 52,000 men and constituted a breach of the bilateral understanding of December 3, 1941, which fixed the strength of the Polish Army on Soviet territory at 96,000 men. As a result of this unfortunate decision the surplus over and above the 44,000 soldiers, which then amounted to 30,000, was evacuated to the Middle East with the agreement of the British Government.

Although in the course of a conference with General Anders, Premier Stalin had agreed to the continuation in the U.S.S.R. of normal recruiting for the Polish Army, it was to be feared that unless the Soviet authorities changed their attitude, the existing strength of the Polish Army could not be increased because: 1) recruiting was limited to persons of Polish origin only; 2) recruiting was carried out by the Soviet authorities alone; 3) 8,000 Polish officers were missing, and 4) on the pretext of preventing unnecessary travel, a ban had been placed on the sale of railway tickets to Polish citizens, who were thus forced to remain in their temporary residences. This prevented volunteers from reaching the Polish Army.

In view of the unsatisfactory news from the Soviet front, General Sikorski sent a message to Premier Stalin on April 9, 1942, to inform him that the Polish soldiers evacuated from the U.S.S.R. would be immediately attached to Polish units in the Middle East, and employed in the struggle against Germany in which Poland was engaged with the other Allies and the Soviet Union. General Sikorski emphasized the importance he attached to the increase of the fighting strength of the Polish forces and said that he relied on continued recruiting of Polish
citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the
Polish Army, and the evacuation of further surplus men to
the Middle East, in view of the limitation of the numerical
strength of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to 44,000.

As the Polish Government attached the greatest importance
to the organization and development of the Polish Army in the
U.S.S.R., it returned again and again to the problem of re-
cruiting. Thus, independently of the above message, the Polish
Minister for Foreign Affairs sent an Aide-Mémoire to Ambassa-
dor Bogomolov on May 1, 1942, and a Note on June 10. In
addition, Ambassador Kot presented a Note to M. Molotov on
May 4, 1942.

Ambassador Kot's Note began by recalling the understanding
arrived at by General Sikorski and Premier Stalin on December
3 of the previous year, concerning the strength of the Polish
Army, and Premier Stalin's subsequent decision, imparted to
General Anders, concerning the limitation of the number of
Polish soldiers in the U.S.S.R. to 44,000. This had been accom-
panied by Premier Stalin's assurance that recruiting for the
Polish Army would be continued, that Polish citizens serving
in the Red Army and in Labor Battalions would be transferred
to the Polish Army, and that the surplus number of soldiers
would be evacuated to the Middle East. The Note continued
by stating that after the evacuation of 30,000 Polish soldiers to
the Middle East recruiting had in effect stopped, that Polish
feeding and registration centres had been closed, that cases
of Polish citizens being conscripted to the Red Army or Labor
Battalions were becoming increasingly common. The Note
ended by expressing the hope that the Soviet Government
would issue adequate instructions to enable recruiting for the
Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to be continued and soldiers over
and above the fixed contingent to be evacuated, in the interest
of the war that Poland and the U.S.S.R. were waging in common
against Germany.
Replying, on May 13, 1942, to General Sikorski’s message asking that the recruiting and evacuation of Polish soldiers be continued, Premier Stalin said that he felt obliged to recapitulate the reasons he had given General Anders, which were that the reduction of the contingents fixed for the Polish Army resulted from the necessity to reduce supplies to units that were not taking part in the fighting. As conditions remained the same, it was not possible to make any change in the contingents fixed in March, 1942, for the Polish Army.

Mr. Molotov’s reply on May 14, 1942, to Ambassador Kot’s Note went much further than Premier Stalin’s message. Mr. Molotov asserted that: 1) in the course of Premier Stalin’s conference with General Anders the number of Polish soldiers was reduced to 44,000 and all soldiers in excess of that number were to be evacuated within a fixed period, so evacuation must now be considered to have ended; 2) further recruiting or voluntary enlistment for evacuation to the Middle East was impracticable for the same reasons that had dictated the establishment of the numerical strength of the Polish Army at 44,000; 3) Ambassador Kot’s reference to a declaration Premier Stalin was said to have made during his conversation with General Anders, to the effect that the recruiting of Polish citizens would be continued and that Polish citizens serving in the Red Army and the Labor Battalions would be transferred to the Polish Army and subsequently evacuated, must have been based on a misunderstanding, as Premier Stalin had never touched upon these questions with General Anders; 4) this being the state of affairs, the Soviet Government considered further recruiting for and voluntary enlistment in the Polish Army for subsequent evacuation, purposeless—as would also be the resumption of the activities of Polish military institutions, such as feeding centres, medical centres, registration officers’ posts, etc. set up in connection with recruiting for the army; 5) as regards the conscription of Polish citizens for the Red Army or Labor Battalions, the
Note asserted that only Soviet citizens were liable for service in the Red Army and in the Labor Battalions.

It is obvious from the above that the decision of the Soviet Government to curtail the strength of the Polish Army and prevent further recruiting was utterly inconsistent with the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, and the understanding reached on December 3, 1941, between General Sikorski and Premier Stalin. The stopping of voluntary and conscripted enlistment from all parts of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish Army was proof that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wished neither the expansion of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. nor of the Polish Army in the Middle East.

On June 13, 1942, the Polish Government issued a statement to the effect that Poland was not responsible either for the failure of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to attain the strength laid down in December 1941, or for its not being properly armed and equipped to go into action. The statement emphasized, moreover, that the Polish Government was unanimous in their desire that the Polish Army should remain in the U.S.S.R. and fight side by side with the Red Army.

However, several weeks later without consulting the Polish Government the Soviet Government decided to evacuate from the U.S.S.R. the remainder of the Polish Army, which then numbered 42,000 men. The Soviet Government informed the British Government of this decision and the latter notified the Polish Government of the Soviet move on July 2. Taken unawares by this entirely unexpected decision, the Polish Government, in cooperation with the British Government, evacuated its remaining troops to the Middle East.

Before the remainder of the Polish Army left the U.S.S.R., General Anders was instructed by the Polish Government to insist that a recruiting staff be left on Soviet territory to continue the enlistment of Polish citizens for the Polish Army.
The Soviet authorities refused General Anders' request because, they asserted, the Polish Government not having found it possible to employ the Polish divisions formed in the U.S.S.R. on the Soviet-German front, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could not permit the recruiting or formation of any Polish units whatever in the U.S.S.R. Thus recruiting for the Polish Army was de facto stopped by the Soviet authorities in March 1942, though this was not officially confirmed by Mr. Molotov in his Note of May 14, 1942, to Ambassador Kot.

The evacuation of the Polish Army from the U.S.S.R. was entirely and exclusively initiated by the Soviet Government. The assertion that the Polish Army was unwilling to fight side by side with the Soviet Army was without the slightest foundation. The Soviet Government was not only informed of the importance attached by the Polish Government to the formation of a Polish Army on Soviet territory, but was told that the Polish Army would fight side by side with the Red Army on U.S.S.R. territory against the German forces. This was expressly stated in the Declaration made by General Sikorski and Premier Stalin on December 4, 1941, which established the principle of cooperation between the Polish Army and the Red Army, and in frequent public declarations by General Sikorski.

Moreover the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in his Note of June 10, 1942, addressed to Ambassador Bogomolov, that "it is possible that the Polish Army formed in the Near East may, after it is equipped and trained, also be used on the front of the U.S.S.R. in case the military situation should so require." That is why the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his Note of August 27, 1942, to Ambassador Bogomolov, declared that the Polish Government considered the allegation made to General Anders that the Polish Army declined to fight side by side with the Soviet Army as entirely unfounded and inconsistent with the true state of affairs, and that they could not take into cognizance
the motives alleged for the refusal to allow further recruiting for the Polish Army.

Replying to this Note on October 31, Ambassador Bogomolov admitted that the organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. had encountered a number of difficulties and that the initiative to reduce the strength of the Polish Army had come from the Soviet Government; at the same time he accused the Polish High Command of showing no desire whatever to send any units of the army to the Soviet-German front, and of continuing to keep all units far behind the lines. In the same Note Ambassador Bogomolov stated that "the Soviet Government did not consider it possible to press the Polish Command in this matter but . . . in February 1942, the Soviet Government enquired when the Polish formations would begin to fight against the Hitlerites. Mention was then made of the 5th Division which had completed its training."

These passages from Ambassador Bogomolov's Note might justify the supposition that the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., particularly its 5th Division, was fully trained and equipped, and that fully armed units were kept far behind the lines because the Polish Government or the Polish High Command did not wish to use them on the Russian front.

Ambassador Bogomolov's statement concerning the equipment and training of the Polish Army or anyone of its divisions in the U.S.S.R. was contrary to the true state of affairs. In the Note that the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London on December 18, 1942, detailed information was given as to the equipment of the Polish Army. In this Note the Minister of Foreign Affairs recalled that uniforms for the army were sent from Great Britain shortly after the signing of the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement, but that they had only reached the Polish Army on October 23, 1941, until which time only 40% of the soldiers were issued with boots. In the initial period of its formation,
the Army was to be supplied with arms by the Soviet Government. It was not until October 22, 1941, however, that Mr. Molotov notified Ambassador Kot, that the Soviet Union was experiencing certain difficulties with regard to the supply of arms and inquired whether the Polish Government could not obtain equipment from the United States and Great Britain. A similar declaration was made by Ambassador Bogomolov to General Sikorski on October 25, 1941. On learning of these difficulties, the Polish Government immediately approached the Governments of Great Britain and the United States with a request for arms and equipment. However, transport difficulties over long distances, the necessity of supplying the U.S.S.R. itself, and of accumulating arms and equipment in the Near East had all made it impossible to equip the Polish Army.

Despite all these difficulties, only the 5th Division was partly armed and equipped—but even this unit was lamentably deficient in comparison with a Soviet infantry division, and it was in no way prepared for action. The Note of December 18, 1942, sets out that the 5th Division was equipped as follows: it had not a single 45 mm anti-tank gun (though it was to have 18), not one 76 mm anti-aircraft gun (the establishment stipulated 4), no synchronized anti-aircraft machine-guns (establishment 18), no 12,7 mm machine-guns (establishment 9). Furthermore, the 5th Division had never received the 76 mm infantry guns (establishment 18) or the ammunition carriers for these and for the 104 mm howitzers. The 5th Division was also sadly deficient in other equipment.

As regards the other divisions, it would be pointless to speak of their equipment, as in all they had only 200 rifles, a fact that obliged General Anders, who did not wish his men to remain idle, to divide part of the 5th Division’s equipment among the remaining units for training purposes.

As far back as March 18, 1942, General Anders had given Premier Stalin detailed information of this state of affairs and
handed him a statement of the amount of arms possessed by the Polish Army and the amount required to complete its equipment.

This proves beyond doubt that the Polish Army as a whole and the 5th Division in particular did not go into action on the Russian front, not because of any alleged reluctance on the part of the Polish Government, but because no single unit of that army was suitably trained or equipped, none was ready for action.

Prohibition by the Soviet authorities of conscription and voluntary enlistment, the reduction of the strength of the Polish Army by unilateral decision, the evacuation of that Army without previous consultation with the Polish Government, the refusal to allow depots for recruiting to be left on Soviet territory, and finally the refusal to transfer to the Polish Army Polish nationals who had been forcibly conscripted in Poland by the German army and were now Soviet prisoners of war, all lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Government, contrary to the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941 and the Moscow Declaration of December 4, 1941, had no desire to see a Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. participate in the fighting on the Eastern Front side by side with the Soviet Army.
CHAPTER 4

The Missing Polish Officers

According to official figures given on September 17, 1940, in the Red Star, published by the People's Commissariat for Defense of the U.S.S.R., the number of Polish officers taken prisoner on Polish territory by the Soviet forces after September 17, 1939, amounted to 9,369, including 12 generals, 58 colonels, 72 lieutenant-colonels, 5,131 other regular officers and 4,096 reserve officers.

This number was increased by several hundred officers arrested by the Soviet authorities during their occupation of Polish territory after actual fighting had ceased, and by 900 officers interned in the Baltic States, when the latter were occupied by the Soviet armies in June 1940. Thus the total number of Polish officers who became Soviet prisoners of war amounted approximately to 11,000.

The Polish officers were placed in some ten prisoner-of-war camps, of which the three largest were: 1) Kozielsk, to the East of Smolensk, 2) Starobielsk, near Kharkov, and 3) Ostashkov, near Kalinin.

The officers interned in these three camps were permitted to correspond with their families in Poland through the Polish Red Cross. Early in 1940 many of them notified their families that the camp authorities had informed them that all three camps would soon be broken up, and they would be able to
return home. During this period the Soviet authorities compiled detailed lists of the prisoners, presumably to ascertain where each of them wished to go on being released.

According to information in possession of the Polish Government the number of prisoners interned in these three camps early in 1940 was as follows:

1) in Kozielsk: 5,000 prisoners including 4,500 officers of various ranks;

2) in Starobielsk: 3,920 officers, including 8 generals, about 100 colonels and lt.-colonels, about 250 majors, 1,000 captains, approximately 2,500 lieutenants and second-lieutenants, and 30 cadets. Apart from these there were also 380 doctors, some of them eminent specialists, several university professors, judges, officials and army chaplains;

3) in Ostashkov: 6,570 persons, mostly judges, public prosecutors, civil servants and policemen, with 380 officers of the police, frontier guard and six regiments of Frontier Defence Corps.

The total number of Polish citizens interned in these three camps was 15,490, including some 8,700 officers.

The breaking up of these camps began early in April 1940. Every few days, until the middle of May, groups of 60 to 300 persons were transferred from the three camps to an unknown destination. Only the prisoners from Kozielsk were transported in the direction of Smolensk. The last group from the three camps consisted of only 400 men who were assembled at the camp at Yuchnowsk in Pavlischchev Bor near the military station of Babynino and later in June 1940 transferred to Griazovetz in the district of Vologda. However, at a later date more than 1,000 officers and civilian prisoners arrived at this camp from smaller prisoner-of-war camps, with some 900 officers who had previously been interned in the Baltic States.

In May 1940, correspondence between the officers interned in the three camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov and
their families in Poland ceased abruptly, and officers interned in Griazovetz were forbidden by the Soviet authorities to mention names of their former colleagues in the letters they wrote home.

When after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, the Polish Government proceeded to form a Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. they expected that officers from these three camps would constitute the command of the army. By the end of August 1941, the officers from the camp in Griazovetz, some 2,300 in all, had reported to the Polish units stationed in Buzuluk, but not a single one of the officers transferred from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov to unknown destinations, appeared or gave any sign of life. So the Army was short of more than 8,000 officers, 7,000 non-commissioned officers and other ranks who would have been of the utmost value in fighting the Germans, to say nothing of the civilians also interned in the three camps.

This alarming state of affairs led the High Command of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. and representatives of the Polish Government in Kuybyshev and London to make frequent representations to the Soviet authorities for the release of the missing officers. To Ambassador Kot, Mr. Vishinsky declared that all Polish prisoners of war had been released from the camps and must therefore be free.

As there continued to be no sign of the missing officers, in October and November 1941, Ambassador Kot made frequent reference to them in the course of his conversations with Premier Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky, insisting that detailed lists of all officers who had been interned by the Soviet authorities be furnished him, as he knew that such lists had been compiled by the Soviet authorities.

At the same time, on October 15, General Sikorski, in a letter to Ambassador Bogomolov, drew the Soviet Government’s attention to the Polish Government’s anxiety as “to the fate of
several thousand Polish officers who have not returned to Poland and have not been found in Soviet military camps.” Re­plying on November 14, Ambassador Bogomolov assured General Sikorski that “... all Polish officers on the territory of U.S.S.R. have also been set free. Your supposition, Mr. Prime Min­ister, that a large number of Polish officers are dispersed throughout the Northern regions of the U.S.S.R. is obviously based on inaccurate information.”

When visiting Premier Stalin in Moscow in December 1941, General Sikorski again intervened for the release of all Polish prisoners of war, and as the Soviet authorities had not supplied a list of their names, he took the opportunity to present to Pre­mier Stalin a list of Polish officers, compiled by their former fellow-prisoners and containing 3,845 names. Premier Stalin then assured General Sikorski that the amnesty was of a general and all-embracing character and included military personnel as well as civilians. In the same conversation with General Sikorski, Premier Stalin while declaring that all the prisoners of war had been released, expressed the belief that they might have escaped to Manchuria. It is obvious that the trip across the entire territ­ory of the U.S.S.R. of men in Polish uniform was something that could not possibly have taken place.

On March 18, 1942, General Anders delivered to Premier Stalin an additional list containing the names of some 800 other officers.

The question of the missing officers was also dealt with exhaustively in the Note of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Bogomolov of January 28, 1942. After calling attention to the fact that the administrative authorities of the Soviet Union had not fully applied the provisions of the Amnesty Decree of August 12, 1941, the Note laid special em­phasis on the failure to release many thousands of senior and junior officers.
In this Note the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that “investigations carried out in Poland and in the Reich have made it possible to establish definitely that these soldiers are not at present in occupied Poland nor in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany.” The Note specifically requested that all the arrested officers be released from the prisons and camps in which they were interned, adding that the Polish Government attached the greatest importance to the loyal execution of the provisions of the Agreement of July 30, 1941 and to the development of friendly relations between both countries in the interest of the common struggle against the aggressor.

Ambassador Bogomolov’s reply on March 13, to the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, introduced no new elements to throw light on the question of the 8,000 missing officers. Ambassador Bogomolov referred to Mr. Molotov’s Note of November 8, 1941, and to the Aide-Mémoire of November 19, presented to Ambassador Kot, containing the assurance that the amnesty had been fully carried out in respect of all Polish citizens, civilian and military. In regard to the Polish Government’s assertion that many Polish officers were to be found near the River Kolyma, on Franz Joseph Land and in Nova Zembla, Ambassador Bogomolov considered this devoid of all foundation.

In view of the utter failure of his frequent verbal and written demands for an elucidation of the whole question, Ambassador Kot, on May 19, 1942, submitted a Memorandum to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in which he expressed regret at the Soviet authorities’ refusal to supply a list of prisoners as the Polish Government had repeatedly requested for several months, and he gave expression to his great anxiety about the fate of these officers.

When, in April 1943, foreign news agencies published a report issued by the German military authorities that a mass-grave containing the bodies of Polish officers had been discovered at Kozia Gora near Smolensk, and when the Soviet Govern-
ment stated in a communique published by the Soviet Information Bureau in Moscow on April 15, that in 1941 Polish prisoners of war were employed on fortification work to the West of Smolensk where they fell into German hands after the Soviet forces withdrew from that region, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a new Note to Ambassador Bogomolov on April 20.

Beginning with the statement that in a public declaration made on April 17, the Polish Government had most emphatically condemned the attempts of the Germans to exploit the tragedy of Polish prisoners of war to further their own political ends, the Note recalled the repeated representations made since October 1941 by the Polish Government to the Soviet Government concerning the missing officers from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov. The Note went on to say that the Polish Government had never received a list of the prisoners nor any detailed information as to where they were, while the verbal and written declarations of representatives of the Soviet Government were confined to general assurances that all Polish officers had been released from prisoner-of-war camps. The Polish Government, as shown by its frequent interventions, had never considered the question of the missing officers closed, and as it appeared from the communique of the Soviet Information Bureau, that the Soviet Government was in possession of fuller information concerning the missing Polish officers than had earlier been communicated to the Polish Government, it renewed its request to the Soviet Government for detailed and accurate information concerning the fate of the prisoners of war and civilians at one time detained in the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov. The Note ended by stating that Polish public opinion was so justly and deeply stirred that only irrefutable facts could outweigh the detailed German statements about the discovery of the bodies of many thousand Polish officers in the vicinity of Smolensk.
The correspondence between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government and the series of verbal interventions by representatives of the Polish Government proved: (1) that from the very moment diplomatic relations were re-established in July 1941, the Polish Authorities had considered the question of the missing officers one of the fundamental problems, a thorough elucidation of which was not only in the interest of Polish-Soviet relations, but also in the interest of the United Nations; (2) although they possessed lists of persons interned in prisoner-of-war camps, the Soviet Government never presented them to the Polish Authorities for examination; (3) the Polish Authorities, to facilitate the search, supplied the Soviet authorities with a list containing the names of more than 50% of the missing officers; (4) despite Soviet Government assurances that the officers interned in Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov had been released, their correspondence with their families in Poland had ended abruptly in the Spring of 1940, and they were not to be found either in the Soviet Union, in Poland or in German camps; (5) furthermore the Soviet Government never informed the Polish Government that Polish officers were working on fortifications near Smolensk and there fell into German hands. This the Polish Government first learned from a communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau on April 15, 1943.

The Soviet Government made the question of the missing officers their reason for severing diplomatic relations with Poland. In his Note of April 25, 1943, which Ambassador Romer did not accept, Mr. Molotov omitted all reference to the frequent interventions concerning the missing officers and with complete disregard of the above mentioned facts and Polish representations, expressed his astonishment that the Polish Government did not consider it necessary to approach the Soviet Government for an explanation of the whole case. He also alleged the Polish Government’s connivance with the German
Government in a common campaign of defamation of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government made the case of the missing officers a political question, and entirely disregarded its human aspect to which the Polish Government attached the greatest importance.

The total number of soldiers and civilians interned in the three camps in question exceeded 15,000. In addition to regular army officers, there were thousands of reserve officers from all professional groups in Poland, the very elite of the Polish educated class, that class which has been so ruthlessly exterminated by the Germans in the course of this war. The fate of these 15,000 persons was therefore the object of intense concern not only to their relatives in Poland, dispersed throughout the world or else serving in the Polish Army, but also to the entire Polish nation which for the last four years has fought so well and sacrificed so much in its occupied homeland for the future victory of the Allies.

Faithful to these principles the Polish Government for nearly two years made repeated demands on the Soviet authorities for an explanation of the fate of the missing prisoners of war. Not only did the Soviet Government fail to acknowledge the natural right of the Polish Government to concern themselves with the fate of missing Polish citizens, but despite their responsibility for the life and safety of prisoners of war they constantly refused to supply any kind of relevant information that might have thrown light on this tragic affair.
CHAPTER 5
Relief for Polish Citizens in the U.S.S.R.

The conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, between Poland and the Soviet Union, made it possible for the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R. to organize relief for Polish citizens. However, in the Autumn of 1941 and early in the Winter of 1942 the carrying out of these plans was opposed by the Soviet authorities, who did not agree to the Embassy's proposal that a certain number of consulates be established, and would permit neither organized assistance by the Polish Red Cross, nor the creation of Citizens' Committees elected by the Polish citizens concerned.

Meanwhile the condition of the Polish population released from prisons, camps and places of exile, was rendered more precarious by the approach of winter. The Soviet authorities continued to oppose plans for the settlement of released Polish citizens, and informed the Embassy early in November, 1941, that the transportation of groups of Poles must cease, because the rail facilities were absorbed by the requirements of the front.

The visit of General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, who came to the U.S.S.R. in December 1941, brought about a change in the attitude of the Soviet authorities as regards two fundamental Polish requests, i.e., the admission of Embassy Delegates to Polish settlements throughout the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the granting of a credit to permit assistance to be given to Polish citizens unfit for
work and deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against their will.

As a result of General Sikorski’s visit an agreement was reached on December 23, 1941 between the Polish Embassy and the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Notes exchanged establishing the “Rules regulating the scope of activity of Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland.” This provided for the appointment of nineteen Embassy Delegates and their staffs on Soviet territory, with the joint approval of both Governments. Some days after this agreement had been concluded, a new agreement with the Soviet Government was signed on December 31, for a loan of 100 million roubles for the relief of the Polish civilian population. Of the nineteen Embassy Delegates, nine were regular Embassy officials with diplomatic status and the rank of secretaries or attachés. In addition to relief work, Embassy Delegates were empowered to extend legal protection to Polish citizens, and in particular to issue them with passports and other personal documents. This was most important as Polish citizens deported to Russia had been made to surrender their personal documents and had received in return either passports as Soviet citizens or Soviet passports as stateless individuals. If in camps or prisons they had been left without any papers at all and on their release received only jail delivery certificates valid for three months. Delegates were under the direct control of the Embassy and supervised the local representatives, whose duties were more restricted and who acted as the regional executives of the Delegates. These representatives were appointed from among responsible Polish citizens in provincial centres.

On December 1, 1942, the Embassy had at its disposal 387 representatives of whom 297 were Poles, 82 Jews, 8 Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians.

The Embassy Delegates began their work in the middle of February 1942, and organized relief for Poles in 46 adminis-
trative districts including 2,600 Polish settlements. The efforts of the Embassy Delegates and representatives soon began to produce substantial results. In addition to distributing financial assistance to those most in need, in one year—by the middle of February 1943—they had established 83 kindergartens for 5,300 children, mostly orphans. This represented 7% of all Polish children in Russian and about 70% of the orphans. They also set up 175 elementary schools, and 176 feeding centres for children. For adults, 58 homes for invalids, 13 hostels, 15 feeding centres and 47 workshops had been organized. Medical aid was supplied in 41 health and hygiene centres as well as in 10 hospitals and convalescent homes. Moreover 43 educational centres for children were set up. In short the Polish Embassy through its Delegates and representatives organized 807 social institutions for deported Polish citizens, both adults and children.

Thanks to the efforts of the Polish and Allied Governments and of charitable institutions in the United States and the British Commonwealth, the first substantial shipments of relief in kind for Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began to arrive during the winter of 1941. From then till the middle of 1943 these enabled the Delegates of the Polish Embassy to supply Polish citizens with some 5,000 tons of food, clothing and medical supplies, that were distributed chiefly to families having a large number of children.

The generous assistance of the United States Government in extending substantial aid under the Lend-Lease Act to the Polish Government for the families of Polish soldiers inducted into the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. is especially acknowledged and emphasized. Mention should also be made of invaluable relief sent to the deported Polish citizens by organizations of Americans of Polish descent, as well as by numerous Jewish welfare organizations in America.

A principle to which the Embassy and its staff strictly adhered was to grant financial aid and assistance in kind first of
all to persons unfit for work, i.e., children, women and old people, who often made up more than half the Polish population of the various centres because the Soviet authorities had deported en masse the wives and children of Poles who were prisoners of war in Germany or in the U.S.S.R., and able-bodied men had voluntarily enlisted in the Polish Army being formed on Soviet territory.

However relief work of the Embassy and its Delegates was not sufficient to produce any basic change for the better in the material situation of the Polish deportees as a whole, because of the impossibility of reaching many of the more distant localities. Transport difficulties brought about by the war prevented the rapid dispatch of supplies where they were most needed. Yet, thanks to the substantial supplies from abroad, many of the Polish citizens deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics received at least clothes or underclothing, shoes and foodstuffs of high quality.

During the initial period the work of the Delegates and their staffs was not hampered to any great extent by the Soviet authorities who, however, as early as March 1942, began to restrict the scope of their activity. It was during this period that the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs approached the Embassy with a demand that the Delegates should refrain from intervening with local authorities on behalf of Polish citizens, large numbers of whom were still detained in Soviet camps and prisons in violation of the Agreement of July 30, 1941 and of the Amnesty Decree of August 12, 1941. The Soviet authorities also began to place difficulties in the way of Polish citizens of Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin who were being assisted by the Embassy’s relief organization. In so doing, these authorities acted on a unilateral decision of December 1, 1941, declaring that such Polish citizens would henceforth be regarded as Soviet citizens.
As Polish relief increased in volume and the activity of the Embassy Delegates developed, to the benefit of hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens, the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards the Polish relief organization began to undergo a change. Manifold difficulties arose, mainly with local authorities who raised objections in matters that had been already settled with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The usual explanation was that they were without instructions from the central authorities. Numerous conferences held between March and July 1942, between representatives of the Polish Embassy and of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs were almost entirely devoted to these difficulties. Towards the end of May the attitude of the Soviet authorities changed abruptly and they began to put obstacles in the way of the Delegates and representatives who wished to report to the Embassy, and to arrest certain representatives, especially those who had shown initiative and energy. To all Embassy representations, the stereotyped reply was that those arrested were engaged in activities hostile to the Soviet Union.

This hampering of the activities of Embassy Delegates came to a head on June 29, 1942. On that day the Embassy Delegates in Vladivostok and Archangel, although members of the Embassy staff and carrying diplomatic passports and identity cards, were arrested by the State Security Police. The Soviet authorities also arrested the entire staff of the Polish relief office in Archangel and sealed the stores without even informing the Embassy that the Polish diplomats had been arrested. The Embassy only learned of this from another source on July 7, 1942. After the Polish Ambassador had lodged a vehement protest, both diplomatic officials were set free on July 10. The Soviet authorities failed, however, to provide any satisfactory explanation of their action, which was without precedent in international relations, and without producing any evidence.
merely stated that the persons in question were carrying on activities hostile to the Soviet Union.

In the course of diplomatic negotiations of the Polish Ambassador and Chargé d'Affaires with Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet representatives gave assurances that the agreed Rules regulating the scope of activities of the Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland remained in force and that the Soviet Government did not intend to change its benevolent attitude towards the Embassy’s relief work. The Soviet authorities demanded, however, that the Embassy either recall its diplomatic officials who occupied posts as Delegates, or else revoke their diplomatic privileges. Having no choice the Embassy recalled all its diplomatic officials to Kuybyshev and officially informed the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that this had been done. How the Soviet authorities respected the principles of international law concerning the personal immunity of diplomats and of the archives of foreign States, may be judged by the fact that, after Mr. Vishinsky, in the presence of the Polish Ambassador, had formally stated that the agreement concerning the relief work of the Polish Embassy remained in full force and effect, all Embassy Delegates, whether enjoying diplomatic immunity or not, and the principal members of their staffs were arrested by the Soviet authorities, and their archives, money and seals seized by the State Securities police.

Following very strong representations by the Polish Government, the Soviet authorities decided to set free the diplomatic officials, nine persons in all, while all the other Delegates, office staff and representatives, totalling 109 persons—remained in prison until the end of October 1942, when 93 persons were released. The remaining 16 persons have never been released.

On July 20, 1942, when all Embassy Delegates had been arrested, their offices closed and their supply stores sealed, Commissar Vishinsky announced to the Chargé d'Affaires of the
Polish Embassy, Mr. H. Sokolnicki, that the Soviet Government would no longer permit the existence of the Delegates’ offices, alleging that instead of organizing relief the Delegates were engaged in activities hostile to the Soviet Union and in intelligence work. The Soviet authorities constantly reiterated this accusation in response to all further representations of the Polish Government or the Polish Embassy on behalf of the arrested officials, without furnishing any proof in support of the charge.

However, at the same time the Soviet authorities declared their readiness to accept a new relief organization for Polish citizens, and said that they awaited Polish suggestions. As the most experienced and valuable social workers were under arrest and a feeling of terror was spreading among the Poles who feared further mass detention in labor camps and prisons, the Embassy was unable to set up any kind of new relief organization. Furthermore, the Polish Government could not negotiate under pressure, with more than a hundred Polish officials in prison.

The Soviet Government had other reasons than the allegedly hostile activities of the Embassy Delegates for closing the Embassy's relief offices. Their real grounds may be inferred from the closing in August 1942 of kindergartens and medical centres, which could not be suspected of carrying on activities hostile to the Soviet Union. First, despite their formal promises, the Soviet authorities placed difficulties in the way of the purchase of food rations by these institutions, and then began to participate directly in their administration or to close up orphanages, homes for invalids, feeding centers, etc. For instance, in the districts of Kustanay, Akmolinsk, Southern Kazakhstan, Semipalatynsk and Pavlodar, the Soviet authorities insisted that the Polish children be transferred to Soviet orphanages. These actions constituted a flagrant breach of the assurances given by the Soviet Government to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev and to the Polish Government in London by Ambassador Bogo-
molov, who emphasized that the Soviet Government had no wish to obstruct the work of relief to Polish citizens.

The Soviet Government's negative attitude to the Polish Government's suggestion that 50,000 Polish children be evacuated from the U.S.S.R. and placed in Allied countries for the duration of the war at the expense of the Polish Government and Allied charitable institutions, is characteristic of the Soviet Government's attitude toward the Poles in Russia. Despite the appalling death rate among these children, who were decimated by hunger and disease, the Soviet Government refused to discuss the technical details of the suggestion and rejected the principle of evacuation.

The arrest of the Embassy Delegates in July 1942, rendered impossible the concentration of several thousand Polish specialists in the area where the Polish troops were quartered in the U.S.S.R., and consequently their evacuation with these forces to the Middle East. These specialists included technicians, doctors, engineers, scientists and journalists, all of whom were employed as lumberjacks in the Siberian forests or on other kinds of hard physical work and dispersed throughout the vast area of the Soviet Union. Thus the 30,000 Polish civilians evacuated from Russia to the Middle East in August 1942, like the 12,000 Polish citizens evacuated in March and April 1942, included only some of the families of Polish soldiers and persons who had reached the vicinity of the Polish Army camps by themselves and often quite accidentally.

Despite continued efforts by the Polish Government, the lot of the Poles in the Soviet Union showed no substantial improvement because the Embassy's relief work was prevented from reaching all the centers in the Soviet Union to which Poles had been deported. Moreover, as Polish citizens were forbidden to change their place of residence or to use public transportation, they were de facto interned in their place of residence and could not themselves improve their conditions or even
attempt to leave the northern regions where the climatic and health conditions were most unfavorable.

Not until late October 1942, when 93 of the arrested members of the Embassy's relief organization were released, did the atmosphere become more appropriate for a renewal of negotiations to establish some new form of relief. Aware of the Soviet Government's objections to the system of Embassy Delegates the newly appointed Polish Ambassador, Mr. Tadeusz Romer, suggested that the whole system of relief be entirely reorganized. This suggestion was accepted by Mr. Vishinsky on December 23, 1942, but was never put into effect for, in the Note of January 16, 1943, the Soviet Government unilaterally proceeded in violation of the Protocol attached to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, to declare that all Polish citizens present on November 1 and 2, 1939, on Polish territory occupied by the Soviet forces had automatically acquired Soviet citizenship. Despite the Polish Government's Note of protest of January 26, 1943, the subsequent negotiations between Ambassador Romer and Mr. Molotov concerning the Note of January 16, the Soviet authorities forcibly took over the Polish Embassy's relief institutions and proceeded immediately by moral and physical pressure to force Polish citizens to accept Soviet passports. It did not deem it necessary even to inform the Embassy of these actions.

The purpose of these measures was to destroy the Polish relief organization and to suppress all relief work as such. In view of these facts the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs on March 30, 1943, presented a Note to Mr. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish Government in London. This Note recalled that the relief organization of the Polish Embassy was set up by joint agreement with the Soviet Government, and it protested emphatically against the withdrawal of that organization from the Embassy's administration and against the methods employed by Soviet authorities. The Note reserved
the Polish Government's right to demand the return by the Soviet Government of all property belonging to the Polish State taken over by Soviet authorities or institutions, and compensation for loss or damage already suffered or that might ensue in the future from the taking over of that property.

Thus since early in the Spring of 1943, hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens deported to the U.S.S.R. have been deprived of the protection of their legal Government, and of help and relief from them, from the Governments of the friendly United Nations and welfare organizations throughout the world which had spared neither funds nor efforts to succor these Polish deportees.
CHAPTER 6
Citizenship of Polish Deportees and Soviet Territorial Claims

By the Protocol attached to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet Government undertook to "grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the U.S.S.R., either as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds" without distinction as to the origin, creed or race of the citizens concerned. Similarly the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, implementing the amnesty granted to all Polish citizens detained on Soviet territory, never contemplated any discrimination whatsoever between Polish citizens of different origins.

Part of the Polish deportees, including persons of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin, were released from labor camps and prisons in the first months following the signing of the Agreement. A considerable percentage of Polish citizens of Jewish, Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian origin volunteered for service in the Polish Army during the initial period of its formation.

The first case of discrimination by the Soviet authorities against Polish citizens of other than Polish origin occurred in the Republic of Kazakhstan in October 1941. According to information received by the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, the
Military Commissar of that Republic, General Shcherbakov, issued an order in Alma-Ata, for the enlistment in the Red Army of all Polish citizens of military age fit for service, deported by the Soviet authorities from occupied Polish territories and in possession of documents issued to them by the Soviet authorities showing they were of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian or Jewish origin.

As soon as it heard of this order the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev in a Note of November 10, 1941, declared it contrary to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and to the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, and demanded that the right of every Polish citizen to serve in the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. be respected.

The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs replied to this Note on December 1, 1941, that it could not agree with the Polish Embassy that the calling-up by the Red Army of persons of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin who had left the territories of Western-Ukraine and Western White-Ruthenia was inconsistent with the Agreements of July 30, 1941, or August 14, 1941. In the opinion of the Soviet authorities, the wording of neither of these Agreements provided any grounds for the views expressed in the Embassy’s Note of November 10. The Note of the Soviet Government further stated that in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., of November 29, 1939, all citizens of the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics who were present in those districts on November 1 and 2, 1939, acquired the citizenship of the U.S.S.R. as laid down in the Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938. The Note ended by stating that “The Soviet Government’s readiness to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin, who resided until November 1 and 2 on the aforementioned territory, gives evidence of good will and compliance on the part of the
Soviet Government, but can in no case serve as a basis for an analogous recognition of the Polish citizenship of persons of other origin, in particular those of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian or Jewish origin, since the question of the frontiers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland had not been settled and is subject to settlement in the future.”

In its reply dated December 9, 1941, to the Soviet Note quoted above, the Embassy pointed out that: 1) Polish legislation was founded on the principle of the equality of all citizens, regardless of their origin or race, and that the Polish Embassy was not aware of the existence of any Soviet laws, which introduced or sanctioned any discrimination or differentiation of this kind. As the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, made no reference to the principle of national origin or race in any of their stipulations relative to Polish citizens, these provisions must apply to all Polish citizens without exception. 2) The possession of Polish citizenship by any given person was governed by Polish law, namely the Polish State Citizenship Act of January 30, 1920. For this and the reasons stated above, the Embassy found itself unable to accept the Soviet Government’s statement that it was prepared to acknowledge as Polish citizens only those of Polish origin among the persons resident on November 1 and 2, 1939, on the territory of the Republic of Poland temporarily occupied by the military forces of the Soviet Union. 3) The Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938, could not be applied to Polish citizens for “its introduction on the territory of the Republic of Poland occupied by the Soviet Union from the latter half of September 1939 until June or July 1941, would be contrary to the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907.” The Embassy’s Note ended by pointing out that the Soviet Note contained a self-contradictory thesis, stating as it did that on the one hand the Soviet authorities did not recognize the Polish
citizenship of persons of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin, and on the other hand that the question of the frontiers between the U.S.S.R. and Poland had not yet been settled and was to be settled in the future. While maintaining its fundamental attitude as set out above, the Polish Embassy also pointed out that the Soviet attitude would mean a unilateral settlement by the Soviet Union at the present time of a problem which according to the statement of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs itself was to be discussed in the future.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs replied to this Note on January 5, 1942, stating that it saw no grounds for changing its attitude as set out in the Note of December 1, 1941. As to the Embassy's reference to the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs considered that the provisions of that Convention applied to a state of occupation of enemy territory, and that the term "occupation" would be quite unjustifiable in the case of the Western-Ukraine and Western White-Ruthenia, for the entry of the Soviet forces in the Autumn of 1939 into Western-Ukraine and Western White-Ruthenia was in their view not an occupation: the incorporation of these territories in the U.S.S.R. was at the express will of their people.

In consequence of this attitude adopted by the Soviet Government, Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin ceased to be treated by them as Polish citizens. This was no mere legal controversy, but involved consequences of the utmost practical importance to the persons concerned. The Soviet authorities prevented them from enlisting in the Polish Army and made it impossible for them to apply to the Polish Embassy for relief or legal protection. The Embassy's interventions for the release of Polish citizens, still detained contrary to the Amnesty Decree in prisons and labor camps, were refused where these persons were concerned. There
were also cases of Polish citizens being re-arrested on the pretext that they had communicated with agencies of the Polish Embassy and had thus infringed the Soviet regulations forbidding Soviet citizens, under severe penalty, to communicate in any matter whatsoever with representatives of foreign States. Moreover and of particular importance to Polish citizens of Jewish nationality who had relatives in Palestine, the United States and Great Britain, they were prevented from leaving the U.S.S.R., exit permits being as a rule refused, though the persons concerned had often completed all the necessary passport and visa formalities. In many cases Polish passports, valid for travel abroad, and endorsed with British, Palestinian and Iranian visas were confiscated when their holders applied to the competent Soviet authorities for exit permits from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

To compel the Polish Government to accept its view on the citizenship of persons forcibly deported from the territory of the Republic of Poland to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet Government also endeavored to limit the powers of the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshhev to issue Polish passports to Polish citizens, a sovereign right of every State. This was emphasized in a Note of June 9, 1942, from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy. In this Note the People’s Commissariat laid down that it was essential that lists of persons to whom the Embassy wished to issue Polish passports should be supplied to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which would then advise the Embassy of any objections the Soviet authorities might have to the issue of Polish passports to any of the persons whose names appeared upon the lists. The Soviet Note added that all persons on the said lists to whose issue with Polish passports the competent Soviet authorities had no objection, would then be provided with permits of residence as aliens. In addition the Soviet Note demanded that the Soviet authorities be supplied
with lists of persons who had already been issued with Polish passports by the Polish Embassy.

To the above, the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev replied in its Note of June 24, declaring that "in accordance with the fundamental principles of international law, the Government of the Republic of Poland asserts that the matter of Polish citizenship rests with them and they do not consider it possible that when verifying lists of Polish citizens demanded of the Embassy, the Soviet authorities should decide the citizenship of Polish citizens resident on the territory of the Republic of Poland, and who between 1939-1942 found themselves as is known not of their free will on the territory of the Soviet Union." The Note went on to point out that the issue of passports to Polish citizens was carried out by the Embassy and its Delegates in accordance with Polish laws and regulations in force. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Polish law, origin, religion, race or place of residence within the frontiers of the Republic of Poland, have no influence on the citizenship of any given person. The note concluded thus, "Taking into consideration that the aforementioned Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is aimed at imposing a procedure in issuing passports, unprecedented in relations between sovereign States, the Government of the Republic of Poland sees no possibility of discussing the principles of this question on the basis of the suggested procedure."

In replying to this Note on July 9, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did not discuss the arguments contained in the Polish Embassy's Note of June 24, but confined itself to stating that it continued to insist on the Polish Embassy's adoption of the suggested procedure for the issue of passports. The Polish Government, unable to consent to such a procedure and unwilling to aggravate the misunderstanding
over this matter, instructed the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to suspend the issue of passports to Polish citizens.

Towards the end of December 1942, the Polish relief crisis appeared to have come to an end when the Soviet authorities gave their consent to the establishment of a new form of relief organization in place of the Embassy Delegates, and it was then hoped that the conflict over Polish citizenship and the issue of passports would also be satisfactorily settled. These hopes proved vain as the Soviet Government adopted an attitude calculated to increase and intensify the conflict.

On January 16, 1943, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a new Note to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev in which it declared that despite the good will shown in its Note of December 1, 1941, when it agreed by way of exception, to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin (although persons of Ukrainian, White-Ruthenian and Jewish origin were thenceforth considered by the Soviet Government as Soviet citizens), the Polish Government had adopted a negative attitude to the said declaration of the Soviet Government and had not only refused to take suitable action, but had put forward demands conflicting with the sovereign rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to the territories in question. In consequence of the above, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had been instructed by the Soviet Government to state that the declaration contained in its Note of December 1, 1941, that an exception would be made in respect of persons of Polish origin must be considered no longer valid and that there was thus no longer any question of exonerating these persons from the regulations applicable to Soviet citizens.

Thus the Soviet Government not only extended its unilateral decision to force Soviet citizenship on all persons residing on Polish territory occupied by the Soviet authorities, but also asserted the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union to that
territory, which meant in fact that the Soviet Government raised territorial claims to Polish territory.

The question of Soviet claims to Polish territory was first raised in Mr. Molotov’s circular Note of January 6, 1942, concerning the atrocities committed on the Russian population by the German armies. In that Note the City of Lwów was included among towns situated on Soviet territory. Acknowledging receipt of Mr. Molotov’s Note, Ambassador Kot stated that the inclusion of Lwów among Ukrainian cities must have been the result of a misunderstanding, for history, international law and the ethnical composition of its population prove that Lwów was and remains a Polish city. In reply to Ambassador Kot’s Note, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated, on January 17, 1942, that it considered the Embassy’s view expressed in the Note and in other documents, in which Lwów, Brześć, Stanisławów and other towns of the Soviet Union were included among towns situated on the territory of the Republic of Poland—unjustified, and advised the Embassy that the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs would not in the future be able to accept for examination any further Notes from the Embassy containing statements to that effect.

In its Note of January 16, 1943, the Soviet Government again stated, this time quite plainly, that their territorial claims were not limited to certain towns in Poland, but to the entire territory which under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of September 28, 1939, had fallen to the Soviet Union. The tenor of this Note was in flagrant contradiction to Article I of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, which provided that “The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity.”

In replying to the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented on January 26, a Note to the Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government, in the
opening paragraph of which he recalled the refusal of the Polish Government to take cognizance of the Note of December 1, 1941, because the granting or withdrawal of Polish citizenship was an exclusive and undeniable attribute of the sovereignty of the Polish State. The Polish Government therefore maintained their fundamental attitude as regards Polish citizenship, and found with the deepest regret, that the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, was inconsistent with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the joint Declaration of both Governments of December 4, 1941, which aimed at the re-establishment of relations based on confidence between both States, and left no doubt as to the nullification of the Soviet-German agreements of 1939, together with their political and legal consequences. The Note recalled, moreover, that in the Protocol attached to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet Government undertook to release all Polish citizens deprived of their freedom on Soviet territory, irrespective of the reason for their detention. On the day the Agreement was signed there was on Soviet territory no category of Polish citizens other than those whose Polish citizenship the Soviet Government now refused to recognize, and the amnesty referred to above applied precisely to these persons in their status of Polish citizens. The Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs ended by declaring that the Polish Government refused to recognize any unilateral decisions taken by the Soviet Government during the period in which Polish-Soviet relations had ceased, for decisions of this kind were contrary to international law, as for instance the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 and the Atlantic Charter to which the U.S.S.R. had adhered, and that therefore the Polish Government insisted that the Soviet Government should treat all Polish citizens in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

Ambassador Bogomolov's reply of February 17, to the Polish Note of January 26, brought no new elements to the problem
under consideration, nor did it provide any relevant explanations. It merely stated that the Soviet Government did not consider it possible to discuss the problems of citizenship and that the Polish Government's assertion concerning the inconsistency of the Soviet views with the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 and the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, as well as the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941—was without foundation. In the opinion of the Soviet Government the people of the western districts of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian Republics had acquired Soviet citizenship at the "freely expressed will of the people."

When the Polish Government's attention was called to the fact that despite all protests and although Ambassador Romer was negotiating with Mr. Molotov in Moscow, the Soviet Government had proceeded to apply pressure to force Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs presented a new Note to Ambassador Bogomolov on March 29, 1943, in which he re-affirmed that in the light of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, binding both parties, the attitude of the Soviet Government must be regarded as illegal and unjustifiable, for: (a) it was inconsistent with the Protocol attached to the Agreement referred to, which granted amnesty to all Polish citizens in the Soviet Union, and which as a bilateral legal act could not be modified or infringed by any unilateral Soviet decisions, and (b) the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of November 29, 1939, as to citizenship, enacted as it was in consequence of the Soviet-German treaties of 1939, and even containing a direct reference to one of them, must have been invalidated by Article I of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941. In view of the fact that the Soviet Government did not agree to suspend the enforcement of its order concerning Polish citizens, the Polish Government had but one course, to protest emphatically and to state that it did not recognize this infringement of the sovereign
rights of the Polish State and that it reserved the fundamental right to repudiate in the future any accomplished fact either of a general character or affecting individual Polish citizens, brought about by the attitude of the Soviet Government.

In the course of the conversations which Ambassador Romer had in Moscow between February 20 and March 18, 1943, with Premier Stalin and Commissar Molotov it was established that the Soviet authorities did not consider as Soviet citizens all Polish citizens who happened to be in the Eastern part of Poland which the Soviet Government consider as incorporated in the U.S.S.R., but not domiciled there. Negotiations were then initiated with a view to determining a suitable procedure for issuing Polish passports; Ambassador Romer insisted that the Soviet authorities define their attitude with regard to those persons in the U.S.S.R. whom they recognize as “indisputably” Polish citizens. In order to make this clear the Soviet Government supplied the Polish Embassy with extracts from the Civil Codes of the Russian and Ukrainian Republics. From these it was possible to learn what Soviet legislation understood by “persons domiciled.” In the light of these documents a person “domiciled” is one residing permanently in a given locality or else attached to it by his work, property or principal source of employment. The Soviet authorities were instructed to comply with this legislation, to revoke any orders incompatible with it and to return the Polish documents that had been confiscated. On April 16, 1943, the Polish Ambassador received a Note informing him that the competent Soviet authorities had received the necessary instructions for supply certificates of residence (vid na zhitelstvo) to Polish citizens on Soviet territory. When issuing these documents, the local Soviet authorities fixed a period of two months as a time limit for acquiring Polish passports from the Embassy. This they considered entirely sufficient.
In theory, the Government of the U.S.S.R. raised no further objection to passports being issued by the Embassy without consulting the Soviet authorities on the citizenship of the persons concerned. In practice, however, only such Polish citizens could apply for passports as had already been given a certificate of residence by the Soviet authorities. Passports issued to other categories of Polish citizens would have made them liable to prosecution by the Soviet authorities.

Although the above procedure was not applied to any appreciable extent because of the rupture by the Soviet Government of diplomatic relations with Poland, it nevertheless remains evidence of the fact that even Soviet legislation recognizes a great number of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as “indisputably” Polish citizens, with the right to acquire Polish passports and leave the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Romer’s conversations with high Soviet officials and the procedure arrived at as described above prove that the attitude of the Soviet Government with regard to the problem of Polish citizenship in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, first defined in the note dated December 1, 1941, and then on January 16, 1943, was once again changed.

However the Note of January 16, 1943, had much wider and deeper implications. It marked the beginning of a new era in Polish-Soviet relations, an era in which the Soviet Government has been trying to deal unilaterally with Poland, the first victim of the 1939 German aggression, and this in their own way without the slightest regard for international law and justice, or consideration for the high principles in defence of which all other United Nations are fighting this war.
Part II
CHAPTER 1

Polish Soviet Relations Prior to the War

No. 1

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 698 issued in Moscow, August 29, 1918, abrogating the agreements of the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the Kingdoms of Prussia and Bavaria, the Duchies of Hesse, Oldenburg, Sachsen-Meiningen, and the City of Lubeck.

Art. 1. ..........................................................
Art. 2. ..........................................................
Art. 3. All agreements and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in connection with the partitions of Poland, are annulled for ever by the present Resolution, in view of the fact that they are contrary to the principle of the self-determination of peoples and to the revolutionary, legal conception of the Russian nation, which recognizes the inalienable right of the Polish nation to decide its own fate and to become united.
Art. 4. ..........................................................
Art. 5. ..........................................................

Signed: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars: V. ULYANOV-LENIN.
Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs: L. KARAKHAN.
Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars: VLAD. BONTCH-BRUYEVITCH.
No. 2


Poland is now confronted with a decision that for many years to come may have grave repercussions on the lives of both nations. Everything shows that the extreme imperialists of the Entente, the supporters and agents of Churchill and Clemenceau are directing at present all their efforts to draw Poland into a futile, ill-considered and criminal war with Soviet-Russia.

Conscious of its responsibility for the fate of the Russian working masses and wishing to prevent new and innumerable disasters, sacrifices and devastation threatening the two nations:

1. The Council of People's Commissars declares that the policy of the U.S.S.R. towards Poland is based not on any occasional, transient considerations of war or diplomacy but on the inviolable principle of self-determination of nations and it has recognized and recognizes unreservedly the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic and declares this recognition to be the basis of all its relations with Poland from the moment of the formation of an independent Polish State.

2. While regarding the last peace proposal of December 22 put forward by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as still fully valid, the Council of People's Commissars, which has no aggressive intentions whatever, declares that the Red Army will not cross the present line of the White-Ruthenian front that passes near the following points: Dryssa, Dzisna, Polock, Borysow, Paryczce, Railroad Stations Ptycz and Bialokozowice. As regards the Ukrainian front, the Council of People's Commissars declares in its own name and in the name of the provisional Ukrainian Government that the army of the Federated Soviet Republic will not engage in military operations to the West of the present line, running near the localities of Budouwa, Pilawy, Dereznia and Bar.

3. The Council of the People's Commissars declares that the Soviet Government has not entered into any agreements or pacts, with Germany or any other country, aimed directly or indirectly against Poland, and that the character and spirit of international policy of the Soviet authorities excludes the very possibility of similar agreements, as well as attempts to exploit eventual conflict between
4. The Council of People's Commissars declares that so far as the essential interests of Poland and Russia are concerned there is not a single question, territorial, economic or other, that could not be solved in a peaceful way, through negotiation, mutual compromise or agreement, as is now the case in the negotiations with Estonia.

While recommending to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that it obtain at the next session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in February, a confirmation by the Supreme Body of the Republic of the above stated basis of Soviet policy towards Poland, the Council of People's Commissars considers on its part that by this categorical declaration it is fulfilling its duty towards the peace interests of the Russian and Polish nations and hopes that all controversial matters will be settled by friendly negotiations between Russia and Poland.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars:  
V. ULYANOV-LENIN.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:  
TCHITCHERIN.

People's Commissar for Army and Navy:  
TROTSKY.

No. 3

Treaty of Peace between Poland, Russia and the Ukraine, signed at Riga, March 18, 1921.

Preamble

Poland—on the one hand—and Russia and the Ukraine—on the other—being desirous of putting an end to the war and of concluding a final, lasting and honorable peace based on a mutual understanding and in accordance with the peace preliminaries signed at Riga on October 12, 1920, have decided to enter into negotiations and have appointed for this purpose as plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Polish Republic:

MM. Jean Dabski,
Stanislas Kauzik,
Edouard Lechowicz,
Henri Strasburger and
Léon Wasilewski.

MM. Adolphe Joffé
Jacob Ganetski
Emmanuel Kviring
Leonide Obolenski and
Georges Koutshoubinski.

The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries met at Riga, and having exchanged their full powers, which were recognized as sufficient and found to be in good and due form, agreed to the following provisions:

Riga, March 18, 1921.

ARTICLE 1

The two Contracting Parties declare that a state of war has ceased to exist between them.

ARTICLE 2

The two Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, recognize the independence of the Ukraine and of White Ruthenia, and agree and decide that the eastern frontier of Poland, that is to say, the frontier between Poland on the one hand, and Russia, White Ruthenia and the Ukraine on the other, shall be as follows:

The frontier shall follow the course of the Western Dzwina, from the frontier between Russia and Latvia, to the point at which the frontier of the former Government of Wilno meets the frontier of the former Government of Witebsk; thence it shall follow the frontier between the former Governments of Wilno and Witebsk as far as the road running from the village of Drozdy to the town of Orzechowno, leaving the road and the town of Orzechowno to Poland;

It shall then cross the railway line near the town of Orzechowno, and, turning towards the south-west, shall run along the railway line, leaving the station of Zahacie to Poland, the village of Zahacie to Russia, and the village of Stelmachowo to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the eastern frontier of the former Govern-
ment of Wilno as far as the meeting point of the districts of Dzisna, Lepel and Borysow;

Thence it shall follow the frontier of the former Government of Wilno at an approximate distance of one kilometre, as far as the point at which this frontier turns westward near Sosnowiec;

Thence the frontier shall continue in a straight line towards the sources of the River Czernica to the east of Hornowa and thereafter it shall follow the Czernica river as far as the village of Wielka-Czernica, which it shall leave to White Ruthenia;

Thence it shall continue in a south-westerly direction, across the Lake of Miadziol, to the village of Zarzeczyck which shall be left to White Ruthenia together with the village of Chmielewiczyszyna; on the other hand, the villages of Starosiele and of Turowszczyzna shall belong to Poland;

Thence the frontier shall run in a south-westerly direction to the confluence of the River Wilja with an unnamed stream on the west of the village of Drohomicz, leaving to White Ruthenia the following villages: Uhly, Wolbarowicze, Borowe, Szunowka, Beztrock, Daleka, Klaczkówek, Zazantów, Maciejowyce, and the following to Poland: Komajsk, Raszkówka, Osowa, Kusk, Wardomicze, Solone, Milcz;

Thence the line shall follow the river Wilja to the road on the south of the town of Dolhinowo;

Thence it shall pass to the south as far as the village of Baturyn, leaving to White Ruthenia all that road and the villages of Rahozin, of Tokary, of Polosy and of Hluboczany, and to Poland the following villages: Owsiianiki, Czarnorucze, Zurawa, Ruszczycze, Zaciemień, Borki, Czerwiaki and Baturyn;

Thence it shall run to the town of Radoszkowicze, leaving to White Ruthenia the villages of Papsze, Sieliszcze, Podworany, Trusowicze North, Doszki, Cyganowo, Dworzyszcze, and Czyrewicze, and to Poland the villages of Lukawiec, Mordasy, Rubce, Lawcowicze North, and Lawcowicze South, Budzki, Klimonty, Wielkie Bakszy and the town of Radoszkowicze;

Thence it shall follow the River Wiazówka, to the village of Lipienie, leaving the latter village to Poland, then running in a south-westerly direction, crossing the railway and leaving the station of Radoszkowicze to White Ruthenia;

Thence it shall run southward as from the town of Raków, leaving to White Ruthenia the villages of Wiekszyce, Dolzenie,
Mietkowa, Wielka Borozdynka and Kozielszczyzna, and to Poland the villages of Szypowaly, Maciewicze, Stary Raków, Kuczkuny and the town of Raków;

Thence the frontier shall continue as far as the town of Wolma, leaving to White Ruthenia the villages of: Wielkie Siolo, Malawka, Lukasze, and Szczepki, and to Poland the villages of Duszkowo, Chimorydy, Jankowce, and the town of Wolma;

Thence it shall follow the road from the town of Wolma as far as the town of Rubiezewicze, leaving that road and the town to Poland;

Thence it shall continue southward as far as the unnamed inn situated at the point at which the Baranowicze-Mińsk railway crosses the Nowy Świeżeń-Mińsk road (see map, scale one English inch to ten versts, above the letter M at the beginning of the word Miezinowka; and map, scale one English inch to twenty-five versts, near Kolosowo) leaving the inn to Poland; the villages of Papki, Zywica, Poloniewicze, Osinówka, shall go to White Ruthenia and the villages of Lichacze and of Rozanka shall go to Poland;

Thence the frontier shall pass across the center of the Nieśwież-Cimkowicze road to the west of Kukowicze, leaving the villages of Swerynowo, Kutiec, Lunina, Jazwina North, Bieliki, Jazwin, Rymaszew, and Kukowicze (all three) to White Ruthenia; the villages of Kul, Buczne, Dwianopol, Zurawy, Posieki, Juszewicze, Lisuny North and Lisuny South, Sultanowszczyzna and Pleszewicze to Poland;

Thence it shall pass halfway between Kleck and Cimkowicze (between the villages of Puzowo and Prochody), leaving to White Ruthenia the villages of Rajówka, Sawicze, Zarakowce, and Puzowo, and to Poland the villages of Marusin, East Smolicze, Lecieszyn, and Prochody;

Thence it shall continue as far as the Warsaw-Moscow road, crossing it to the west of the village of West Filipowicze, and leaving the village of Ciechowa to White Ruthenia and the village of Jodcyce to Poland;

Thence it shall run south as far as the Morocz river, near Choropol, leaving the villages of Stare Mokrany, Zadworze, Mokrany and Choropol to White Ruthenia, and the villages of Ciecierowiec, Ostaszkoi, Lozowicze, and Nowe Mokrany to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the Morocz river as far as its confluence with the river Slucz of Mińsk;
Thence it shall follow the river Slucz as far as its confluence with the River Prypec;

Thence it shall continue towards the village of Berezce, leaving the villages of Lubowicze, Chilczyce, and Berezce to White Ruthenia, and the villages of North Lutki and South Lutki to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the road from the village of Bukcza, leaving the road and the village of Bukcza to White Ruthenia and the village of Korma to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the Sarny-Olewsk railway, which it shall cross between the stations of Ostki and Snowidowicze, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Wojtkowicze, Sobiczyn, Michalówka, and Budki Snowidowickie, and to Poland the villages of Radziwilowicze, Raczków, Bialowiska, Bialowiż, and Snowidowicze;

Thence the frontier shall continue towards the village of Myszakówka, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Majdan Hołyszewski, Zaderewie, Marjanpol, Zolny, Klomowa, and Rudnia Kłonowska, and to Poland the villages of Deré, Okopy, Netreba, Woniacze, Perelyssanka, Nowa Huta, and Myszakówka;

Thence it shall continue as far as the mouth of the River Korczyk, leaving the village of Mlynek to the Ukraine;

Thence it shall run up the River Korczyk, leaving the town of Korzec to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the village of Milatyn, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Poddubce, Kilikijów, Dolzki, Narajówka, Ulaszanówka, and Marjanówka, and the villages of Bohdanówka, Czernica, Kryłów, Majków, Dolha, Friederland, Poręba Kuraska, and Milatyn to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the road leading from the village of Milatyn to the town of Ostróg, leaving the villages of Moszczańówka, Krzywin, and Solowie to the Ukraine, and the villages of Moszczańica, Bodówka, Wilbowno, the town of Ostróg and the road to Poland;

Thence it shall run up the River Wilja as far as the village of Chodaki, which remains to Poland;

Thence it shall continue as far as the town of Bialozórka, leaving to the Ukraine the villages of Wielka Borowica, Stefanówka, North Bajmaki and South Bajmaki, Liski, Siwki, Wołoski, the town of Jampol, the villages of Diłkowce, Wiażowiec, and Krzywczyki, and to Poland the villages of Bołoźówka, Sadki, Obory, Szkro-
botówka, Pańkowce, Grzybowa, Lysohorka, Molodzków, and the town of Bialozórka;

Thence it shall continue as far as the River Zbrucz, leaving the road and the village of Szczesnówka to Poland;

Thence it shall follow the River Zbrucz, as far as its confluence with the River Dniester.

**ARTICLE 3**

Russia and the Ukraine abandon all rights and claims to the territories situated to the west of the frontier laid down by Article 2 of the present Treaty. Poland, on the other hand, abandons in favour of the Ukraine and of White Ruthenia all rights and claims to the territory situated to the east of this frontier. The two Contracting Parties agree that, in so far as the territory situated to the west of the frontier fixed in Article 2 of the present Treaty includes districts which form the subject of a dispute between Poland and Lithuania, the question of the attribution of these districts to one of those two States is a matter which exclusively concerns Poland and Lithuania.

**ARTICLE 4**

**ARTICLE 5**

Each of the Contracting Parties mutually undertakes to respect in every way the political sovereignty of the other Party, to abstain from interference in its internal affairs, and particularly to refrain from all agitation, propaganda or interference of any kind, and not to encourage any such movement.

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to create or protect organisations which are formed with the object of encouraging armed conflict against the other Contracting Party or of undermining its territorial integrity, or of subverting by force its political or social institutions, nor yet such organisations as claim to be the Government of the other Party or of a part of the territories of the other Party. The Contracting Parties therefore, undertake to prevent such organisations, their official representatives and other persons connected therewith, from establishing themselves on their territory, and to prohibit military recruiting and the entry into their territory and transport across it, of armed forces, arms, munitions and war material of any kind destined for such organisations.
No. 4

Decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, on the subject of the frontiers of Poland, March 15, 1923.

The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, signatories with the United States of America, as the principal Allied and Associated Powers, of the Versailles Treaty of Peace:

Considering that by the terms of Article 87, paragraph 3, of the said Treaty, it is for them to fix the frontiers of Poland, which have not been specified by that Treaty;

Considering that on February 15, 1923, the Polish Government addressed to the Conference of Ambassadors a request inviting the Powers there represented to avail themselves of the rights conferred on them by the said Article;

That, for its part, the Lithuanian Government has already, in its Note of November 18, 1922, shown itself anxious to see the said Powers avail themselves of the said rights;

Considering that by the terms of Article 91 of the Treaty of Peace of Saint Germain-en-Laye, Austria has renounced in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all its rights and titles to the territories which previously belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and which, situated outside the new frontiers of Austria, as they are described in Article 27 of the said Treaty, are not actually the subject of any attribution;

Considering that it is recognized by Poland that in so far as the eastern part of Galicia is concerned, the ethnographical conditions necessitate an autonomous régime;

Considering that the Treaty concluded between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland on June 28, 1919, has provided for special guarantees in favour of racial, language and religious minorities in all the territories placed under Polish sovereignty;

Considering that so far as its frontier with Russia is concerned, Poland has entered into direct relations with that State with a view to determining the line;

That in so far as the frontier between Poland and Lithuania is concerned, there is cause to take into account the actual situation resulting, notably, from the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on February 3, 1923:
Have charged the Conference of Ambassadors with the regulation of this question.

In consequence, the Conference of Ambassadors:

1. Decides to recognize as the frontiers of Poland:
   
   (1) With Russia:
   The line drawn and delimited by the agreement between the two States and on their responsibility dated November 28, 1922.*

   (2) With Lithuania:
   The line below described (according to the German map, scale 1:100,000):

   From the point where the northern administrative limit of the district of Suwalki meets the frontier of Eastern Prussia (the point common to Eastern Prussia, Poland and Lithuania) and as far as the most southerly point of re-entry of the limit of the district of Suwalki, a point situated at about seven kilometres to the north-west of Puńsk, the northern administrative limit of the district of Suwalki;

   Thence towards the south-east as far as a point on the road Berzniki-Kopciowo, situated about two kilometres to the south-east of Berzniki;

   A line to be determined on the spot, leaving Puńsk to Poland, traversing Lake Galadus from its north-westerly extremity as far as a point situated about two kilometres to the north of Zegary, then passing towards the east, then parallel with the line of small lakes situated between Berzniki and Zegary at about two kilometres to the east of these lakes;

   Thence as far as a point about two kilometres 500 metres to the east of Zelwa on the River Marycha, a line to be determined on the spot;

   Thence, down the course of the River Marycha as far as the confluence of a small tributary situated on the left bank of this river and immediately above Studzianka;

   Thence, a line to be determined on the spot as far as the source of the River Igorka, then the course of this river which passes to Warwiszki as far as its confluence with the Niemen;

   Thence, down the course of the River Niemen as far as the confluence of the River Grawe;

   * Polish-Soviet Delimitation of Frontiers Agreement, signed November 28, 1922, under the Treaty of Riga.
Thence, the River Grawe as far as the point where it intersects the high road from Merecz to Rotnica;

Thence, a line to be determined on the spot as far as the confluence of the River Skroblis with the River Mereczanka;

Thence, the course of the Mereczanka, as far as a bridge about 300 metres to the south-east of Podkamień;

Thence and as far as frontier post 142 at about two kilometres to the north-east of Strzelciszki;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving to Lithuania the localities of Podkamień, Karpiški, Strzelciszki, to Poland those of Bortele, Kukle, and passing by way of the intersection of the roads from Bobryszki to Olkieniki and from Orany to Wojtowo on the railway from Grodno to Wilno;

Thence as far as a point to be determined on the course of the River Wilja at about 800 metres to the west of Siurmańce;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving to Lithuania the localities of Kalańce, Szpiengleni, Giecieniszki, Uzuleje, Prybańce, Greczówka, Ismańce, Jagielany, Dergiąńce, Kopciszki, Zailgi, Chwoszczyzna, Niedzwiedówka, Janczuny, Daniliszki, Jerzówka, Nowy Dwór, Promyśłówka, Walakiszki, Kukle, Kalki, Wiluniszki, Kiermanczyski, Białoleśnic and Owsięszki, and leaving to Poland the localities of Wójtowo, Puszkarnia, Czarnókowale, Kol-lejpuń, Wększtelańce, Ejgielanie, Markowszczyzna, Strazn, Skobski, Wizgirdy, Dombrowo, Dembiaki, Stanisławówka, Kotysz, Staszkuniszki, Lebiedzie, Mejlszczyn, Podwórana, Główcz, Pietkieniszki, Kiermeliszki, Kudrany, Poniewieżka, Mejdany, Miciuny, Łojciszki, Mejryszki, Barcie, Jatełuny, Puzanowo, Kazimierówka and Siurmańce;

Thence, the course of the River Wilja as far as a point situated about one kilometre 200 metres to the south of Sejmieniszki;

Thence and as far as a point to be determined at the southwestern extremity of Lake Dubińskie to the south of Zaltynie;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory Pospierze, Kejmińce, Sketery, Olinowo, Pory, Kontromiszki, Kiele, Awizańce, Niečzańce, Bojary, Olany, Palki, Ollis, Okmianka, Towkiele, Aleksandryszy, Gawełki, Zaltynie, and in Polish territory the localities of Podwarańce, Podgaj, Drawca, Mejłuny, Papiernia, Bortkuszy, Uzubledzie, Lipówka, Poblyńdie, Zydulce, Astyki, Szalkowszczyzna, Romaszkańce, Pogiry, Borówka, Santoki,
Pustylki, Gudejki, Stolewsczynka, Zylwiszki, Szmilginie, Gawejki, Sidabry;

Thence, a line traversing Lake Dubińskie as far as a point to be determined on the north-east bank at about 500 metres to the south-east of Olka;

Thence and as far as a point to be determined on the south bank of Lake Prowal to the east of Surgańce;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Olka, Lake Bołosza, Labejszyszki, Mlynek, Janiszki, Szerejkiszyki, Surgańce, and in Polish territory the localities of Jankuniszki, Purwiniszki, Szarkiszki, Maciejowo, Ormiany, Skardzie, Nowosiółka, Grzybiance;

Thence and as far as a point to be determined on the southern edge of the lake on the bank of which is Antolkony and at 500 metres to the west of this locality;

A line to be determined on the spot, leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Madejki, Mazule, Szakaliski, Andrulanie, Żukowszczyzna, Zemajtyski, Prudziszyki, Poluknis, Pozenis, Zwińbliszyki, Sidoriszki, Melejszany, and in Polish territory the localities of Maldziuny, Rutowsczynka, Baranowo, Antolezjdie, Berniuny, Lyngmiany, Antokalny;

And thence as far as the frontier of Latvia;

A line to be determined on the spot running towards the north-east then towards the north, passing between Lake Bołosza and Lake Dringis, and leaving in Lithuanian territory the localities of Aukstienis, Achramianecz, Rejnie, Azany, Sadziuny, W.-Derewnia, Suntupie, Kalniszki, Szabolowszczyzna, Mugiłskie, Jurkokałnie, Smolweczi, Werugiszki, and in Polish territory the localities of Kozaczyzna, Mejlny, Wardzikiemie, Aliejuny, Sakiszki, Pozemiszki, Karaczuni, Smolwy, Paukszteniszki, Smolwy (north), Dulkiszki, Matejkiszyki;

The tracing of this line on the spot is left to the care of the two Governments concerned, who will have every latitude to proceed, by mutual agreement, to rectifications of detail which they may recognize on the spot as indispensable.

2. Decides to recognize to Poland, which accepts all rights of sovereignty over the territories comprised between the frontiers above defined and the other frontiers of the Polish territory, with reserve to the dispositions of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Saint Germain-en-Laye concerning the charges and obligations incumbent
upon the States to which any territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred.

Done at Paris, March 15, 1923.

Eric Phipps. R. Poincaré.
Romano Arezzana. M. Matsuda.

The undersigned, duly authorized, declares, in the name of the Polish Government, his acceptance of the foregoing dispositions.

Done at Paris, March 15, 1923.

Maurice Zamoyski.

No. 5

Note of April 5, 1923 from Hon. Hugh Gibson, Minister of the United States of America in Warsaw, to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, taking cognizance of the Decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 15, 1923.

Warsaw, April 5, 1923.

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government has taken cognizance of the decision of the Council of Ambassadors at Paris of March 15, 1923 with regard to the Polish frontiers, this decision being in harmony with the assertions of territorial Sovereignty of Poland.

In view of this the officials of the American Government charged with the administration of the immigration law have agreed that for the balance of the present fiscal year the quotas of the regions of Pinsk and Eastern Galicia shall be merged into that of Poland.

I take the occasion to express, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

Hugh Gibson.

No. 6

Protocol between Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the immediate entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of August 27, 1928, regarding renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy,* signed at Moscow, February 9, 1929.

The Government of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, His Majesty

* Briand-Kellogg Pact.
the King of Rumania, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being desirous of promoting the maintenance of peace between their respective countries and for this purpose of putting into force without delay, between the peoples of those countries, the Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, have decided to achieve this purpose by means of the present Protocol and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE 1**

The Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, a copy of which is attached to the present Protocol as an integral part of that instrument, shall come into force between the Contracting Parties after the ratification of the said Treaty of Paris of 1928 by the competent legislative bodies of the respective Contracting Parties.

**ARTICLE 2**

The entry into force in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 in reciprocal relations between the Parties to the present Protocol shall be valid independently of the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 as provided in Article 3 of the last-named Treaty.

**ARTICLE 3**

1. The present Protocol shall be ratified by the competent legislative bodies of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with the requirements of their respective constitutions.

2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within one week of the ratification of the present Protocol by the respective parties.

3. As from the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two of the Contracting Parties, the present Protocol shall come into force between those two Parties. In reciprocal relations between the other Contracting Parties and the States for which it
has already come into force, the Protocol shall come into force as and when their instruments of ratification are deposited.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall immediately notify the deposit of the several ratifications to all the signatories to the present Protocol.

**ARTICLE 4**

In order to give effect to Article 1 of the present Protocol, each of the Contracting Parties, after ratification by its legislative bodies of the Treaty of Paris of 1928, shall immediately notify the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all the other Parties to the present Protocol, through the diplomatic channel.

**ARTICLE 5**

The present Protocol shall be open for the accession of the Governments of all countries. Notification of final accession shall be made to the address of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall duly notify all the other Parties to the present Protocol. Immediately on receipt of such notification of accession, the present Protocol shall be put into force in reciprocal relations between the acceding State and all the other Parties to the present Protocol.

**ARTICLE 6**

The entry into force, in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928, in reciprocal relations between the acceding State and all the other Parties to the said Protocol, shall be effected in the way laid down in Article 4 of the Protocol.

**ARTICLE 7**

The present Protocol has been drawn up in a single copy, an authentic copy of which shall be communicated by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to each of the signatory or acceding States.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed their seals thereto.

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Pact of Non-Aggression between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow, July 25, 1932.

The President of the Polish Republic, of the one part, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the other part,
Desirous of maintaining the present state of peace between their countries, and convinced that the maintenance of peace between them constitutes an important factor in the work of preserving universal peace;

Considering that the Treaty of Peace of March 18, 1921, constitutes, now as in the past, the basis of their reciprocal relations and undertakings;

Convinced that the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the exclusion of all that might be contrary to the normal condition of relations between States are the surest means of arriving at the goal desired;

Declaring that none of the obligations hitherto assumed by either of the Parties stands in the way of the peaceful development of their mutual relations or is incompatible with the present Pact;

Have decided to conclude the present Pact with the object of amplifying and completing the pact for the renunciation of war signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, and put into force by the Protocol signed at Moscow on February 9, 1929, and for that purpose have designated as their Plenipotentiaries.

Who, after exchanging their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

**ARTICLE 1**

The two Contracting Parties, recording the fact that they have renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, reciprocally undertake to refrain from taking any aggressive action against or invading the territory of the other Party, either alone or in conjunction with other Powers.

Any act of violence attacking the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political independence of the other Contracting Party shall be regarded as contrary to the undertakings contained in the present Article, even if such acts are committed without declaration of war and avoid all possible warlike manifestations.

**ARTICLE 2**

Should one of the Contracting Parties be attacked by a third State or by a group of other States, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to give aid or assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the aggressor State during the whole period of the conflict.
If one of the Contracting Parties commits an act of aggression against a third State the other Contracting Party shall have the right to be released from the present Treaty without previous denunciation.

**Article 3**

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to be a party to any agreement openly hostile to the other Party from the point of view of aggression.

**Article 4**

The undertakings provided for in Articles 1 and 2 of the present Pact shall in no case limit or modify the international rights and obligations of each Contracting Party under agreements concluded by it before the coming into force of the present Pact, so far as the said agreements contain no aggressive elements.

**Article 5**

The two Contracting Parties, desirous of settling and solving, exclusively by peaceful means, any disputes and differences, of whatever nature or origin, which may arise between them, undertake to submit questions at issue, which it has not been possible to settle within a reasonable period by diplomatic channels, to a procedure of conciliation, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention for the application of the procedure of conciliation, which constitutes an integral part of the present Pact and shall be signed separately and ratified as soon as possible simultaneously with the Pact of Non-Aggression.¹

**Article 6**

The present Pact shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Warsaw within thirty days following the ratification by Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after which the Pact shall come into force immediately.

**Article 7**

The Pact is concluded for three years. If it is not denounced by one of the Contracting Parties, after previous notice of not

¹The Convention for Conciliation between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was signed at Moscow, November 23, 1932.
less than six months before the expiry of that period, it shall be automatically renewed for a further period of two years.

**ARTICLE 8**

The present Pact is drawn up in Polish and Russian, both texts being authentic.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Pact and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

**PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE NO. 1**

The Contracting Parties declare that Article 7 of the Pact of July 25, 1932, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the expiry of the time-limit or denunciation before the expiry of the time-period under Article 7 could have as a result the limitation or cancellation of the obligations arising out of the Pact of Paris of 1928.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

**PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE NO. 2**

On signing the Pact of Non-Aggression this day, the two Parties having exchanged their views on the draft Conciliation Convention submitted by the Soviet Party, declare that they are convinced that there is no essential difference of opinion between them.

Done at Moscow, in two copies, July 25, 1932.

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**No. 8**


His Majesty the King of Rumania, the President of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, and His Majesty the King of Afghanistan;

Being desirous of consolidating the peaceful relations existing between their countries;

Mindful of the fact that the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of which they are signatories, prohibits all aggression;
Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified;

And noting that all States have an equal right to independence, security, the defence of their territories, and the free development of their institutions;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries;

And judging it expedient, in the interest of the general peace, to bring into force, as between their countries, precise rules defining aggression, until such time as those rules shall become universal;

Have decided, with the aforesaid objects, to conclude the present Convention, and have duly authorized for this purpose . . . .

Who have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the other Parties, from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, the definition of aggression as explained in the report dated May 24, 1933, of the Committee on Security Questions (Politis Report) to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which report was made in consequence of the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

ARTICLE 2

Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

1. Declaration of war upon another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5. Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own
territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

**Article 3**

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2 (for examples see Annex).

**Article 4**

The present Convention shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with its laws.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the High Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by two of the High Contracting Parties, the present Convention shall come into force as between those two Parties. The Convention shall come into force as regards each of the other High Contracting Parties when it deposits its instruments of ratification.

Each deposit of instruments of ratification shall immediately be notified by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to all the signatories of the present Convention.

**Article 5**

The present Convention has been signed in eight copies, of which each of the High Contracting Parties has received one.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done in London, July 3, 1933.

**Annex**

To Article 3 of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression.

The High Contracting Parties, signatories of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression.

Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the rule laid down in Article 3 of that Convention shall be in no way restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor.
Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

(a) The internal condition of a State:
E.g., its political, economic, or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war.

(b) The international conduct of a State:
E.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial, or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognize that the present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.

Protocol of Signature

It is hereby agreed between the High Contracting Parties that should one or more of the other States immediately adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accede in the future to the present Convention, the said accession shall confer on the State or States in question the same rights and shall impose on them the same obligations as those conferred and imposed on the ordinary signatories.¹

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No. 9

Protocol signed at Moscow, May 5, 1934, between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prolonging until December 31, 1945, the Pact of Non-Aggression of July 25, 1932.

The President of the Republic of Poland, and The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Being desirous of providing as firm a basis as possible for the development of the relations between their countries;

Being desirous of giving each other fresh proof of the unchange-

¹On July 22, 1933, the Republic of Finland adhered to this Convention.
able character and solidity of the pacific and friendly relations happily established between them;

Moved by the desire to collaborate in the consolidation of world peace and also for the stability and peaceful development of international relations in Eastern Europe;

Noting that the conclusion on July 5, 1932, at Moscow, of the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has had a beneficial influence on the development of their relations and on the solution of the above-mentioned problems;

Have decided to sign the present Protocol, and have for this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and true form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

In modification of the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty of Non-Aggression concluded at Moscow on July 25, 1932, between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the date and manner in which that Treaty shall cease to have effect, the two Contracting Parties decide that it shall remain in force until December 31, 1945.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to denounce the Treaty by giving notice to that effect six months before the expiry of the above-mentioned period. If the Treaty is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties, its period of validity shall be automatically prolonged for two years; similarly, the Treaty shall be regarded as prolonged on each occasion for a further period of two years, if it is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties in the manner provided for in the present Article.

ARTICLE 2

The present Protocol is drawn up in duplicate, each copy being in the Polish and Russian languages and both texts being equally authentic.

The present Protocol shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the Contracting Parties at Warsaw.
The present Protocol shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow in duplicate, in the Polish and Russian languages, the 5th day of May, 1934.

**FINAL PROTOCOL**

In connection with the signature on this date of the Protocol prolonging the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of July 25, 1932, each of the High Contracting Parties, having again examined all the provisions of the Peace Treaty concluded at Riga on March 18, 1921, which constitutes the basis of their mutual relations, declares that it has no obligations and is not bound by any declarations inconsistent with the provisions of the said Peace Treaty and in particular of Article 3 thereof.

Consequently, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirms that the Note from the People's Commissar, G. V. Tchitcherin, of September 28, 1926, to the Lithuanian Government cannot be interpreted to mean that the Note implied any intention on the part of the Soviet Government to interfere in the settlement of the territorial questions mentioned therein.

Done at Moscow in duplicate, in the Polish and Russian languages, the 5th day of May, 1934.

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**No. 10**

Notes exchanged in Moscow on September 10, 1934, between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government in connection with the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations.

Moscow, September 10, 1934.

Mr. People's Commissar,

In connection with the eventuality of the entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, the Government of the Republic of Poland proposes to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a reciprocal recognition that after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has entered the League of Nations the relations between the Republic of Poland and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will in all their extent continue on the basis of all existing agreements between them, including the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression.

HENRYK SOKOLNICKI.

Mr. Mikolai Krestinski,
Director of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow.

MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 10, 1934.

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires,
In reply to your Note of even date, I have the honor to communicate to you in the name of my Government that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics completely agrees with the Polish Government on the question that, after the eventual invitation to and entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the League of Nations, the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Poland will remain on the basis of the treaties existing between them, all of which, including the Pact of Non-Aggression and the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, will continue to preserve all their force.

M. KRESTINSKI.

Mr. Sokolnicki,
Chargé d'Affaires of the Republic of Poland in Moscow.

No. 11

Joint Communiqué issued in Moscow, November 26, 1938, by the Polish and Soviet Governments on the subject of Polish-Soviet relations.

A series of conversations recently held between M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., and M. Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, has led to the following statement:

1. Relations between the Polish Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are and will continue to be based to the fullest extent on all the existing Agreements, including the Polish-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression dated July 25, 1932. This Pact, concluded for five years and extended on May 5, 1934, for a
further period ending December 31, 1945, has a basis wide enough 
to guarantee the inviolability of peaceful relations between the two 
States.

2. Both Governments are favorable to the extension of their 
commercial relations.

3. Both Governments agree that it is necessary to settle a num-
ber of current and longstanding matters which have arisen in con-
nection with the various agreements in force, and, in particular, 
to dispose of the various frontier incidents which have lately been 
occuring.

CHAPTER 2

Soviet Aggression and Polish-Soviet Conflict 
arising therefrom

No. 12

Despatch of September 17, 1939, from Mr. Grzybowski, Polish 
Ambassador in Moscow, to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
reporting his conversation with M. Potemkin, Deputy People's 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Moscow, September 17, 1939.

Mr. Potemkin sent for me today, September 17, at 3 a.m., and 
read me a Note from his Government, signed by Premier Molotov. 
The Note communicates that the Soviet Government have ordered 
their troops to cross the Polish frontier. The motives given in the 
Note were of such a nature that I refused to take it into cognizance 
and categorically protested against its contents. In view of the 
absence of Soviet diplomatic representatives from Poland, I agreed 
only to transmit the above information. I await instructions.

No. 13

Text of Note of September 17, 1939, read by M. Potemkin, Deputy 
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to M. Grzybowski, Polish 
Ambassador in Moscow.

The Polish-German War has revealed the internal bankruptcy of 
the Polish State. During the course of ten days' hostilities Poland
has lost all her industrial areas and cultural centres. Warsaw no longer exists as the capital of Poland. The Polish Government has disintegrated, and no longer shows any sign of life. This means that the Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist. Therefore the Agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have ceased to operate. Left to her own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a suitable field for all manner of hazards and surprises, which may constitute a threat to the U.S.S.R. For these reasons the Soviet Government, which hitherto has preserved neutrality, cannot any longer observe a neutral attitude towards these facts.

The Soviet Government further cannot view with indifference the fact that the kindred Ukrainian and White Ruthenian people, who live on Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate, are left defenceless.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government has directed the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia.

At the same time the Soviet Government proposes to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they were dragged by their unwise leaders, and enable them to live a peaceful life.

No. 14

Communiqué issued on September 17, 1939, by the Polish Embassy in London.

London, September 17, 1939.

On September 17, at 4 a.m., Soviet troops crossed the frontier of Poland at many points and were met immediately with strong resistance on the part of the Polish national army. A sharp encounter in particular is being fought near the frontier in the region of Molodeczno.

The pretext which the Soviet Government advance in order to justify this flagrant act of direct aggression is that the Polish Government has ceased to exist, and that it has abandoned the territory of Poland, thus leaving the Polish population on territories outside the zone of war with Germany without protection. The
Polish Government cannot enter into any discussion of the pretext which the Soviet Government has invented in order to justify the violation of the Polish frontier.

The Polish Government, responsible to the President of the Republic and to the duly elected National Parliament, are functioning on Polish territory and are carrying on the war against the German aggressors by all the means in their power.

By the act of direct aggression committed this morning the Soviet Government have flagrantly violated the Polish-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression concluded in Moscow on July 25, 1932, in which both parties mutually undertook to abstain from all aggressive action or from attack against each other. Moreover, on May 5, 1934, by the Protocol signed in Moscow, the above Pact of Non-Aggression was prolonged until December 31, 1945.

By the Convention concluded in London on July 3, 1933, Soviet Russia and Poland agreed on a definition of aggression, which clearly stamped as an act of aggression any encroachment upon the territory of one Contracting Party by the armed forces of the other and furthermore, that no consideration of a political, military, economic, or any other order could in any circumstances serve as a pretext or excuse for committing an act of aggression.

Therefore, by the act of wanton aggression committed this morning, the Soviet Government stands self-condemned as a violator of its international obligations, thus contradicting all the moral principles upon which Soviet Russia pretended to base her foreign policy since her admittance into the League of Nations.

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No. 15

Communiqué issued in Kuty on September 17, 1939, by the Polish Government, protesting against the Soviet aggression.

The Polish Ambassador in Moscow has refused to accept the Note presented to him to-day by the Soviet Government.

The Polish Government has approved this attitude of their Ambassador who has asked the Soviet Government for his passports.

The Polish Government solemnly protest against the unilateral violation of the Non-Aggression Pact by Russia and against the invasion of Polish territory at a moment when the whole Polish Nation is making a supreme effort to repel the German aggressor.
The Polish Government protests against the motives alleged in the Note of the Soviet Government because the Polish Government are carrying on their normal activities and the Polish Army is successfully resisting the enemy.

No. 16

Note of September 18, 1939, presented by the Polish Ambassador in Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

On the instruction of his Government the Polish Ambassador has the honor to communicate the following to the Government of the French Republic:

To-day, September 17, 1939, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics committed an aggression against Poland. At dawn large Soviet forces crossed the Polish frontier at several points. The Polish troops resisted. In view of the superiority of the Soviet forces, the Polish troops withdrew, fighting.

The Polish Government have protested to Moscow, and have instructed their Ambassador to demand his passports. The Polish Government await from the Allied French Government a categorical protest against the aggression committed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Polish Government reserve the right to call upon their Allies in regard to the obligations devolving upon them by virtue of the treaties in force.

No. 17

German-Soviet Communiqué of September 18, 1939, concerning military co-operation on Polish territory.

In order to avoid all kinds of unfounded rumours concerning the respective aims of the Soviet and German armies operating in Poland the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government declare that the operations of these armies do not involve any aim contrary to the interests of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. or to the spirit and the letter of the German-Russian pact of non-

* A similar Note was presented to the British Foreign Office by the Polish Ambassador in London.
aggression. On the contrary, the aim of these armies is to restore peace and order destroyed by the collapse of the Polish State and to help the Polish population to reconstruct the conditions of their political existence.

No. 18

German-Soviet Communique of September 22, 1939, on the demarcation line between the German and Soviet military zones.

The German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have established a demarcation line between the Soviet and the German armies along the course of the river Pissa to its confluence with the river Narew; further the river Narew to its confluence with the river Bug; then the river Bug to its confluence with the river Vistula.

No. 19

Soviet-German Agreement signed in Moscow, September 28, 1939.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government, following the collapse of the former Polish State, consider it as exclusively their own task to restore peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples inhabiting them a peaceful existence which will correspond to their national characteristics. With this object in view, they have concluded the following Agreement:

**ARTICLE 1**

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government establish, as the frontier between their respective State interests in the territory of the former Polish State, a line which is marked on the attached map and which will be given in more detail in a supplementary Protocol.

**ARTICLE 2**

Both countries recognize as final the frontier between their respective State interests, as set out in Article 1, and will resist any interference with this decision on the part of other Powers.

**ARTICLE 3**

The German Government will carry out the necessary State reconstruction on the territory west of the line indicated in Article 1, and the Soviet Government on the territory east of this line.
ARTICLE 4

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government regard the above-mentioned reconstruction as a reliable foundation for the future development of friendly relations between their peoples.

ARTICLE 5

This agreement is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place as soon as possible in Berlin.

The agreement enters into force from the moment of its signature.

Molotov Ribbentrop

No. 20

Polish Government's protest of September 30, 1939, against the German-Soviet Agreement of September 28, 1939, presented by the Polish Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Office.*

In face of the flagrant violation of the sacred rights of the Polish State and the Polish Nation constituted by the Agreement of September 28 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., disposing of territories of the Polish Republic for the benefit of the two aggressor States, in the name of the Polish Government I make the most formal and solemn protest against this machination woven between Berlin and Moscow in contempt of all international obligations and all human morality.

Poland will never recognize this act of violence, and strong in the justice of her cause she will not cease to struggle for the day when, her territory liberated from the invaders, her legitimate rights will be established in their entirety.

By the heroic resistance of her army, by the patriotic sacrifice of all her population which has been demonstrated in the heroic defence of the capital city of Warsaw, of Lwów, of Gdynia, of Modlin and of so many other towns, the Polish nation has clearly proved to the world its steadfast will to live in freedom and independence.

Basing herself on the unanimous sympathy of all the countries which respect liberty and good faith in relations between peoples,

* A similar protest was presented by Polish diplomatic representatives abroad to the respective Governments to which they were accredited.
and confident in the steadfast support which is guaranteed her by her treaties of alliance, Poland will continue the struggle by all means in her power, confident in her future and in ultimate victory.

No. 21

Soviet-Lithuanian Agreement signed in Moscow, October 10, 1939.

With a view to furthering the friendly relations established by the Treaty of Peace of July 12, 1920, between the U.S.S.R. and the Lithuanian Republic, which are based on the mutual recognition of political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. on the one part and the President of the Lithuanian Republic on the other part:

Being of the opinion that the treaty of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of differences has continued, since it was signed on September 28, 1926, to serve as the foundation of their mutual relations and obligations;

Being convinced moreover that it is in the interests of the two Contracting Parties to define the exact conditions of their guarantee of mutual security and of a just decision as to sovereignty over the city and district of Wilno, which were illegally detached from Lithuania by Poland;

Have deemed it necessary to conclude the present Agreement for the restoration of the city and district of Wilno to the Lithuanian Republic, as well as a pact of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, and for this purpose have appointed their Plenipotentiaries .

Article 1

In order to strengthen the friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, the city of Wilno and the district of Wilno are hereby returned to the Republic of Lithuania by the U.S.S.R. to be reunited with the territory of the State of Lithuania. The boundary between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Lithuania is demarcated as shown in the attached map. This boundary line is to be more exactly described in a supplementary Protocol.
No. 22

Polish Government's protest of October 18, 1939, against the Soviet-Lithuanian Agreement sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Polish Government, having learned of the Pact of Mutual Assistance signed on October 10, 1939, between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, have presented a formal protest to the Lithuanian Government against the acceptance by the said Government of any territory ceded by the U.S.S.R. which does not belong to that Union.

No. 23

Polish Government's protest of October 21, 1939, against the holding of a plebiscite by the Soviets on Polish territory temporarily occupied by the U.S.S.R. sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

By order of my Government, I have the honor to submit the following for your Excellency's information:

The Polish Government have just learned that on Polish territory temporarily occupied by the U.S.S.R. a plebiscite is to be held to ascertain the will of the population on the question of the transfer of such territory to the U.S.S.R.

The Polish Government hereby declare that the holding of such a plebiscite in areas under military occupation is contrary to International Law. Therefore they will consider such a plebiscite as null and void, and in no case will they recognize it as having force of law.

No. 24

Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. issued in Moscow on November 1, 1939, concerning the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its union with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having heard the report of the Authorized Committee of the National Assembly of Western Ukraine has decided as follows:
1. To comply with the petition of the National Assembly of Western Ukraine to incorporate it in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to unite it with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

2. To instruct the Presidium of the Supreme Council to fix a date for the election of representatives of Western Ukraine to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.

3. To propose to the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic the admission of Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian S.S.R.

4. To instruct the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. to submit to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for examination a plan for the demarcation of boundaries between the provinces and districts on the borders of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the White-Ruthenian Socialist Soviet Republic.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.
M. Kalinin.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.
A. Gorkin.

No. 25

Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. issued in Moscow on November 2, 1939, concerning the incorporation of Western White Ruthenia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its union with the White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having heard the report of the Authorized Committee of the National Assembly of Western White Ruthenia has decided as follows:

1. To comply with the petition of the National Assembly of Western White Ruthenia to incorporate Western White Ruthenia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to unite it with the White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic.

2. To instruct the Presidium of the Supreme Council to fix a date for the election of representatives of Western White Ruthenia to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.
3. To propose to the Supreme Council of the White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republic the admission of Western White Ruthenia to the White Ruthenian S.S.R.


Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.
M. Kalinin.
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.
A. Gorkin.

No. 26

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. issued in Moscow on November 29, 1939, concerning the acquisition of citizenship of the U.S.S.R. by the inhabitants of the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian S.S.R.

1. In conformity with the Citizenship of the U.S.S.R. Act of August 19th, 1938, it is decreed that the following are henceforth citizens of the U.S.S.R.:

a) former Polish citizens who were on the territory of the Western districts* of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia when these became part of the U.S.S.R. (November 1 and 2, 1939).

b) persons who arrived in the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the agreement of November 16, 1939, between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the German Government as well as those who arrived as a result of the cession by the U.S.S.R. to Lithuania of the city of Wilno and the district* of Wilno in accordance with the agreement of October 10, 1939.

2. Former Polish citizens resident in the Western districts* of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia who were not present in the territory of these districts* on November 1 and 2, 1939, and do

* Oblast.

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not possess Soviet citizenship can acquire the citizenship of the U.S.S.R. by the procedure provided in Article 3 of the Citizenship of the U.S.S.R. Act.

3. Such persons enumerated in Paragraph 1 of the present Decree as were deprived of Soviet citizenship under the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. of December 15th, 1921 may acquire citizenship of the U.S.S.R. by the procedure provided in Article 3 of the Citizenship of the U.S.S.R. Act.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.

M. Kalinin.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.

A. Gorkin.

No. 27

Polish Government's Protest of February 3, 1940, against the conscription of Polish citizens by the Red Army, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

By order of my Government I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

The Soviet authorities have proceeded on the territories of the Republic of Poland occupied by the armies of the U.S.S.R. to carry out a military census of all men aged from 18 to 50 and of all women who have attended nursing courses, and this as a preliminary step to their military service.

Further to its protest against the decision to incorporate the above mentioned territories in the U.S.S.R. and having regard to the stipulations of international law in force, the Polish Government protests against this new violation of international law and custom.

In drawing attention to the fact that the use of force to compel Polish nationals to serve in the army of a State which occupied by violence part of the territory of Poland, will entail a large number of victims, the Polish Government here and now hold responsible therefore the Government of the U.S.S.R.
Polish Government's Protest of July 25, 1940, against the annexation of the district of Wilno, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

By order of my Government I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

The Government of the U.S.S.R. has proceeded to annex the territories of the three Baltic Republics. This annexation also includes the territory of Wilno which was already illegally occupied by Soviet troops in September 1939 and retroceded to the Lithuanian Government in October 1939, and is now reoccupied by Soviet troops simultaneously with the Lithuanian territory.

The Polish Government solemnly protests against this new violation of international law by the U.S.S.R. and formally reserves all its rights to the territories of the Republic of Poland occupied by Soviet troops, whether in September 1939 or recently. This act of violence committed by the U.S.S.R. confers upon it no rights whatsoever to the territories thus occupied, and the Polish Government reserve the right to claim at the appropriate time reparation from the Soviet Government for damages which the Soviet occupation has caused or may cause to Poland and Polish nationals.

No. 29

Polish Government’s Protest of February 21, 1941, against the forcing of Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens, sent to Allied and Neutral Governments through Polish diplomatic representatives.

By order of my Government I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

The Polish Government has recently been informed that the Soviet authorities acting now on the Polish territories occupied by the U.S.S.R. are proceeding to register the population and are forcing Polish citizens, under threat of reprisals, to renounce formally their Polish nationality, to cease all activity aimed at the restoration of the independence of Poland, and to declare that they will henceforward consider themselves loyal citizens of the U.S.S.R.

The Polish Government protests against this new and flagrant breach of the elementary principles of international law and justice
CHAPTER 3

The Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941

No. 30

Polish-Soviet Agreement signed in London, July 30, 1941.

The Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have concluded the present Agreement and decided as follows:

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relative to territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity. The Government of the Republic of Poland declares that Poland is not bound by any Agreement with any third State directed against the U.S.S.R.

2. Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two Governments upon the signature of this Agreement and an exchange of ambassadors will follow immediately.

3. The two Governments mutually undertake to render one another aid and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.

4. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses its consent to the formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of a Polish Army under a commander appointed by the Government of the Republic of Poland, in agreement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be subordinated in operational matters to the Supreme Command of the U.S.S.R. on which there will be a representative of the Polish Army. All details as to command,
organization and employment of this force will be settled in a subsequent Agreement.

5. This Agreement will come into force immediately upon its signature and without ratification. The present Agreement is drawn up in two copies, each of them in the Russian and Polish languages. Both texts have equal force.

Protocol

1. As soon as diplomatic relations are re-established the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the U.S.S.R., either as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds.

2. The present Protocol comes into force simultaneously with the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

WŁADYSŁAW SIKORSKI

No. 31

Communique issued by the British Foreign Office in London, July 30, 1941.

1. An agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union was signed in the Secretary of State’s room at the Foreign Office on July 30. General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, signed for Poland; Mr. Maiski, Soviet Ambassador, signed for the Soviet Union. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were present.

2. The agreement is being published.

3. After the signature of the agreement, Mr. Eden handed to General Sikorski an official Note in the following terms:

“On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of today, I desire to take this opportunity of informing you that in conformity with the provision of the agreement of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland of the 25th of August 1939, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertakings towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics which affect the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty’s Government do not recognize any terri-
torial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939.

General Sikorski handed to Mr. Eden the following reply:

"The Polish Government take note of your letter dated July 30 and desire to express sincere satisfaction at the statement that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939. This corresponds with the view of the Polish Government which, as they have previously informed His Majesty's Government, have never recognized any territorial changes effected in Poland since the outbreak of the war."

No. 32

Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow on December 4, 1941, by General Sikorski for the Government of the Republic of Poland and by Premier Stalin for the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government of the Polish Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, animated by the spirit of friendly understanding and fighting collaboration, declare:

1. German Hitlerite imperialism is the worst enemy of mankind—no compromise with it is possible.

Both States together with Great Britain and other Allies, supported by the United States of America, will wage war until complete victory and final destruction of the German invaders.

2. Implementing the Treaty concluded on July 30, 1941, both Governments will render each other during the war full military assistance, and troops of the Republic of Poland located on the territory of the Soviet Union will wage war against the German brigands shoulder to shoulder with Soviet troops.

In peace-time their mutual relations will be based on good neighborly collaboration, friendship and reciprocal honest fulfillment of the obligations they have taken upon themselves.

3. After a victorious war and the appropriate punishment of the Hitlerite criminals, it will be the aim of the Allied States to ensure a durable and just peace. This can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations on the basis of unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for inter-
national law backed by the collective armed force of the Allied States must form the decisive factor in the creation of such an organization. Only under this condition can a Europe destroyed by German barbarism be restored and a guarantee be created that the disaster caused by the Hitlerites will never be repeated.

For the Government of the Republic of Poland
Sikorski

By authority of the Government of the Soviet Union
Stalin

CHAPTER 4
Release of Polish Citizens and Prisoners of War

No. 33
Decree of August 12, 1941, by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. granting amnesty to Polish citizens deprived of their freedom on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

An amnesty is granted to all Polish citizens on Soviet territory at present deprived of their freedom as prisoners of war or on other adequate grounds.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.
M. Kalinin.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.
A. Gorkin.

No. 34
Note of October 13th, 1941, from Ambassador Kot to Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, drawing attention to the incomplete fulfillment of Soviet obligations concerning Polish citizens, under the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

Moscow, October 13, 1941.

Mr. Commissar
Referring to the Note of the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Republic of Poland addressed to the Commissar for Foreign
In both the aforesaid Notes, as in my conversation with you, Mr. Commissar, I emphasized particularly the need for the fulfillment by the Soviet Government of the provisions of the Agreement concluded between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government on July 30, 1941, and of the provisions of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, concerning the release of Polish citizens from prisons, labour camps and localities of compulsory residence at the earliest possible date, at least before the coming winter, during which the departure from many of the camps would be most difficult if not altogether impossible. The question of release was also brought up by the Polish delegation at the two meetings of the Mixed Polish-Soviet Commission, when emphasis was laid on the special urgency of this problem.

During my conversation with you, Mr. Commissar, on September 20, I received your assurance that the Soviet authorities would take care that Polish citizens detained in distant Northern regions, where the climate is unsuitable for Poles, were transported to more suitable districts before the winter season set in. During my conversation on October 7, I quoted figures relating to Polish citizens who were still detained in large numbers in camps and mentioned the fact that certain categories among them had been transferred to very remote Northern regions. In spite of repeated Polish requests and the assurances given on behalf of the Soviets, this Embassy has not as yet received the list of localities nor the exact numbers of Polish citizens released.

Contrary to the assurances that except for a small number of individuals suspected, indicted or convicted of espionage on behalf of Germany, whose names and dossiers up to now have not been communicated to the Embassy, all Polish citizens had been set free and that in a small number of cases only was delay caused by purely technical considerations, the Embassy is in possession of information that there are still in a number of prisons and camps thousands of Polish citizens who were not informed of the Agreement concluded on July 30, 1941, or were informed that the provisions of this Agreement and of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12 did not apply to them.
By way of example, may I state that Polish citizens are still being detained in prison at Saratov, Gorki, Balashov, Tschelabinsk, Kizel and in compulsory labour camps in the Primorski Kray in the North-Eastern extremity of the Yakut district (near the mouth of the Kolyma on the Arctic Ocean), near Aldan, in the region of Tomsk, Karaganda, in the mines of Karabash (Tschelabinsk district), in the Ivjgel camp (Svierdlovsansk district), in the Archangel district and in the Republic of Komi, along the railway line under construction between Kotlas and Pechora and at other points.

More detailed information concerning the numbers and condition of these Polish citizens is given in the Annex to the present Note. As will be seen therefrom the local authorities either did not receive detailed orders concerning the treatment of Polish citizens after the conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, or, in some cases, the local authorities were content to deal with the matter in a purely pro forma way (the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs withdrew police supervision of the 2,000 Polish citizens employed in the mines of Karabash-Voloshynowski-Rudnik, but left the persons concerned where they were which actually made their position worse than before), or with a partial execution of the orders issued. It is to be assumed that various considerations have dictated this treatment and in some instances local authorities may have desired to secure for themselves virtually unpaid manpower, whence the tendency to release sometimes elderly, invalid or ailing persons, while the stronger and healthier are retained for compulsory labour.

I have the honor to draw your attention, Mr. Commissar, to another characteristic feature of the conduct of local government authorities towards Polish citizens who are released, or who approach them with the request for employment or for the assignment of a residence. This conduct, without doubt unknown to the Central authorities, which should cease in the interests of good relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments, consists in informing those concerned that the blame for their difficult situation rests with the Polish Government and their representatives in the U.S.S.R. Naturally Polish nationals are not misled by this, but it arouses unnecessary mistrust among the Polish population.

Information issued abroad by the Polish Government, entirely in line with good Polish-Soviet collaboration, is to the effect that Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have
been liberated from prisons and camps. I presented to you, on the
7th of this month, copies of communiqués issued by the Polish
Telegraph Agency in London and New York. The Polish Govern-
ment is of the opinion that such official information should corre-
spond to the real situation of the Polish population in the U.S.S.R.
In the common interest of both Governments the Polish-Soviet
Agreement should be fully carried out so that in foreign countries
no elements unfriendly to this collaboration and hostile to the
U.S.S.R., should find in the difficult position of the deported Polish
population a theme for their propaganda.

The Polish Government could in no case agree that, as a result
of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the lot of Polish citizens residing
in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should become worse or
that local authorities should carry out its provisions in a manner
contrary to the declarations and statements of the representatives of
the Soviet Government.

Consequently, in its Note, No. 30/41 of August 22, 1941, the
Embassy presented a number of proposals forming a logical whole
with a view to the practical solution of the problem of the Polish
population in the U.S.S.R., in accordance with the interests of this
population and of both Governments. The fact that the suggestions
contained in point 2 were only carried out in part, and that points
3 and 4 were left completely unfulfilled, has meant that such Polish
citizens as have been released have not been able to improve their
living conditions and a large number of them have been forced to
wander aimlessly and compelled to camp at railway stations or in the
open air in the localities newly chosen for their residence. In view
of the approaching winter which in some parts of the Soviet Union
has already set in, many of them are threatened with death by
starvation. Their position is rendered still worse by the fact that
the local authorities not only refuse to carry out the suggestions of
the Embassy, but do not even comply with the assurances given by
the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs contained in the Aide-
Mémoire of August 28, 1941, with regard to free railway fares,
travelling subsidies, subsistence allowances and, most important of
all, employment for the persons released.

I also venture to draw your attention, Mr. Commissar, to the
fact that the organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. is not
progressing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Agree-
ment of July 30, 1941, or with the intentions of the two Governments.

The Supreme Command of the Polish armed forces in the U.S.S.R. has vainly waited four weeks for a decision on the formation of further Polish divisions and the designation of the localities in which this formation is to take place. In consequence, numerous Polish citizens reporting for military service and rallying en masse to the Polish Army stream into the two already overcrowded camps, which lack the necessary number of tents, adequate food supplies and medicines. Thus a situation, harmful alike to the troops and to the common cause is being created. The local administrative authorities very often do not carry out the instructions issued by the central authorities with regard to questions concerning the Polish Army and create new additional difficulties, as for instance by declining to release from prisons and camps all Polish citizens, military and reservists, and in many instances by detaining the more physically fit elements, which reduces the military value of the units already formed. Moreover, considerable numbers of Polish citizens enrolled in the Red Army and subsequently transferred to the so-called labor battalions, have not up till now been directed to the Polish Army.

Thus the Polish contribution to the common struggle against Germany, contrary to the intentions of the Polish and Soviet Governments and to the unanimous will of the Polish citizens, is being weakened to the detriment of the cause of all the Allies.

In the profound belief that the Soviet Government attaches no less importance than the Polish Government to the development of friendly relations between the two States, I have the honor to request you, Mr. Commissar, to take measures to put into full effect all the proposals contained in the Note of the Embassy of August 22, and in particular the immediate release from prisons, camps and localities of compulsory domicile of all Polish citizens, the friendly treatment of those who are unfit for military service and the acceleration of the decision concerning the formation of further large units of the Polish Army, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Kot.
No. 35

Note of October 15, 1941, from General Wladyslaw Sikorski to Ambassador Bogomolov, in London, concerning the failure to release a certain number of Polish officers from Soviet prisoner-of-war camps.

London, October 15, 1941.

Excellency,

May I request Your Excellency to convey to the Soviet Government the assurance that the Polish Government appreciates the good will shown by the Soviet Government in carrying out the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941. However, certain difficulties have become apparent which do not seem to have any connection with those arising from military operations. Thus the immediate release of Polish citizens deprived of their freedom appears necessary in view of the approaching winter; as well as means of assuring their existence. The fate of several thousand Polish officers who have not returned to Poland and who have not been found in Soviet military camps, continues to remain uncertain. They are probably dispersed in the Northern districts of the U.S.S.R. Their presence in Polish Army camps is indispensable.

May I also request Your Excellency to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the necessity of increasing the aid essential to the formation and development of this Army.

At the same time I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in view of existing military operations I have issued instructions to intensify sabotage and subversive activities by Poles in German occupied Poland.

I have the honor to be, etc.

SIKORSKI.

No. 36

Note of November 14, 1941, from Ambassador A. Bogomolov to General Sikorski, in reply to the Note of October 16, 1941.

London, November 14, 1941.

Mr. Prime Minister,

In reply to your Note of October 16, 1941 I am instructed by the Soviet Government to inform you, Mr. Prime Minister, that all
Polish citizens to be set free in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, have been set free, and certain specified categories of those released have received material help from the Soviet Authorities (free passes for railway and waterway travel, subsistence allowances during their journeys, etc.). All Polish citizens released and not called up by the Polish Army are given an opportunity to work on conditions identical to those enjoyed by Soviet citizens and this without any special obligation whatsoever on the part of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

All Polish officers on the territory of the U.S.S.R. have also been set free. Your supposition, Mr. Prime Minister, that a large number of Polish officers are dispersed throughout the Northern regions of the U.S.S.R. is obviously based on inaccurate information.

Concerning your reference, Mr. Prime Minister, to the necessity of further aid from the Soviet Government in respect of the organization of the Polish Army, such aid is unfailingly being given in accordance with the Soviet-Polish Military Agreement to grant the Government of the Republic of Poland a non-interest bearing loan of 65 million rubles to meet the expenses of the Polish Army during the period ending January 1, 1942.

The Soviet Government have taken special note of your statement, Mr. Prime Minister, concerning your instructions for the intensification of sabotage and subversive action in German occupied Poland.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Bogomolov.

No. 37

Note of January 28, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Bogomolov, concerning the failure to set free a number of Polish citizens, and specifically a number of Polish officers.


Mr. Ambassador,

The Polish Government regrets to have to bring to Your Excellency’s notice that, according to information just received, the
liberation of Polish citizens detained on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in labour camps and other places of detention has not been completely carried out. In a number of cases the local administrative authorities of the Union do not apply in full the provisions of the Soviet Decree dated August 12, 1941.

In this respect I have the honor to mention in particular the painful fact, that of all the officers and soldiers registered in the prisoner of war camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov, 12 generals, 94 colonels, 263 majors and about 7800 officers of lesser rank have so far not yet been set free. It must be emphasized that investigations carried out in Poland and in the Reich, have made it possible to establish definitely that these soldiers are not at present in occupied Poland, nor in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany.

According to fragmentary information that has reached us, a certain number of these prisoners find themselves in extremely hard circumstances on Franz Joseph Land, Nova Zembla and on the territory of the Yakut Republic on the banks of the Kolyma river.

I must add that the question of the fate of Polish citizens, civilians and military, has been the subject of several consecutive interventions by the Polish Embassy at Kuybyshev, which will soon be in a position to submit a new list of names of all these persons to the Government of the Union. The same question was also the subject of a conversation in Moscow on December 4, 1941, between the Polish Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. During the course of this conversation General Sikorski was relieved to receive an assurance that the necessary instructions would be issued to the competent Soviet authorities and that all the prisoners would be set free.

Referring to the letter and spirit of this conversation and of the understandings reached by our two Governments, I have no doubt that Your Excellency will share my conviction that the efficient and speedy execution of the provisions of the supplementary Protocol to the Polish-Soviet Agreement signed in London on July 30, 1941, concerning the liberation of Polish citizens, imprisoned or detained in prisoner of war camps or labour camps, rests on imperative motives of humanity and justice. Your Excellency will no doubt also share the Polish Government's opinion that special importance should be attached to the favourable development of our mutual
relations, as desired by the political leaders of both our countries united in the common struggle against the invader.

In requesting Your Excellency to be so good as to bring the contents of this Note to the attention of Your Government, I take this occasion to assure Your Excellency of my highest consideration.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Raczynski.

No. 38

Note of March 13, 1942, from Ambassador Bogomolov to Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to his Note of January 28, 1942.


Mr. Minister,

In reply to your Note of January 28, 1942, I have the honor, by order of the Soviet Government, to bring the following to your notice:

The Soviet Government cannot agree to the statements contained in Your Excellency’s Note. According to these statements the liberation of Polish citizens, including officers and soldiers, detained on the territory of the U.S.S.R. in labor camps and other places of detention, has not been completed, because, it is alleged in the Note, the local Soviet authorities have not applied to their full extent the provisions of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, concerning the amnesty to Polish citizens.

In the reply by M. V. M. Molotov’s Note of November 8, 1941, addressed to M. Kot, and in the Aide-Mémoire of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of November 19, it had already been announced that the amnesty to Polish citizens had been strictly carried out. An appropriate investigation conducted by competent Soviet authorities after the conversation held on December 4, 1941, between the Polish Prime Minister, General Sikorski, and the Chairman of the People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin, completely confirmed the above statement; besides the People’s

* Ukase.
Commissar in the spirit of his Note No. 6 of January 9, 1942, addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland, gave additional detailed explanations on the carrying out of the amnesty in favour of Polish citizens.

As the Polish officers and soldiers were liberated on the same basis as other Polish citizens under the Decree of August 12, 1941, all that has been said above applies equally to the Polish officers and soldiers.

As regards the statements contained in Your Excellency's Note, alleging that there are still Polish officers who have not yet been set free, and that some of them are on Franz-Joseph and Nova Zembla islands, and the banks of the River Kolyma, it must be stated that these assertions are without foundation and obviously based on inaccurate information. In any case, whenever it is learned that there are certain isolated instances of delay in setting free Polish citizens, the competent Soviet authorities immediately take measures necessary for their release.

The Soviet Government takes this opportunity to declare that it has put into full effect the measures concerning the liberation of Polish citizens in accordance with the Supplementary Protocol to the Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941, and that thus the Soviet Government is doing in this respect all that is necessary for the future favorable development of Soviet-Polish relations.

I have the honor to be, etc.

BOGOMOLOV.

No. 39

Communique issued on April 17, 1943, by the Polish Minister of National Defence concerning the fate of Polish prisoners of war in the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov.

London, April 17, 1943.

On September 17, 1940, the official organ of the Red Army, the Red Star, stated that during the fighting which took place after September 17, 1939, 181,000 Polish prisoners of war were taken by the Soviets. Of this number about 10,000 were officers of the regular army and reserve.

According to information in possession of the Polish Government, three large camps of Polish prisoners of war were set up in the U.S.S.R. in November 1939:
1) in Kozielsk, east of Smolensk,
2) in Starobielsk, near Kharkov, and
3) in Ostashkov, near Kalinin, where police and military police were concentrated.

At the beginning of 1940 the camp authorities informed the prisoners in all three camps, that all camps were about to be broken up, that prisoners of war would be allowed to return to their families and, allegedly for this purpose, lists of places to which individual prisoners wished to go after their release were made.

At that time there were:
1) In Kozielsk, about 5,000 men, including some 4,500 officers.
2) In Starobielsk, about 3,920 men, including 100 civilians; the rest were officers of whom some were medical officers.
3) In Ostashkov, about 6,570 men, including some 380 officers.

On April 5, 1940, the breaking up of these camps was begun and groups of 60 to 300 men were removed from them every few days until the middle of May. From Kozielsk they were sent in the direction of Smolensk. About 400 people only were moved from all the three camps in June 1940 to Griazovetz in the Vologda district.

When after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941, and the signing of the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, the Polish Government proceeded to form the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., it was expected that the officers from the above mentioned camps would form the cadres of senior and junior officers of the army in formation. At the end of August 1941 a group of Polish officers from Griazovetz arrived to join the Polish units in Buzuluk; not one officer however, among those deported in other directions from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov appeared. In all therefore about 8,300 officers were missing, not counting another 7,000 N.C.O.'s, soldiers and civilians, who were in those camps when they were broken up.

Ambassador Kot and General Anders, perturbed by this state of affairs, addressed to the competent Soviet authorities inquiries and representations about the fate of the Polish officers from the above mentioned camps.

In a conversation with Mr. Vishinsky, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on October 6, 1941, Ambassador Kot asked what had happened to the missing officers. Mr. Vishinsky answered, that
all prisoners of war had been freed from the camps and therefore they must be at liberty.

In October and November, in his conversations with Premier Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky, the Ambassador on various occasions returned to the question of the prisoners of war and insisted upon being supplied with lists of them, such lists having been compiled carefully and in detail by the Soviet Government.

During his visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Sikorski in a conversation on December 3, 1941, with Premier Stalin, also intervened for the liberation of all Polish prisoners of war, and not having been supplied by the Soviet authorities with their lists, he handed to Premier Stalin on this occasion an incomplete list of 3,845 Polish officers which their former fellow-prisoners had succeeded in compiling. Premier Stalin assured General Sikorski that the amnesty was of a general and universal character and affected both military and civilians, and that the Soviet Government had freed all Polish officers. On March 18, 1942, General Anders handed Premier Stalin a supplementary list of 800 officers. Nevertheless not one of the officers mentioned in either of these lists has been returned to the Polish Army.

Besides the interventions in Moscow and Kuybyshev, the fate of Polish prisoners of war was the subject of several interviews between Minister Raczyński and Ambassador Bogomolov. On January 28, 1942, Minister Raczyński, in the name of the Polish Government, handed a Note to Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov, drawing his attention once again to the painful fact that many thousand Polish officers had still not been found.

Ambassador Bogomolov informed Minister Raczyński on March 13, 1943, that in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, and in accordance with the statements of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of November 8 and 19, 1941, the amnesty had been put into full effect, and that it related both to civilians and military.

On May 19, 1942, Ambassador Kot sent the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a Memorandum in which he expressed his regret at the refusal to supply him with a list of prisoners, and his concern as to their fate, emphasizing the high value these officers would have in military operations against Germany.

Neither the Polish Government nor the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev has ever received an answer as to the whereabouts of the
missing officers and other prisoners who had been deported from the three camps mentioned above.

We have become accustomed to the lies of German propaganda and we understand the purpose behind its latest revelations. In view however of abundant and detailed German information concerning the discovery of the bodies of many thousands of Polish officers near Smolensk, and the categorical statement that they were murdered by the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940, the necessity has arisen that the mass graves discovered should be investigated and the facts alleged verified by a competent international body, such as the International Red Cross. The Polish Government has therefore approached this institution with a view to their sending a delegation to the place where the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war is said to have taken place.

No. 40


No Pole can help but be deeply shocked by the news, now given the widest publicity by the Germans, of the discovery of the bodies of the Polish officers missing in the U.S.S.R. in a common grave near Smolensk, and of the mass execution of which they were victims.

The Polish Government has instructed their representative in Switzerland to request the International Red Cross in Geneva to send a delegation to investigate the true state of affairs on the spot. It is to be desired that the findings of this protective institution, which is to be entrusted with the task of clarifying the matter and of establishing responsibility, should be issued without delay.

At the same time, however, the Polish Government, on behalf of the Polish nation, denies to the Germans any right to base on a crime they attribute to others, arguments in their own defence. The profoundly hypocritical indignation of German propaganda will not succeed in concealing from the world the many cruel and reiterated crimes still being perpetrated against the Polish people.

The Polish Government recalls such facts as the removal of Polish officers from prisoner-of-war camps in the Reich and the
subsequent shooting of them for political offences alleged to have
been committed before the war, mass arrests of reserve officers sub-
sequently deported to concentration camps, to die a slow death,—
from Cracow and the neighboring district alone 6,000 were de-
ported in June 1942; the compulsory enlistment in the German
army of Polish prisoners of war from territories illegally incor-
porated in the Reich; the forcible conscription of about 200,000
Poles from the same territories, and the execution of the families of
those who managed to escape; the massacre of one-and-a-half-million
people by executions or in concentration camps; the recent imprison-
ment of 80,000 people of military age, officers and men, and their
torture and murder in the camps of Maydanek and Tremblinka.

It is not to enable the Germans to make impudent claims and
pose as the defenders of Christianity and European civilization, that
Poland is making immense sacrifices, fighting and enduring suffering.
The blood of Polish soldiers and Polish citizens, wherever it is shed,
cries for atonement before the conscience of the free peoples of the
world. The Polish Government condemn all the crimes committed
against Polish citizens and refuse the right to make political capital
of such sacrifices, to all who are themselves guilty of such crimes.

No. 41

Note of April 20, 1943, from Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.,
demanding an explanation of the fate of Polish prisoners missing
in the U.S.S.R.

London, April 20, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

Foreign telegraph agencies publish a report of the German
military authorities concerning the discovery at Kozia Góra near
Katyn in the vicinity of Smolensk of a mass-grave containing the
bodies of the Polish officers allegedly killed in the spring of 1940.
During the first few days 155 bodies were identified among which
the body of Major General Mieczysław Smorawiński is supposed to
have been found.

This report, although emanating from enemy sources, has pro-
duced profound anxiety not only in Polish public opinion but also
throughout the world.
In a public statement on April 17, 1943, the Polish Government categorically condemned Germany's attempt to exploit the tragedy of Polish prisoners of war in the U.S.S.R. for her own political ends. But more than ever the Polish Government unalterably maintains its attitude that the truth about this case so cynically exploited by Hitlerite propaganda must be fully elucidated.

You are no doubt aware, Mr. Ambassador, that after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Polish Government repeatedly approached the civil and military authorities of the U.S.S.R. with requests for information concerning the prisoners of war and civilians who were in the camps of Kozielsk (East of Smolensk), Starobielsk (near Kharkov) and Ostashkov (near Kalinin).

According to information of the Polish Government there were in all at the beginning of 1940, 15,490 Polish citizens, including 8,700 officers, in the three above mentioned camps. From April 5, 1940, until the middle of May, 1940, the Soviet authorities proceeded to break up these camps, deporting the inmates in batches every few days. Prisoners of the Kozielsk camp were deported in the direction of Smolensk, and from all the three camps only 400 men were transferred in the last batches, first to the Yukhnovski camp (railway station Babynino) and subsequently in June 1940, to Griazovetz in the Vologda district.

When after the signing of the Polish-Soviet military agreement on August 14, 1943, the Polish Government proceeded with the organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., the camp of Griazovetz, to which in the meantime military and civilian prisoners from other camps had arrived, was also broken up and from the above mentioned group of 400 prisoners more than 200 officers reported for service in the Polish Army before the end of August 1941. All the other officers however, who were deported to an unknown destination from the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov have neither been found nor have they given any sign of life. So it became apparent that more than 8,000 officers were missing who might have supplied the cadres of senior and junior officers of the army in formation and who would have been of inestimable value in the military operations against Germany.

From October 1941, both Ambassador Kot and General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., con-
stantly intervened, both orally and in writing, in the matter of the
missing officers. Ambassador Kot discussed this subject with Premier
Stalin, with Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and
with Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
demanding a list of the prisoners detained in the three camps men-
tioned above and an explanation as to their fate. During his visit
to Moscow in December 1941, General Sikorski also intervened in the
above matter in a conversation with Mr. Stalin and on that occasion
handed him a list containing the names of 3,845 Polish officers. On
March 18, 1942, General Anders gave Mr. Stalin, Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars, a list of 800 officers. On January
28, 1942, I had the honour to send you, Mr. Ambassador, a Note in
which I emphasized the anxiety of the Polish Government at the
failure to find many thousands of Polish officers. Lastly, on May 19,
1942, Ambassador Kot sent the People's Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs a Memorandum in which, reverting again to the question
of the missing officers, he expressed his regret at the refusal to
supply him with the list of prisoners, and his concern as to their
fate.

I regret the necessity of calling your attention, Mr. Ambassador,
to the fact that the Polish Government in spite of reiterated requests,
has never received either a list of the prisoners or definite informa-
tion as to the whereabouts of the missing officers and of other
prisoners deported from the three camps mentioned above. Official,
verbal and written statements of the representatives of the U.S.S.R.
have been confined to mere assurances that, in accordance with a
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.,
dated August 12, 1941, the amnesty was of a general and universal
character as it included both military and civilian prisoners, and
that the Government of the U.S.S.R. had released all the Polish
officers from prisoner of war camps.

I should like to emphasize that the Polish Government, as can
be seen from their many representations quoted above, entirely
independently of recent German revelations, has never regarded the
question of the missing officers as closed. If, however, as shown by
the communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau of April 15,
1943, the Government of the U.S.S.R. would seem to be in posses-
sion of more ample information on this matter than was com-
municated to the representatives of the Polish Government sometime
ago, I beg once more to request you, Mr. Ambassador, to communicate to the Polish Government detailed and precise information as to the fate of the prisoners of war and civilians previously detained in the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov.

Public opinion in Poland and throughout the world has rightly been so deeply shocked that only irrefutable facts can outweigh the numerous and detailed German statements concerning the discovery of the bodies of many thousand Polish officers murdered near Smolensk in the spring of 1940.

CHAPTER 5

Organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

No. 42

Polish-Soviet Military Agreement signed in Moscow on August 14, 1941.

MILITARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POLISH HIGH COMMAND AND THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND

1. The military agreement derives naturally from the political agreement of July 30, 1941.

2. A Polish army will be organized in the shortest possible time on the territory of the U.S.S.R., wherefore:
   a) it will form part of the armed forces of the sovereign Republic of Poland,
   b) the soldiers of this army will take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of Poland,
   c) it will be destined with the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. and other Allied States for the common fight against Germany,
   d) after the end of the war, it will return to Poland,
   e) during the entire period of common operations, it will be subordinated operationally to the High Command of the U.S.S.R. In respect of organization and personnel it will remain under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, who will coordinate the orders and
regulations concerning organization and personnel with the High Command of the U.S.S.R. through the Commander of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

3. The Commander of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces; the candidate for this appointment to be approved by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

4. The Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will consist of units of land forces only. Their strength and number will depend on manpower, equipment and supplies available.

5. Conscripts and volunteers, having previously served in the Polish Air Force and Navy, will be sent to Great Britain to complement the establishments of the respective Polish services already existing there.

6. The formation of Polish units will be carried out in localities indicated by the High Command of the U.S.S.R. Officers and other ranks will be called from among Polish citizens on the territory of the U.S.S.R. by conscription and voluntary enlistment. Draft boards will be established with the participation of U.S.S.R. authorities in localities indicated by them.

7. Polish units will be moved to the front only after they are fully ready for action. In principle they will operate in groups not smaller than divisions and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the High Command of the U.S.S.R.

8. All soldiers of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will be subject to Polish military laws and decrees. Polish military courts will be established in the units for dealing with military offences and crimes against the establishment, the safety, the routine or the discipline of the Polish Army.

   For crimes against the State, soldiers of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will be answerable to the military courts of the U.S.S.R.

9. The organization and war equipment of the Polish units will as far as possible correspond to the standards established for the Polish Army in Great Britain.

   The colors and insignia of the various services and military rank will correspond exactly to those established for the Polish Army in Great Britain.
10. The pay, rations, maintenance and other materiel problems will be in accordance with regulations of the U.S.S.R.

11. The sick and wounded soldiers of the Polish Army will receive treatment in hospitals and sanatoria on an equal basis with the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. and be entitled to pensions and allowances.

12. Armament, equipment, uniforms, motor transport etc. will be provided as far as possible by
   a) the Government of the U.S.S.R. from their own resources,
   b) the Polish Government from supplies granted on the basis of the Lend-Lease Act (an Act to promote the defense of the United States, approved March 11, 1941).

In this case, the Government of the U.S.S.R. will extend all possible transportation facilities.

13. Expenditures connected with the organization, equipment and maintenance of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will be met from credits provided by the Government of the U.S.S.R., to be refunded by the Polish Government after the end of the war.

This problem will be dealt with in a separate financial agreement.

14. Liaison will be established by
   1) a Polish Military Mission attached to the High Command of the U.S.S.R.,
   2) a Soviet Military Mission attached to the Polish High Command in London.

Liaison officers attached to other commands will be appointed by mutual agreement.

15. All matters and details not covered by this agreement will be settled directly between the High Command of the Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. and the corresponding authorities of the U.S.S.R.

16. This agreement is made in two copies, in the Polish and Russian languages, both texts are equally valid.

   Plenipotentiary of the Polish High Command.
   SZYSZKO BOHUSZ,
   Brigadier-General.

   Plenipotentiary of the High Command of the U.S.S.R.
   A. Wasilewskij,
   Major General.

Moscow, August 14, 1941.
Message of April 9, 1942, from General Sikorski to Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, concerning the evacuation of part of the Polish Army to Iran, and recruiting in the U.S.S.R., delivered to Ambassador Bogomolov on April 13, 1942.

Gask, April 9, 1942.

General Sikorski was happy to learn that as a result of conversations held in Moscow, President Stalin has graciously expressed his definite agreement to the evacuation to the Near East of Polish soldiers over and above the strength contemplated for the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. Pursuant to this decision about 30,000 men have already arrived in Iran. They will immediately be incorporated in Polish units and equipped to take part in the struggle carried on by Poland, together with the Soviet Union and the other United Nations, against Germany.

General Sikorski hopes that President Stalin agrees in view of the probable development of the military situation in the Near East, and as this theatre of operations forms an integral part of the front on which the Soviet armies are so heroically fighting, that it is most desirable to form strong Polish units in this sector.

General Sikorski has expressed his conviction to the British Government and to the Government of the United States that it is essential the Western Powers should undertake offensive action against Germany at a time when that country’s principal forces are engaged on the Russian front. In particular he emphasized this point of view and the necessity of concentrating the main effort in the first place against Germany, in his conversations with President Roosevelt, who said that he shared these opinions. In further conversations with American officials General Sikorski returned to this subject, insisting on the necessity of speeding up preparations for an offensive in Western Europe.

As Polish Armed Forces stationed on British territory may be called upon to take an active part in such an operation, General Sikorski attaches great importance to the increase of their effectives and fighting strength.

General Sikorski is happy to find that President Stalin fully appreciates this necessity. He is thus strengthened in his conviction that, in spite of the difficulties that may have arisen, recruiting in
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Polish citizens for military service, and their evacuation will be resumed and happily completed.

General Sikorski hopes that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by carrying out these proposals as well as by respecting Polish rights and by a friendly attitude towards Polish interests, will enable every Polish citizen capable of bearing arms to take part under the national flag in the struggle for common victory.

No. 44

Decision of the Polish Cabinet of April 30, 1942, to leave part of the Polish Forces on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

The Polish Cabinet expresses its approval of the fact that a number of Polish soldiers have been evacuated from the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Agreement of December 1941, and hopes that the Soviet Government will place no difficulties in the way of the further recruiting and evacuation of soldiers and volunteers for the Polish Forces, thus enabling the Polish Army fighting for the common cause of the Allies to increase its strength.

The Polish Cabinet reaffirms that it would be in accordance with Polish interests and with the policy that found expression in the Agreement concluded with the Soviet Government on July 30, 1941, to leave on Soviet territory part of the Polish Armed Forces which would subsequently fight on the Eastern front side by side with the Soviet Army.

No. 45

Note of May 13, 1942, from Mr. I. Tchitchaiev, Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R., to Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, containing a message from Premier J. Stalin to General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister.


Mr. Minister,

In reply to the Message from General Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, to J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Coun-
cil of People's Commissars of the Union of S.S.R., I have the honor to communicate the following through your good offices:

J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., having carefully studied General Sikorski's Message, thanks him for the information concerning his conferences with the British Government and with Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States, regarding preparations for concerted action against Germany and proposals for the participation of Polish armed forces in this action. As regards General Sikorski's proposals for the resumption of recruiting in the U.S.S.R. of Polish citizens for military service and their evacuation, J. V. Stalin deems it necessary to recall the grounds he submitted to General Anders on March 18, last, on which the strength of the Polish army was definitely fixed at 44,000 men because of circumstances connected with restrictions in supplies for units not taking part in fighting. Owing to the fact that up to the present moment these circumstances have not changed, it is impossible to introduce any change whatever in the strength of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., as determined last March. J. V. Stalin does not doubt that Polish citizens called to their national colors will make their contribution to the cause of the common struggle against the Hitlerite aggressors.

I have the honor to be, etc.

TCHITCHAIEV.

No. 46

Note of June 10, 1942, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning further recruiting and evacuation of Polish Forces from the U.S.S.R.

London, June 10, 1942.

Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt from Your Excellency of the Message from M. J. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, addressed to General W. Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, which was communicated to me on May 13, 1942, by Mr. Tchitchaiev, Counsellor of Embassy.

In reply to this communication I have the honor to inform
Your Excellency that General Sikorski, after having duly studied the contents of the message, has directed me to submit to you certain remarks in connection therewith and to request that Your Excellency will be pleased to convey them to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

The Polish Government fully appreciates the temporary difficulties as regards supplies in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and for this reason has not insisted on an increase in the number of food rations for the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The object of General Sikorski's message was not to increase the strength of the Polish Army, nor, as would have followed, the supplies for the Polish Armed Forces on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Polish Government desires to be able to continue on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the recruiting of Polish citizens capable of bearing arms, so as to widen the cadres of the Polish Army in Britain and in the Near East, and thus to give every Polish citizen fit for military duties the opportunity of active service in Polish units.

The Polish Government are ready to undertake temporarily the service of supplies for the number of men over and above the established strength of 44,000, during their transit through the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on their way to the Southern ports of the Caspian Sea, or, as the case may be, to Ashabad and Meshed. For this purpose a reserve of one million food rations has been constituted in Teheran and this reserve could be placed at the disposal of General Anders without delay in the event that evacuation be resumed.

The Polish Government are determined to use the Polish Armed Forces now in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the Near East and in Great Britain, in the struggle for the common cause against the common enemy: the Polish Army will thus serve the allied cause as a whole.

The losses recently sustained by the Polish Armed Forces are eloquent proof of this determination of the Polish Government; these losses include, among others, two* warships sunk while escorting a convoy of war materials from Britain to the Union of

* Three, according to later reports.
Soviet Socialist Republics. The part played by the Polish Air Force in recent operations is illustrated by the fact that 101 Polish bombers took part in the recent raids on Cologne and the Ruhr.

It is possible that the Polish Army formed in the Near East may—after it is equipped and trained—also be used on the front of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in case the military situation should so require. Certain units of this army have already taken a noteworthy part in the defence of Tobruk, and in fighting in the desert. The fact that the Polish Army has not yet fought side by side with the Red Army is solely due to the armament difficulties experienced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the shipping difficulties that beset Great Britain and the United States.

If the Polish Government insists on the full execution of the agreements concluded by it with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it does so solely in the well understood interest of all.

The strength of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was fixed at 96,000 men; besides which 25,000 men were to be evacuated to the Near East, exclusive of the 2,000 trained sailors and airmen. Thus the total Polish armed forces recruited in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Polish citizens was to amount to 123,000 soldiers. At present the contemplated strength of cadres in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is only 44,000 men, not counting the 30,000 already evacuated. The Polish Government is of opinion that in order to arrive at the stipulated number of 123,000 men, a complement of 49,000 men should be recruited on Soviet territory, and, should it prove impossible to attach it to the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—should be evacuated to the Near East.

Referring to his conversations in Moscow with the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, General Sikorski appeals to Premier Stalin and asks him to make possible continuation of recruiting of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the evacuation to Iran and Palestine of contingents over and above the number of 44,000 soldiers.

I have the honor to be, etc. RACZYNSKI

No. 47

Minute of Mr. E. Raczyński's conversation on July 2 and July 4, 1942, with Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, concerning the evacuation of the remainder of the Polish Army from the U.S.S.R., and the Polish Government’s Memorandum presented on the occasion of these conversations on July 3, 1942.

London, July 4, 1942.

On July 2, I visited the Foreign Office at the request of Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, who notified me of the contents of a telegram he had received from Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. who is at present in Moscow. The Ambassador had received from Commissar Molotov a statement of Premier Stalin, in connection with Mr. Churchill’s conversation with Mr. Molotov in London when Mr. Churchill made a suggestion to transfer part of the Polish Forces from Soviet territory to the Middle East. Mr. Stalin now suggests that three Polish divisions “well trained, but not yet fully armed” be moved to that region. Sir Alexander Cadogan asked me to notify him as soon as possible of the Polish Government’s decision in this matter. He added that the British Government would be satisfied with such a solution and would be prepared to take immediate steps to receive these Forces and to assure them the necessary equipment.

I promised Sir Alexander a reply in the shortest possible time.

On the evening of July 4, I delivered the enclosed Memorandum to Sir A. Cadogan. The Memorandum defines the conditions which in the opinion of the Polish Government should be fulfilled in the event of the Polish divisions leaving Soviet territory.

Sir Alexander undertook to communicate the contents of the Memorandum to the British Ambassador in Moscow and to instruct him to submit the Polish conditions to the Soviet Government. Sir Alexander added that he was not aware of the reasons for which the Soviet Government had chosen to negotiate with us through the intermediary of the British Government, on grounds which he was in no position to judge. He thought that at the present stage this method should be maintained until the situation cleared in the course of the British Ambassador’s introductory negotiations with Mr. Molotov. In the light of these negotiations we should be able to consider the most suitable steps to be taken next. I agreed to such an attitude.
MEMORANDUM

1. The Polish Government are gratified to be afforded an opportunity to help in the defence of the Near East with the Polish troops from Russia.

2. They are, however, compelled to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the duty of the Polish Government to assist their citizens in Soviet Russia. The presence of Polish troops in Russia has up to now enabled the civilian Poles to obtain the necessary means of existence.

3. Therefore the Polish Government feel they are entitled to hope for His Majesty's Government's collaboration in obtaining from the Soviet Government the fulfillment of the following request:
   a) After the departure of three Polish divisions from Russia the Polish recruiting center shall remain in Russia and recruiting of all Polish citizens able to carry arms shall be resumed until such time as the complete mobilization of all available men shall have been effected.
   b) Auxiliary military services of women and boy-scouts shall leave Russia together with the aforesaid three divisions as well as the families of the officers and men leaving Russia.
   c) The necessary measures shall be undertaken to begin the evacuation from Russia of 50,000 Polish children accompanied by 5,000 mothers or guardians who would be given refuge outside Russia through the collaboration of the British authorities. The Polish Embassy in the Soviet Union whilst maintaining fully its protection over Poles remaining in the Union on the basis of arrangements now in force, will be given the opportunity to cooperate through its appointed representatives in this evacuation. President Roosevelt has expressed his personal interest in the fate of these children and has pledged the assistance of American authorities in facilitating the withdrawal of a first contingent of 10,000 from Russia in order to save them from starvation.

4. Finally, the Polish Government hope for the collaboration of His Majesty's Government in the further search for the Polish officers missing in Russia. These officers would prove of great service in the formation of Polish divisions after the withdrawal of three divisions. The matter is urgent as it is only in the short summer
months that access is possible to the Northern regions to which these officers have presumably been removed.

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No. 48

Note of August 27, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador A. Bogomolov, concerning the continuation of recruiting for the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

London, August 27, 1942.

Mr. Ambassador,

The Government of the Republic of Poland has been informed by General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have adopted a negative attitude towards the Polish Government's efforts and endeavours to maintain a reserve depot on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics so as to be able to continue recruiting Polish citizens for the Polish Army.

The authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explained their refusal as follows:

"As the Polish Government does not find it possible to use the Polish divisions formed on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Soviet-German front, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cannot allow the formation of any Polish units whatsoever nor any recruiting in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

As regards the adoption by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of such an attitude in a matter as important to the Polish Government as the problem of carrying on recruiting of Polish citizens for the Polish army, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

The political Agreement of July 30, 1941, and particularly the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, provided for the organization of a Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by voluntary enlistment and by normal recruiting. In view of the explicit terms of this Agreement, the Polish Government was entitled to expect that the organization of the army would not meet with any difficulties from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that its executive au-
thorities would in the measure of their possibilities extend their help to the Polish Embassy and the Polish Army Command in their efforts to form an Army of Polish citizens capable of bearing arms and willing to fulfill their duty to their country in its Armed Forces. Unfortunately actual events have not justified these hopes of the Polish Government, and the facts given below will show that the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have not lent their support to the development and organization of the Polish Army.

Thus, when in November last, before the recruiting boards were set up, and the strength of the Polish Army already amounted to 46,000 men, the Military Authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics informed the Polish Command that the strength of the Polish Army could not exceed 30,000 men and that the establishment and rations for the Army had been limited to that number. Although Ambassador Kot immediately intervened with Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, this unilateral decision was not changed and as a result the Polish Command was forced to discharge from the ranks of the Army 16,000 soldiers who had enlisted as volunteers. This was the first serious setback that hampered the organization of the Polish Army.

It would have seemed that the problem of the numerical strength of the Polish Army was finally and definitely settled in December of last year during General Sikorski's visit to Moscow. General Sikorski together with Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, established the numerical strength of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at 96,000 men, exclusive of 25,000 men to be evacuated to the Near East to reinforce the Polish units fighting in Libya, and the 2,000 airmen and sailors to be evacuated to Great Britain. Thus the total number of Polish soldiers to be recruited on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was to amount to 123,000.

Hardly had three months elapsed, however, before this decision agreed upon by both parties, underwent an unexpected unilateral change. Thus in March 1942, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars informed General Anders, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the strength of the Polish Army could not exceed 44,000 men and that the surplus over and above that number would be evacu-
ated to the Near East. The decision to reduce the strength of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 96,000 to 44,000 men was a new obstacle to the organization of the Polish Army.

The Polish Government, thus faced with an accomplished fact, received this decision with genuine regret. The Polish Government had hoped that thanks to the continuation of recruiting for the army, that had been promised to General Anders, a considerable number of soldiers over and above the established strength of 44,000 would also be evacuated to the Near East to reinforce the Allied armies fighting the enemy. These hopes were openly expressed in General Sikorski's message of April 9, 1942, to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, delivered to Your Excellency on April 13; in my Aide-Mémoire of May 1, 1942, to Your Excellency; in Ambassador Kot's Note of May 4, to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; and in my Note of June 10, 1942, to Your Excellency. I should moreover like to add that in accordance with the Declaration made on December 4, 1941, by General Sikorski and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, which established the bases of cooperation between the Polish Army and the Soviet Army, and in accordance with the frequent public statements made by General Sikorski about the common struggle of the Polish Forces and the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against the German forces, I stated in my Note of June 10, that even those Polish soldiers who had been evacuated from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would take part, after they had been adequately equipped and trained and should the necessity arise, in fighting on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, side by side with the soldiers of the Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The answer sent by Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on May 14, 1942, in reply to Ambassador Kot's Note of May 4, surprised and astonished the Polish Government. The reply in question contained a statement that the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in his conversation with General Anders never touched upon the problem of continued recruiting for the Polish Army, and further that the recruiting, supply and medical centres of the Polish Army, intended to facilitate the dispatch of volunteers to that Army, must also be closed.
This decision to reduce the strength of the Polish Army, the refusal to allow recruiting and voluntary enlistment, already restricted by the ban on Polish citizens leaving their places of temporary residence and the suspension of railway passes, prove that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did not desire an increase in the strength of the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or in the ranks of the Polish units fighting in the Near East.

The negative attitude of the Soviet Government to the further development of the Polish forces is also proved by the fact that more than 8,000 Polish officers, who in the spring of 1940 were interned in the prisoner of war camps of Ostashkov, Starobielsk and Kozielsk, are still missing despite frequent interventions by the Polish Government, and although incomplete lists of the names of these officers were delivered to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars by General Sikorski in December, 1941, and in March, 1942, by General Anders.

Taking into consideration all the aforementioned indisputable facts concerning the organization of the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that the Government of the Republic of Poland considers the allegation that the Polish Army declines to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as entirely unfounded and inconsistent with the true state of affairs, and that the Government of the Republic of Poland cannot take into cognizance the motives alleged for the refusal to allow further recruiting for the Polish Army.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYŃSKI.

No. 49

London, October 31, 1942.

Note of October 31, 1942, from Ambassador A. Bogomolov to Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning the organization of the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. Minister,

In reply to your Note of August 27, 1942, I have the honor to inform you of the following:
1) As is known, in accordance with the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, a Military Agreement was signed on August 14, 1941, between the High Command of the U.S.S.R. and the High Command of the Republic of Poland, with a view to forming on the territories of the U.S.S.R. a Polish Army for the prosecution of the war against Germany in common with the Soviet armies and those of the other Allied countries.

To carry out this purpose the representatives of the Soviet and Polish High Commands started from the necessity of completing the formation of the Polish Army in the shortest possible time, with a view—as was emphasized on many occasions by the representatives of the Polish High Command, Generals Anders and Szyszko-Bohusz—to the earliest possible participation of these units in active warfare.

Such a plan for the organization of the Polish Army necessitated the immediate setting up of recruiting boards and that Polish citizens throughout the Soviet Union be at once notified of the formation of a Polish Army, and of the possibility as Polish citizens of joining this Army as volunteers.

As is known, all this was undertaken at the time (the end of August) with the fullest possible cooperation of the Soviet military and local civilian authorities.

Also, at that time an agreement was reached between the Soviet and Polish Commands that the strength of the Polish Army be fixed at 30,000 men (two rifle divisions, one reserve regiment, a military school for officers, the staff and staff offices), and it was decided that the formation of the two rifle divisions and a reserve regiment should be completed by October 1, 1941. This date was decided upon to meet the desire of the Polish Command for the quickest possible organization of a Polish Army. For the same reason, and in accordance with a proposal of the Polish representative (General Anders), it was agreed to send one or the other of these divisions to the Soviet-German front as soon as it was ready.

The Soviet military authorities, acting upon instructions from the Soviet Government, cooperated with the Polish Command in the fullest possible measure to assist it in the most successful solution of all the intricate problems connected with the formation of a Polish Army, namely: food supplies, stocks, billeting of military units, staffs and the various staff institutions, billeting facilities for officers, supplying newly formed units with arms, etc.
As regards the method of providing the Polish forces with supplies, the Soviet Government arranged to ensure that the Polish Army should be included within the Red Army supply system, which greatly facilitated the whole task of forming the Polish units. Thus, food supplies were to be the same as those for the Red Army behind the front, until the advance of the Polish units into the front line. Forage, fuel, grease, training ammunition, were also issued in quantities equal to Red Army standards. To this should be added that the use by the Polish Army of military barracks, staff billets, means of communication, transport, lighting, etc. was paid for according to normal rates fixed for the Red Army.

All these arrangements connected with the formation and maintenance of the Polish Army were financed through a non-interest bearing loan of 65 million roubles made by the Soviet Government to the Polish Government. This loan fully covered all expenses connected with the army until January 1, 1942. In fact, the financial credit given by the Soviet Government for the organization of the army exceeded the amount of the non-interest bearing loan, for this loan did not include considerable grants amounting to an additional 15 million roubles made to the officers corps of the Polish military units in formation.

2) Regardless of the fact that the organization of the Polish divisions was not completed within the period originally fixed, by October 1 of that year, which indeed could not but create many difficulties and adversely affect the further development of the Polish Army, the Soviet Government expressed itself fully agreeable to the proposal of the Polish Government that the Polish Army be increased to the strength of 96,000 men, including officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

As a result, in December 1941, the Soviet Government gave its consent to this increase and the Polish Army was to be expanded from two divisions to six divisions of 11,000 men each.

Furthermore the Soviet Government consented that the effectives of the schools for officers, the service of supplies, the reserve units and complementary units, and the staffs and personnel of the staff offices, originally fixed at 3,000, be increased to 30,000.

In view of this large increase in the strength of the Polish Army, the Soviet Government also raised the amount of the loan for the maintenance of the Polish Army from 65 million roubles to 300 million roubles, on the same easy terms (non-interest bearing loan, 141
repayment over a period of ten years beginning from the sixth year after the end of the war, etc.).

This increase in the strength of the Polish Army to 96,000, made necessary the establishment of a number of complementary services, both administrative and economic. All these were set up at the time of the transfer of the Polish Army to the Soviet Republics of Uzbek, Kirgiz and Kazakhstan, as desired by the Polish Command.

Climatic conditions were the main reason for this transfer to the Southern regions of the U.S.S.R., but it was also connected with the need for more space than was afforded in the central regions for the Polish divisions already organized, and the tens of thousands of Polish citizens to be recruited. This necessarily involved a tremendous amount of work, for camps had to be erected, quarters found for the staffs, locations for the military schools, sanitary institutions and accommodation for the officers, etc.

As may be well understood in these circumstances, the execution of this programme of more than trebling the size of the Polish Army from that contemplated in the original plan (from 30,000 to 96,000) was fraught with many difficulties as regards organization, transport and materials, these difficulties were particularly complicated and increased by the barbarous warfare waged on the Soviet nation by the German occupants. But all these difficulties were overcome and by February-March of 1942, the Polish Army had reached a strength of nearly 70,000 men.

Such an increase in the strength of the Polish Army in a relatively short period, and the increase by more than four and a half times of the expenditure for the maintenance of that army, from 65 million roubles to 300 million roubles, is ample proof of the Soviet Government's interest in the creation of a Polish Army and in assisting the Polish nation to take its honorable place in the war against the Hitlerite brigands.

3) However the further development of the Polish Army met with certain difficulties caused by such unforeseen circumstances as the non-delivery of wheat to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the United States and England as a result of the outbreak of war in the Pacific Ocean.

Since the U.S.S.R. could not receive supplies of foodstuffs it became necessary to cut down the quantity distributed to the non-fighting divisions of the army, so as to ensure supplies to the fight-
ing forces. As the Polish Commander-in-Chief showed no inclination to direct any of his divisions to the German-Soviet front, and continued to keep the Polish Army well behind the fighting lines, the Soviet Government was compelled to treat these units as a non-fighting force, and accordingly the decision to cut down the rations of non-combatant units was applied to them.

In view of these circumstances the Soviet Government took the following decision as regards the Polish Army: from April 1 of that year the number of rations to be reduced to 44,000 and the Polish Army over and above these 44,000 to be sent to Iran in accordance with the wish of the Polish Government.

This decision was taken by the Soviet Government on March 18. Already at the beginning of April about 30,000 Polish men and officers left the U.S.S.R. and proceeded immediately, under instructions of the Polish Government to Iran. Some three months after this evacuation of the Polish military units to Iran, the remaining 44,000 men and officers followed in their footsteps, having been sent outside the U.S.S.R. frontiers by the Polish Government— to Iran, Syria, Palestine and North Africa.

Thus the question of the Polish Army’s participation together with the Soviet Armies in the campaign against Hitlerite Germany was removed by the Polish Government from the agenda. The Polish Government came to a negative decision on this problem, despite its previous assurances and despite the solemn declaration it made in this respect on December 4, 1941, that “the army of the Republic of Poland which is now on the territory of the Soviet Republic will wage war against the German brigands shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet armies.” Such a decision by the Polish Government was however not unexpected. In spite of the repeated assurances of the Polish Commander-in-Chief that he was determined to bring his detachments into action as soon as possible, in actual fact the date of the despatch of these detachments to the front was constantly postponed.

Indeed when the Polish Army was first being organized the date for its readiness for action was fixed, as is well known for October 1, 1941, and the Polish Command in this connection declared it was considered advisable to send individual divisions to the front as and when their organization was completed and they were ready for action. Though the preparations connected
with the different divisions were delayed, even if it were not possible to fulfill this obligation by October 1, it could nevertheless have been done later. However, the obligation has not been fulfilled, and not once has the Polish Command raised the question of sending the organized divisions to the Soviet-German front.

The Soviet Government did not consider it possible to press the Polish Command in this matter, but nearly five months after the organization of the Polish military divisions had begun, namely in February 1942, the Soviet Government became concerned as to when the Polish divisions would begin to fight against the Hitlerites. Mention was then made of the 5th Division, which had completed its training. At the same time the Soviet Government emphasized that it was important, both for political and military reasons, that Polish Units which were in readiness should be sent as soon as possible to fight against the Germans. When raising this question the Soviet Government based itself on the clear and explicit provisions of the Soviet-Polish Military Agreement concluded on August 14, 1941, point 7 of which reads as follows:

"Polish units will be moved to the front only after they are fully ready for action. In principle they will operate in groups not smaller than divisions, and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the High Command of the U.S.S.R."

Regardless of this categorical provision of the Military Agreement, excluding the possibility of any reservation whatsoever or refusal as to the propriety of moving to the front separate units ready to go into action, the Polish Government adopted an entirely different attitude in this matter. In reply to the Soviet Government’s question, General Anders informed the Soviet Commander-in-Chief that he considered it inadvisable and purposeless to send single divisions, although the Poles were fighting even in brigades on other fronts.

Incidentally, General Anders gave his promise that the whole Polish Army would be ready to take part in the campaign against the Germans by June 1 of the present year. Neither by June 1 nor at a much later date did the Polish Army, or rather the Polish Command and the Polish Government show their willingness to fight the Germans on the Soviet-German front. Furthermore the Polish Government even formally declined to move their units to the Soviet-German front on the grounds that "the employment of
single divisions would give no result,” that “the possible readiness for action of one division does not correspond to our expectations” (telegram from General Sikorski of February 7).

4) While refusing to send its army to the Soviet-German front, the Polish Government at the same time obstinately demanded the consent of the Soviet Government to carry out on Soviet territory supplementary recruiting for the Polish Army.

However, as not a single Polish detachment had taken part in active warfare, the Soviet Government was unable to give its consent. J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R., in a message addressed to General Sikorski, and V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in a Note of May 14, drew the attention of the Polish Government to these circumstances.

Nevertheless the Polish Government repeated its request to carry out supplementary recruiting for the Polish Army amongst the Polish citizens residing on Soviet territory. In its Note of June 10, however, the Polish Government explicitly stated a projected use of the Polish fighting forces organized in the Soviet Union, that was nothing else but a refusal to use them on the Soviet-German front.

In reply to this statement, transmitted by Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Polish Government in London, the Soviet Government informed the Polish Government that in view of the fact that in spite of agreements between the U.S.S.R. and Poland, the Polish Government did not deem it possible to employ the Polish divisions organized in the U.S.S.R. on the Soviet-German front, the Soviet Government could not permit the further organization of Polish units in the U.S.S.R.

The above facts prove that the Soviet Government used every means to ensure a successful organization and development of the Polish Army on the territory of the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Government made all the necessary arrangements, and supplied all the necessary means and facilities for this purpose.

The agreement of July 30, 1941, and the declaration of December 4, 1941, clearly and explicitly defined the aims of the Soviet Government and the Polish Government, to unite the forces of the Soviet and Polish nations in the common struggle against the Hitlerite brigands and occupant
with this high ideal and to give it an opportunity to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army for the independence of their motherland, their homes and their native soil.

The Soviet Government did everything that was necessary for the realization of this aim. The Polish Government took a different path. The Polish Government showed no inclination to send their divisions—neither the first divisions formed, nor those subsequently formed—to the Soviet-German front, they refused to employ the Polish Army on this front against the Germans hand in hand with the Soviet divisions, and thereby declined to fulfil the obligations they had undertaken. Therefore, the Polish Government must assume full responsibility for the breach that has occurred in the continued organization on Soviet territory of their army from among the Polish citizens in the Soviet Union.

I have the honor to be, etc.

BOGOMOLOV.

No. 50

Note of December 18, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. V. Valkov, Chargé d'Affaires of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, containing a reply to the Soviet Note of October 31, 1942, concerning the organization of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R.

London, December 18, 1942.

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires,

In respect to the negative attitude adopted by the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to the efforts of General Anders to have one reserve depot left on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to continue the recruiting of Polish citizens for the Polish Army, I had the honor to represent in my Note of August 27, 1942, addressed to Ambassador Bogomolov, the consistent and sustained efforts of the Polish Government to organize a numerically strong army of Polish citizens, fit for military service and anxious to fulfil their duty to their motherland in the ranks of the armed forces. To recall these continued efforts of the Polish Government I quoted in my Note a series of facts and referred to the abundant correspondence in the matter between the representatives of the Polish Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
I wish to emphasize that in his reply of October 31, 1942, to my Note mentioned above, Ambassador Bogomolov neither questioned nor denied any of the facts quoted by me. On the contrary, Ambassador Bogomolov, referred in his Note to the decision taken on March 18, 1942, to reduce the Polish forces to 44,000 men, a decision which, as I had the honor to remark in my Note of August 27, 1942, was taken unilaterally by the Soviet Government, without any consultation whatsoever with the representatives of the Polish Government, and which was contrary to the bilateral Polish-Soviet understanding of December 3, 1941, on the formation of a Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 96,000 men, apart from the evacuation of 25,000 infantry and 2,000 air and navy personnel. He also emphasized that “the further development of the Polish Army met with certain difficulties caused by such unforeseen circumstances as the non-delivery of wheat to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the United States and England as a result of the outbreak of war in the Pacific Ocean.” So without questioning in any way my statement concerning the negative attitude of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to the numerical development of the Polish Army, moreover, himself emphasizing that the reduction of that Army in March, 1942, was due to the outbreak of war in the Pacific Ocean and not to any fault on the part of the Polish Government, Ambassador Bogomolov arrives at the end of his Note at a conclusion which I completely fail to understand, namely, that it is the Polish Government which should bear the entire responsibility for the discontinuation of the organization of their army from among the Polish citizens living on the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Before discussing in further detail the various statements made by Ambassador Bogomolov in his Note of October 31, 1942, I wish first of all to observe that a considerable part of this Note is devoted to the enumeration of all measures and facilities granted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make possible the creation of a Polish Army. Ambassador Bogomolov includes in this list the setting up of recruiting boards, the notifying of Polish citizens of the organization of a Polish Army, the collaboration of Soviet military authorities with the Polish High Command for the most satisfactory solution of various problems connected with the organization of the Army, viz.: furnishing ap-
appropriate premises, barracks, food and other supplies, munitions for training purposes, etc., as well as a non-interest bearing loan originally of 65 million roubles, raised subsequently to 300 million roubles, granted to the Polish Government by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to cover the cost of all the above mentioned services and deliveries in kind. The Polish Government fully appreciated the efforts the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made to this end, efforts undoubtedly great and complicated in view of the war waged on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—and this is why they pressed no demands in this respect. If, however, there were serious shortcomings in matters concerning barracks for the army, food supplies, fodder for horses, which led to repeated representations by General Anders and by General Sikorski on December 3, 1941, in his talk with Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, those complaints were not made as a reproach to the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics nor to place their efforts in doubt, but to draw their attention to the fact that these shortages and failures to deliver supplies must evidently impair the rapidity with which the Polish Army could be made ready for action.

In his Note of October 31, 1942, Ambassador Bogomolov mentions that in accordance with the understanding between the Soviet and Polish High Commands, the strength of the Polish Army was fixed at 30,000 men and that the formation of two Polish rifle divisions and of one reserve regiment should have been completed by October 1, 1941, and further, that in accordance with the proposal made by General Anders it was agreed to send the divisions as and when formed to the Soviet-German front without delay.

Ambassador Bogomolov's assertion that the strength of the Polish Army was fixed at 30,000 men is obviously contrary to the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, to which Ambassador Bogomolov frequently refers in his Note. Article 4, of the above mentioned Military Agreement, reads as follows:

"The Polish Army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. will consist of units of land forces only. Their strength and number will depend on the man-power, equipment and supplies available."

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As results from the above text, the Military Agreement—that is the basic document governing the organization of the Polish armed forces—does not fix any restriction as to the strength, making it dependent solely on the man-power and equipment available. Moreover, at the signature of the Military Agreement, the Polish Government deliberately abstained from putting forward any definite figure as to the strength of the Army, on the assumption that the Polish armed forces fighting against the Germans would include all Polish citizens capable of bearing arms and eager to fulfil on the fields of battle their duty to their motherland. The Polish Government were fully convinced that on the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a numerically strong Polish Army could be raised in view of the man-power available there. These hopes of the Polish Government were based on three factors:

1. The number of Polish citizens, prisoners of war according to the figures published in the Red Star, the organ of the Red Army, on September 17, 1940 was 181,000 men, including 12 generals, 58 colonels, 72 lieut. colonels, 5,131 officers of lesser rank and 4,096 reserve officers.

2. In the Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there were about 100,000 Polish citizens from the classes of 1917, 1918 and 1919, conscripted on Polish territory in the spring months of 1941.

3. Among those deported from Polish territory, there were considerable numbers of men of military age, who could join the Polish Army in formation, as volunteers or regular recruits, according to the provisions of Art. 6 of the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941.

Several months after the conclusion of the Military Agreement, to be exact, on December 3, 1941, a bilateral decision was reached by General Sikorski and Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, with regard to fixing the strength of the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As I mentioned above and in my Note of August 27, 1942, the Polish armed forces were to consist of 96,000 men; apart from 27,000 men evacuated to the Middle East, or a total of 123,000 men.

As Ambassador Bogomolov in his Note refers to an alleged fixing of the strength of the Polish Army at 30,000 men during General Anders's negotiations with the Soviet High Command, this refers probably to the so-called Protocol No. 2, of August 19, 1941. I
desire to recall in this connection the explanations communicated by Ambassador Kot to Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, on November 14, 1941, and on November 15, 1941, to Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, which were taken into cognizance. Consequently Protocol No. 2 did not contain any limitation of the strength of the Polish Army—as this would have been contrary to Art. 6 of the Military Agreement signed a few days previously—but provided for a gradual formation of the Army by stages, according to the influx of recruits and the supply of technical equipment, which could be delivered to the Polish Army in formation only by the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and without which the formation of any armed force whatever was completely inconceivable. This Protocol, at the wish of the Polish Command—as emphasized by Ambassador Bogomolov in his Note—fixed a short time limit, October 1, 1941, for the organization and military preparedness of two divisions and one reserve regiment. This extraordinarily short period provided for the organization and military training of the Army, on the initiative of the Polish Command, is irrefutable proof of the eager desire of the Polish Army to take part in war operations on the Eastern front at the earliest possible date. It is obvious, however, that the problem of the military training of two divisions and one reserve regiment in a period of six weeks from the date of the signature of the Military Agreement has no connection whatsoever with the totally different problem of the strength of the Polish Army, as a separately organized entity that was to be formed in accordance with the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and of the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941. Therefore I must consider as wholly unjustified the assertion as regards a definite fixing of the strength of the Polish Army at 30,000 men during the negotiations with General Anders. Equally devoid of all foundation is the attempt to represent the understanding of December 3, 1941, which actually for the first time fixed the number of divisions to be formed on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the number of soldiers to be evacuated, as a concession made to the Polish Government.

In the above mentioned Note, Ambassador Bogomolov tries to burden the Polish Government with responsibility for the fact
that the two divisions mentioned above did not achieve their military preparedness by October 1, 1941, and that these and other divisions were also not ready to fight at a later date, and finally he asserts that the Polish Government deemed it undesirable to send single divisions to the front, and even refused to send their Army to the Soviet-German front.

I wish to draw your attention, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, to the fact that the Government of the U.S.S.R., at the time of the conclusion of the Military Agreement with the Polish Government were well aware that the Polish Government disposed of considerable man-power out of which many army divisions could be formed, but that on the other hand, they did not possess their own armament or munition factories. Therefore Article 12 of the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement explicitly provided that “armament, equipment, uniforms, motor transport, etc., will be provided as far as possible by (a) the Government of the U.S.S.R. from their own resources, (b) the Polish Government from supplies granted on the basis of the Lend-Lease Act.”

The first care of the Polish Government when proceeding with the creation of the Polish Army was to take measures to fully provide the troops with the necessary equipment in the shortest possible time. Thanks to the efforts of the Polish Government a few weeks after the conclusion of the Military Agreement shipments of uniforms for the Polish Army were already despatched from Great Britain. General Anders received the first consignment of uniforms and boots from Soviet authorities only on October 23, 1941, and up to that date the soldiers were in rags, and 40% of them went barefoot. During the initial period of the formation of the Army, arms were to be supplied by the Government of the U.S.S.R. But it was only on October 22, 1941, that Mr. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, notified Ambassador Kot that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had some difficulties as regards armaments and asked whether there was any possibility that the Polish Government might obtain armaments from the United States and Great Britain. An identical statement with regard to armament difficulties was made by Ambassador Bogomolov to General Sikorski and myself on October 25, 1941.

If I mention this matter here it is not with the aim of imparting any blame; I merely record facts which show that in spite of the
best will on the part of the Polish Government, Polish armed forces could not be adequately armed within the period of time originally fixed and that the Polish Government cannot assume any responsibility on that score.

The Polish Government informed by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the difficulties concerning the arming of the Polish Army, immediately approached the Governments of Great Britain and of the United States with a request for arms and equipment. As you are aware, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the necessity of continuing supplies to the U.S.S.R. on the one hand, and the imperative need of massing arms and munitions in North Africa on the other, together with complications arising from the great length of the journey were responsible for the fact that the arms could not be delivered at the dates fixed.

As a result it was only possible to arm and equip the 5th Division of the Polish armed forces on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and even that division very inadequately compared to a Soviet infantry division, so it was in no case ready to fight. The division did not possess any of the eighteen 45 mm anti-tank guns the establishment called for, it had no 76 mm anti-aircraft guns (establishment 4), also it did not possess any synchronized anti-aircraft machine guns (establishment 18) nor any 12.7 mm machine-guns (establishment 9). The 5th Infantry Division had not received any 77 mm field guns, although according to the establishment it should have had 18, and finally it was without munition carriers for 77 mm guns or 104 mm howitzers. As for the 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, it had only four instead of the six called for in the establishment. Finally the 5th Division was also very short of equipment: the division had only 10% of motor-cars, 56% of field kitchens, 80% of two-horse carts, 45% of ambulances, 60% of one-horse carts and 85% of the horses provided for in the establishment. As far as the other divisions were concerned there was actually no question of their being armed, as all they had was only 200 rifles, a number insufficient even for training purposes, so that in order to prevent the soldiers from remaining idle, General Anders was obliged to distribute among them part of the firearms of the 5th Division.

When on March 18, 1942, General Anders informed the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of this state of affairs and simultaneously presented him with a list of arms already re-
ceived and an estimate of additional arms required to complete the needs of the Polish Army, Premier Stalin said: "You will have enough time to organize and to train your Army. We do not press you to go to the front. I understand that it will be better for you to go to the front when we shall have advanced to the Polish frontiers. You should have the honor to be the first to step on Polish soil."

The facts quoted by me above prove that if neither the Polish Army as a whole nor any part of it, such as the 5th Division frequently mentioned by Ambassador Bogomolov, took part in the fighting on the Eastern front, it was not because the Government of the U.S.S.R. deemed it impossible to exert pressure on the Polish Command, but because no part of this Army was either properly trained or adequately armed, consequently, it did not meet the explicit and simple requirements set down in Art. 7 of the Military Agreement, in the following words: "The Polish units will be moved to the front only after they are fully ready for action."

In his Note Ambassador Bogomolov also refers to the second part of this Article, which reads: "In principle they (the Polish units) will operate in groups not smaller than divisions and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the High Command of the U.S.S.R.," and at the same time he expresses the opinion that the sentence quoted above excludes the possibility of any reservation whatever or refusal as to the propriety of moving to the front separate units ready to go into action. Although I have already had the honor of proving that for lack of armaments none of the Polish divisions had reached the stage of full readiness for action, and consequently none was in a position to participate in the fighting, I now take the liberty of drawing your attention, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, to the fact that the interpretation of this part of this Article may be twofold, that is to say, that Polish military units not smaller than a division might be or must be moved to the front. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the matter and to give to this Article a uniform interpretation which would exclude all ambiguity, General Sikorski on August 23, 1941, instructed General Szyszko-Bohusz to have a further talk with the High Command of the Red Army to explain that the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics would operate as a whole under Polish Command and that individual Polish divisions would not be sent to the front. Requesting such an interpretation of Article 7, General Sikorski took the stand that not only military considerations but the prestige of Poland demanded that the Polish Army should operate as a whole and have a special sector of the Eastern front entrusted to it under a Polish general. He also took into consideration the propaganda value that the taking over of a particular sector of the front by the Polish Army would have in Poland and in the whole world. The throwing up to the front of one Polish division and the splitting up of the Polish Army into single units would cause not only unfortunate consequences in the organization of the Polish Army, but would also have undesirable effects for the U.S.S.R., as far as propaganda was concerned. After carrying out his instructions, General Szyszko-Bohusz informed General Sikorski on September 11, 1941, that he had been officially informed, on September 10, by the Government of the U.S.S.R., through the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Panfilov, that the said Government interpreted Article 7 of the Military Agreement in accordance with the suggestion of the Polish Government and recognized entirely the necessity of using the Polish Army at the front as a homogeneous whole. Also in his conversations with the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, General Sikorski made explicit reservations against employing individual Polish divisions at the front and against splitting the Polish Army into single units which would be lost in the immense Red Army.

I am obliged to take the most emphatic exception to the assertion of Ambassador Bogomolov that the Polish Government removed from the agenda the question of the participation of the Polish Army in the common fight together with the Soviet forces against the Germans. The Polish Government were and continue to be firmly resolved to respect all Polish-Soviet agreements, the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941 and the Polish-Soviet Declaration of December 4, of the same year. Evacuation of a part of the Polish Army, agreed upon in the negotiations between General Sikorski and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, resulted from the necessity of the speediest possible arming of the Polish troops so that they might be thrown into the battle against Germany. An evacuation of part or even the whole of the Polish Army did not exclude a continuation of recruit-
ing of Polish citizens fit for military service as clearly provided for in the Military Agreement and did not depend on the earlier or later participation of the Polish Army in the battles at the front. In accordance with the provisions of the above mentioned Agreement, recruiting should be continued until the man-power resources of Polish citizens residing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are exhausted. The recruiting was stopped without agreement with the Polish Government, in spite of the fact that being informed of the difficulties in feeding the troops in the rear of the Army, on June 10 of the current year, they made a proposal to the Soviet Government to supply food rations for recruits over and above the figure of 44,000 pending evacuation to the Middle East. As you are well aware, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, this offer was not accepted by the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the recruiting of Polish citizens for the Polish Army was stopped.

In the final paragraph of his Note of October 31, Ambassador Bogomolov asserts that in my Note of June 10 of the current year, the Polish Government declared themselves in favor of such a use of the Polish armed forces formed on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that meant nothing else than a refusal to use them on the Soviet-German front. Desirous to demonstrate that the above assertion can be based only on a misunderstanding, I take the liberty of quoting the paragraph of my Note of June 10, referring to the use of the Polish Army on the Eastern front among others. I wrote then: "The Polish Government are determined to use the Polish Armed Forces now in the U.S.S.R., in the Near East or in Great Britain in the struggle for the common cause against the common enemy." Moreover, I did not preclude in the above mentioned Note the possibility of the return of evacuated units of the Polish Army to the fighting on the Eastern battle-front, as shown by the following sentences: "It is possible that the Polish Army formed in the Near East may—after it is equipped and trained—also be used on the front of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in case the military situation should so require. Certain units of this army have already taken a noteworthy part in the defence of Tobruk and in the fighting in the desert. The fact that the Polish Army has not yet fought side by side with the Red Army is solely due to armament difficulties experienced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as to the shipping difficulties that beset Great Britain and the United States."
As you see, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the excerpts from my Note of June 10, quoted above, are perfectly clear and unequivocal and they contradict Ambassador Bogomolov's assertion concerning the alleged declaration of the Polish Government against the use on the Soviet-German front of Polish armed forces organized on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. All the facts quoted by me above irrefutably testify that the Polish Government, attaching great importance to the possibility of forming a Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, fulfilled with complete loyalty all the obligations they assumed, and most zealously spared no efforts to make that Army as strong numerically as possible. The Polish Government also did everything in their power and spared no steps to obtain as soon as possible from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and from the Governments of Great Britain and the United States the necessary arms and equipment for the Polish Army to enable it to take part in the fighting on the Eastern front. It is through no fault of the Polish Government that their efforts in this direction, owing to a whole series of unforeseen circumstances, did not bring the hoped for results within the time foreseen, as a consequence of which the training of the Army and its readiness for action were also delayed. On the other hand, the decision to reduce the strength of the Polish Army and to stop recruiting for that Army was taken by the Government of the U.S.S.R. alone without any attempt at consultation with the Polish Government in the matter. Consequently, full responsibility for those decisions must be borne solely by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Bearing in mind that the interests of the United Nations in the present war against the aggressor States demand that all available man-power be utilized to wage a most successful war against them, and in view of the fact that many thousands of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics capable of bearing arms have not yet been recruited for the Polish armed forces, and, moreover, the possibility that when those Polish units already organized enter into action in the near future, casualties and losses must ensue which will necessitate replacements in the fighting ranks,—the Polish Government cannot alter their opinion that the continuation of recruiting for the Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, interrupted several months ago, is in the common interest of all Allied Nations.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI
CHAPTER 6

Transfer to the Polish Army of Poles forcibly conscripted by the German Army and subsequently taken prisoner by the Red Army.

No. 51

Note of January 18, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, concerning the transfer to the Polish Army of Poles, forcibly conscripted by the German Army, and now in Soviet Prisoner of War Camps.

Referring to its Notes D. 713/41 of November 8, 1941, and D. 48/42 of January 7, 1942, the Polish Embassy has the honor to submit the following for the information of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

In the second half of December, 1941, groups of prisoners of war, soldiers of the German Army, passed through Tatishchevo and Saratov, among them were many Polish citizens forcibly conscripted by the German Army. These prisoners, on seeing Polish soldiers of the 5th Infantry Division at stations en route asked their countrymen to report their fate to the Polish authorities and to make endeavours to have them set free from prisoner of war camps and enrolled in the Polish Army in formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Submitting the above for the information of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, this Embassy has the honor to renew its request that instructions be issued with a view to collecting in a separate center prisoners of Polish nationality who were forcibly mobilized by the German authorities of occupation, and after particulars as to their identity, etc., have been investigated and their nationality ascertained, make it possible to enlist them in the Polish Army.

Kuybyshev, January 18, 1942.

No. 52

Note of January 23, 1942, from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, refusing special treatment to Poles, prisoners of war from the German Army.
In reply to the Notes of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland of November 8, 1941, No. 713/41 and January 7, 1942, No. 48/42, and of January 18, 1942—No. 164/42, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the following:

In the Notes mentioned above the Embassy referred to the transfer to the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. of Polish citizens, prisoners of war from the German Army, on the assumption that these prisoners surrendered of their own will, supposedly wishing to join the Polish Army in formation on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

The People's Commissariat considers itself obliged to declare, that it cannot agree to the Polish Government's proposal and that it sees no grounds for adopting any regime for German prisoners of war of Polish nationality other than the regime established for all German prisoners of war.

Further to the above, the People's Commissariat deems it necessary to inform the Embassy that an overwhelming majority of Poles—soldiers in the German Army—were taken prisoner with arms in their hands, having actively resisted the Soviet forces, and not as a result of voluntary surrender.

Kuybyshev, January 23rd, 1942.

No. 53

Note of February 6, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev containing a reply to the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of January 23, 1942, and demanding the transfer to the Polish Army of Poles, prisoners of war from the German Army.

In reply to the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs No. 13 of January 23, 1942, the Polish Embassy has the honor to submit the following:

When it approached the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with the request that Poles be separated from prisoners of war, former soldiers in the German Army, taken prisoner by the Red Army, this Embassy was prompted by the following considerations:

The conscription of Polish citizens by the German Army constitutes a flagrant breach of the fundamental rules of international law, and should be met, in the common interest of all Allied States, not only by condemnation, but also by counter-action both on the
part of the Polish Government and on the part of the friendly Government of the U.S.S.R. The Germans are endeavoring to mobilize every force to combat the Democracies, and spare no effort to put at the disposal of the German High Command the greatest possible man-power, including even hostile elements. One of the important tasks of both our Governments is to counteract this action.

The Poles, constituting as they do an element decidedly hostile to the Germans, are, as a rule, distributed on conscription by the German Army among different units, in small groups or singly so as to prevent any organized resistance, as for instance mass desertion to the Allied Forces. That the Germans do not trust the Poles conscripted by force is illustrated by the fact that Poles are not admitted to commissioned and non-commissioned rank in the German Army, nor to branches of the service requiring individual action, as for instance tanks, air force, signals, but are given auxiliary duties in supply columns or in infantry units, where an individual soldier surrounded by a mass of Germans would face immediate death at their hands should he lay down his arms.

The Polish Government has, for its part, undertaken appropriate steps on the German occupied territory of the Republic of Poland to deal with the disastrous results of the conscription of Polish citizens by the German Army, issuing secret instructions to Poles to surrender to the soldiers of the Red Army at the earliest opportunity. The Polish Government intends to extend this action as soon as possible. The principle of deserting from the ranks of the German Army, encouraged on the territory of the Polish Republic, is not fruitless: as best shown by public statements of Soviet authorities. Among others, a report in the Comsomol Pravda No. 308 of December 30, 1941, fully supports the attitude adopted in the present Note, and requires no further comment. (A copy of this report is forwarded herewith.)

Besides, last November the Soviet authorities organized a meeting of Slav prisoners of war, former soldiers in the German Army, at which a resolution accepted by all the Slav nations oppressed by Germany was passed. This resolution, signed on behalf of the Poles by Kurt Klauzen, a worker from Bydgoszcz and former soldier of the 106th German Infantry Division, and Ryszard Slibo, from Chorzów, former soldier of the 29th German Infantry Division (Izvestia November 29, 1941)—fully corroborated the correctness of this

In the opinion of the Embassy, to restrict to propaganda in the Soviet press the results of this action, aimed at encouraging Poles to surrender to the soldiers of the Red Army, is not enough in the present period of friendly collaboration between both States, a collaboration which aims at the fullest mobilization of every force for the fight against the common enemy, and to which expression was given in the Moscow Declaration of December 4, 1941.

At the same time the Polish Embassy has the honor to draw the attention of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the undesirable consequences which would ensue should information reach occupied Poland that Poles conscripted by force are treated by the Soviet authorities on being taken prisoner, in the same manner as German prisoners-of-war. Information of this kind would immediately be utilized by German propaganda not merely to hinder the Polish Government’s action with regard to desertion by Polish citizens, but also endanger the principle of Polish-Soviet collaboration on the territory of the Republic of Poland.

This being the state of affairs, this Embassy has the honor to request the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to reconsider its hitherto negative attitude to the transfer of Polish prisoners, former soldiers in the German Army, to the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, an attitude expressed in the Note of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of January 23, 1942.

Kuybyshev, February 6, 1942.

No. 54

Note of December 15, 1942, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. V. Valkov, Chargé d’Affaires of the U.S.S.R., concerning the transfer to the Polish Army of Poles, prisoners of war from the German Army, and the cessation of tendentious broadcasts concerning the part played by Poles in the German Army.


Radio stations on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have on several occasions recently broadcast news of the
mass participation of Poles in the German Army, and even of the formation of special Polish units allegedly commanded by Polish officers. This information was given in such a form as to create the impression that there existed voluntary cooperation between the Poles and the German Army against the Red Army.

At the same time the Polish authorities have had the opportunity to ascertain by reports from Poland that many Polish officers and other ranks, residing in territories illegally incorporated in the Reich, have been forcibly conscripted by the German Army and sent to various German fronts. Poles, thus mobilized, have found themselves in Fieldmarshal Rommel's army in Libya, and in German units which took part in the fighting at Dieppe. Availing themselves of the first opportunity, these men surrendered to Allied units and are today in the ranks of the Polish Army, preparing to fight against their age-old enemy.

The Government of the Republic of Poland have therefore instructed Ambassador Romer to explain to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the real reasons for the existence of a certain number of Polish soldiers in the German Army. At the same time Ambassador Romer has instructions to submit to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the aforementioned broadcasts throw a false light upon the part played in the German Army by the forcibly conscripted Poles, whose only desire is to concentrate their efforts against the German oppressor.

Repeating to a verbal intervention by Ambassador Romer, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lozovsky, stated, that from investigations carried out among individual prisoners, the authorities of the U.S.S.R. estimate the number of Polish soldiers at three hundred thousand. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics possesses information to the effect that these soldiers are under strong German supervision. Desiring to influence these soldiers by propaganda, the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have distributed to them appeals and proclamations in Polish.

As can be seen from the statement of Mr. Lozovsky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, anti-German sentiments prevail among the soldiers referred to, a fact the Polish Government never doubted.

The lowering of Germany's war potential is indisputably an aim common to all the United Nations. Its realization in respect of
Polish soldiers conscripted by the German Army against their will and contrary to international law ought in the common interest to belong primarily to the Polish Government. The success of appeals addressed to Polish soldiers in the German Army would beyond all doubt be greater if the Polish Government were in a position to assure them that on surrendering they would be separated and sent to special camps under the care of Polish Authorities and would be able subsequently to transfer to the ranks of the Polish Army.

I am deeply convinced that a considerable number of Poles forcibly conscripted by the German Army and ordered against their will to fight the Allied Armies could already find themselves in the ranks of the Polish Army, thus contributing to strengthen the forces fighting for the common cause.

Therefore I should like to express the hope that in view of the increasing importance of this problem, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will take into account the Polish Government’s suggestion and reconsider the attitude hitherto adopted towards Poles who are already Soviet prisoners of war, or may be taken as such in the future, and will consider issuing orders to the effect that broadcasts on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should cease to interpret the tragic fate of the victims of this forcible conscription in a way that may prove a source of misapprehension harmful to them.

I have the honor to be, etc.

RACZYNSKI.

No. 55

Note of January 11, 1943, from Mr. V. Valkov, Chargé d’Affaires of the U.S.S.R., to Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, containing the refusal of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to separate Poles, prisoners of war from the German Army and to transfer them to the Polish Army.

London, January 11, 1943.

Mr. Minister,

On behalf of the Government of the U.S.S.R. I have the honor to remind you that on the question of German prisoners of war of Polish nationality, which is the subject of your Note of December
15, 1942, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has already had occasion to communicate to you, in the Note of January 23, 1942, that for reasons indicated in this Note it does not find it possible to apply to Poles among German prisoners of war any regime other than that established for all German prisoners of war in general.

The attitude of the Soviet Government, as set forth in the Note of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of January 23, 1942, was confirmed twice: by the People’s Commissariat in Kuybyshhev and by the Soviet Embassy in London.

In reply to your Note of December 15, 1942, on the same question I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government cannot see any reason to reconsider their decision.

In regard to the Soviet radio broadcasts concerning the creation of Polish units in the German Army under the command of Polish officers, it is necessary to mention that the radio broadcast, the only one of its kind to take place in the course of the last two months, was based on positive facts. In the above broadcast the undeniable fact was recorded of the presence in the German Army of whole groups and units, consisting exclusively of Poles under Polish commanders whose names were given in the broadcast: Maritime Regiment, Colonel Polkowski; Commander of the 4th Company, Colonel Rakowski.

I have the honor to be, etc.

VALKOV.

CHAPTER 7

Citizenship of Poles in the U.S.S.R.

No. 56

Note of November 10, 1941, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshhev to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, concerning conscription by the Red Army, of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to submit the following for the information of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:
According to information received, the War Commissar for Kazakhstan at Alma-Ata, General Shcherbakov issued orders that all Polish citizens deported by the Soviet Authorities from occupied Polish territory and possessing documents issued to them by these authorities, endorsed to the effect that they are of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian or Jewish origin are to be enrolled in the Red Army if they meet the age and fitness requirements.

After an intervention by the interested parties and by representative of this Embassy, General Shcherbakov declared that he was acting on instructions from the Central Authorities, who are alleged to have directed him to treat as citizens of the U.S.S.R. all citizens of the Republic of Poland of other than Polish origin possessing Soviet passports. Among others the following Polish citizens, despite protests on their part, were among those conscripted and sent it would seem to the Far East: Aleksander Rotstein, Silberspitz and Kotok.

This same discrimination between Polish citizens according to origin or race, devoid of any impartial basis and contrary to the provisions of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, is being practiced by the military authorities in Alma-Ata, who also explain to the Polish citizens reporting to them to settle various formalities connected with their enlistment in the Polish Army in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that they are acting on instructions from the Central Authorities. Only Polish citizens of Polish origin are given permits to travel to centers where the Polish Army is being organized, while Polish citizens of Ukrainian and Jewish origin are, it seems, categorically refused permits by the aforementioned authorities.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to request the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to cause instructions to be given to the War Commissar in Kazakhstan to apply impartially to all Polish citizens residing in the area under his authority, the principles resulting from the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, which guarantee the right to serve in the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to every Polish citizen who is capable of bearing arms.

Kuybyshev, November 10, 1941.
Note of December 1, 1941, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in reply to the Note of the Polish Embassy of November 10, 1941, concerning the conscription by the Red Army of Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin.

In reply to the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland No. D. 740/41 of November 10, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to state the following:

Referring to the fact of the conscription by the Red Army in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, as Soviet citizens, of citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin who left the territories of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia, the Embassy of the Polish Republic calls in question the existence of a legal basis for this order, considering that it is contrary to the principles of the Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941 and the Soviet-Polish Military Agreement of August 14, 1941.

The People's Commissariat cannot agree with this point of view of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland. No foundation to support the point of view expressed in the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland, referred to above, can be found in the Agreement of July 30, or in the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941. In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of November 29, 1939, all citizens of Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian S.S.R. who found themselves on the territory of the said districts on November 1 and 2, 1939, respectively, acquired the citizenship of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938. The Soviet Government's readiness to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin, who resided until November 1 and 2, 1939, on the aforementioned territory, gives evidence of good will and compliance on the part of the Soviet Government but can in no case serve as a basis for an analogous recognition of the Polish citizenship of persons of other origin, in particular those of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian or Jewish origin, since the question of the frontiers between the U.S.S.R. and Poland has not been settled and is subject to settlement in the future.

With regard to the Polish Embassy's reference to an order issued in Alma-Ata by General Shcherbakov, according to the
information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs no order was issued calling the aforementioned citizens to the ranks of the Red Army, but orders were given to call them up for work behind the lines, as is also done in the case of other citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Kuybyshev, December 1, 1941.

No. 58

Note of December 9, 1941, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning Polish citizenship.

The Polish Embassy acknowledges receipt of the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, and has the honor to bring the following to the notice of the People's Commissariat:

1) Polish legislation is founded on the principle of equality before the law of all citizens, regardless of their origin or race. The Polish Embassy is also not aware of any Soviet laws which would introduce or sanction any discrimination or differentiation of this kind.

The Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, do not introduce in any of their provisions relative to Polish citizens (amnesty, military service) the notion of origin or race, and thus they concern all Polish citizens without exception.

In this state of affairs, this Embassy sees no possibility of changing its attitude as expressed in its Note of November 10, 1941, which stated that it was contrary both to the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, that only Polish citizens of Polish origin should be able to enlist in the Polish Army, while Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin were enlisted in the Red Army by the War Commissariat in Kazakhstan.

2) The fact of the possession of Polish citizenship by a given person is regulated by Polish law, in particular by the Polish State Citizenship Act of January 20, 1920. For this reason and for the reasons stated above under Paragraph 1, this Embassy has the honor to declare that it finds itself unable to take into cognizance
the statement included in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941, to the effect that the Soviet Government is prepared to recognize as Polish citizens only persons of Polish origin from among the persons who found themselves on November 1 and 2, 1939 on the territory of the Republic of Poland temporarily occupied by the military forces of the Soviet Union.

3) The Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938 cannot be applied to Polish citizens, for its introduction on the territory of the Polish Republic occupied by the Soviet Union from the latter half of September, 1939, until June or July, 1941, would be contrary to the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907.

4) The Polish Embassy does not connect the matter referred to in Note D. 740/41 of November 10, 1941, with the problem of Polish-Soviet frontiers. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs points out in the Note in question that it does not recognize as Polish citizens persons of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Jewish origin who possessed Polish citizenship before November 1-2, 1939, "because the problem of the frontiers between the U.S.S.R. and Poland has not been settled, and is subject to settlement in the future." The Polish Embassy is bound to state that such a thesis is self-contradictory. Maintaining fully the fundamental attitude expressed above in Paragraphs 1-3, this Embassy has the honor to point out that such a view would be tantamount to a unilateral settlement by the Soviet Union at the present time of a problem which, in accordance with this same statement of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, is subject to settlement in the future.

Kuybyshev, December 9, 1941.

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No. 59

Note of January 5, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, concerning Polish citizenship.

In reply to the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland No. 902/41 of December 9, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the following:
1. After taking note of the considerations set out in the Note of the Embassy of December 9, 1941, on the question of the former Polish citizens forming part of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia—Ukrainians, White Ruthenians and Jews—the People's Commissariat cannot see any reason to change the attitude set forth in its Note of December 1, 1941.

2. The assertion of the Embassy that the law concerning citizenship of the U.S.S.R. of August 19, 1938, could not be applied to the territories of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia in the period between the middle of September 1939 and the middle of July 1941, as this would be incompatible with the provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, is incorrect. The provisions of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, which the Embassy evidently has in view, refer to the regime of occupation on enemy territory, whereas the assertion of "occupation" in respect to Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia is, in this case, devoid of all foundation, alike from the political as from the international point of view, because the entrance of the Soviet forces into Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia in the autumn of 1939 was not an occupation but an attachment of the districts mentioned to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the result of the freely expressed will of the population of those districts.

Kuybyshuv, January 5, 1942.

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No. 60

Note of June 9, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshuv on the issuing of Polish passports in the U.S.S.R.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs taking into consideration that the Polish Embassy and, under the arrangement relating to the scope of action of the Delegates of the Embassy of the Polish Republic, its Delegates in the Republics and Districts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its representatives are proceeding to issue Polish national passports, has the honor to state that the competent Soviet authorities find it indispensable that, to properly order this matter, the Embassy should present to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs alphabetical lists of Polish citizens to whom it proposes to issue
national passports. These lists, made out separately for each district inhabited by Polish citizens, should be presented in four copies with a Russian translation attached to accelerate the procedure. The lists should include all persons above the age of 16. These lists should indicate:

a. Surname, name and father's name;
b. Year and place of birth;
c. Origin;
d. Religion;
e. Present address in full;
f. Citizenship and place of residence until November 1939;
g. If covered by the Amnesty Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of August 12, 1941, when and where arrested and sent out, number of jail delivery certificate, when and by what office of the People's Commissariat of the Interior it was issued;
h. If not a permanent inhabitant of Western Ukraine or White Ruthenia, when and how arrived on the territory of the U.S.S.R.;
i. Whether married or single. If married, place and date of marriage, citizenship of husband and wife since the time of marriage;
j. Present and past citizenship and place of residence of parents.

These lists may be drawn up in descriptive form or in the form of questionnaires.

All objections of competent Soviet authorities to the issue of Polish national passports to these or other persons included in the lists will be notified by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy on the return of these lists.

Persons included in the above mentioned lists to whom the competent Soviet authorities raise no objection will receive, on presentation of their Polish national passports, permits of residence for foreigners, issued by Militia Headquarters of the respective counties through the Militia Office of their district or town.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs also has the honor to inform the Embassy that it is indispensable to include in the above mentioned lists all persons who have already been issued with Polish national passports.

Kuybyshev, January 9, 1942.
No. 61

Note of June 24, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, replying to the Soviet Note of June 9, 1942, on the issuing of Polish passports (excerpt).

Referring to the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs No. 107 of June 9, 1942, the Polish Embassy, on the instruction of its Government, has the honor to submit the following for the information of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

In accordance with the fundamental principles of international law, the Government of the Republic of Poland assert that the matter of Polish citizenship rests with them and they do not consider it possible that, when verifying lists of Polish citizens demanded of the Embassy, the Soviet authorities should decide the citizenship of Polish citizens resident on the territory of the Republic of Poland and who between 1939-1941 found themselves, as is known, not of their free will on the territory of the Soviet Union.

In particular this attitude of the Polish Government is also in accordance with the Agreement concluded on July 30, 1941, between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. . . . The issue of passports to Polish citizens is carried out by the Polish Embassy and its representatives under existing Polish laws and regulations. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Polish law, origin, religion, race or place of residence within the frontiers of the Republic of Poland have no influence on the citizenship of a given person.

Taking into consideration that the aforementioned Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is aimed at imposing a procedure in issuing passports, unprecedented in relations between sovereign States, the Government of the Polish Republic see no possibility of discussing the principles of this question on the basis of the suggested procedure.

Kuybyshev, June 24, 1942.

No. 62

Note of January 16, 1943, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, claiming as Soviet citizens all persons who on November 1-2, 1939,
found themselves on Polish territories occupied by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the Embassy of the Polish Republic of the following:

In connection with the exchange of Notes in the years 1941-1942 between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Embassy, concerning the citizenship of persons who previously lived in the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy on December 1, 1941, that all inhabitants of the above-mentioned districts who found themselves on the territories of these districts at the time of their entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (November 1-2, 1939), had acquired Soviet citizenship in accordance with the Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. dated November 29, 1939, and the Citizenship of the U.S.S.R. Act of August 19, 1938.

In its Note of December 1, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy that the Soviet Government were prepared, by way of exception, to regard as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin living in the territories of the above-mentioned districts on November 1-2, 1939. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is bound to state that despite the good-will of the Soviet Government thus manifested, the Polish Government has adopted a negative attitude to the above statement of the Soviet Government and has refused to take the appropriate steps, putting forward demands contrary to the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union in respect to these territories.

In connection with the above, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, on instructions from the Soviet Government, gives notice that the statement included in the Note of December 1, 1941, regarding the readiness to treat some categories of persons of Polish origin on an exceptional basis must be considered as without validity and that the question of the possible non-application to such persons of the laws governing citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has ceased to exist.

Kuybyshev, January 16, 1943.
Note of January 26, 1943, from Mr. Raczynski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., in reply to the Note of January 16, 1943, concerning Polish citizenship in the Soviet Union.

London, January 26, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

In the Note of the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev of December 9, 1941, the Polish Government notified its refusal to take into cognizance the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign affairs of December 1, 1941, in which the Soviet Government declared its readiness to exonerate, by way of exception and favor, certain categories of persons of Polish origin from the application of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of November 29, 1939, as well as from the laws which confer upon them the status of citizens of the Union. The aforementioned Note of the Polish Embassy pointed out that the conferment or withdrawal of Polish citizenship was an exclusive and inalienable attribute of the sovereignty of the Polish State, whose laws, moreover, make no distinction between the origin, race or faith of its citizens.

Since then a year has passed during which the aforementioned categories of Poles residing in the Union have been treated in accordance with their status as Polish citizens. However, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has informed the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev by its Note No. 12 of January 16, 1943, that the Soviet Government considers it necessary to cancel the declaration contained in the Note of December 1, 1941, and that in consequence the possibility of exonerating from laws governing Soviet citizenship the said persons of Polish nationality has now ceased to exist.

Maintaining its point of view in principle on the question of citizenship, the Polish Government records with deep regret that the Soviet communication of January 16, 1943, is incompatible with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the joint Declaration made by both Governments on December 4, 1941.

These documents were based on the mutual conviction of the two Contracting Parties, that the re-establishment between them of normal and confident relations in the interest of their cooperation in
the present struggle against the common enemy and of their good
neighborliness after the war, calls for the nullification of a recent
pact that was contrary to these arrangements. Thus these documents
leave no room for doubt as to the annulment of the Soviet-German
Agreements of 1939 and their political and legal consequences.

I must recall that according to Paragraph 1 of the Supplementary
Protocol to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet
Government undertook to set free all Polish citizens detained on
Soviet territory for whatsoever reason. On July 30, 1941, there were
on Soviet territory no other categories of Polish citizens than those
to whom this status is now denied by the Soviet Government. So it
was precisely to these persons in their status of Polish citizens,
that the amnesty applied. It must be emphasized that the point men-
tioned above which was the subject of laborious negotiations, con-
stitutes one of the essential clauses of the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

The Polish Government has always refused to recognize the
validity of the unilateral decisions of the authorities of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, taken when there were no Polish-Soviet
relations; among them was the decision concerning the forcing of
citizenship of the Soviet Union upon Polish citizens. It may be
added that decisions of this kind are incompatible with international
law as defined by the IVth Hague Convention of 1907, and with the
provisions of the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, to which the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered in the Declaration of
the United Nations, dated January 1, 1942.

Always desirous for its part to maintain with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics the best of relations, based on the observance of
all treaties and arrangements existing between the two countries, the
Polish Government see themselves obliged to insist that the Soviet
Government grant to all Polish citizens residing in the Soviet Union,
a treatment in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Agreement
of July 30, 1941, and the principles of equity and liberty on which
rests the collaboration of all Powers united in the struggle against
the common enemy and oppressor.

I have the honor to be, etc. 

RACZYNISKI.

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No. 64

Note of February 17, 1943, from Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of
the U.S.S.R., to Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
containing a reply to the Note of January 26, 1943, concerning Polish citizenship in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Minister, London, February 17, 1943.

With reference to your Note of January 26, 1943, I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government do not regard it as possible to reconsider the subject of the citizenship of those persons who on November 1-2, 1939, found themselves on the territory of the western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics, since this matter remains wholly within the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union over these territories.

As to your assertion regarding the incompatibility of the Soviet Government's statement of January 16, 1943,* with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Declaration of December 4, 1941, the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 and the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, such an assertion is devoid of all foundation. The Soviet Government also emphatically reject the statement of the Polish Government contained in the Note of January 26, about the alleged forcing of Soviet citizenship upon the above-mentioned persons, as entirely unfounded and a distortion of the true state of affairs.

The Soviet Government consider it imperative to recall that citizens of the western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Socialist Soviet Republics acquired Soviet citizenship exclusively on the strength of the freely voiced will of the population which found its expression in the unanimous resolutions adopted by the people's assemblies of the districts in question, and the Decree of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, issued on November 29, 1939, in accordance with these resolutions.

I have the honor to be, etc. BOGOMOLOV.

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No. 65

Note of March 8, 1943, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, concerning the forcing of Soviet citizenship upon Polish citizens.

The Embassy of the Republic of Poland has the honor to inform the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that reports from a

* i.e. in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev.
number of places in the U.S.S.R. indicate that local Soviet authorities are employing methods of compulsion described in the Embassy's Note No. 307/21/43 of March 6, 1943.

In the town of Syzran, district of Kuybyshev, officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs are threatening with imprisonment or confinement in labor camps all Polish citizens who refuse to accept Soviet passports. Endeavours are also being made to persuade those who resist by the argument that "Poland no longer exists," which is flagrantly inconsistent with the obligations undertaken by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Those refusing to accept Soviet citizenship are as a rule kept in confinement without food or water until they sign a document agreeing to accept a Soviet passport.

Similar reports are coming in from the Krasnoyarsky Kray, and the Kirov, Kuybyshev and Akmolinsk districts. In the town of Kuybyshev three inmates of the Embassy's Home for Invalids are still under detention without food or drink.

Fragmentary information which has succeeded in reaching the Embassy indicates that many hundreds of persons have been affected by these arrests.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to renew its request to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to instruct local authorities immediately to abandon the use of force and to set free Polish citizens who have been deprived of their freedom without committing any offence whatsoever.

Kuybyshev, March 8, 1943.

No. 66

Note of March 29, 1943, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., containing the protest of the Polish Government against the forcing of Soviet citizenship upon Polish citizens.

London, March 29, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

It has come to the knowledge of the Polish Government that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the strength of the Notes of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs addressed to the Polish Embassy at Kuybyshev on December 1,
1941, and January 16, 1943, and in disregard of the reservations expressed by the Polish Government on each occasion, and invoking the Decree* of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of November 29, 1939, has proceeded to force Soviet citizenship upon Polish citizens who find themselves in considerable numbers and not of their will on the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In these circumstances the Polish Government deem it necessary to declare once more that in the light of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, which is binding on both parties, they consider the principles underlying the attitude of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in this matter as unjustified and unfounded, because:

a) The aforesaid attitude is contrary to Paragraph 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the above-mentioned Agreement of July 30, 1941, granting amnesty to all Polish citizens within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which bilateral legal instrument cannot be infringed or changed by any unilateral Soviet order.

b) The Decree* on citizenship of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of November 29, 1939, resulting from the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 referring to territorial changes in Poland, and invoking expressis verbis one of these treaties, must obviously have lost its validity together with these same treaties from the moment of the German aggression against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on June 22, 1941, as recognized by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article 1 of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.

In view of the fact that regardless of the outcome of the present conversations in Moscow between the two Governments which seek agreement on their attitude in this matter in the spirit of mutual friendliness and collaboration that underlies their present relations, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not agreed to the suspension, at least during the course of the conversations in progress, of the execution of its orders in respect of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Polish Government find themselves regretfully compelled to lodge a deter-

* Ukase.
mined protest against this and to declare that they cannot recognize this infringement of the sovereign rights of the Polish State; they reserve to themselves the fundamental right to call into question in the future all de facto conditions, both as regards general matters and those affecting individual citizens, resulting from the aforesaid attitude of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and the right to claim compensation for any losses sustained by Polish citizens in consequence of this attitude.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

Raczyński.

No. 67

Excerpts from the Civil Code of the Russian S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. containing the definition of domicile as interpreted by Soviet Law, delivered to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev on April 2, 1943.*

CIVIL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R.

II. Subjects of the law (persons).

11. A place of domicile is a place where a person remains constantly or for the greater part of time in connection with his or her official employment, or usual occupation, or the presence therein of his or her property.

By the place of domicile of persons under age or in custody is meant the place of domicile of their legal representatives (parents, adopters, guardians or trustees) (November 14, 1927) (G.U. No. 115, art. 770).

CIVIL CODE OF THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R.

II. Subjects of the law (persons).

11. A place of domicile is a place where a person remains constantly or for the greater part of time in connection with his or her official employment, or usual occupation, or the presence therein of his or her property.

By the place of domicile of persons under age or in custody is meant the place of domicile of their legal representatives (parents or guardians).

* Cf: Minute of Ambassador Romer’s conversation with Mr. Molotov, Document 87.
CHAPTER 8

The Execution of Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich

No. 68

Note of March 8, 1943, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., protesting against the execution of W. Alter and H. Ehrlich.

London, March 8, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

Excerpts have been published in the American and British press of a letter from the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington addressed to Mr. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, containing information on the execution of Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich, who were sentenced to death by the Soviet authorities on the charge of complicity in subversive action against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, giving assistance to Polish Intelligence and appealing to the Soviet army to cease bloodshed and conclude an immediate peace with Germany.

In connection with the above information the Polish Government refer to Notes regarding Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich addressed by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and beg to state as follows:

1. The Councillor of the capital city of Warsaw, Henryk Ehrlich (born in Lublin in 1882), and ex-Councillor and Sheriff of the city of Warsaw, Wiktor Alter (born in Mlawa, province of Warsaw, in 1890), were released from prison on September 13, 1941, by the competent authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the provisions of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August 12, 1941, granting amnesty to all Polish citizens domiciled and detained in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The fact of their release was communicated to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland at Moscow in a Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on September 23, 1941, which clearly proves that Messrs. Alter and Ehrlich had been recognized by the Soviet authorities as Polish citizens.
2. Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter were widely known and distinguished leaders of the Jewish Socialist movement in Poland; furthermore Mr. Ehrlich was a member of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Labor International, and Mr. Alter a member of the Executive Committee of the International of Trade Unions.

In consideration of his services with the Jewish labor movement in Poland, the Polish Government had intended to appoint Mr. Ehrlich a member of the National Council, and with this aim in view had taken steps to facilitate his journey from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Great Britain. Mr. Alter was to be appointed assistant at the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev in relief work for Polish citizens on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The political and social activities of Messrs. Alter and Ehrlich for many years well-known throughout Poland and in international labor circles, their patriotism and loyalty as Polish citizens during the German invasion of Poland and also in the light of the desolation caused throughout the Polish nation and the Jewish population by that invasion, are absolute guarantees that they could not even indirectly have been sympathizers with or tools of any action whatsoever in favor of Germany, and even less so in favor of Hitlerism. At the same time the charge that Messrs. Ehrlich and Alter worked against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics at any period whatever in conjunction with the alleged Polish Intelligence must be firmly rejected as being entirely imaginary and contrary to fact.

On the contrary, it was well known to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that during the period between their release from prison and their re-arrest in December 1941, Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter proceeded, with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet authorities, to organize in Moscow an International Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the object of which was to unite all Jewish masses throughout the world in the war effort against Germany and Hitlerism.

On the strength of the above statement, the Polish Government firmly repudiate the motives put forward in the letter of the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington to Mr. Green and protest against the execution by shooting of the Polish citizens Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

Raczynski.
Note of March 31, 1943, from Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., to Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to the Note of March 8, 1943, protesting against the execution of W. Alter and H. Ehrlich.

London, March 31, 1943.

Mr. Minister,

In reply to your Note of March 8, 1943, I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government reject the entirely unfounded protest of the Polish Government concerning the execution of Ehrlich and Alter, sentenced on account of their activities directed against the U.S.S.R. at the end of the year 1941, which went so far as to appeal to the Soviet armies to cease this bloodshed and to conclude an immediate peace with Germany; this at the time of the hardest struggle of the Soviet armies against the advancing armies of Hitler.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

BOGOMOLOV.

CHAPTER 9

Relief Organization for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R.

No. 70

Rules regulating the scope of activities of Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the U.S.S.R., coordinated as a result of negotiations between representatives of the Polish Embassy and the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on December 23, 1941.

Rules Governing the Scope of Activities of Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland

General Provisions.

1. The Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the republics and districts (oblasts) where more important con-
centrations of Polish citizens exist, are the executive representatives of the Embassy authorized to carry out, in close collaboration with the Soviet authorities, such duties towards Polish citizens as arise from the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

2. The functions of Embassy Delegates are temporary. They act as long as concentrations of Poles exist in a given locality, or until they have completed their duty toward Polish citizens, in their capacity as Delegates.

Duties of Embassy Delegates.

The duties of Embassy Delegates include the following:

1. To inform the Embassy of the requirements and situation of Polish citizens.
2. To supply Polish citizens with information and guide them according to the spirit of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.
3. To register Polish citizens in a given area, to record their movements, their fitness for military service, for work, and their professional qualifications; to search for missing members of their families and their near relatives.
4. To cooperate with local Soviet Authorities in directing Polish citizens to suitable work in accordance with the labor legislation in force in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
5. To exercise due care that Polish citizens unfit for work are assured the minimum means of subsistence, by distributing among them aid in the form of money or in kind, except in cases where the Soviet authorities are obliged to assure them means of livelihood in accordance with existing Soviet legislation.
6. To organize cultural aid for adults and education for youth.
7. To supply Polish citizens with essential documents (passports, certificates, etc.).
8. To receive, dispatch, store and distribute shipments of aid in kind from abroad for the relief of the Polish civilian population.
9. To seek out representatives for regions or localities where Polish citizens are resident. These representatives perform in the districts allotted to them the duties provided under Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the present Regulations, and on instruction of the Delegates the duties provided for in Paragraphs 1, 3 and 8. Candidates for representatives selected by a Delegate are subject to
approval by the Embassy. The Delegate exercises direct supervision over the activity of the representatives.

10. In areas where there are no Embassy Delegates, their duties are performed by travelling Embassy Delegates.

Cooperation with Soviet Authorities.

1. Embassy Delegates, their deputies and travelling Delegates are appointed by the Polish Ambassador. Their names are immediately notified to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which on its part notifies their nomination and the character and scope of their activity to the Soviet authorities of the given Republic or district, instructing them to accord all necessary assistance to the Embassy Delegates.

2. The scope of activity of Embassy Delegates requires their close collaboration with the competent officials of the Soviet authorities in their district, and in particular with the local representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Oblispolkoms, Rayispolkoms, and the district and regional officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The Embassy Delegates shall acquaint the local Soviet authorities with the situation and requirements of Polish citizens and settle with them all practical questions arising from the situation of the Polish population.

No. 71

Note of July 6, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, protesting against the infringement of the diplomatic immunity of the Embassy Delegate in Archangel, and against the arrest of his staff.

The Polish Embassy has the honor to call the following to the attention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

After the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Polish Government and the Soviet Government as a result of the conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the "Rules governing the scope of activities of Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland" were established by an exchange of Notes, No. 48 of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, of December 23, 1941, and No. D. 1078/41 of the Polish Embassy of December 24, 1941.

On January 23, 1942, during a conversation which aimed at establishing in greater detail the legal status of these Delegates,
their privileges and rights, their personal security and the immunity of their archives, correspondence and offices, Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. stated to Mr. Kot, the Polish Ambassador, that when dealing with the problem of Embassy Delegates, the Soviet authorities realized it was indispensable to grant them a special position in relation to the local authorities, who received instructions to treat the Delegates as representatives of a foreign Embassy and as official persons. When asked by the Polish Ambassador whether this statement would be considered a guarantee that the Delegates would enjoy personal immunity, immunity of their archives and official correspondence, freedom to organize their offices and to choose their office staff and the liberty to travel, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars declared that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had done all in its power to secure these conditions for them, and requested the Ambassador to inform him should any difficulties of a local nature arise, adding that these difficulties would be removed.

On July 2, 1942, at about 4 p.m. Mr. Józef Gruja, Polish Embassy Delegate in Archangel, 2nd Secretary of the Polish Embassy, was obliged to go on official business to Murmansk, leaving behind as his deputy in Archangel (in agreement with the local authorities) Mr. Waldemar Kuczyński, one of his officials. A few hours after the Embassy Delegate had left, three officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs accompanied by two women employed in the local Inturist Hotel, entered the office of the Archangel Delegate, carried out a thorough search and for several hours questioned the officials present in the Delegate's office. Finally, according to information received by the Embassy, the officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs took the liberty of removing all the archives and official correspondence of the Embassy Delegate in Archangel, his seal and his money, and after having arrested the officials of the Delegate's office, that is to say, the acting Embassy Delegate, Waldemar Kuczyński, the storekeeper, Anna Witkowska, the assistant storekeeper, Marjan Pytlak, and office-worker Zdzisława Wójcik, they drove these persons away to an unknown destination, leaving with Mr. Kuczyński's wife previously prepared documents concerning the search they had carried out.

In view of the fact,
1. That the action described above was taken by officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, a considerable number of hours before this Embassy was informed, on the night of July 3-4, 1942, of the unilateral decision of the Soviet authorities that the maintenance of an Embassy Delegate in Archangel would serve no further purpose because his principal tasks had been carried out—this at a time when even from the Soviet authorities' point of view there existed a Polish Embassy Delegate in Archangel who was acting legally, i.e., in accordance with the Polish-Soviet agreement, concluded by Notes exchanged on December 23 and 24, 1941 and on January 8 and 9, 1942;

2. That, in connection with the above, the action taken by the officials of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the entry into the office of the legally officiating Polish Embassy Delegate, the carrying out of a search therein, the violation of the immunity and the carrying away of the archives and official correspondence and a seal and money belonging to the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R., constitute a flagrant violation of the rights enjoyed by Polish Embassy Delegates and their offices, expressly guaranteed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;

3. That the Polish citizens, acting Delegate Mr. Kuczynski, in the temporary absence from Archangel of the Embassy Delegate, and the three afore-mentioned officials of the Delegate's Office were deprived of their liberty seems all the more unjustified as the Soviet authorities had not only failed to raise any objection or complaint against the activities of the Office of the Archangel Delegate, but even expressed, through the medium of Mr. Novikov in his conversation, on March 9, 1942, with Mr. Arlet, 1st Secretary of the Embassy, their appreciation of the activities of that office.

The Polish Embassy is obliged:
To regard the action taken by the Soviet authorities in Archangel as altogether inconsistent with the rules and customs accepted in international relations, and as entirely opposed to the principles of friendly collaboration, which found their expression in the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Declaration of December 4, 1941;
To protest against this action of the Soviet authorities; and
To ask the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to cause:
1. the immediate release of the officials of the office of the Polish Embassy Delegate in Archangel, that is the Polish citi-
zens Messrs. W. Kuczyński, M. Pytlak, A. Witkowska and Z. Wójcik;

2. the immediate restoration to Mr. J. Gruja, 2nd Secretary of the Polish Embassy, on his return to Archangel, of all the archives and official correspondence of the Polish Embassy Delegate in Archangel and of the seal and money, constituting the property of the Polish Embassy;

3. that investigations be immediately ordered and that the Soviet officials, guilty of taking the action described in this Note, be punished.

Kuybyshev, July 6, 1942.

No. 72

Note of July 19, 1942, from Mr. Sokolnicki, Chargé d’Affaires of the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev, to Mr. A. J. Vishinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, on the unilateral decision to close the offices of various Delegates and the arrest of Polish Embassy Delegates in the U.S.S.R.

Kuybyshev, July 19, 1942.

Mr. Chairman,

In the course of your conversation with the Polish Ambassador on July 8, 1942, when you discussed with him the latest actions of the Soviet authorities with regard to the network of local offices of Embassy Delegates established in accordance with the corresponding agreements between this Embassy and the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, reference was made to the unilateral decision of the Soviet authorities to close the offices of the Delegates in Aldan-Yakutsky, Vladivostok, Archangel, and Saratov; the arrest of Mr. M. Zalenski, 1st Secretary of Embassy, acting Embassy Delegate in Vladivostok; the arrest of the entire staff of the office of the Embassy Delegate in Archangel; searches carried out in the offices of the Embassy Delegates in Vladivostok and Archangel; the violation of the immunity of the Embassy’s archives in the offices of these Delegates; the seizure by the local authorities of a number of documents, of money and of seals belonging to the Embassy, and the closing and sealing of the Embassy’s stores. In the course of this conversation the Polish Ambassador asked a question, which I now again put to you, that is do the above actions of the Soviet authori-
ties denote a change in the policy of the Soviet Government as initiated on July 30, 1941, in respect of that portion of the Polish population, which as a result of well known events found itself forcibly on the territory of the Soviet Union. It is the opinion of the Ambassador that if this action on the part of the Soviet Authorities was aimed at the destruction of the entire welfare and relief organization for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R., created with such difficulty by this Embassy in agreement with the People's Commissariat, then it would be better to state this clearly instead of creating a fictitious situation in which one cannot be certain of the fate either of people or of institutions.

It was to be inferred from your reply, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Government did not propose to change the attitude that it had hitherto adopted towards Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. and their relief organization set up by this Embassy, and that general conclusions should not be drawn from specific cases based on misunderstandings of local officials or resulting possibly from criminal actions of individuals.

During the ten days that have passed since the aforementioned conversation took place, this Embassy has been informed of new facts, which seem to signify that the organization of Embassy Delegates on the territory of the U.S.S.R. is actually being closed down; this is accompanied by the arrest of those members of this Embassy's staff who have been most active in bringing relief to Polish citizens in their districts, the seizure by the local authorities of official archives and documents of this Embassy, the blocking of this Embassy's accounts in branches of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., the closing and sealing by the Soviet authorities of warehouses containing relief goods from the Allied States addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the U.S.S.R.

Apart from the arrest of Mr. M. Zalenski, 1st Secretary of Embassy; Mr. Gruja, 2nd Secretary of Embassy and the staff of the Delegate's office in Archangel, already the subject of separate diplomatic correspondence, I am obliged, Mr. Chairman, to bring the following further facts to your notice:

On July 16, 1942, this Embassy received news of a search having been carried out by the local authorities in the office of the Embassy Delegate in Barnaul, the arrest of the Embassy Delegate Dr. J. Mattoszko and his staff, M. Siedlecki, D. Wajgetner, J. Kowalewski
and K. Bartosz, and of the seizure by these same authorities of the archives and seal of the Delegate's office and the closing of the Embassy's current account in the local branch of the State Bank.

On July 17, 1942, this Embassy received news of a search having been carried out by the local authorities in the office of the Embassy Delegate in Samarkand and the arrest of Mr. M. Heitzman, Attaché of Embassy, who enjoys diplomatic immunity, and of the Delegate's staff, K. Kazimierczak, F. Kowol, K. Jaroszewski, and F. Mantel.

On July 18, 1942 this Embassy received news of a search having been carried out by the local authorities in the office of the Embassy Delegate in Kirov, where is located the greatest clearing warehouse on the territory of the U.S.S.R. for goods arriving from Allied States for the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R. At the same time Mr. A. Wisinski, the Embassy Delegate in Kirov whose appointment to this post received the approval of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on June 26, 1942, was arrested, together with his staff, T. Slucki, F. Dubrowski, S. Fink and Z. Piotrowski.

On July 19, 1942, this Embassy received news that the office of the Embassy Delegate in Petropavlovsk had been de facto deprived of its freedom of action, while stores of relief goods sent to the Polish Embassy from Allied States, located at the station of Mamlutka, were closed and sealed by the local authorities.

On the same day, this Embassy received similar information concerning the office of the Embassy Delegate in Syktyvkar, where Dr. Winiarczyk, the Embassy Delegate was arrested.

Further details of the aforementioned steps taken by the Soviet Authorities with regard to the local offices of this Embassy are as yet unknown to me. I do, however, possess information to the effect that telegrams addressed to this Embassy and containing reports on these events, are not delivered to this Embassy and that this Embassy's telegrams to certain of its Delegates and representatives are being intercepted. The dispatches in question included those sent by the Ambassador and intercepted and not delivered to Attachés of Embassy Ploski and Lickindorf and to Secretaries of Embassy Glogowski and Gruja, which contained instructions in accordance with the contents of this Embassy's Note to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, of July 10, 1942, No. D. 2871/42. This constitutes a new infringement of diplomatic immunity and privileges, established by law and international custom.
Though I intend to return to each of the matters just mentioned on receipt of more concrete and detailed information, I have, perforce, to limit myself at present to protesting against the action of the Soviet authorities in closing down the Embassy’s relief organization; and to insist that the Delegates and their staffs who have been arrested, be immediately set free, and that the archives, seals and money belonging to the Embassy be returned.

At the same time I have to state, that as a consequence of instructions issued by the Soviet Authorities during the last three weeks:

1. Four out of the twenty, that is 20% of the offices of Embassy Delegates established in agreement with the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, namely the offices of Embassy Delegates in Vladivostok, Archangel, Aldan Yakutsky and Saratov have been closed down by unilateral order of the Soviet authorities;

2. According to information so far received by this Embassy, five other offices of this Embassy’s Delegates, namely those in Barnaul, Samarkand, Kirov, Petropavlovsk and Syktyvkar are de facto no longer able to function because the Soviet authorities have arrested most if not all of their staff;

3. In this way the Soviet authorities have actually paralyzed the activity of 45% of all the Embassy Delegates, appointed in accordance with a joint agreement between the Embassy and the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and operating in districts where there are at present more than 170,000 Polish citizens, according to the as yet incomplete registration figures;

4. In view of the fact that the offices of nine Embassy Delegates have been prevented from functioning, the issue of food and clothing to tens of thousands of Polish citizens, some of them in very difficult circumstances, has had to be stopped in the districts served by these Delegates. The same applies to the distribution of financial aid to Polish citizens, unfit for work. Food, clothing, and medical stores, worth millions, and consisting of goods sent to the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R. from Allied States are left entirely unprotected. Further shipments of food, clothing and medical supplies which are on their way to the offices of individual Delegates, will no longer go to persons duly authorized to receive them. Preventive inoculation against typhus will have to be suspended. Homes for orphans and the aged, maintained by individual Delegates, will be left without suitable care;
5. In view of the fact that the relief activities of this Embassy's agencies are being formally or actually rendered impossible, the responsibility for every consequence of this action rests with the Soviet authorities;

6. In view of the effective stopping, closing and sealing by the Soviet authorities of food, clothing and medical stores, collected at great expense and effort by the Polish Government, as well as by the Governments and peoples of the Allied States, destined for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. and delivered to Soviet ports by Polish and Allied sailors, who sacrificed much and risked their lives to accomplish this task,—the responsibility for the destruction and deterioration of these goods which may ensue, must also rest with the Soviet authorities.

I have the honor to be, etc.

SOKOLNICKI.

No. 73

Note of September 1, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., concerning the closing of the Delegates' Offices, and the new organization of relief.

London, September 1, 1942.

Mr. Ambassador,

Many weeks have elapsed since the arrest of the Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, their staffs and representatives. One hundred and thirty Polish citizens recognized by the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as possessing official status and who, as I may state, have in the majority of cases carried out their duties of bringing help and relief to their countrymen with sacrifice and devotion under difficult conditions, are still in prison. The Polish Government has made several interventions on their behalf either through your good offices, Mr. Ambassador, or through the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev. All these interventions have so far been without result.

The Polish Government is not, of course, in possession of detailed information concerning the fate and treatment of those imprisoned. From the scarce and of necessity fortuitous information
reaching us, it is to be feared, that their fate is particularly hard. At the same time the relief organization for Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, only just created with great difficulty, has been closed down.

I need not repeat, for I have done so orally and in writing more than once, that the Polish Government consider that bringing relief to Polish citizens, who, neither of their own fault nor of their own will, find themselves on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is their fundamental right and duty which they will not and can not surrender. These citizens, in a foreign country, in strange conditions and surroundings, torn away from their homes and occupations, deprived of any funds whatever—have become more than anyone else the victims of a situation difficult for all, a situation caused by war, and therefore in greater need of help than others. Moreover, Mr. Ambassador, you are fully aware how difficult it was from the very first moment after the conclusion of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, to find and agree upon a form of relief administration. I shall confine myself to stating that the organization finally accepted was the result of prolonged negotiations between the Polish Embassy and the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that the principle of entrusting specifically the responsibility for the entire organization to no one else but Embassy Delegates, who were endowed with an official status, and Embassy's representatives, was initiated by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, after the authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had rejected the plan to set up Consulates, to restore the activities of the Polish Red Cross or to form Social Welfare Committees, chosen by the Polish citizens concerned. Once the laborious preparations, which lasted until last February and March, were completed, the field organization set up enjoyed comparative freedom from interference during the first period of its activity. It is, however, particularly significant, that the moment its work commenced to develop, when relief in the form of food, clothing and medicine began to reach Polish citizens, the local authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began to show distrust of the Delegates, and to place difficulties in the way of the Delegates and their staffs. Subsequently, when supplies arrived and their distribution started on a large scale, there followed the arrest of the Delegates, the seizure of their archives and the closing down of all these activities.
I desire to state here with all firmness and with that frankness which ought to characterize our mutual relations, that the assumption that the problem of re-establishing the relief organization can be separated from the problem of the arrested Delegates would be a denial of reality. A re-establishment of the relief and welfare organization without the release of all those arrested, and the return of the archives, is impossible not only in principle, but also for purely practical reasons. The deportation and imprisonment of the Delegates and their staffs, i.e., of people enjoying the fullest confidence of the Polish citizens under their protection, inevitably caused uneasiness and confusion in the minds of those citizens. Were there no other obstacles, the lack of faith in the probable effectiveness of their work and the fear of persecution by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on grounds incomprehensible to the general public, would make it impossible to find persons suitable to manage the work of relief, while their predecessors were suffering the torture of imprisonment for precisely the same work.

Far be it from me to criticise or even to judge the administrative arrangements and legal principles in force in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is an internal affair of your country, in which no outsider has the right to mix or interfere. You will, however, agree with me, Mr. Ambassador, that the arrangements and principles in question differ in many respects from those accepted in other European States, particularly the countries of Central and Western Europe or on the American Continent. I am only mentioning this in order to suggest that it is conceivable that some of the activities carried on in good faith by the Delegates, and in complete accord with Western European conceptions, laws and customs to which they were used and among which they had grown up, may have come into formal conflict with the more rigorous and unfamiliar regulations in force in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

I must, however, categorically reject the allegation of any action having been consciously undertaken by the Delegates to the detriment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The supposition that any of these persons, numbering more than one hundred and selected with the utmost care, should have undertaken of their own accord and independently, action inconsistent with the line indicated by the Polish Government, is devoid of any traces of likeli-
hood. As regards the general line laid down for the entire field relief organization by the Polish central authorities through the intermediary of the Polish Embassy, this was exclusively directed at the concentration of all the efforts of this organization to assure the utmost aid and relief to the Polish citizens dispersed throughout the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Polish Government always considered and continues to consider this activity an integral and important part of the common struggle against the enemy, who has adopted as one of his most cruel but at the same time most effective methods of total warfare the biological extermination of nations whose love of freedom opposes them to him. It is to this struggle, in which Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stand together, that the Polish Government subordinates all its undertakings.

One of the basic conditions of the victory of our common cause is the establishment of relations of confidence and sincere collaboration between the United Nations. Prompted by this principle the Polish Government has endeavored to give the least possible publicity to the difficulties which it has encountered in protecting the welfare of its citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; in so doing this Government has trusted that these difficulties will be rapidly overcome by mutual good will. The prolongation, however, of the period of the forced inactivity of the relief and distribution organization has created circumstances which, quite independently of the will of the Polish Government, make further silence on this subject impossible. The piling up and even partial deterioration of relief goods in stock, received originally from America, and the inability to distribute them among those for whom they are intended, oblige the Polish Government to warn the institutions donating them of the state of affairs created by the arrest of the Delegates.

News of the stoppage of the distribution of aid to Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has already reached Polish territory occupied by the Germans, and is spreading feelings of understandable anxiety and bitterness, reflected in reports received by the Polish Government from its agencies, political organizations and individuals. It would, of course, be entirely contrary to the intentions of the Polish Government, should this anxiety exercise a detrimental effect on the preparedness for action of the people in occupied Poland, or should it arouse sentiments likely to impede
the development of future good-neighborly relations between Poland
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in conformity with the
Declaration signed in the Kremlin on December 4, 1941, by General
Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government, and Premier
Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

If I insist again, Mr. Ambassador, on the release at the earliest
possible moment of the arrested Delegates of the Polish Embassy,
their staffs and representatives, and at the same time express my
readiness to persuade them to leave the territory of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics as soon as they are released, I do so
not merely in defense of my imprisoned countrymen and colleagues,
as is my right and duty; I come forward not merely in the interest
of those hundreds of thousands of Poles, who from one day to
another have found themselves deprived of the aid and care which,
not infrequently, in the present wartime conditions, constituted for
them the sole means of safeguarding their lives; I address myself to
you in the name of those supreme interests for which Poland and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are fighting in the ranks of the
United Nations, and in the name of what I believe to be the common
aim of both our nations, the laying of foundations for future co-
operation between our countries, based on good neighborly relations.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

Raczynski.

No. 74

Note of September 5, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev
to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the release of the
arrested Embassy Delegates, representatives and staffs.

With reference to the statement made by Mr. J. Vishinsky,
Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the
U.S.S.R., on July 20, 1942, his personal Note of July 20, 1942,
Note No. 138 of July 24, 1942, and the Aide-Mémoire of the People's
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of July 27, 1942, the Polish Em-
bassy has the honor to communicate the following:

1. This Embassy categorically rejects the allegation contained
in the Statement of July 20, 1942, that all the arrested Delegates
of the Embassy, and their staffs, instead of loyally carrying out their
duties of bringing relief to Polish citizens—were engaged in actions
hostile to the Soviet Union and in intelligence work.
It is impossible that all the Delegates without exception, most of the members of their staffs and many of their representatives who were continuously and consistently instructed by the Embassy to cooperate with the Soviet authorities in accordance with the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Declaration of December 4, 1941—in the spirit of the common struggle against Hitlerite Germany, could have at the same time carried on actions hostile to a State allied with the Republic of Poland. Most of these persons, and especially the Delegates, are well known personally to this Embassy and have always shown exceptional ability in social work and devotion to the welfare of the Polish population in the U.S.S.R.

The charges brought against those arrested, lacking any semblance of proof, must have been based on some tragic misunderstanding, highly injurious to the persons arrested. Indirectly—in view of the wholesale and simultaneous arrests—it shatters the entire relief organization of the Embassy and in consequence adversely affects, both from the moral and the material point of view, all Polish citizens residing on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

This Embassy again asks the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to cause the immediate release of all those arrested, and asserts that their official activities, carried on in conformity with the Rules governing the scope of activity of Embassy Delegates, for instance furnishing this Embassy with information concerning the requirements and condition of Polish citizens, can in no way provide a basis for their being charged with intelligence work in the U.S.S.R.

2. This Embassy cannot agree with the statement of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs alleging that up to now the activities of the Delegates have shown their lack of usefulness. The tremendous tasks which the Delegates had to perform were in no way decreased as the same masses of Polish citizens still remain, requiring help and feeling its lack today more than ever. The institution of the Embassy Delegates was created out of practical considerations, and in future the only really practical solution of the problem of relief for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. must be based on some intermediary organization or other to go between the central body—the Embassy—and the field representatives working in Polish centers dispersed throughout the vast territory of the U.S.S.R.

3. This Embassy cannot consider as closed the matter of the arrest by the Soviet authorities of Secretaries of Embassy Zalenski
and Gruja, as well as other Polish diplomats. Avoiding formal discussion as to whether the local authorities were or were not informed of the diplomatic status of these officials who, in point of fact, were well known in the localities where they worked and who possessed diplomatic identification cards issued to them by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, this Embassy wishes to state that it has not as yet received appropriate satisfaction either for their illegal arrest or for their equally illegal detention in Soviet prisons.

The Embassy wishes also to correct a fundamental inexactitude contained in Paragraph 7 of the Personal Note of July 27, 1942, stating that this Embassy agreed to deprive of their diplomatic rights and privileges, as from July 6, persons with whom Note No. 128 of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was concerned. To the proposal contained in Note No. 128 of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs "that Embassy Delegates occupying diplomatic posts, be relieved by the Embassy either of their duties as Embassy Delegates or of their diplomatic posts," this Embassy replied in its Note No. 8, D-287/42 of July 10, 1942, protesting a unilateral decision in a matter settled by mutual agreement, and informing the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of its decision to recall from posts as Embassy Delegates persons of diplomatic status, of which decision those concerned were immediately informed by telegraph.

4. The Embassy cannot agree that the return of the official seals, archives and money of the Embassy held illegally by the Soviet authorities, be made conditional on the completion of whatever kind of investigation, and once more requests the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to return them to this Embassy without further delay.

Kuybyshev, September 5, 1942.

No. 75
Aide-Mémoire of September 10, 1942, from the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning the fate of Polish children in the U.S.S.R.

AIDÉ-MÉMOIRE.

The fate of Polish children is a subject of special concern to the Polish Government which is sparing no effort to provide the best
possible conditions to enable them to survive the present war. In view of the methods applied by Hitlerite Germany which by mass murder, systematic persecution and de-nationalization is endeavoring to destroy the youth of Poland, every Polish child outside the homeland and especially in Allied and friendly countries is of priceless value to the future of the Polish nation.

One of the ways by which the Polish Government is endeavoring to provide effective relief is the dispatch from abroad of food-stuffs and clothing for Polish children. Last year the extent of such relief in the U.S.S.R. was quite considerable, but unable as it was to satisfy all needs in the past, it will also not be able to satisfy them in the future.

Conditions for effective relief to Polish children in the U.S.S.R. were created by the following orders issued by the Soviet authorities in agreement with the Polish Embassy:

1. Granting of special food quotas to Polish citizens, especially to non-working members of families (izhdiventzy) which in practice chiefly favored children;

2. Permission for the Embassy to establish relief institutions in the form of orphanages (diet-dom), kindergartens (diet-sad), etc.

The order granting food quotas for Polish citizens was only carried out in part and irregularly by the local Soviet authorities. In practice the carrying out of this order varies considerably in different districts and generally the izhdiventzy receive no food rations at all, or at the best, in kolkhozes, half the bread ration. As the average food ration for a working person amounts to 400 grammes of bread as well as soup, he is in no position to give any of this ration to other members of his family who are not working.

On the whole, while the Embassy Delegates were still functioning, the development of orphanages and kindergartens proceeded satisfactorily. At present, however, the Embassy is continually receiving information that local Soviet authorities are closing the orphanages and kindergartens established with such great difficulty, and even the soup kitchens, especially in the Kazakh S.S.R. The number of children in relief institutions is constantly decreasing instead of increasing according to needs.

This being the case the Embassy's concern for the fate of Polish children during the approaching winter is easily understood. Parents cannot be expected to be able to feed their children from the
modest food rations they receive, and it is doubtful whether it will be possible to set up new relief institutions for children in view of existing conditions.

In order to save Polish children from the consequences of this state of affairs the Embassy deems it necessary—

1. To develop the present system of orphanages and kindergartens in the various districts and regions, and to extend the system of food quotas to all Polish citizens unfit for work, especially to all children. The Embassy is of opinion that it would be especially desirable to supplement the existing relief institutions for children by setting up in the most suitable places ten or twelve large orphanages, each to accommodate 1500 to 2000 children. The provisioning and administration of such institutions would be considerably easier and more effective. They would remain under the direct control of the Embassy which would supply the staff and provide special food for the children from foreign relief consignments. The local Soviet authorities would provide suitable premises for these institutions and the essential foodstuffs.

2. Since whatever the efforts of the Embassy and the Soviet authorities the proposed measures could not, in existing war conditions, provide for all Polish children requiring assistance, the Embassy renews its suggestion to evacuate a certain number of Polish children from the U.S.S.R. to those Allied countries which have already declared to the Polish Government their readiness to support these children for the duration of the war. If such evacuation were extended over a long period and consisted of small parties of ten to fifteen children and guardians at a time, it would not require the provision of special transport. The Embassy, on its part, would provide food and medical assistance for the children on their journey.

Kuybyshev, September 10, 1942.

No. 76

Note of September 16, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev on the closing of Embassy Agencies.

In reply to the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland of September 5, 1942, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the following:
I. The question of the reasons for the arrests of Embassy Delegates and local representatives of the Embassy and the closing of their offices was exhaustively dealt with in the declaration made by Mr. A. J. Vishinsky to Mr. Sokolnicki, Polish Chargé d'Affaires, on July 27, and in a series of subsequent conversations between the representatives of the People's Commissariat and the representatives of the Embassy, and for this reason the People's Commissariat sees no necessity to return to this question. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs can only confirm that, in spite the repeated declarations of the Embassy concerning the loyalty to the U.S.S.R. of all its delegates and the alleged lack of grounds for their arrest, the investigation of their actions now in course provides considerable evidence entirely corroborating information in possession of the Soviet authorities, as to their intelligence work hostile to the U.S.S.R.

In view of the reasons stated above, the request of the Embassy for the immediate release of the arrested persons cannot be granted, as this question can only be decided after the conclusion of the investigation and will depend upon its results.

2. The question of Embassy delegates in the field, raised in Paragraph 2 of the Note, was fully exhausted in the Personal Note of Mr. A. J. Vishinsky to Mr. Sokolnicki on July 27, 1942, and the People's Commissariat does not see any reason to reconsider its point of view in this matter.

3. The question of the arrest of Messrs. Zalenski, Gruja and others raised by the Embassy in the first part of Paragraph 3 of its Note, was also exhaustively dealt with in the Notes of the People's Commissariat No. 130 of July 10, 1942, No. 138 of July 24, 1942, and in the Personal Note of Mr. A. J. Vishinsky to Mr. Sokolnicki of July 27, 1942.

As to the question raised in the second part of Paragraph 3 of the above mentioned Note of the Embassy, the People's Commissariat deems it necessary to make clear that in Paragraph 7 of the Note of the People's Commissariat of July 27, the assent of the Embassy was given only to the cessation in future of the state of affairs under which diplomatic collaborators of the Embassy, while discharging the duties of local Embassy Delegates, retained their diplomatic rights and privileges. This viewpoint of the Embassy was confirmed in the Note No. D. 2871/42 of July 10, 1942, concerning Embassy Delegate Mr. Heitzman in whose case the Em-
bassy consented not to claim diplomatic immunity for him during the period of his activity as Embassy Delegate in Samarkand.

4. To the question raised in Paragraph 4 of the above mentioned Note, the People's Commissariat has already given answer in the Note of July 27, 1942 and for the time being does not see any reason to change its attitude as therein defined.

Kuybyshev, September 16, 1942.

No. 77

Aide-Mémoire of October 16, 1942, handed by Mr. Novikov of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Sokolnicki, Polish Chargé d'Affaires, concerning the termination of investigations in respect of the arrested members of the staff of the Polish Embassy.

Investigations in respect of the arrested Polish citizens have now been brought to a close.


In respect to the remaining 78 persons, a decision was reached at a special meeting of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs whereby these persons compromised by actions hostile to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are subject to deportation from the U.S.S.R.

Kuybyshev, October 16, 1942.

No. 78

Note of November 17, 1942, from Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.,
Mr. Ambassador,

London, November 17, 1942.

I have already had the honor to inform you in my Notes of July 11, July 24, and September 1, 1942, and in conversations with yourself, that I consider the charges brought against the diplomatic officials of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuybyshev, its Delegates, representatives and office staffs, to be entirely unfounded. The Memorandum, you delivered to me, Mr. Ambassador, on October 31, repeats these same charges in a form derogatory to the dignity of Polish officials and Polish authorities, to which I am obliged to take categorical exception.

For my part I desire therefore to further state that, fully maintaining the attitude previously adopted, I most categorically reject the supposition that the distinct instructions of the Polish Government along lines of collaboration with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the struggle against the common enemy, were not carried out by persons who devoted themselves with much sacrifice to the welfare of their fellow citizens dispersed throughout the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and many of whom had already had opportunity to give proof of their efficiency and loyalty in carrying out duties entrusted to them in other posts.

After a thorough examination of the matter, for which it is indispensable, as already stated in Ambassador Romer's conversation with Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on October 31, 1942, to have all the documents and archives seized from the Embassy Delegates and their representatives by the police authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, returned to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuybyshev, I shall reply to each of the points raised in the Memorandum you delivered to me.

At the same time I should like to express my deep conviction, that an early settlement of this incident would be desirable in the interests of the satisfactory development of mutual relations between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and should simultaneously include the resumption of relief work for Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the release of those Delegates and representatives who are still under arrest.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Raczynski.
The Embassy of the Republic of Poland has the honor to notify the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the following:

In the course of the conversation he had on September 5, 1942, with Mr. Lozovsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sokolnicki returned once more to the subject of the evacuation from the U.S.S.R. of a certain number of children possessing Polish citizenship. In compliance with Mr. Lozovsky's request Mr. Sokolnicki despatched an Aide-Mémoire on September 10, 1942, which included suggestions for the evacuation of a certain number of Polish children in small groups at a time, the whole plan to operate over a long period. In reply to this Aide-Mémoire a representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed a representative of the Polish Embassy on September 28, 1942, that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had no objection to the evacuation of a certain number of orphans possessing Polish citizenship and that it awaited concrete information from the Embassy concerning the number, destination, and method of evacuation of these children.

On the basis of this statement, the Polish Embassy advised its Government that the decision of the Government of the U.S.S.R. was a favorable one. Accordingly the Polish Government approached the British Government, which agreed to receive up to 10,000 Polish children in India and in British Africa as soon as possible. Orphanages and distribution centers were immediately arranged for in those countries as well as in Iran, and preparations were undertaken for providing the children with food and medical aid.

At the same time, in compliance with a request of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Polish Embassy began to elaborate a plan for the evacuation of specified groups of children from a number of localities in the U.S.S.R., whereby about 1000 were to be evacuated per month during the initial period.

In the course of a conversation which took place on October 26, 1942, a representative of the Polish Embassy notified a representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that several groups of children were now ready to leave. Having taken into
cognizance this information, the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs requested the Embassy to submit the entire evacuation plan, and in particular data concerning the number of children and the dates and localities of their departure. As a result of this conversation it was definitely settled that owing to the difficulties involved in drafting a comprehensive and detailed plan within a short time, the Embassy would submit to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a plan for the first stage of the evacuation while the subsequent ones would be communicated to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as and when further groups were made ready for departure.

In the course of a conversation which took place on November 3, 1942 in Moscow, Mr. Molotov, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, notified Mr. Romer, the Polish Ambassador, that while he did not in principle object to evacuation, he considered it expedient that it be carried out as soon as possible.

When speaking to Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on November 12, 1942, Mr. Romer, the Polish Ambassador, presented the final plan for the evacuation of 19,000 children, pointing out that by an extension of the existing relief arrangements, 10,000 orphans and semi-orphans could be accommodated in the orphanages and kindergartens organized by the Embassy. In view of the above statements made by representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the reply given by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars at this conversation that the total evacuation was to be reduced to the 600 children who were in Ashabod, or whose names had previously been notified to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, came as a complete surprise. This statement by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars fundamentally changed the evacuation plan and rendered useless the preparatory work which the Polish Government had undertaken on what appeared to be firm grounds. Such being the state of affairs, the Embassy reported the position to its Government and is awaiting appropriate instructions.

Without determining the final settlement of this problem, on November 13, 1942 a representative of the Embassy presented to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a plan for the evacuation of 600 children. In the course of the conversations which took
place on November 27, 1942, December 21, 1942, and January 11, 1943, representatives of the Polish Embassy provided representatives of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with detailed information concerning the number of children in Ashabad at the respective dates, the number of children en route, details regarding the groups from among the children included in the quota of 600, who were to leave and the names of persons who were to act as guardians. In the course of each of the aforesaid conversations representatives of the Polish Embassy requested the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to issue suitable instructions to enable the children who had been in the Embassy’s orphanage in Ashabad for some time to leave that town since they were all included in the 600 listed for evacuation.

According to information in the possession of the Embassy there are at present in the orphanage in Ashabad 555 children ready to be evacuated; furthermore, the following groups of children are ready to leave: 40 in Tayshet, Irkutsk district; 40 in the Zyriensk and Teguldetz regions of the Novosibirsk district; 30 in Tomsk, Novosibirsk district; 30 in Semipalatynsk; 40 in Syktyvkar, Komi A.S.S.R. The Embassy has at the same time to state that from September 29, 1942 up to the present day only one group, numbering 61 children has so far left Ashabad.

Since all the details concerning the evacuation of the children included in the quota of 600 have already been submitted to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in an exhaustive form, and since it must be considered inadvisable from the point of view of hygiene to accumulate too great a number of children in the orphanage in Ashabad, the Polish Embassy has the honor to request the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to issue final instructions which would enable the departure for other countries of the children who have in most cases been in Ashabad for several months, and of the five groups mentioned above—in all 594 children.

Kuybyshev, January 23, 1943.

No. 80

Note of March 30, 1943 from Mr. E. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. A. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.,
protesting against the sovietisation of the relief institutions of the
Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R.


Mr. Ambassador,

The Polish Government has received information to the effect
that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
has proceeded to take over the administration of the relief institu­
tions (orphanages, homes for invalids, etc.) of the Polish Embassy
in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above-mentioned institutions were set up on the strength
of an agreement between the Polish Embassy and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contained in the Note
of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of February 12,
1942. In this Note the Polish Embassy was assured that the afore­
said institutions would receive food allotments (fondy) from ap­
propriate Soviet organizations, and was encouraged to set up these
institutions on the understanding that from then on the responsibil­
ity for the welfare of Polish citizens would rest with the Polish
Embassy. In a verbal statement made by a representative of the
People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to a representative of
the Polish Embassy on September 26, 1942, the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed its consent to the
further extension of the network of the Embassy's relief institutions.

In accordance with the above, the Embassy set up on the ter­
ritory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at considerable
effort and great expense, several hundred relief institutions, and
supplied them throughout their existence with substantial quanti­
ties of foodstuffs, clothing and medical supplies from abroad, either
purchased by the Polish Government, or presented as a gift by
Allied Governments and scores of welfare associations in Allied and
neutral countries.

To the surprise of the Polish Government the Soviet authori­
ties have recently begun to take over the administration of these
institutions and, I state with regret, the Soviet Government did
not even deem it necessary to inform the Polish Embassy thereof.
In taking over the administration of these relief institutions the
local Soviet authorities are at the same time dismissing some of
the employees and inmates and are introducing different educa­
tional methods for those children remaining there.
The Polish Government also learned with regret that independently of the outcome of the present conversations in Moscow between the two Governments, with a view to reaching an agreement on their attitude in this matter, in the spirit of mutual friendship and collaboration underlying their present relations, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not agreed to the suspension, at least during the course of the conversations now in progress, of the execution of its orders in respect of Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In such circumstances, the Polish Government find themselves regretfully compelled to lodge a determined protest against the very fact of removing the relief institutions from the administration of the Polish Embassy, as well as against the procedure adopted by the Soviet authorities in the matter. In the legal and de facto status of institutions, functioning on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the two Governments and disposing of property belonging to the Polish State, no changes could be made unless by mutual agreement of the two parties.

At the same time the Polish Government reserve their right to demand from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the restoration of all property belonging to the Polish State or to institutions taken over by Soviet authorities in these circumstances, also compensation for all damage and loss already sustained, or which may in future be sustained or brought to light in connection with the taking over of the Embassy's relief institutions.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Raczyński.

CHAPTER 10
Soviet Territorial Claims

No. 81

Note of January 9, 1942 from Mr. Kot, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland, to Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on the status of Lwów as a Polish city.

Kuybyshev, January 9, 1942.

Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of January 6, 1942, in which you brought to the notice of
all Governments maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the facts concerning the unheard of treatment of the defenceless civilian population by the German Army in the territories temporarily occupied by it as a result of recent war operations.

While fully sharing the Soviet Government's view that responsibility for these inhuman and barbarous actions of the German forces rests with the criminal Hitlerite Government of Germany, I have the honor to remark that this responsibility is also shared to a large extent by the obedient and zealous executors of that Government's will, that is to say German officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks, and members of the various formations of the German National Socialist Workers Party who take part in the war operations and in the administration of the occupied territories. I have the honor to recall that in my Note to your Excellency of November 27, 1941, I already pointed out the bestial treatment of the civilian population on the territories of the Republic of Poland by the Germany Army, and I supplied facts as to pogroms and executions in Lwów, Brześć nad Bugiem, Stanisławów, Komarno and other localities.

At the same time I have the honor to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact, that the inclusion of Lwów among "other Ukrainian cities" in your Note of January 6, 1942, must be the result of a misunderstanding, for from the historical point of view and from that of international law, and as far as the ethnological constitution of its population is concerned, Lwów was and remains a Polish city.

I have the honor to be, etc. 

Kot.

No. 82

Note of January 17, 1942, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev on the status of Lwów, Brześć and Stanisławów.

With reference to the Personal Note of Mr. Kot, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland, of January 9, 1942, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs has the honor to present to the Embassy the following declaration on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
The People's Commissar deems unjustified the statement by the Embassy in the above mentioned Note and in certain other documents, in which the towns of Lwów, Brześć, Stanisławów and others on the territories of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the White Ruthenian S.S.R. belonging to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are referred to as cities which are on the "territories of the Republic of Poland."

While finding it impossible to enter into a discussion on the historical and legal bases on which the city of Lwów or any other town on the territories of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the White Ruthenian S.S.R. belong to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Commissar deems it his duty to inform the Embassy that in future he will not be able to accept for consideration Notes of the Embassy containing declarations of this kind.

Kuybyshev, January 17, 1942.

No. 83

Declaration of the Polish Government of February 25, 1943, concerning Polish-Soviet relations.

The Polish Government, at a meeting in London on February 25, presided over by General Sikorski, discussed Polish-Soviet relations and issued the following declaration:

The Polish Government affirm that neither before the outbreak of this war nor during it has the Polish nation ever agreed to any co-operation with the Germans against the Soviet Union. In her relations with the U.S.S.R. Poland has not ceased to be ready to co-operate with the Soviet Union in the prosecution of the war and in maintaining friendly, neighborly relations after the victory.

The Polish Government repudiate most definitely the malicious propaganda which accuses Poland of indirect or direct inimical tendencies towards Soviet Russia. It is absolutely absurd to suspect Poland of intentions to base the eastern boundaries of the Polish Republic on the Dnieper and the Black Sea, or to impute to Poland any tendencies to move her frontier farther to the east.

The Polish Government, representing Poland in the boundaries in which Poland, first among the Allied nations, took up the fight imposed on her, have, from the moment of the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941, maintained the unchange-
able attitude that so far as the question of frontiers between Poland and Soviet Russia is concerned, the *status quo* previous to September 1, 1939, is in force; and they consider the undermining of this attitude, which is in conformity with the Atlantic Charter, as detrimental to the unity of the Allied nations.

The Polish Government consider close co-operation and confidence between all the Allies to be an indispensable factor for victory and a permanent peace, and condemn all acts and suggestions tending to wreck or weaken the common front of the United Nations.

The declaration of the Polish Government is fully supported by the following resolution passed unanimously by the Polish National Council on February 26:

"The National Council, maintaining, in unanimous agreement with the Government, its attitude that the difficulties which exist in creating mutual trust in the collaboration between the United Nations must be removed, declares that the integrity of the territory of the Polish Republic within its frontiers of September 1, 1939, and its sovereignty, are inviolable and indivisible. No unilateral acts or illegal activities, from any quarter whatever, directed against either the territory and sovereignty of the Republic of Poland or the rights of its citizens residing in Poland or outside her territorial boundaries, can in any way alter this state of affairs."

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**No. 84**

*Soviet Declaration of March 1, 1943, in reply to the Polish Government's Declaration of February 25, 1943.*

The Soviet news agency issued on March 1 the following official Russian statement replying to the Polish declaration:

The declaration of the Polish Government in London bears witness to the fact that the Polish Government refuses to recognise the historic rights of the Ukrainians and Bielo-Russian peoples to be united within the national States.

Continuing to regard as legitimate the aggressive policy of imperialist States, which partitioned among themselves the traditional Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian lands, and disregarding the universally known fact of the reunion of the Ukrainian and Bielo-Russian peoples within their national States which has already taken place, the Polish Government thus comes out as an advocate of a partition
of the Ukrainian and Bieloran-Russian lands in favour of the policy of plundering the Ukrainian and Bieloran-Russian peoples.

The leading Soviet circles are of the opinion that the denial of the right of the Ukrainian and Bieloran-Russian peoples of reunion with their blood brethren bears witness to an imperialist tendency, whereas the references of the Polish Government to the Atlantic Charter have no foundation whatever. The Atlantic Charter does not entitle anyone to encroach on the national rights of the Ukrainians and Bieloran-Russians, but on the contrary it has its origin in the principle of the recognition of the national rights of peoples, including the Ukrainian and the Bieloran-Russian peoples.

Even the well-known British Minister, Lord Curzon, in spite of his inimical attitude to the U.S.S.R., realized that Poland cannot put forward a claim to the Ukrainian and Bieloran-Russian lands, but the Polish ruling circles still show no understanding in this matter.

The assertion of the Polish ruling circles that Poland until the beginning of this war refused to collaborate in any way with Germany against the Soviet Union does not correspond with reality. The whole world knows of the pro-Fascist policy of rapprochement with Germany of the Polish Government and its Minister Beck, who tried to oppose Poland to the Soviet Union.

If the present war teaches us something it is above all that the Slav peoples must not quarrel among themselves, but must live in friendship in order to rid themselves of the danger of the German yoke. The Polish ruling circles have learned nothing if they put forward claims on the Ukrainian and Bieloran-Russian lands, and thereby cultivate enmity between the Polish people and the peoples of the Ukraine and Bieloran-Russia. Such a policy of the Polish leading circles weakens, in the first place, Poland herself and breaks the united front of the Slav peoples in their struggle against German invasion.

The declaration of the Polish Government bears witness to the fact that the present Polish ruling circles do not reflect in this matter the genuine opinion of the Polish people, whose interests in the struggle for the liberation of their country and for the restoration of a strong and united Poland are indissolubly linked with the strengthening to the utmost of mutual confidence and friendship with the brotherly peoples of the Ukraine and Bieloran-Russia, as well as with the Russian people and the other peoples of the U.S.S.R.
Communique of the Polish Telegraph Agency of March 5, 1943, concerning the Eastern frontiers of Poland and containing a reply to the Soviet Declaration of March 1, 1943.

The Polish Telegraph Agency has been authorized by the Polish Government to issue the following reply to the Russian statement:

Until the conclusion of agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the Third Reich concerning the partition of Polish territories, the Treaty of Riga and its frontier clauses, approved in 1923 by the Conference of Ambassadors and by the United States, were never called in question by Russia. The Russo-German agreements were cancelled by the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941. The question of any return to the German-Soviet frontier line of that year requires no further comment.

The so-called "Curzon line" was proposed during hostilities in 1919-1920 solely as an armistice line and not as a frontier.

The polling ordered by the Soviet-occupying authorities in Eastern Poland in 1939 was contrary to international law. It constitutes one of those unilateral acts which are not recognized by the Allied nations. Therefore it cannot form a basis for any legal acts, and cannot, in particular, deprive Polish citizens of their title to Polish citizenship or to relief organized for their benefit by the Polish Government with the aid of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States.

All German proposals previous to 1939, which were aimed at gaining the co-operation of Poland in military action against Russia, were repeatedly rejected, and this led finally to a German attack on Polish territory in September 1939.

The declaration of the Polish Government of February 25, 1943, unanimously supported by the entire Polish nation, was not intended to produce controversy which would be so harmful at the present moment. It only stated the indisputable Polish rights to these territories, in which the Polish nation will continue to live in harmony with its Ukrainian and White Ruthenian fellow-countrymen in accordance with the principles proclaimed by the Polish Government. The Polish Government, categorically rejecting the absurd insinuations concerning alleged Polish imperialistic claims in the East, has expressed, and continues to express, to the Soviet Government its readiness for an understanding based on friendly mutual relations.
CHAPTER 11

The Crisis in Polish-Soviet Relations

No. 86

Letter of February 9, 1943 from General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, to Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, concerning the conference to take place between Premier Stalin and Ambassador Romer.

London, February 9, 1943.

Mr. President,

The great victories won by the Red Army over our common enemy fill the whole world with admiration. I also wish to congratulate you most sincerely as Supreme Commander of the Soviet armed forces. I never doubted their success, for I always recognized their true value.

I regret that for the moment the forces I command are only taking part in this struggle on distant fronts and not by the side of your forces on the Eastern front of Europe. Awaited with impatience, the final crushing of Germany is near. It will also bring, I am certain, the independence of Poland. Meanwhile she continues to offer to the oppressor a heroic resistance that the recent offers of the enemy, seeking to win the collaboration of the Polish people by promising to give up the reign of terror, fail to weaken.

Thus the outcome of the war presents itself to us in a reassuring light. However, I see myself obliged to point out to you the increasing concern of the Polish Government and of public opinion in Poland at more and more serious difficulties that go up against the path of the Polish-Soviet entente inaugurated in 1941 by you, Mr. President, and by myself. These difficulties threaten to compromise this entente and to disserve the interests of our two countries and of our common cause. They seem neither justified nor inevitable and I continue to believe that if examined by both sides in a broad spirit of understanding and of mutual conciliation, they can be removed.

Such at least is the desire of the Polish Government which remains firmly convinced of the advantages of a policy of rapprochement and collaboration between Poland and the Soviet Union, as
much in view of the prosecution of the war against Germany as of future good neighborly relations between our two countries. To be acceptable to the Poles, to be lasting, to be considered in accordance with the great principles that are common to all in the present struggle, this policy cannot, however, neither because of existing conditions nor of the disproportion of forces involved, consist in the elimination of difficulties that arise by asking Poland to abandon any principles or to make unilateral sacrifices. The exceptional trials my country has endured and the way she has known how to meet them, in the sight of the whole world, entitle her—I have no doubt—to special consideration of her interests and her aspirations at a time when the war of liberation is entering into a decisive phase.

It is in this spirit that I recently had the opportunity to exchange views with President Roosevelt and with the American Government on the subject of the conduct of the war and of the steps its conclusion may call for, including the final elimination of the German danger, and the task of economic reconstruction of the Europe of tomorrow. These same problems are the subjects of consultations of the Polish Government with the British Government and of the Governments in London of various European countries under German occupation.

I have not failed to emphasize, on various occasions, that the Polish Government would be desirous of examining on the same bases the said problems with the Soviet Government, within the framework of our mutual relations formed by the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and of our joint Declaration of December 4, 1941.

If you share my point of view in this matter, I shall be obliged if you will devote a moment of your precious time to receiving Ambassador Romer, who returns to his post after having been in touch with his Government and with myself and who, enjoying my full and complete confidence, is charged by me to acquaint you with the details of my recent negotiations and with the point of view of the Polish Government. This interview will also give him an opportunity to speak to you in my name of the Polish-Soviet difficulties to which I have alluded in this letter and which seem to me to deserve your serious attention.

I have the honor to be, etc.  

SIKORSKI.
Excerpts from the Minutes of the negotiation conducted by Mr. Tad­
emz Romer, Polish Ambassador in Moscow, with Premier Stalin and
Mr. V. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, concerning
the Polish citizenship of persons deported to the U.S.S.R. and the
Embassy’s relief organization.

1. Excerpts from Ambassador Romer’s conversation with Mr.
Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, at the
Kremlin on February 20, 1943.

Romer: We find ourselves at present, Mr. Commissar, in a
historical moment as far as Polish-Soviet relations are concerned.
The steps we take now will decide the course of those relations
for many years to come. Bearing this in mind, I think, we ought
to avoid the discussion of such issues as cannot be settled today
and which would only strain our relations. On the other hand
what we should discuss is the problem of relief for the Poles in
the U.S.S.R. whose fate is causing the Polish Government special
concern.

Molotov: The basis of this problem is our Note of January
16, last, in which the Soviet Government declined to recognize as
Polish citizens persons who on November 1 and 2, 1939 found
themselves in the western districts of the Ukraine and White
Ruthenia.

Romer: What are the reasons, Mr. Commissar, for this change
in the attitude of the Soviet Government?

Molotov: The reasons are explained in the Note. Our good
will did not meet with an appropriate response from the Polish
Government. Now we simply confirmed this.

Romer: Truly, Mr. Commissar, I fail to see any motive for
this sudden decision which fundamentally changes the problem of
relief for the Polish population.

Molotov: Mr. Ambassador, December 1941 went by and so
did the whole of 1942 and in spite of this the Polish Government
never accepted the proposals put forward by the Soviet Government.

Romer: The January Note came unexpectedly at a time when
negotiations concerning relief for the Poles were well advanced and
reaching their final stage. I fail to understand what new develop­
ment occurred to bring about such a decision on the part of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.
MOLOTOV: This subject has been discussed not only with you, Mr. Ambassador, but also with your predecessor. The problem could not have come as a surprise after our Note of December 1, 1941; on the other hand, however, the attitude of the Polish Government has remained unchanged ever since. This could not continue.

ROMER: This matter is for us of paramount importance. An attempt to deprive us of hundreds of thousands of Poles who are in the U.S.S.R. not of their own will, and this at a time when the population of Poland is being decimated as a result of the atrocities committed by the German occupants, is for us a most painful blow and cannot but have a serious effect on Polish-Soviet relations.

MOLOTOV: It is not proper, Mr. Ambassador, to connect this problem with that of German persecutions in Poland. The Government of the U.S.S.R. has waited long enough for a reply to the proposals it advanced, only by way of exception and good will.

ROMER: I point out that this matter has never been raised before in the course of my conversations with you and with Commissar Vishinsky.

MOLOTOV: On the contrary, Mr. Ambassador, during your tenure of office, we have received Notes in which our attitude was not recognized.

ROMER: Am I to understand, Mr. Commissar, that the attitude of the Soviet Government to this problem is connected with the future Polish-Soviet frontier, or is it confined to citizenship?

MOLOTOV: Our Note merely concerns our attitude towards citizenship, which in turn is connected with the problem of the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

ROMER: I cannot share your attitude with regard to citizenship, Mr. Commissar. The Government of the U.S.S.R. could not unilaterally force Soviet citizenship upon Polish citizens. In our eyes, and in the eyes of impartial foreign observers, the matter could only have been settled on the basis of an agreement between the two Governments concerned.

MOLOTOV: No foreign observers will be able to change decisions taken by the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. with regard to the incorporation of the territories in question, which took place on the basis of a plebiscite in which the people freely expressed themselves.
ROMER: I do not wish to go deeper into the discussion of this problem. But I shall make two remarks. First—what you referred to as a plebiscite took place within the frontiers set up by the Soviet-German treaty, which the Soviet Government later solemnly renounced in the Polish-Soviet Agreement. Second—Soviet legislation governing citizenship is contrary to its territorial principle as it grants Soviet citizenship not according to domicile, but according to where a given person happened to be at a given time. These are merely incidental remarks independent of the fundamental attitude of my Government to this problem as a whole.

MOLOTOV: Our Note refers to the Soviet citizenship of persons who found themselves on the territories in question on November 1 and 2, 1939. Persons who arrived there subsequent to that date are Polish citizens.

ROMER: Does it not then seem unnatural, even from the Soviet viewpoint, that persons who have no connection whatever with these territories should be considered Soviet citizens against their own will?

MOLOTOV: I do not agree with your view. In accordance with Soviet legislation, the Soviet Citizenship Act also applies to persons who came to Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia from the Western districts of Poland.

ROMER: I want to make it quite clear, Mr. Commissar. Am I, therefore, to understand that the relief work to assist our people in the U.S.S.R. is to be regarded as at an end?

MOLOTOV: We examined this problem in our Note of January 16, 1943. Exceptions were made in respect of persons whom we recognize as Polish citizens, that is those who arrived in the territories we consider to be Soviet after November 1 and 2, 1939.

ROMER: Practically, one would then be able to count the number of Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. on one's fingers. Do you realize, Mr. Commissar, what consequences will result from the application of the Note of January 16, 1943, and in what position the Poles in the U.S.S.R. will find themselves?

MOLOTOV: Their position will not suffer as a result of it, Mr. Ambassador. All that was being done for them before, we shall continue to do as for our own citizens.

ROMER: Irrespective of the deep and painful impression which a decision of this kind would make on the Polish Government and
on our people in occupied Poland and abroad, representing as it does, in the present extremely hard circumstances, an entirely unjustified attempt to force foreign citizenship upon a considerable part of our nation, and this against their will, sentiments and traditions which are bound up with the struggle for independence and our most sacred ideals, I want again to draw your attention to the impression this will make abroad, and especially in the countries which collaborated with us in bringing relief to several hundred thousand Polish citizens, and who from one day to the next will learn to their surprise that these people have ceased to be Poles and no longer require their assistance.

MOLOTOV: As you are aware, Mr. Ambassador, there have been for many years considerable number of Poles in the U.S.S.R., Soviet citizens and who have never considered themselves treated any worse than Soviet citizens of other origins. There was never any question of restricting their rights, for our Constitution severely punishes all actions contrary to our principle of national equality. But as regards the subject referred to by you, Mr. Ambassador, I wish once more to state that the entire blame rests with the Polish Government. Now, as early as 1941, we made a concession and agreed not to apply our legislation, showing our good will to recognize Poles as Polish citizens. The Polish Government did not appear to be willing to accept our good will, on the contrary it rejected our proposals. We waited a month, two months, a year—and the attitude of the Polish Government remained unchanged, nor has it changed since your arrival, Mr. Ambassador. Thus, the Polish Government bear the entire responsibility for the consequences.

ROMER: I must point out, that the Polish Government never rejected the Soviet Government’s readiness to recognize Poles in the U.S.S.R. as Polish citizens, but it could not accept the terms on which this readiness was conditional, and in particular it had to reject the attempt to distinguish between Polish citizens and divide them into categories for discriminatory treatment, that is unknown to Polish law. I must emphasize once again that this is the first time since I am Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. that this problem has been raised, and I see no reason for the change made by the Note of January 16, 1943 in the previous attitude of the Soviet Government.

MOLOTOV: I have already stated the position of the Soviet Government, Mr. Ambassador. It is clear and irrevocable.
Romer: The problem is so fundamental and its consequences so serious, that I shall have to inform my Government of your declaration, Mr. Commissar, and at the same time refer the matter to renewed consideration by ourselves. For the time I only renew my request that you transmit the letter of Prime Minister General Sikorski to Premier Stalin and beg him to receive me so that I may submit to him the matters I have already referred to and learn his views on the difficulties in Polish-Soviet relations.

Molotov: I shall forward the letter, Mr. Ambassador, and when I find out about your visit to J. V. Stalin, I shall let you know.

2. Excerpts from Ambassador Romer's conversation with Premier Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, at the Kremlin during the night of February 26-27, 1943.

Romer: I should still like to discuss the problem of Polish-Soviet relations which unfortunately are passing through a crisis, causing anxiety. We have just ended a friendly discussion on a number of important subjects dealing with military collaboration between our countries. But such collaboration can actually bear fruit only as and when accompanied by mutual friendly feeling. First of all in this connection, the fate of Polish citizens in the Soviet Union is of special interest to the Polish Government and public opinion. The Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, introduced new and unexpected elements and implications which have filled us with deep concern and which it is my duty to elucidate in this conversation with you, Mr. President.

Stalin: I am listening, please.

Romer: As a result of the Agreement of July 30, 1941, the amnesty proclaimed by the Soviet Government affected a vast number of Polish citizens, not excluding national minorities, whose Polish citizenship was only called into question on December 1, 1941, in a note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Set free from camps and prisons our citizens began to rally en masse to the Polish Army then in formation. With the assistance of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, and of a number of social welfare organizations and institutions, the Polish
Government organized relief work on a large scale for their families and for those who remained at work in their places of exile. The need for this relief did not in the least imply a desire to assure to the Polish population an existence in any way privileged as compared with their surroundings, nor even an allegation, never put forward by us, that Polish deportees received worse treatment at the hands of the Soviet authorities than the local population. Their position was worse for other reasons. They had been deported at an hour's notice and as a rule with no money, clothing or food, torn away by force from the surroundings in which they had grown up. Frequently they were separated from their families and were taken under most difficult circumstances to distant, foreign countries, often with extremely severe climates differing greatly from that to which they were accustomed. They were settled among an alien people whose language and customs were foreign to them, and where they lacked the adequate living quarters and vegetable gardens at the disposal of the local population. They were made to do work of which they had no previous experience, for instance intellectuals were given heavy manual work which they had never done before. They were also suffering from disease. For these reasons relief in the form of food, clothing and medical supplies was and remains an absolute necessity.

STALIN: Whom do you refer to as the Polish population, Mr. Ambassador? The whole Polish population which found itself in Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia?

ROMER: According to Polish legislation, I consider as Polish citizens all those persons who possessed Polish citizenship in 1939. There is a difference of opinion between our two Governments on this subject, the more so since, as was made clear by the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, and its interpretation which I heard from Commissar Molotov several days ago,—the Soviets extended their citizenship to all persons who were in the disputed territories on November 1 and 2, 1939, even if they found themselves there quite temporarily and by accident and had no connection whatever with the place where they were staying.

MOLOTOV: That is not exact. There is reference in the Note to the Citizenship Act which differentiates between permanent and temporary residents: the former have become citizens of the Soviet Union by virtue of the law, while the citizenship of the latter is a matter for individual examination.
ROMER: The note of January 16, 1943, states quite explicitly that all persons present in the disputed territories acquired Soviet citizenship.

STALIN: But at the same time there is reference to the Soviet Citizenship Act.

ROMER: May I remark that we have received a number of Notes from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stating that all residents in these districts have become Soviet citizens. The Polish Embassy in Kuybyshev has even received a written warning that intervention on behalf of individual persons will not be considered until evidence is produced showing the whereabouts of such persons on November 1 and 2, 1939.

STALIN: Distinction is made between those who happened to be in those territories and those who lived there permanently.

MOLOTOV: Citizens of a number of States could have been there at the time, as for example Rumanians, Hungarians, Frenchmen and others, but obviously they did not acquire Soviet citizenship on this account. Our Constitution provides distinctly for such eventualities, which, however, have to be examined individually.

ROMER: This is an entirely new situation to me. I find this interpretation, which I hear for the first time, extremely interesting. Hitherto, ever since its note of December 1, 1941, the Soviet Government has adhered consistently to the attitude that especially that category of Polish citizens who found themselves in the territories in question at the time specified acquired Soviet citizenship.

STALIN: Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador, but persons whose presence in these territories was merely transitory did not automatically acquire Soviet citizenship.

ROMER: I can quote a whole series of concrete cases of the attitude hitherto held by the Soviet Government. I do not remember them all, but a classical example is that of the two Warsaw city councillors, Alter and Ehrlich, who despite our objections and representations were classified as Soviet citizens.

MOLOTOV: There may have been individual cases.

ROMER: What is then the official Soviet interpretation in this matter, Mr. President? All Soviet Notes and statements have indicated hitherto that in practice all Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. have lost their citizenship. We cannot agree to that.

STALIN: The Polish Government persists in considering as Polish citizens all Poles now in the U.S.S.R. That is wrong. Truly,
a number of Soviet offices have overstepped their authority in certain individual cases, but we must put a stop to extremes. I must moreover point out that it also depends on the person concerned what citizenship he wishes to choose. Thus everybody must be asked. Take, Mr. Ambassador, the example of Wanda Wasilewska, a Pole from Warsaw who considers herself a Soviet citizen. The people's wishes must be given consideration, one cannot force citizenship upon them. There is in our Note a reference to the Citizenship Act. I must admit that not all Soviet bureaus have always acted along uniform lines and correctly. But not all the Poles who lived and were domiciled in Polish territory will be Polish citizens. That has to be stopped. There are some who are coming over to us.

ROMER: Many Poles, Soviet citizens, have lived in the territories of the U.S.S.R. for many years. We do not claim them, nor have we ever raised this question.

STALIN: I was thinking of Poles domiciled in the western parts of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia.

ROMER: I therefore note, Mr. President, that you recognize the will of each person concerned as an important element in determining his or her citizenship. On our part we shall gladly agree to such a criterion for we have no desire to have citizens who do not wish to be Polish citizens. I must, however, emphasize that a large number of practical issues are bound up with the citizenship problem. Of these I will mention the continuation of relief to our people and permission for individuals to go abroad without of course burdening Soviet railways engaged in war transport. I have in mind particularly Polish children and the families still left in the U.S.S.R. of soldiers serving in the Polish Army in Great Britain and in the Near East, and also families of Polish State officials and welfare workers. The fact that they are separated from their bread winners can neither be explained nor understood by any one.

ROMER: Reverting to the subject of citizenship, in view of the practical consequences involved for hundreds of thousands of our people and thus also for Polish-Soviet relations, I must insist that this be settled not unilaterally but by mutual agreement between our two governments. It is unthinkable that a large and valuable portion of our Nation be thus abruptly cut off against its will from the rest.
STALIN: If we consider the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians as nations, we must recognize that a reunion (vossoyedinienie) has taken place between the lands they inhabit and Soviet White Ruthenia and Soviet Ukraine. Surely the Ukrainians are not Poles! Surely the White Ruthenians are not Poles! We have not joined a single Polish province to the Soviet Union. All Polish territories have been occupied by the Germans.

ROMER: Since you refer to the plebiscites in our Eastern provinces, Mr. President, I must recall that they were carried out within the boundaries set up by the German-Soviet agreement which was subsequently solemnly repudiated in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.

STALIN: It was the German attack on the U.S.S.R. which rendered the German-Soviet agreement invalid, and especially the non-aggression pact.

ROMER: At the time the Soviet Union took our territory we were in opposite camps, and we have not recognized any acts of violence committed at our expense. Since July 30, 1941, we are in the same anti-German camp, which entitles us to expect that no changes will be made in the lands that are ours or in our fundamental rights without our agreement. In default of this we must maintain the attitude that the former Polish-Soviet frontiers, established by the Treaty of Riga, remain always in force.

ROMER: We must have a friendly discussion on all subjects of friction between our two Governments, a friction that is of no benefit to either party but only serves Germany. It is in such a spirit that the problems connected with relief for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. and with their departure should be discussed.

STALIN: What problems?

ROMER: This is a historical moment which will decide the course of Polish-Soviet relations for many years to come. We must approach the decisions it calls for with mutual and full understanding and good will, excluding for the time being from our discussions such matters as cannot now be decided and which, if raised, merely lead to friction in Polish-Soviet relations and provoke public controversies.

STALIN: The Soviet Government keeps consistently silent on the subject and so should the Polish Government.
ROMER: It is easier to remain silent when one is acquiring something than when one is losing it. As a result of the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, we are threatened with a loss of several hundred thousands of our citizens who are all the more important to us as we have lost so many at the hands of the Germans. Furthermore we are threatened with the loss on Soviet initiative of the whole eastern part of our territory. No wonder, then, that Polish public opinion is embittered.

STALIN: The territory we have lost is larger than the whole of Poland.

ROMER: But the Red Army has already reconquered vast regions and will undoubtedly regain everything. And, moreover, these territories are only a small part of the Soviet Union.

STALIN: Mr. Ambassador, after the Red Army has beaten the Germans on Russian soil it will enter Polish territory and help to chase the Germans out of Poland and then it will immediately return these lands to the Polish Government, and then, Mr. Ambassador, will you say that this will be a unilateral action adversely affecting good mutual relations?

ROMER: It will not be as bad as that.

STALIN: Mr. Ambassador, we want a strong Poland; we shall give you the whole of German-occupied Poland regardless of the fact that we are being insulted (niezmotria na to tshto nas rugayut). But we can take these insults on our shoulders!

ROMER: Thank you, Mr. President, for these words. I shall remember them. And do you agree with me as to the need for coming to a mutual agreement regarding the problem of the citizenship of Poles at present in the U.S.S.R. and of further relief and assistance for them from our own resources?

STALIN: There will be Poles who wish to acquire Soviet citizenship.

MOLOTOV: We are, of course, referring to citizens other than those from Western Ukrainian or Western White Ruthenian territories. This problem should furthermore be examined for the purpose of determining the citizenship of persons whose presence in those territories was only temporary.

ROMER: According to what Mr. President has said, the will of the persons concerned must be given consideration. Since on the strength of an understanding between the two governments it will be made possible for such persons to express their wishes quite
freely, I have no doubt that the atmosphere will be easily and smoothly cleared, since all those in whom we are interested will never reconcile themselves to the thought of parting with their Polish citizenship.

**Stalin:** It must nevertheless be carried out in accordance with our legislation relating to citizenship. The problem of persons serving in the Red Army presents another difficulty. Out of a desire to evade further service, they may express their wish to go, say to Australia in the capacity of Polish citizens. Desertion might thus be facilitated. Apart from the will of the persons concerned, other considerations will therefore have to be taken into account. The nationality of such people and their origin will have to be looked into.

**Romer:** A problem of vital interest to me in this connection is that of our children. There are several tens of thousands in the Soviet Union and they will be of great value to the future of resurrected Poland. From the point of view of bringing to agreement our conflicting views on citizenship, we attach great importance to the fate of the orphans. We should like to make it possible for these orphans to go to other countries where they would find favourable conditions of existence and education and be a minimum financial burden to the Polish Government.

**Stalin:** In accordance with our legislation this depends on a variety of factors. It is difficult to generalize.

**Romer:** I think that the problem of citizenship can only be resolved by means of a formal, bilateral agreement.

**Stalin:** We cannot infringe our laws.

**Molotov:** Obviously not.

**Romer:** We have seen that in the past Soviet legislation did not preclude a large measure of elasticity in its application. I think that on such a premise a way would be found to an understanding on the basis of mutual good will.

**Stalin:** If conversations take place then all these problems will be cleared up.

**Romer:** Do you see any possibility, Mr. President, of such negotiations being begun?

**Stalin:** If you, Mr. Ambassador, see such a possibility, I make no objection.

**Romer:** Well, we shall go into this matter further.

**Stalin:** Thus according to you we have as subjects for our
negotiations, the question of propaganda, the question of citizenship and the problem of frontiers (vopros o granitizach).

Romer: No, I understood differently and emphasized that in order to improve our relations it would be better to avoid discussing frontiers for the time being; on the other hand I suggested that we should begin negotiations on the subject of preventing unfriendly propaganda on both sides, on the problem of citizenship and its practical consequences.

Stalin: Very well, Mr. Ambassador.

Molotov: A declaration of the Polish Government was published in London yesterday. Its contents are unfriendly to the Soviet Union.

Stalin: The declaration is more than a newspaper reply. It is in fact an official statement (eto zayavlenye). Where Soviet territory is concerned there is no Soviet Government prepared to waive (otkazalsia by) any provisions of our Constitution. And the adherence of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia to the Soviet Union has been included in the Constitution.

Romer: On the other hand you will not find a single Pole who would deny that Wilno and Lwow are Polish. I myself so declare it in your presence, Mr. President, with the fullest conviction.

Stalin: I understand your viewpoint. We also have ours. We are quits. Perhaps we should act similarly to the Polish Government as regards frontiers and also publish a statement.

Romer: In the interest of our common front in the fight against Germany which occupies first place in your thoughts and in ours, I insist on agreement, by means of Polish-Soviet negotiation, on the standpoint and behavior of both parties in the difficult sphere of citizenship and the problems arising from it; also for mutual cessation of public statements and propaganda unfriendly to one another. Would you authorize me, Mr. President, to suggest this to my Government?

Stalin: You are right, Mr. Ambassador. I congratulate you on your good idea. The matter must be examined, we must find out whose citizens these people are, each case must be considered.

Romer: May I count on our being enabled to continue our relief work until our negotiations concerning citizenship are concluded?
STALIN: I do not know, Mr. Ambassador, that depends on the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

ROMER: It is a vital problem for us. We could thus avoid in the event of the suspension of our relief work all consequences which might arise in other countries interested in it, such as England and America. It would be much better if we could reach an understanding without intermediaries.

STALIN: You are right. I cannot promise you anything definite in advance, but negotiations can be started.

ROMER: Am I to conduct these negotiations in Moscow with Mr. Molotov, the People's Commissar?

STALIN: Yes, do.

MOLOTOV: If it is convenient for you, Mr. Ambassador, I am at your disposal.

ROMER: I shall report the above to my Government and ask for instructions, whereupon I shall take the liberty of communicating with Mr. Molotov. In any case, I consider the attitude of the President as an assurance that the problems under consideration will be examined with good will and I hope that the negotiations will lead to an understanding which will remove all existing difficulties.

3. EXCERPTS FROM AMBASSADOR ROMER'S CONVERSATION WITH MR. MOLOTOV, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE KREMLIN ON MARCH 9, 1943.

ROMER: Before entering upon the actual subject of our conversation to-day I regret to have to communicate to you a number of events which to my painful surprise have recently occurred in this territory.

The arrests of local representatives of the Embassy continued throughout the whole second half of 1942 and increased in number in January and February last. In these two months twenty-one representatives were arrested whose names, previously, had been regularly made known to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and who, for the most part, had been confirmed in their functions. The Embassy has not, in one single instance, been informed of these arrests, nor of the reasons thereof.

The authorities have begun to carry out the instructions contained in the Note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
of January 16 last, concerning citizenship. They are forcing Polish citizens to accept Soviet passports. At Kirov, employees at the local Embassy warehouse were summoned to take out Soviet passports. The vast majority of these employees refused to do so and were arrested together with their families. One of our largest warehouses serving a wide expanse of territory in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was thus deprived of its staff and immobilized. In this connection it must be noted that the fate of shipments of relief goods sent from abroad for the Polish population and already under way from Archangel has not yet been ascertained.

A similar procedure was applied at Kirov and Kustanay with regard to all Polish citizens living there; the number of those arrested in these circumstances already amounts to about two hundred.

The same principles are applied with regard to families of members of the Polish armed forces now on active service in Great Britain and the Near East. Thus the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs refused to allow a group of families of Polish military men to leave the Soviet Union, although before my departure from Kuybyshev, to be precise on December 23, 1942, that is to say before the issue of the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, I had received the most formal undertakings from Deputy Commissar Vishinsky on behalf of the Soviet Government that the permission would be granted. I personally attach great importance to this matter, as it gives me the measure of how assurances given to me are carried out.

On the other hand, the Polish citizenship of Mrs. Wolska from Warsaw has been questioned; she is the wife of the Embassy Delegate at Alma-Ata, who was arrested and then expelled from the Soviet Union. The same applies to Mrs. Bardecka and to the Pajonk family whose bread-winners have been deported abroad by the Soviet authorities. The Polish citizenship of Mrs. Eleonora Winczewska has been likewise challenged although she is a Polish citizen from Warsaw who in 1939 was living as a refugee in Wilno, that is to say on territory not within the scope of the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943. I must emphasize that Mrs. Winczewska is now living at the Embassy with the full consent of the Soviet authorities and that she, as well as Mrs. Wolska, is under my protection.

Throughout the territories of the U.S.S.R., Polish welfare institutions, such as orphanages, homes for invalids, etc., are being
sovietized. The home for invalids and the orphanage at Bolshaya Konstantinovka in the Kuybyshev area, organized by the Embassy on the basis of a special agreement with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, were taken over in the following circumstances. On February 22, 1943, a Commission composed of members of district and regional authorities arrived on the spot and demanded the handing over of the administration of the institution. They declared that these proceedings had been agreed to by the Embassy. In other similar cases the authorities declared that the Embassy no longer existed.

Subsequently, the whole personnel and the adult inmates of the institution were summoned to accept Soviet passports. Terrorized and yielding to direct threats twelve old and ailing persons accepted the Soviet passports. All the other adults in the institution numbering about thirty, were ousted from the building. Later a schoolmistress arrived. She is, according to information received, of Volga-German origin. Lessons are in Russian only. The children, regardless of nationality, refuse to be taught in Russian and, despite orders and threats, they sing religious hymns and national songs in Polish.

Before I report on these cases to my Government, I should like to ask you, Mr. Commissar, whether you have any knowledge of these facts and whether they have occurred with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet Government?

Molotov: I have not heard anything about the facts you mention, Mr. Ambassador. I will now reply to your statements, dividing my remarks in two parts:

First: I would advise that the Embassy instruct its representatives throughout the country to conform to the Note of January 16, was applied, it is not excluded that local authorities may have less misunderstandings because if applied the principles laid down in our Note will make it possible to avoid all incidents.

Second: As regards specific cases in which the Note of January 16 was applied, it is not excluded that local authorities may have carried it out wrongly. For instance, inhabitants of Warsaw do not as a matter of law become Soviet citizens. Such cases of a faulty interpretation of the Note may have occurred, but they were quite accidental. If mistakes were made, they will be rectified. I can assure you of this, Mr. Ambassador. On the other hand I must request that the Embassy cooperate with us in this matter.
ROMER: I must remark that the Note of January 16 does not say anything about the taking over by Soviet authorities of Embassy institutions, such as orphanages, homes for invalids, and that we were never notified about this. I must further emphasize in this connection that the local authorities are taking over property owned by the Polish State and I don't know on what grounds this is being done. As for the Note of January 16, it refers exclusively to the legal position of persons regarding themselves and also regarded by us as Polish citizens and on whom Soviet citizenship is now being forced.

I must lay special emphasis on the fact that this action is exceptionally painful to me and that it cannot fail likewise to affect the Polish Government and the Polish people. As you, Mr. Commissar, now appeal to us to cooperate in this matter, I must record that the way the Soviet authorities are proceeding excludes such cooperation on our part.

ROMER: On what legal grounds are orphanages and other Embassy institutions being taken over by the Soviet administration?

MOLOTOV: If we establish that Soviet citizens are found there, then these institutions become subject to appropriation by the Soviet authorities. I desire, Mr. Ambassador, to leave no room for misunderstanding in these matters.

ROMER: These institutions and everything belonging to them are the property of the Polish State. As far as citizenship is concerned, however, from our point of view, these people are Polish citizens and, in part, would also seem to remain Polish citizens, even from the Soviet viewpoint. The state of affairs thus created is quite inadmissible.

ROMER: I am forced to inform my Government about these facts. If we are to discuss in a friendly spirit questions relating to citizenship, in accordance with what was agreed on in my conversation with Marshal Stalin, then I must ask you, Mr. Commissar, what interest can the Soviet Government possibly have in arousing Polish public opinion, and also in exciting public opinion abroad where these facts will undoubtedly become known. I have precise information showing that the local authorities deal with these matters drastically. I think the only reasonable solution
corresponding to the spirit of my conversation with Marshal Stalin and with you would be the suspension of all steps of this nature by the local Soviet authorities, at least for the period of the negotiations we are to conduct.

MOLTOV: The local authorities who received instructions on the grounds of the Note of January 16, must put them into operation. For these authorities the question is not controversial at all and it is their duty to carry out their instructions. The way in which this was done may, indeed, have provoked friction. But I must assure you, that it is the intention of the Soviet Government that conditions of life of the Polish population not only shall not suffer any deterioration but on the contrary be improved.

ROMER: I must state once again, that the manner in which these instructions are carried out by the local authorities has been extremely ruthless, and they are applied to matters that have not been agreed upon between us, although the authorities concerned referred to an alleged consent of the Embassy. I see no grounds whatever for taking over welfare institutions of the Embassy and Polish State property assigned to them.

ROMER: How do you contemplate, Mr. Commissar, the problem of further relief aid and of handling shipments from abroad of food, clothing and medical supplies, as well as their distribution through the Embassy at least to those Polish citizens whose citizenship is regarded by both Governments as incontestable?

MOLTOV: The Embassy may continue to assist these people.

ROMER: But if difficulties are already now being made?

MOLTOV: We shall elucidate this matter in a spirit of collaboration.

ROMER: It would be better to settle this matter at once. I am informed that the activities of the Embassy warehouse at Ashabad through which all shipments of relief goods pass on the southern route are paralysed, since our chauffeurs are not allowed to drive from Ashabad to Badjigiran and the Soviet Embassy in Teheran refuses to grant visas valid for several crossings of the frontier to sixteen chauffeurs of Iranian nationality who were also to bring these goods to Ashabad from Iran. Owing to this, our Ashabad warehouse which serves the greater part of the territory of the Soviet Union is virtually immobilized.
Molotov: It seems to me, Mr. Ambassador, that your views as to the complete cessation of relief work in the interests of the Polish population are exaggerated. This work can be continued and in point of fact is functioning in numerous places. I will have the case of Ashabad investigated.

The main object at present is to ensure that the change over to new forms of organization, as regards relief work in aid of the Polish population, should not lead to a deterioration of the condition of that population. The Soviet Government is also anxious that not only its material conditions should not be depressed but that its cultural requirements should also be safeguarded. The Soviet authorities have already received detailed instructions to this effect...

Rommer: And what in your view will be the possibilities of distinguishing between the two categories of people, those who for both sides are and remain indisputably Polish citizens, and those whom the Soviet Government now considers Soviet citizens?

Molotov: This problem is purely practical. It will be dealt with within the scope of our legislation.

Rommer: I have precise information, Mr. Commissar, that Polish citizens are being arrested for not accepting Soviet passports and I am unable to reconcile this procedure with the stand taken by Marshal Stalin in his conversation with me.

Molotov: You simplify this matter, Mr. Ambassador. The moment is difficult. Truly there is friction. If a Pole resists the orders of Soviet authorities, we shall deal with that as with a hostile action.

Rommer: In the cases on which we have most detailed reports, the Soviet authorities failed to take into account the will of individuals. Whereas, during my conversation with Marshal Stalin, the latter laid emphasis on the fact that precisely this factor would have to be taken into serious consideration. We, on our part, give due attention to this circumstance, and therefore you, Mr. Commissar, will not, for instance, have to deal with any claim on our part with regard to the citizenship of Wanda Wasilewska, of whose case mention was made.

Molotov: Your reference to Marshal Stalin is incorrect. Comrade Stalin spoke of two factors and you, Mr. Ambassador, mention only one. Stalin said that one must take into consideration: first,
Soviet legislation; and second, the will of the citizen. As to Wanda Wasilewska, she voluntarily accepted Soviet citizenship although she was born in Warsaw.

ROMER: I very well remember the stand taken by Marshal Stalin and I must emphasize that the Soviet authorities only count with the one of the two factors which, according to the Marshal, were to influence the determination of citizenship, namely, Soviet legislation; but they totally ignore the second factor, the will of the person concerned. Therefore, even in the light of Marshal Stalin's explanations, the procedure applied by the authorities is unfair and unjust.

MOLOTOV: We will verify all these facts, and I will inform you of the outcome.

ROMER: I must now ask you to give me some explanation regarding citizenship laws in force in the Soviet Union and also to clear up some points which come to my mind in connection with the Note of January 16.

MOLOTOV: I am listening.

ROMER: Leaving aside, for the moment, the Polish stand in the matter of citizenship, and we know it is opposed to that of the Soviets, I would like to be informed, as accurately as possible, about Soviet guiding principles, so as to be able to eliminate from our further discussion that special category of persons whose Polish citizenship is not questioned by the Soviet side. I know from Marshal Stalin's declarations and from your own that such a category of persons actually exists according to your views and that it consists of individuals who found themselves fortuitously in the contested territory on November 1 and 2, 1939. A definition of this category of persons, for which I ask, would restrict the field of our controversial discussion.

MOLOTOV: In the Note of January 16, 1943, two laws are mentioned, the Citizenship Law of the U.S.S.R. of August 19, 1938 and the Decree of the Supreme Council on citizenship of November 29, 1939. They govern this matter. I will endeavor to give you in writing, shortly, a legal definition of the category of persons who do not come under these laws. For the moment I can only explain that the persons we regard as Soviet citizens are those who resided at the time we have in mind in the territories of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia which entered the Soviet Union. In so far as the inhabitants of these territories were not
citizens of a second or a third state—for such persons may have been there likewise, for instance Japanese, British, Rumanians or other nationals, as I have already mentioned, and insofar as this is not understood to include persons who were there fortuitously and who consequently after all may not have acquired Soviet citizenship—these cases must be cleared up individually—persons belonging to all remaining categories have become Soviet citizens. As regards military families there may be cases, for instance, the wife of a member of the Polish armed forces now in Iran may not wish to join her husband and desire to retain her Soviet citizenship. When such a person acquires Soviet citizenship, the different citizenship of her husband cannot constitute an obstacle. Cases bearing on citizenship must be dealt with individually. True, persons originating from Warsaw, Poznań and other Polish territories are Polish citizens, but, as I say, their cases ought to be treated individually, for these persons may wish to acquire Soviet citizenship and if they acquire can no longer be regarded as Polish citizens.

ROMER: May I request you to send me the text of the Decree of the Supreme Council of November 29, 1939?*

MOLOTOV: Yes, I will send it to you.

ROMER: In the notes of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941 and January 16, 1943, the terms citizens of the oblasti** of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia are used, whereas the Law on Citizenship makes use exclusively of the terms: Citizens of the Soviet Union and citizen of the various Republics forming the Union. How then should one understand the term citizen of an oblast which is unknown in law?

MOLOTOV: Mr. Ambassador, all Republics are made up of oblasti. Thus, for instance, there can be a citizen of the Kiev oblast of the U.S.S.R.

ROMER: The law says nothing about this. I do not think, for instance, that there can be any such thing as a citizen of the Kuybyshev oblast.

MOLOTOV: Yes—yes—there can be such a thing as a citizen of the Kuybyshev oblast. But in that case he will be a citizen of the R.S.F.S.R. and so in all Republics.


** District.
ROMER: In the Soviet law on citizenship mention is made of citizens of the State, and not of a province, therefore, the use of the term: citizen of an oblasti in both notes of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is not clear to me, the more so as at the time in question, the territories referred to did not form a part of the Soviet Union. To whom does the term employed in the Notes actually refer?

MOLOTOV: The Soviet citizens of the oblasti of Western Ukraine and of Western White Ruthenia and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and of the White Ruthenian Socialist Republic were until November 1, 1939 in various legal positions, for some were only becoming Soviet citizens while others were already citizens.

ROMER: Now, what persons were actually implied in the term used in the Notes of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which, as we see, causes such a confusion of legal concept.

MOLOTOV: No law can provide for all practical cases. There is no such thing in the world as a perfect law.

ROMER: Has one not to do here, simply with Polish citizens, as the inhabitants of those territories at that time must have been considered even by Soviet legislation?

MOLOTOV: You are quite right, we do not deny this. The population there formerly possessed Polish citizenship.

ROMER: We can therefore stand on the ground that in the light of Soviet interpretation, we were dealing with Polish territories and Polish citizens.

MOLOTOV: I do not know what inferences you are making in connection with this matter, or what you are aiming at. Not all oblasti entered the Soviet Union at the same time. From part of the oblasti, the Soviet Union was formed in 1918. Other oblasti belonging to this Republic were incorporated in 1939. The Ukrainian Republic was not erected at one stroke, but step by step. We cannot help that.

ROMER: To fix the interpretation of these questions is a matter of great practical importance. As has become manifest, it is impossible to decide upon fundamental principles of citizenship, quite independently of territorial questions, and the Note of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of December 1, 1941 is a signal
proof of this. It states clearly that the unsolved question of frontiers between Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be settled in the future.

**Molotov:** What does your question aim at, Mr. Ambassador?

**Romer:** I merely quote a sentence from the Note of December 1, 1941, to throw light on the problem of citizenship, in the Soviet interpretation.

**Molotov:** The question of frontiers will certainly be subject to future settlement. We will further discuss this matter. Do you perhaps wish to enter into a conversation on this subject now?

**Romer:** No, Mr. Commissar, as I already told Marshal Stalin, I do not think that it would serve a good purpose for our two governments at present, in the interest of an improvement of their relations.

**Molotov:** The territorial boundary of the Soviet Union as confirmed in 1939 by the Supreme Council, is the frontier of the Soviet Union; however we shall not decline to discuss in more concrete terms the subject of frontiers. Rectifications are possible. I mean a few. In the matter of citizenship I will send you an interpretation in writing.

**Romer:** Thank you. I should prefer, as a means of facilitating our further conversations, if you would send me a draft of this interpretation first, so that we could still discuss it before it is given final form. I should like, in particular, to emphasize that the discussion on citizenship which we have had was only of an informative nature and that it merely aimed to enlighten me as to the standpoint and views of the Soviet Government in this matter, without affecting any change in the fundamental viewpoint of the Polish Government on this subject. I should like it to be well understood, that in asking you these questions, I do not cease to support entirely our different viewpoint in this matter. I shall inform my Government of the regrettable incidents I communicated to you at the beginning of our conversation to-day and shall also advise them of your assurance that these facts will be investigated without delay and that the result will be made known to me.

**Molotov:** I shall do so immediately after I receive the explanations.

* In Russian: "Nie otkazyvayemsia."
ROMER: Well, it is always better to clean up all matters in an amicable way, to avoid further incidents that can only complicate the situation.

MOLOTOV: I understand.

ROMER: Do you wish to inform me of the date of our next interview, Mr. Commissar, or is it more convenient to you for me to suggest it?

MOLOTOV: I am at your service, Mr. Ambassador.

4. EXCERPTS FROM AMBASSADOR ROMER’S CONVERSATION WITH MR. MOLOTOV, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE KREMLIN ON MARCH 18, 1943.

ROMER: In the course of our last conversation, three days ago you promised to send me an explanation in writing concerning the manner in which Soviet laws on citizenship are to be interpreted, and also on a number of events affecting our interests, which occurred in Soviet territory.

MOLOTOV: I must also ask you a question. Did you receive the Decree of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. of November 29, 1939? (The Ambassador nods assent.) I shall now answer your question.

During our last conversation I had not at hand the above Decree. On reading it, I saw that the matter of citizenship is quite explicitly dealt with. The text refers to inhabitants of the districts of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia. Within the meaning of this Decree, therefore, any person who was not an inhabitant of these oblasti remains a Polish citizen. The Decree deals with this question quite exhaustively and does not require any further elucidation; it says everything there is to say.

ROMER: To revert to the written interpretation of Soviet legislation on citizenship which you promised to give me during our last conversation, I again emphasize the great importance I attach to receiving it. The Decree actually speaks of inhabitants whereas the Soviet Notes of December 1, 1941, and January 16, 1943, mention persons who found themselves on the contested territories on November 1 and 2, 1939. All this is not clear, and consequently the local authorities interpret their instructions in a divergent and arbitrary fashion.
Molotov: There is no intrinsic difference in the texts, although different expressions are used. We base ourselves on the Decree. I see no need for issuing an interpretation in writing, since obviously the term inhabitant is perfectly understandable. We refer to permanent inhabitants, residing on this territory. What is it, that is not clear in this?

Romer: Your explanation on this point is valuable to me in itself, but the whole matter nevertheless still presents certain doubts. The question is to define the Soviet principle in accordance with which permanent residence is established.

Molotov: There is no one law in the world that could be applied to all cases arising from life. However detailed a law, it will never decide all possible individual cases. If controversial questions arise, we shall be able to discuss them. Personally, I think, that the law is quite clear.

Romer: But the application of the law is relevant, the more so as it exposes our citizens to still greater hardships.

Molotov: Is it necessary to explain what inhabitant means? During our last conversation you did not have the text of the Decree. Do you really require additional explanations, although in the meantime we sent you the text of the Decree?

Romer: I propose, Mr. Commissar, to postpone this discussion until later, so that the concrete cases I intend to present to you may furnish practical illustrations.

Molotov: Willingly I agree, this will be more appropriate.

Romer: The facts I have to bring to your notice are very painful, because they do not show that the Soviet authorities act in a way consistent with the spirit of friendship that ought to be the rule between our two governments. I shall divide these facts into the following categories:

First: The forcing of Soviet citizenship about which we already have information, fragmentary but sufficient to draw the conclusion that this is a mass procedure ordered by the central authorities and applied to the entire Polish population in the U.S.S.R. This procedure is carried out on lines of moral and physical compulsion that arouse my deepest indignation, as being inadmissible in relations between Allies and in the midst of a hard war against our common enemy. We have proof that Polish citizens, men and women, subjected to this procedure are detained for examination for days on end, that they are even deprived of food and drink to break
their resistance. Such arguments are made use of for this purpose, as statements that there is no longer any Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R., or that Poland no longer exists. Those who resist are thrown into prison. Local authorities do not, as a rule, investigate the place of origin of a given person, and consequently do not respect the differentiation implied in the interpretation of the Soviet law on citizenship that I received from Marshal Stalin and from you.

Second: The taking over by the Soviet authorities, Mr. Commissar, of the relief institutions of the Polish Embassy, a proceeding likewise carried out on a mass scale. These institutions—they number about 570—were created and operated on the basis of agreements between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Embassy; they were subordinated exclusively to the latter and had at their disposal, in all cases—in larger or smaller measure—Polish State property, equipment, supplies of food, clothing and medicines, school utensils, etc. On grounds unknown to me and in a totally inadmissible manner, the Soviet authorities are taking over these institutions and disposing of them and also of Polish property without the consent of the Embassy, to whom the rightful ownership of and control over these objects belongs. They do not even give any warning of what they intend to do. As regards the taking over the home for invalids and orphanage at Bolshaya Konstantinovka, in the Kuybyshev district, under conditions I described to you during our last interview, the Embassy has received a Note from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, dated March 10, giving as justification for all this that no Polish citizens were found there. This allegation has no foundation in truth. It was precisely Polish citizens refusing to accept Soviet passports who together with the manager of the establishment were expelled from it. The citizenship of children was obviously decided by higher authorities without any investigation, despite opposition put up by the children themselves. I am therefore compelled to state once again, that methods of actual terrorism were employed by the local authorities, methods wholly incompatible with the spirit of Polish-Soviet friendship and collaboration.

Molotov: Mr. Ambassador, it is very easy to speak about friendly understanding in the matter of incidents that have occurred, but here I do not see anything of this sort on your part. Your reproaches on this subject are unfounded and out of place. I shall not reply to them.
However, as regards Polish State property, I already told you the last time and I repeat once more, that all losses will be made good.

If the Embassy should obstruct our action, the result will be anything but good. I see that you do not want to get reconciled to our standpoint, and the Embassy still continues to follow its old line of procedure. This has nothing to do with assurances of friendship. I must remark that the Embassy's attitude towards these problems is strange, for it does not issue instructions in accordance with our laws. No good can result from this. All this is quite incomprehensible to me.

ROMER: Your expostulation, Mr. Commissar, I shall answer later when I substantiate my statement with facts. I will now submit to your consideration a further series of facts, and, in doing so, I would—in connection with point three—emphasize that the Embassy has been exposed of late to various vexations and difficulties. Even I, personally, have trouble when I speak over the telephone with Kuybyshev. Long distance telephone calls of the Embassy are not attended to. An ever increasing number of telegrams from outlying places are not delivered to the Embassy. Callers leaving the Embassy are forced to show their identity papers and are arrested. Worse, cases are known in which such persons have been beaten up in public. If you so desire, I can give further particulars as well as the dates of the incidents. Families of Embassy officials and of employees of institutions under it in outlying districts are forced to accept Soviet passports.

(The Ambassador deals at length with the cases of Mrs. Zagórksa, Mrs. Kasińska, Mrs. Maksymowicz, Mrs. Emchowicz, Mrs. Winczweska, Mrs. Wolska and of Messrs. Kulyba, Cygler and Wójtowicz, and shows that none of the persons involved originated from the contested territories or were resident therein.)

I will now revert to the matter touched on by you, Mr. Commissar, concerning the taking over of relief institutions by the Soviet authorities. I am obliged to emphasize, once more, that the Embassy never agreed thereto and was not even notified by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in this matter, and that a policy of accomplished fact is being applied. The institutions are closed down before the question of citizenship of the staff and inmates has been established. This is not indicative of any good will on the part of the Soviet Government. I suggest, on my part, that the local authorities discontinue this action at least until our
conversations have been brought to a close, as they are intended to bring about a friendly settlement of pending difficulties. At the present juncture it is difficult to arrive at an understanding. Whilst we are discussing questions of principle, things are happening out there in the provinces that are apt to change the whole situation. The Polish Government cannot be indifferent to these happenings.

Molotov: I would like to ask, Mr. Ambassador, at what you are actually aiming? We shall verify the individual facts mentioned by you. (Molotov repeats this twice.) What more can you wish? If you start by not recognizing our laws, then all attempts to achieve an understanding will be futile. From the conversations we have had hitherto I have gained the impression that you continue uninterruptedly to maintain your standpoint of not recognizing the Decree of November 29, 1939.

I will make several remarks:

First: I have the impression that what you actually have in mind is that we should ask each individual inhabitant of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia what citizenship he wishes to retain. Here I must state that there can be no question of any individual citizen, who acquires Soviet citizenship by virtue of the Decree declaring his or her consent. That would be contrary to Soviet legislation.

Second: Within the meaning of the Decree the place of birth of a given citizen is irrelevant; what is relevant, however, is whether that citizen resided in the territory of Western Ukraine and Western White Ruthenia.

Third: I should like to emphasize that if the Embassy hampers our action of issuing passports to Soviet citizens in accordance with our Decree, and if it induces such persons not to accept Soviet passports, then no good will come of it. There will be unnecessary incidents. If, however, the Embassy will cooperate with us in a helpful spirit then we shall be able to investigate individual cases very carefully and rectify any possible mistakes. You certainly do not possess, Mr. Ambassador, general information as to how this whole action is being carried out.

Romer: On the contrary, Mr. Commissar, I have a large number of facts affecting not only Embassy officials. I can for instance mention the case of Mrs. Sigmund, born and domiciled in Warsaw, now residing at Kustanay, a daughter of the well-known writer Adolph Nowaczyński.
MOLOTOV: We will verify these facts.

ROMER: Persons who know beyond any doubt that even within the meaning of the Decree they may retain their Polish citizenship and who consequently refuse to accept Soviet passports, are sentenced to imprisonment for this in violation of every principle of law. I can in this respect refer to the cases of three employees of the Embassy’s warehouse at Kirov who were sentenced each to two years in prison. What I want is that the local authorities should not consider the question of citizenship from different angles, and that we should draw practical conclusions from the facts, Mr. Commissar.

MOLOTOV: Right!

ROMER: I wish to obtain a precise definition of that special category of persons who even from your viewpoint, for all that it does not as we know correspond to our own, remain Polish citizens within the meaning of the Decree.

MOLOTOV: I agree with you, Mr. Ambassador, that persons not falling within the scope of the Decree may be classed separately as Polish citizens. However as Soviet legislation on citizenship is questioned on the Polish side, I must remark that our authorities will execute the legal enactments that are binding upon them. What I am concerned with is that no obstacles, in the nature of a demonstration, be placed in the way of these orders.

ROMER: The Embassy never did anything of the sort, but on the contrary always advised Polish citizens to loyally obey orders of the authorities. On the other hand, our citizens must have the possibility of appealing to the superior authorities and also to their Embassy, against decisions which they consider legally unjustified. I may add that, as bearers of Soviet passports thrust upon them by sheer force, they are—under severe penalties—deprived of the possibility of applying to the Polish Embassy and that they would likewise not be in a position to appeal against the unjust decisions of which they may be victims. I am, therefore, first of all anxious to make sure that Soviet authorities do not wrongly interpret the rules set down by the law. Besides, I should like to point out once more, that the local authorities compel the Polish population by various means to accept Soviet passports and that they destroy and deride their national identity papers, which justifies the terms used by me in presenting this matter. I recall that according to the statements of Marshal Stalin, the free will of the persons concerned was also to be an important factor in deciding the question of citizenship. Do
you authorize me to assure my Government that in the future, at least pending the termination of our conversations, the method of compulsion in the question of citizenship will be abandoned?

Molotov: I do not agree, Mr. Ambassador, I cannot agree. The authorities are carrying out the Soviet law on citizenship, and they cannot remain passive in the face of resistance. You refer to your conversation with Comrade Stalin and you say, you had the impression that he made the matter of citizenship dependent upon an expression of will. The case of Wanda Wasilewska was mentioned then, and the question was whether she wished to be a Polish or a Soviet citizen. Such individual cases may arise, when Polish citizens not falling within the scope of the Decree are concerned. But it appears, Mr. Ambassador, that you wish that every citizen be asked his opinion.

Romer: I should like to further discuss the category of persons of incontestable citizenship.

Molotov: We will verify these cases.

Romer: The local authorities undoubtedly are acquainted with a series of successive Soviet legal enactments of various dates, the Amnesty Decree, the Note of December 1, 1941, the Note of January 16, 1943. The contents of these documents differ in each case. This leads to a variety of interpretations and is a source of confusion for local authorities, as they do not know how to proceed with regard to Polish citizens, and unnecessary incidents arise. In my view—quite apart from the conflict of principle existing between us—the local authorities ought to receive more precise instructions.

Molotov: If local authorities have applied the law wrongly, Mr. Ambassador, we shall check these facts. But, I should like to remark that the Decree on Citizenship of November 29, 1939, and the Soviet Note of January 16, 1943, constitute the basis of action by our authorities.

Romer: I revert to the discussion we had at the beginning of our conversation today. A more precise definition of the terminology used in Soviet legislation as to who is a resident of the contested territories will contribute to remove friction and difficulties.

Molotov: I do not see any need or necessity to further elaborate such a definition. We shall never reach an ideal formula. Everybody understands what is meant by inhabitant. It is better to deal with these cases individually.
ROMER: There can be no question of individual cases since the authorities apply the law to all and compel even persons, incontestably Polish citizens in the meaning of Soviet law itself, to accept Soviet passports.

MOLOTOV: These facts must be verified.

ROMER: I am in possession of accurate information. Nine days ago you promised to send me an interpretation in writing. The facts occurring throughout the country are becoming more numerous and causing many unnecessary additional difficulties.

MOLOTOV: There will be no difficulties; the local authorities apply the laws correctly.

ROMER: I revert now to the matter of Embassy institutions and relief establishments taken over by Soviet authorities. Would you be willing to authorize me to assure the Polish Government that this action will be suspended at least for the duration of the conversations now proceeding between us?

MOLOTOV: The principal consideration by which we are actuated is that the condition of the Polish population should not be impaired. I do not exactly know how far the transfer of these institutions to Soviet administration has been accomplished. But I can state that the entire property of the Embassy and all the possessions of the Polish State will be restored in full or compensation paid.

ROMER: In each of these 570 institutions are objects belonging to the Polish State. I make the formal proposal that the action of taking over these establishments be stayed until we reach an agreement.

MOLOTOV: The interests of the Embassy shall be safeguarded in any case.

ROMER: But here we deal with the infringement of property rights and management of these Embassy institutions.

MOLOTOV: To avoid misunderstandings, let me quote an example: if butter was taken away, the same quantity of butter will be returned.

ROMER: Is the Administration of the said institutions being changed?

MOLOTOV: You will understand that at present a large number of persons belonging to the management have turned out to be Soviet citizens.
Romer: It would appear to be fairer, if the questions them­

selves were first cleared up and deductions reached later, after this

has been done. Meantime the institutions should be able to carry

on as heretofore. Moreover, there are many children there whose

citizenship has not yet even been verified.

Molotov: There are institutions where the employees may

have been ill or unable to fulfill their duties, and others which do

not function properly. For this reason the Soviet administration was

bound to intervene and appoint people who will better fulfill their

tasks. The procedure, Mr. Ambassador, is of no importance, what

really counts is that the population should not suffer.

Romer: Only the Embassy could decide who worked well in

its own institutions. I really do not see any valid grounds on which

the local authorities can interfere in the matter. And I must further

remark that the Embassy issues instructions to these institutions,

supplies them with funds and assistance in kind, and that it is not

even notified when they pass into other hands. This causes unprece-

dented and most harmful confusion.

Molotov: The main thing, Mr. Ambassador, is that the material

condition of the population should not suffer.

Romer: Have any instructions been given out by the central

authorities for these institutions to be taken over? Why were we

not notified of this in advance?

Molotov: I repeat once more that the central authorities, act-

ing on the grounds of the decision of the People's Commissars of

January 15, 1943, gave categorical orders to the local authorities

that the taking over of these institutions by the Soviet Administra-

tion must not entail any hardship on the population. But I wish to

emphasize that the Embassy will have very little to say in the matter

of institutions whose staff and inmates are now for the most part

Soviet citizens. The majority of these people acquired Soviet citizen-

ship by virtue of our Note of January 16, 1943. Today is March 18,

and the whole matter is now about to be closed.

Romer: How could it happen that the Embassy was not pre-

viously notified of this decision nor of the orders issued under it

which do not respect Polish State property? Besides, this is wholly

contrary to our previous agreements, under which the relief institu-

tions of the Embassy were called into being.

Molotov: The authorities have received instructions to the
effect that the situation of the Polish population must not suffer any deterioration.

ROMER: It is also our concern, and it was precisely thanks to the work of the Embassy in the field that the Polish population was provided with substantial relief.

MOLOTOV: The Embassy will not lose a farthing.

ROMER: That matter, in truth, is secondary. But the violation of principle is inadmissible.

MOLOTOV: Persons who are found to be Soviet citizens must obey the orders of the authorities who are—as a matter of fact—concerned in not allowing the situation of the population to deteriorate. The authorities have been instructed to see to this, irrespective of the sentiments of individual persons.

ROMER: I must emphasize once more that the taking over, by an officially recorded act, of relief institutions belonging to the Embassy is illegal and incompatible with their interests, as well as with those of persons benefited by them.

MOLOTOV: What are you aiming at?

ROMER: I want the transfer of these establishments to the Soviet Administration to be suspended. I repeat my question whether I may assure my Government that this will be done?

MOLOTOV: I have already told you that the central authorities formally ordered the local authorities to take over these institutions. Apart from this, these institutions have now become Soviet institutions, since the persons serving them are now Soviet citizens. The inviolability of the property of the Polish State will be safeguarded.

ROMER: How do you contemplate the question of further relief in kind now due to arrive, bought or ordered abroad by the Polish Government and already shipped with the collaboration of Allied Powers, or donated by friendly Governments and welfare institutions in allied and neutral countries? I am now looking at the practical side of the problem.

MOLOTOV: In principle, I regard all assistance as being desirable if it serves the interests of the Polish population. I am ready to discuss this matter separately.

ROMER: Finally, I would like to ask you, Mr. Commissar, to give me an assurance that compulsory methods in the matter of citizenship will not be applied.

MOLOTOV: I regard this demand as unfounded, since our Administration is proceeding in accordance with the instructions.
Mr. Ambassador: Then I have no other choice but to appeal to my Government. And may I count on receiving a written interpretation of the term inhabitant, as contained in the Decree of November 29, 1939?

Molotov: I have already answered this question, Mr. Ambassador.

No. 88

Note of April 25, 1943, from Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Romer, Polish Ambassador in the U.S.S.R., severing relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government.

Moscow, April 26, 1943.

Mr. Ambassador,

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to notify the Polish Government of the following:

The Soviet Government consider the recent behavior of the Polish Government with regard to the U.S.S.R. as entirely abnormal, and violating all regulations and standards of relations between two Allied States. The slanderous campaign hostile to the Soviet Union launched by the German Fascists in connection with the murder of the Polish officers, which they themselves committed in the Smolensk area on territory occupied by German troops, was at once taken up by the Polish Government and is being fanned in every way by the Polish official press.

Far from offering a rebuff to the vile Fascist slander of the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government did not even find it necessary to address to the Soviet Government any inquiry or request for an explanation on this subject.

Having committed a monstrous crime against the Polish officers, the Hitlerite authorities are now staging a farcical investigation, and for this they have made use of certain Polish pro-Fascist elements whom they themselves selected in occupied Poland where everything is under Hitler's heel, and where no honest Pole can openly have his say.

For the "investigation," both the Polish Government and the Hitlerite Government invited the International Red Cross, which is compelled, in conditions of a terroristic regime, with its gallows and mass extermination of the peaceful population, to take part
in this investigation farce staged by Hitler. Clearly such an “investigation,” conducted behind the back of the Soviet Government, cannot evoke the confidence of people possessing any degree of honesty.

The fact that the hostile campaign against the Soviet Union commenced simultaneously in the German and Polish press, and was conducted along the same lines, leaves no doubt as to the existence of contact and accord in carrying out this hostile campaign between the enemy of the Allies—Hitler—and the Polish Government.

While the peoples of the Soviet Union bleeding profusely in a hard struggle against Hitlerite Germany, are straining every effort for the defeat of the common enemy of the Russian and Polish peoples, and of all freedom-loving democratic countries, the Polish Government, to please Hitler’s tyranny, has dealt a treacherous blow to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government is aware that this hostile campaign against the Soviet Union is being undertaken by the Polish Government in order to exert pressure upon the Soviet Government by making use of the slanderous Hitlerite fake for the purpose of wrestling from it territorial concessions at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Lithuania.

All these circumstances compel the Soviet Government to recognize that the present Government of Poland, having slid on the path of accord with Hitler’s Government, has actually discontinued allied relations with the U.S.S.R., and has adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.

On the strength of the above, the Soviet Government has decided to sever relations with the Polish Government.

Molotov.

No. 89

Note of April 26, 1943, from Mr. Romer, the Polish Ambassador, to Mr. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stating his reasons for refusing to accept the Soviet Note severing relations between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Poland.

Moscow, April 26, 1943.

Mr. People’s Commissar,

You were good enough to receive me today at 0.15 a.m. at your own invitation and for the purpose of reading to me a Note dated
April 25, 1943, signed by yourself and addressed to me, notifying me of the decision of the Soviet Government to sever relations with the Polish Government. Upon hearing the text of the Note, I declared that there was nothing I could do but accept with regret the news of this decision of the Soviet Government, which will be held fully and exclusively responsible for this step. At the same time, however, I most emphatically refused to be a party to the motives and conclusions set forth in the Note that was read to me, and which ascribed to the Polish Government in an inadmissible form, conduct and intentions entirely inconsistent with the facts, thus making it impossible for me to accept your Note. I stated, moreover, that contrary to the allegations contained in the Note, the Polish Government had striven for close on two years to obtain from the Soviet Government information concerning the fate of the missing Polish officers, and had as recently as the 20 inst. returned to this matter in a Note to Ambassador Bogomolov.

Since despite my refusal to accept the Note, I received it later at my hotel in a sealed envelope of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to return it herewith in conformity with my attitude as set forth above.

I have the honor to be

ROMER.

No. 90

Statement of the Polish Government of April 28, 1943, concerning the decision of the Soviet Government to sever relations with the Polish Government.

The following statement was issued on April 28, 1943, by the Polish Government in London:—

The Polish Government emphatically declare that their policy aiming at a mutual friendly understanding between Poland and Soviet Russia on the basis of the integrity and full sovereignty of the Republic of Poland was and continues to be fully supported by the Polish nation.

Conscious of their responsibility towards their own nation and towards the Allies, whose unity and solidarity the Polish Government consider to be the cornerstone of future victory, they were the
first to approach the Soviet Government with a proposal for an understanding, in spite of the many tragic events that had taken place from the moment of the entry of the Soviet Armies on the territory of the Republic, that is from the day of September 17, 1939.

Having settled their relations with Soviet Russia by the Agreement of July 30, 1941, and by the Declaration of December 4, 1941, the Polish Government have strictly discharged their obligations.

Acting in close union with their Government, the Polish nation, making unheard of sacrifices, fights unwaveringly in Poland and abroad against the German invader. It produced no traitor Quisling and accepted no collaboration with Germany. In the light of facts known throughout the world, the Polish nation and the Polish Government have no need to defend themselves from any charge of contact or understanding with Hitler.

In a public statement of April 17, 1943, the Polish Government categorically denied to Germany the right to abuse the tragedy of Polish officers for her own perfidious aims. They unhesitatingly denounced the effort of Nazi propaganda to create mistrust between the Allies. About the same time a Note was sent to the Soviet Ambassador accredited to the Polish Government asking once again for information which would help to elucidate the fate of the missing officers.

The Polish nation and the Polish Government look to the future. They appeal in the name of the unity of the Allies and of elementary human principles for the release from the U.S.S.R. of the thousands of families of soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces, engaged in the fight or preparing in Great Britain and the Middle East to take their part in the fight, tens of thousands of Polish orphans and children for the education of whom they would take full responsibility and who now, in view of the German mass slaughter, are particularly precious to the Polish people. The Polish Army, in waging the war against Germany needs as reinforcements all Polish men able to fight who now find themselves on Soviet soil. The Polish Government appeal for their release. They reserve their right to plead the cause of all these persons before the world. Finally, the Polish Government appeal for the continuation of relief for the mass of Polish citizens who remain in Russia.

In defending the integrity of the Republic of Poland, which accepted the war with the Third Reich, the Polish Government never
claimed and do not claim, in accordance with their statement of February 25, 1943, any Soviet territories.

It is and will be the duty of every Polish Government to defend the rights of Poland and of Polish citizens. The principles for which the United Nations fight, and the strengthening by all means of their solidarity in this struggle against the common enemy, remain the unchanging bases of the policy of the Polish Government.
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