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Antecedents and consequences of pay disparity between CEO and non-CEO executives

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Date Issued:
2008
Summary:
This dissertation investigates the antecedents and consequences to pay disparity between the CEO and non-CEO executives from an equity-based perspective. While the principles of agency theory suggest that CEOs are granted higher compensation packages to better align their motives to those of the firm's shareholders, empirical research has not supported a positive relationship between rising CEO pay and firm performance. Some results even suggest a negative relationship. This dissertation argues that if organizational outcomes are determined by the integrated skills and talents of its dominant coalition, and if the management of a firm's trajectory is a shared process, then, the disparity in rewards between the CEO and those that work closest to him becomes an important area of study.
Title: Antecedents and consequences of pay disparity between CEO and non-CEO executives.
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Name(s): Pissaris, Seema.
Florida Atlantic University
College of Business
Department of Management
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Electronic Thesis Or Dissertation
Issuance: monographic
Date Issued: 2008
Publisher: Florida Atlantic University
Physical Form: electronic
Extent: xiii, 184 p. : ill. (some col.).
Language(s): English
Summary: This dissertation investigates the antecedents and consequences to pay disparity between the CEO and non-CEO executives from an equity-based perspective. While the principles of agency theory suggest that CEOs are granted higher compensation packages to better align their motives to those of the firm's shareholders, empirical research has not supported a positive relationship between rising CEO pay and firm performance. Some results even suggest a negative relationship. This dissertation argues that if organizational outcomes are determined by the integrated skills and talents of its dominant coalition, and if the management of a firm's trajectory is a shared process, then, the disparity in rewards between the CEO and those that work closest to him becomes an important area of study.
Summary: The dissertation investigates the antecedents of pay disparity and proposes that the quality of a firm's governance marked by independent boards as well as higher levels of blockholders will be more likely to temper and better align the CEO's compensation and thereby reduce pay disparity. Empirical results support the major propositions as firms with independent Chairman of the Board, fewer interlocking directors, and higher levels of blockholders were found to have lower levels of pay disparity between the CEO and non-CEO executives. Pay disparity was tested both at the firm level and at the individual executive level and both were found have a significant effect on non-CEO executive turnover for up to two years.
Summary: Central to the dissertation is a moderation model which proposes that pay disparity has a profound effect on an executive team's ability to integrate its diverse experience and educational background, and consequently, its capacity to respond strategically to its changing competitive landscape. The study examines the education, age, tenure and functional background of top management teams of Fortune 500 firms and finds support for the assertion that the positive relationship between heterogeneously composed teams and firm performance is contingent on rewards equality between the CEO and balance of the top team membership. The findings suggest that higher levels of pay disparity attenuate the negative aspects of cognitive diversity serving to impede the firm's competitive performance.
Identifier: 231745773 (oclc), 58009 (digitool), FADT58009 (IID), fau:4295 (fedora)
Note(s): by Seema Pissaris.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2008.
Includes bibliography.
Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, FL : 2008 Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Subject(s): Chief executive officers -- Salaries, etc
Corporate governance
Compensation management
Managerial economics
Held by: FBoU FAUER
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/58009
Use and Reproduction: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Owner Institution: FAU