NATO AND THE WEST – THE DISCURSIVE MYTHS OF SALVATION AND

CONSPIRACY: A POST-COMMUNIST ANALYSIS OF THE ROMANIAN CASE

by

Daniela Popescu

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

The Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Masters of Arts

Florida Atlantic University

Boca Raton, Florida

April 2011

NATO AND THE WEST – THE DISCURSIVE MYTHS OF SALVATION AND
CONSPIRACY: A POST-COMMUNIST ANALYSIS OF THE ROMANIAN CASE

by

Daniela Popescu

This thesis was prepared under the guidance of the candidate's thesis advisor, Dr. Noemi Marin, School of Communication and Multimedia Studies, and has been approved by the members of her supervisory committee. It was submitted to the faculty of the Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

Noemi Marin, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor

Fred Fejes, Ph.D.

Renat Shaykhutdinov, Ph.D.

Susan Reilly, Ph.D.
Chair, School of Communication and Multimedia Studies

Manjunath Pendakur, Ph.D.
Dean, The Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters

Barry T. Rosson, Ph.D.
Dean, Graduate College

4/6/11
Date

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Author: Daniela Popescu

Title: NATO and the Discursive Myths of Salvation and Conspiracy:

                    A Post-Communist Analysis of the Romanian Case

Institution: Florida Atlantic University

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Noemi Marin

Degree: Master of Arts

Year: 2011

This thesis provides a critical cultural analysis of the discursive myths of salvation

and conspiracy, using as a case study the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

during the transition period in Romania, from 1989 to 2007. The study offers an answer

to the questions: how do NATO myths change? Why and with what discursive

implications for the Romanian audience? The thesis uses a combination of

methodological tools from three different disciplines—history, mythology, and rhetoric—

with the intent of showing how the Romanians' public attitudes toward NATO change in

four different political contexts: during the integration period until Romania's admission

into the alliance, during the Kosovo war, after 9/11 events and during the installation of

NATO troops on Romanian territory. This study demonstrates that NATO myths are

effective operational strategies that offer Romanians a sense of identity in the critical

period of transition. The thesis also explains how NATO, as a carrier of Western values,

helps the democratization of the Romanian public sphere and the reconstruction of a

national identity based on democratic principles.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

After the demise of the bourgeoisie during the rise of the Marxist promise of equality, and continuing with the remapping of Europe, the realities of the countries involved in these divisions during the Cold War became a perfect illustration of the human struggle for power.[1] The Cold War experience not only made people very sensitive to dichotomies such as communism vs. capitalism and West vs. East (where the West was represented by the U.S. and the Western European countries, and the East by the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries), but also created a propitious ground for the formation of an antithetical thinking that split Europe into two different ideologies and ways of living.

The Cold War ideological world that controlled the minds of millions of people for the greater part of the twentieth century was rhetorically created, showing how powerful words can be. Human beings are "'conditioned' not directly to belief and behavior, but to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and beliefs" (McGee, "The Ideograph" 428). This vocabulary of concepts (the Cold War being one good example) that influences the actions of the human being underlies the domain of political and cultural imaginary, where imaginary

---

[1] The Cold War was a "period of intense antagonism between the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—lasting from 1945 to 1991." Mason, John W. *The Cold War, 1945-1991*. London; New York: Routledge, 1996: ix.

represents a system of "norms," "institutions," and "orientations" that is most of all "anonymous, collective and unconscious and it is interiorized by individuals to become 'the human history'" (Castoriadis 8-10).

Human history as an imaginary account of the journey of human experience uses myth as a strategic rhetorical device that creates vocabularies specific to a unique system of beliefs. These beliefs defy the rational, for they become universals inscribed in the popular doxa.[2]

In Romania, after the revolution of 1989, the pre-established model of community life seemed to empty out any significance, any legitimacy, causing the Romanian people to ask questions about their national identity. Losing confidence in the reality, Romanians found relief in the imaginary; they found in the myth an undeniable force of social cohesion. As the government elites could offer no more than "cosmetic remedies" with little for the population to identify with, Romanians tried to take a look outside, and European and American models of society became the most appealing to them (Tismaneanu, "Reinventing Politics" xiv). After 1989, Romanians' eagerness to integrate the Western culture coincided with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's interest in extending eastward.[3]

---

[2] The *doxa* is, in Bourdieu's view, the experience by which "the natural and social world appears as self-evident." It encompasses the "the universe of possible discourse" that "goes without saying because it comes without saying." Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977: 164-169.

[3] According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) official website, NATO is a military alliance established by the North Atlantic Treaty (also called the Washington Treaty) of April 4, 1949, which sought to create a counterweight to Soviet armies stationed in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II. Its original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Joining the original signatories were Greece and Turkey (1952); West Germany (1955; from 1990 as Germany); Spain (1982); the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004); and Albania and Croatia (2009). "North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)." 2011.Web. 28 Jan. 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/what_is_nato.htm.

This thesis examines how the cultural and political myths of NATO changed during the transition period in Romania and what are the discursive effects that impact the Romanian audience. It is very difficult to establish the end of this transition period; some scholars believe that Romania continues to experience the transition even in the present days (Phinnemore 7). This study analyzes the period between the revolution of 1989 and the installation of NATO troops in Romania in 2007, highlighting periods of time when NATO is on the Romanian public agenda: the integration period (1989 to 2004), the Kosovo war (1999) and post-9/11 events (2001).

NATO myths shifted to mean two diametrically opposed myths (salvation and conspiracy), because NATO offered Romanians a fluid imaginary in which everybody could find a sense of belonging. NATO myths also changed because of the cultural and political characteristics of the unsettled societies in transition, in which cultural values changed very often and rapidly. This thesis is a critical cultural analysis of the discursive myths of NATO, intended to help one understand how these changes determined the cultural and persuasive attitudes of the Romanian public.[4] It combines perspectives on NATO in Romania using the relationships between history, political/cultural myth and rhetoric.

This study explores the cultural implications of the transition period in post-communist Romania,[5] focusing on the rhetorical construction of NATO discursive myths

---

[4] By discursive myths, I refer to the political and cultural myth that has a narrative format and rhetorical implications and is capable of influencing people to adopt an attitude that makes them act in a certain direction (e.g., NATO myths convince Romanians to act in the direction of adopting a democratic vocabulary and attitude, which contributes to the democratization of the Romanian public sphere after 1989).

[5] In *The Tragedy of Central Europe*, Milan Kundera argues that "it is not politics, but *culture* which must be seen as the decisive force by which nations constitute their identity, express that identity and give its own distinctive mold" [emphasis added] (33-38).

of salvation and conspiracy. It offers a perspective on how the Romanian audience revived myths that came from the past and applied them to NATO during different periods of time, through a permanent process of mythological and discursive production.

This analysis has a fourfold structure: (1) a literature review of previous studies about NATO and a theoretical framework of the methods used for analysis (2) a historical analysis of NATO as a myth of the West and of the transition period in Romania, (3) an analysis of the cultural myths of transition and NATO salvation and conspiracy myths, using Raoul Girardet's analysis of the political myth and (4) a rhetorical analysis of the implications of NATO discursive myths.

After the Cold War, NATO changed its orientation toward the East as all of Eastern and Western Europe changed, and the world in general. The unique situation of the transition offered for Romanians and for most Eastern Europeans a background for the change and renegotiation of cultural and political values. Before the Cold War, for example, the cultural and political borders were well delimited; NATO represented the West, while the Warsaw Pact represented the East. After the Cold War, as the Pact disbanded, NATO came to represent the West and salvation for the countries of Eastern Europe, and for Romania in particular. However, NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 made a part of the Romanian population see the East as signifying the Orthodox bond with the Serbian brother and the West (NATO) as a conspirator interested in a new world order for the benefit of the big powers.

Imaginary and its narrative vehicle, the myth, function very well in societies in crisis, such as Romania after 1989. Mythological turmoil increases from the moment that a phenomenon of non-identification intervened in the collective conscience. For over half

4

a century of strong control, Romanians felt lost in a new world that promised to the most powerful. Since the revolution, they were confronted with a new social dimension: the replacement of an ideologically and politically determined social structure with a meritocratic structure based on non-discrimination and equal opportunity. Romanians saw themselves in need of "a daddy, somebody who will look after [them], so that [they] don't have to look after [themselves]" (Drakulić 107). After 1989, Romanians faced an identity crisis that stemmed from the quest for "who they were." Like other Eastern and Central Europeans just liberated from the political commitment to communist governments, Romanians no longer knew who they were. This was one of the great outcomes of life after the revolution (Ash, "Between Past and Future" 401).

Who was the enemy now and who was the friend? Was it better to remain oriented toward the East (Russia) or to embrace Western (American and European) values? What did the West represent after so many years of cultural isolation?[6] What did the much trumpeted word "democracy" mean after all? An even more difficult question was to be asked and hopefully answered: What does being Romanian represent today or what are the cultural traits that make one a Romanian? In their attempt to find answers to these ontological questions, Romanians experienced an identity crisis as they realized for the first time that they had no real references on which to build clear answers.

This quest for national and cultural identity in Romania and most other countries of "New Europe" (formed by countries from the ex-Soviet communist bloc) became a modern pilgrimage, as the countries searched for permanent relief from their

---

[6] The term "Western" refers to North America and to European countries that have not been part of the Warsaw Pact.

identitarian/ethnical quarrels away from home.[7] One of the characteristics of the

Romanian society was that people created national and cultural identities by appealing to

history and myth (Boia 22). One myth that the Romanians created after 1989 and strongly

believed in involves NATO.

 Romanians identified with each other on the basis of a shared vocabulary of

democracy as well as public attitudes of acceptance or rejection that NATO carried. The

construction of NATO discursive myths explained the rhetorical characteristics of the

transition period and helped the settlement of the civil society in Romania. NATO myths

of salvation and conspiracy talked a great deal about the way Romanians appealed to

history to recreate a national identity freed of the ideological remnants of Nicolae

Ceausescu's dictatorship.[8] Thus, NATO became a new concept on the rhetorical scene of

transition, meaning both salvation and conspiracy. NATO made Romanians gather their

aspirations and fears under the same rhetorical construct of myth. Consequently, NATO

became for Romanians a *doxa*, a myth that defied the rational and that settled its

rhetorical virtues on the public scene of the transition period.

 Romanians have been involved since 1989 in an ongoing process of rhetorical

negotiation of NATO meanings. Sometimes NATO signified a Western agent of

democratic values, while at other times it meant the carrier of imperialist ideals of

reordering the world for the best interests of the United States. The cultural perceptions

of NATO witnessed the difficult changes in the transition period, where points of

reference were lost and, along with them, a sense of identity. The mutability of NATO

myths tracked the sociopolitical metamorphosis of the transition period in Romania. The

---

[7] Black, Edwin. "The Second Persona". In John Louis Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, Sally
Caudill (Eds.). *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader.* New York: Guilford Press, 1999: 335.
[8] Nicolae Ceausescu was the president of Romania from 1965 to 1989.

rhetoric of NATO myths as described by the Romanian experience is characteristic to the rhetoric of societies in transition.

For the purpose of this study, the *Romanian culture* refers to its mainstream cultural tendencies, keeping in mind that a nation is *par excellence* multicultural, as Konrad astutely observes: "The idea of a territorial state is more realistic than the idea of a single nation, single language state. It allows for human reality, which – made up, as it is, of individuals – is by nature diverse. There is no region or town of any size that is not multicultural" (61). Romania was a multicultural country of people sharing different views of events. If some Romanians believed NATO represented salvation, there was another segment of the population that remained reluctant toward the capacities of the alliance to help the country. Nonetheless, the present thesis refers to the discursive myths as shared by the large majority of the population.

Chapter One of this thesis reviews the methodologies used herein and offers a literature review on the academic work that has previously analyzed the subject of NATO. Specifically, the chapter examines the role of history, of political and cultural myths and of rhetoric in Romanian transitional society, and asks about the particularities of the Romanian audience and the role played by the media in the process of myth creation.

Chapter Two shows how the end of communism in Eastern Europe and the Cold War have impacted the Romanian culture, and explores the legacy of communism from a cultural perspective. It includes a historical perspective of what NATO meant for Romanians during the Cold War (1945 to 1991), including the Nicolae Ceausescu's rule (1965 to 1989) and during the transition period (1989 to 2007), showing how important

the past is in the making of the present. This chapter offers a portrayal of the Romanian

society as it was predisposed to identify culturally and politically with the West,

symbolized by NATO. It provides an overview of how history, mythology and rhetoric

are interrelated and contributed to the democratic dynamic of the Romanian society after

1989. To Romanians, NATO was the opposite of the Warsaw Pact.[9] Chapter Two

answers the following questions: What are the Cold War's legacies in Romania's modern

history? What was the state of mind of Romanians since the revolution and in the wake of

Ceausescu's legacy? Why were the cultural and political differences in the East and West

so important in Romania after 1989?

Chapter Two also focuses on the characteristics of the transition period from

historical and rhetorical perspectives. It also analyzes the contemporary political myths

that contributed to NATO imaginary: the myth of the besieged fortress, the myth of

salvation and the myth of conspiracy. This chapter demonstrates that there are myths with

stronger social virtues that transgressed the test of history, were resurrected in the present

and gave renewed rhetorical dimensions to NATO. Myths are discussed in this chapter as

rhetorical vehicles used to re-legitimate political attitudes in the present, as viable

alternatives to induce change in a society. It also presents how Romanians were involved

in a cultural mobilization that involves NATO.

---

[9] "Warsaw Pact", formally Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, (May 14, 1955–July 1, 1991) is a treaty establishing a mutual-defense organization (Warsaw Treaty Organization) composed originally of the Soviet Union and Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Albania withdrew in 1968, and East Germany in 1990.) The treaty (which was renewed on April 26, 1985) provided for a unified military command and for the maintenance of Soviet military units on the territories of the other participating states. Whetten, Lawrence L. *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries*. London, 1971: 15.

Chapter Three of this thesis presents the mythological perceptions of NATO using Girardet's views on political myth that apply and encompass the complexity of NATO myths in the transition period in Romania. Out of the many political and cultural myths that populated the Romanian public sphere, two are most useful to the study of NATO discursive manifestations and are presented in this chapter: salvation and conspiracy. The chapter presents the stages of NATO salvation and conspiracy myths as discussed in Girardet's *Mythes et Mythologies Politiques*. In societies in transition, it is very difficult to pin down rhetorical patterns. This chapter demonstrates that NATO had opposing meanings: acceptance of an alliance as a possible *salvation* for Romania, vs. rejection of alliance with the occasion of Kosovo war as *conspiracy*. In the case of the NATO-as-salvation myth, there was a waiting time, a call for the savior, a redemption period (when society must become worthy of the arrival of the savior) and the arrival of the savior. With the war in Kosovo, the NATO savior became a conspirator, as the religious proximity of Romanians with the Serbian people and the fear of precedence for the separation of the Hungarian minority temporarily replaced the hopes for salvation.

Chapter Four explains the rhetorical implications of NATO discursive myths in the years following the revolution of 1989, which made Romanian people find propitious methods of democratization and national identification. The Burkean concepts of terministic screens, frames of acceptance and rejection, and identification are analyzed here as they applied to NATO, with the purpose of showing how Romanians created political attitudes toward the alliance.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

The transition period in Romania has idiosyncratic characteristics that must be understood in order to examine how the Romanian people have appealed to history to create or renew myths (and particularly NATO myths) in their search for identity. This chapter analyzes the literature that treats the role of history in the transition period, how people create myths, and what functions myths provide for a society in crisis. Further, it examines how rhetoric helps with the creation and perpetuation of imaginary, and the effects it has on the Romanian audience. The literature review is presented according to the threefold structure of the thesis: history, imaginary/myth, and rhetoric.

This chapter also outlines the methods used for analyzing the NATO myths of salvation and conspiracy, and the rhetorical implications of these discursive strategies. It introduces methodologies that study the role of the audience and the media in the intersection between history, myth, and rhetoric in post-1989 Romania.

A. Literature Review

To understand how NATO is given different cultural meanings in post-1989 Romania, one should become familiar with the particularities of societies in transition. A large body of literature has dedicated thousands of pages to the transition period from a

multitude of vantage points, including Vaclav Havel, Light Duncan and David Phinnemore, George Konrad, Julia Kristeva, Milan Kundera, Noemi Marin, Cezar Ornatowski, Mark Pittaway, Nikolaeva Todorova, Vladimir Tismaneanu and Katherine Verdery.

Rejoicing in the "freedom of speech" after long years of censorship, Eastern European intellectuals try to remember, reconstruct and rewrite the history of a period when they were considered pariahs and were systematically silenced. Some countries, such as Romania, have opened the path to rhetorical studies where rhetoric was/is not even a discipline, resulting in Lucian Boia's *History and Myth in Romanian Conscience*, Noemi Marin's *After the Fall* and Vladimir Tismaneanu's *Fantasies of Salvation*. Marin also shows how dissidents from Eastern Europe preserved their cultural identities during communism through rhetorical resistance (Marin, "After the Fall" 1-31). These dissidents became the post-revolutionary intellectual elite that is the most ardent supporter of NATO-European Union integration, as it promises the continuing development of a strong civil society capable of bringing democratic change.[10] Boia argues that history and myth are some of the necessary ingredients of national identity, and presents the myths Romanians have believed in from time immemorial (22). Verdery considers that Romanians fantasize about being a part of Europe since the fall of communism, but that their dream is of an irreconcilably dualistic nature: Europe represents either aid and salvation or imperial domination (69-105). Ornatowsky argues that the past is very important for societies in transition because its discourse offers people an ideological background on which they can build a sense of identity (193).

---

[10] The European Union (E.U.) is an international organization comprising 27 European countries, which governs common economic, social and security policies. Hix, Simon. *The Political System of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005: 8.

In societies in transition where people have difficulty knowing who to believe in, myths are ideal in offering people ways to find a sense of identity. Boia, Marin and Tismaneanu recognize that myth is an effective rhetorical device that functions in such societies to give a sense of order and identity to a people in crisis. Kenneth Burke, Ernst Cassirer, Christopher Flood, Raoul Girardet, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Göran Therborn agree that the myth is a new power in the political and cultural realm and is rich in persuasive virtues. Myth is very assiduously studied in modern times when its effects on people's attitudes are recognized to be powerful and when myth is not seen a simple distortion of the truth, but rather as an account of the reality.

Myth in Girardet's view comes from the past to give legitimacy to present discursive attitudes (15). For Romanians, the past—most often understood as history—is very important. It represents one of the grounds on which they create national identity, scholars such as Marin, Boia and Tismaneanu argue. Consequently, this thesis offers an extensive description of the historical and cultural contexts of the creation of NATO discursive cultural and political myths.

A discourse is a dense reconstruction of all the bits of other discourses from which it was made; Michael McGee calls these other discourses "fragments." ("Text, Context" 274). Not only is the context of seminal importance in our analysis to understand the functions of the discourse about NATO in Romania, but such is the formation of this discourse. To ignore these two aspects in the formation of Romanian culture can only create a truncated image of how the texts unfold their rhetorical function "The fundamental root of frustration," says McGee, "is our inclination to treat scraps of

social problems and fragments of texts as if they were whole. …[T]he solution is to look for *formations of texts* rather than *'the text'* as a place to begin analysis" (279).

NATO, as a military and political alliance, receives a great deal of academic attention. Studies can be broken down into several major orientations:

- the pertinence of NATO existence after the Cold War (Cooley 79-92; Duffield 763-787; Mearsheimer 5-57; Smith 55-76; Waltz 44-79);

- the state and the nature of transatlantic relations and NATO's relations with new comers and potential country members from Central, Southern and Eastern Europe and whether or not the alliance should expand (Asmus et al. 28-40; Aybet 65-75; Cornish "NATO: The Practice" 63-74; Gibler 627-637; Lake 6-12);

- national perspectives on the alliance: most of the books and academic articles are dedicated to Old Europe's NATO members like Germany, France and Italy (Hillenbrand 3-24; Jervis and Snyder 3-51; Larson 85-111);

- the impact of 9/11 on NATO, and its strategy (Granville 439 – 446; Walker 1-10)

- the perception of NATO intervention in Kosovo (Latawasky and Smith 143-170; Sloan 495-511).

A small number of studies focus on the Romanian relationship to NATO; most of these describe the integration process and its perception by the public. Even fewer analyses look at NATO as a cultural and rhetorical construct in Romania (Ionescu and Treptow 7-11; Zilberman and Weber 145-170). Ian Thomas, in *The Promise of Alliance*, is one of few scholars who describes the role of rhetoric in the evolution of the alliance, but he does so from the perspective of its Western participants, especially the American ones (83). Thomas argues that NATO has the rhetorical potential to act as a counter

reaction to communism, and represents the embodiment of the higher ideals of western civilization: defender of moral values and instrument of human rights, diplomacy and democracy. He does not mention, however, the Eastern European countries' position towards the alliance, perhaps because the first wave of negotiations for NATO enlargement towards East only took place in 1997, the year his book was published.

Many scholars focus on the Cold War's political, historical and social impact; in fact, there is an entire academic program dedicated to the era at Harvard University. Few scholars have apparently insisted, however, on studying how words—with their capacity to induce action—can shape a conflicting rhetorical territory in what becomes an unending *logological* "war."[11] NATO was part of Cold War ideology and, as such, it was expected to cease to exist with its *raison d'être*. Whatever people believe, the reality always proves different for some.

B. Methodologies

The complexity of the transition period in Romania and its political, cultural and rhetorical manifestations demand a variety of rhetorical methods of analysis (an emic perspective, or view from inside the text: let the text talk by itself). The alternative, a prescriptive approach (an etic perspective, or view from outside the text) would omit insightful ideas about the quality, consequences and real purpose of NATO myths during the transition period.

---

[11] I borrow Kenneth Burke's use of the term *logology*, which he defines as "words about words." Burke, Kenneth. *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961:1.

The method of analysis used throughout this study is a discursive analysis of the cultural myths of NATO during transition in Romania and their rhetorical portrayal in Romanian newspapers, public official discourses and official documents. The research covers a historical-contextual analysis of discourses about NATO and their context, a descriptive analysis of NATO myths and a rhetorical evaluation of the discursive acts.

This thesis argues that the NATO cultural myths in Romania are entangled in political arguments, but have also been assimilated into social, cultural and economic public discussions that benefit Romanian people in times of crisis. The shifts between political myths demonstrate an important dimension for the formation of political and public opinion through rhetorical methods in countries like Romania. The articles and the official discourses utilized herein are representative of the periods when NATO was on the public agenda, such as during the Romanian candidacy to NATO integration, the Kosovo war, 9/11 and the settlement of NATO troops on Romanian territory.

The methods used in this study are from three academic domains: (1) history, (2) mythology and (3) rhetoric. History is of vital importance not only in Romania but throughout Eastern Europe, where people still fight and die in the name of events that happened in the past: "The notion of killing people [. . .] because of something that may have happened in 1495 is unthinkable in the Western world. Not in the Balkans" (Cohen 24). When looking at history in post-1989 Romania through the scope of understanding how Romanians mythologize about NATO, this thesis uses political/ cultural perspectives of Romanian scholars such as Tismaneanu and Boia, who pinpoint the predisposition of the Romanian people to go into their past and to fantasize about external salvation in times of crisis. Tismaneanu and Boia both also argue that Romanians form a national

identity by a permanent return to history, where they find figures of heroes and villains and transfer their traits onto contemporary faces. These scholars offer a solid theoretical framework for the role of history in Romanians' consciousness and show how NATO was perceived during the Cold War, during communist Romania and during the transition period (Tismaneanu, "Fantasies of Salvation" 153-184; Boia 153-167).

Rhetoric, history and mythology intertwine at a point that one would find it difficult to see the difference between reality and imaginary. That is why some scholars announce the appearance of a new power in the contemporary era: the mythical thought (Cassirer 3).

The mythmaking process that people, especially the media and public officials, participate in has its roots in the past. If we were to stay in the realm of historiography, we would be trapped in the realm of motion that keeps us prisoners of someone's "memories of their [own] persons" (Konrad 148) because that is what history is – a selection of a bit of reality that a writer (historian) makes at a certain moment in time.[12] A rhetorical perspective directs us towards the realm of action; to have a complete picture of social motives that engage people in action and fuels NATO myths, one should search in the words and their transformative potential, in their capacity to induce action.

As the loyal witness to a crisis affecting not only the whole group but also every individual within it, myth "in two ways brings about a certain type of response, by the social rehabilitation of the 'anomic' individual and the reorganization of the group" (Girardet 182). In other words, myth is reactivated in times of crisis when people are lost in an amalgam of choices (or perhaps are not given any choice at all). It offers to the

---

[12] Burke explains the difference between *motion* and *action* : While *motion* assumes that change is the result of purely physical, autonomous processes, *action* captures the idea of "motion with intent." Burke, Kenneth. *A Grammar of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945: 199.

16

individual and to the whole group—the society—a sense of order, of belonging to a system of beliefs.[13] The myth carries under its discursive form this system of beliefs; that is why establishing the truth of a myth is such a difficult, if not impossible, task. It seems that the communities are more receptive to the symbolic factors found at the interference of the discourse and the cultural references of every individual than to the truth itself. People may prefer a plausible lie to a less plausible truth, as Aristotle observed centuries ago.

The texts of NATO myths are rhetorically constructed in Romania's transition period, in which the myth exerts the social function of reducing fears and anxieties. Claude Lévi-Strauss defines the myth in *Myth and Meaning* as a mechanism "that reduces the anxieties caused by the contradictions that cannot be resolved, expressed in opposition couples (Good/Evil, Nature/Culture)" (75).

The myths that NATO has represented for the Romanian people from the fall of communism until present times can be considered effective rhetorical/cultural/ ideological devices used by people to propel the political leaders and the media into action. This practical orientation of rhetoric is characteristic for societies in transition and sets the ground for identification, argues Noemi Marin in *The Other Side(s) of History. The Return of Rhetoric* (219).

NATO discursive myths shift depending on different temporal contexts and can only be understood in relation to other fields, such as culture, history and political imaginary/mythology. A major part of this study utilizes Raoul Girardet's theory of political myths. Although Girardet defines and categorizes the political myth, his theory

---

[13] Myth can be seen as "defining or illustrating a great belief which animates a people." Boia, Lucian. *History and Myth in Romanian Conscience*. Humanitas: Bucharest, 1997: 3.

also incorporates traits of the cultural myth. The cultural myth adds to the political its capacity to make people identify with each other on the basis of a daily ritual. During the effervescence of NATO myths, judging by the journalists' fervor to cover the subject, reading and talking NATO seemed to become a national ritual.

Kenneth Burke's views on identification, one of rhetoric's major roles recognizable in the discursive myths of NATO, assist in examining such myths.[14] His views on myth and ideology and on frames of acceptance and rejection can be applied to NATO and its cultural significance in post-1989 Romania. Along with Burke's, Marin's interpretations of the relationship between history and myth during the transition period are useful to study the role of the Romanian people (as audience) in the rhetorical interpretation of NATO myths. To detect the theoretical nuances of these frames, one must look at the "terministic screens" on which these frames are projected—what part of reality Romanians select to believe in, what part they deflect, and what part is reflected in their attitudes (Burke "Language as Symbolic Action" 45-46). Other rhetorical method applied to NATO myths include Edwin Black's "second persona" (331-340), Lloyd Bitzer's "rhetorical situation" (1-14), Michael McGee's "ideograph" (425-440), and Slavenka Drakulić's use of pronouns as a way of identity creation on the basis of a responsibility lesson (4-12).

This study also invites rhetorical inquiries about how people use language to create their own universe (ideology) and act in accordance with it. Ideology, as "the colonization of the psyche," acts through myth (as ideological vehicle, often oriented towards the past) to annihilate people's capacity to focus on the reality of the moment

---

[14] Identification, sustains Burke, happens when people identify with each other on the basis of common interests. Burke,Kenneth. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952: 20-21.

(Deleuze and Guattari 170). In an attempt to critique ideology, this thesis has a difficult

mission to accomplish. It must "reconstruct" the reality through myths and provide a

picture of history showing the power mechanisms that cause people to accept the

discursive myths of NATO.

> The critic must attend to the "microphysics of power" in order to understand what *sustains* social practices. Power, thus conceived, is not repressive, but productive-it is an active potentially positive force which creates social relations and sustains them through the appropriation of a discourse that 'models' the relations through its expression. (McKerrow 122)

Thus, the critic should be more of an inventor than an observer of the social scene.

McKerrow believes that, to write enduring criticism, the critical rhetoric should celebrate

its reliance on contingency—on context, on culture (common belief or popular opinion)

as the basis for knowledge, and on rhetoric's capacity to make people act in a certain

direction (where rhetoric makes appeal at universals). As a rhetorical critique of the texts

around NATO, this study adopts a polysemic view of the discourses:

> A polysemic critique is one which uncovers a subordinate or secondary reading which contains the seeds of subversion or rejection of authority, at the same time that the primary reading appears to confirm the power of the dominant cultural norms. (McKerrow 131)

Thus, the rhetorical/cultural analysis in this thesis should be viewed as performance. It

moves the focus from criticism as method to criticism as practice.

Chapter 2: NATO as a National Myth by Choice

for Romanians Post-1989—Historical Perspectives

The national perception of NATO in Romania is very different from how Americans or Western Europeans view the organization. NATO is, for Romanians, a very appealing cultural alternative to what has existed at a local level from 1989 to the present. NATO also represents the exponent of Western values that prevails over the ideals the Soviets have inculcated in Romanians' minds for so long. For Romanians, NATO is not only a military alliance providing security to its members, but also an icon of the Western way of life—a promise, a hope.

The most fervent supporters of NATO myth of the West are the Romanian (and other Eastern European) public intellectuals, as they try to create and contribute to the development of a civil society oriented toward Western values, from which the most prevalent and important for the people is the democratic principle. For Romanian intellectuals, sustaining Romania's integration into NATO and the West is a civic and cultural call to reshape the expectations of the society on democratic principles after the fall of communism and the end of Cold War. In these conditions, the word NATO becomes imbued with meanings and connotations, all of them gathered under the rhetorical concept of discursive myth.

This chapter will discuss

- how the end of communism and the Cold War left Romanians from a cultural standpoint;

- how Romanians perceived NATO during the Cold War, Nicolae Ceausescu's dictatorship and the transition period since 1989;

- the relationship between East and West and how Romanians perceive themselves at the crossroads of these both mythological and real locations,

- NATO's post-Cold War mission that follows Romanians' aspirations to join the alliance;

- how from a variety of myths that circulate in the transition period and that offers local figures to identify with, Romanians chose two specific myths to apply to an international organization, NATO: salvation and conspiracy;

- the role of myths in the mobilization of the Romanian society toward the adoption of a democratic vocabulary post-1989.

As local alternatives of salvation or conspiracy prove to be only temporary sources of belief that cannot pass the mythological test, Romanians orient their search outside the country. Eventually NATO wins the race between local figures of both heroes and villains.

A. The End of Communism and the Beginning of Hope

The year 1989 is crucial in the history of humanity. It means both the end of the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe and the end of the Cold War.[15] Such changes make the post-communist transition process one of the boldest and most challenging projects of contemporary history. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc with the visual symbol of the demolition of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union caused some observers to declare the end of the Cold War and the triumph of Western values (Schopflin 10). Others predicted for both West and East a culture of disillusionment that "has left the West without a clear-cut symbol of the enemy. In the East a whole institutional universe has fallen apart" (Tismaneanu 49).

A "New Europe" comprised of ex-Soviet satellite states in Eastern and Central Europe began to take shape after 1989, gradually replacing entrenched cultural symbols with new ones.[16] For the duration of the Cold War, people from different regions of the world accepted the idea of a common enemy. NATO was one of the military alliances created to fight this potential enemy, specifically, the Soviet enemy that threatened to spread communism around the world. On the other side, from the Soviet perspective, the imperialist tendencies of America were to be fended away by the counterpart of NATO, the Warsaw Pact. After the end of the Cold War (1991), people from Eastern European

---

[15] According to the Global Museum of Communism, there are more than 100 million victims of communism. *Global Museum of Communism*. Web 2011. 10 Mar. 2011. <http://www.globalmuseumoncommunism.org/museum>

[16] "New Europe" is used here as a rhetorical term to describe European post-Communist countries that have aspired since 1989 to the values of Western democracy. Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: England, 1996: 55.

countries have been able to know more about the Western countries and to become
fascinated by them.

The settling of new Romania after 1989 began with an idea: that freedom opens a
whole universe of choices and possibilities. Immediately after the revolution of 1989,
after years of "the most irrational dictatorship Eastern Europe had known since Stalin's
time," people enjoyed the freedom to express themselves, to criticize their leaders and
organize in associations and political parties (Tismaneanu x). The first days of freedom
in December 1989 were for Romanians the occasion of an incessant ecstatic atmosphere.
Their high spirits, however, were very quickly replaced by inquietude.

What were Romanians to do with their so-called freedom if nobody was there to
tell them what to do with it? During the communist period (1947 to 1989), and especially
under the Ceausescu dictatorship (1965 to 1989), the individual was "a mere term of
abstract reference" (Tismaneanu, "Stalinism for all Seasons" 218). One was controlled in
every aspect of life: personal, social, political and even cultural; individuals were left
with little, if any, references to build their identity upon.[17]

In a nutshell, Romania has a history of relative independence from the Soviet
Union, but a weak economy and a virtually nonexistent civil society due to decades of
Ceausescu's isolationism.[18] It was hence impossible after the revolution for a "new"
political class with democratic credentials to emerge. Romanians found, says Wolchick,

---

[17] By *national identity* herein I do not mean only semiotic representations of the nation such as the flag,
anthem and other national figures and symbols, but also beliefs that people share from rhetorical discourses
in their existence as cultural human beings.
[18] Ceausescu's Romania is known for an absolute lack of freedom to organize independently around
common interests. The dictator crushed civil society altogether, unlike other leaders in Central and Eastern
European countries.

that "undoing the past proved to be far more difficult than expected in the heady days of the December 1989 revolution" (322).

Under these conditions in early 1990, the beginning discussions of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) integration offered Romanians a seemingly viable promise to their long lasting hopes: a Western identity, in terms of security, economic development and cultural gain. Why was NATO, and not other political or cultural organizations, subject to Romanians' aspirations? Because NATO was an ideal Euro-Atlantic combination for Romanians. It represented not only the United States (the incontestable international leader), but Europe too: in short, it represented the West.

The Romanian audience became the most active force on the transition scene in mythologizing about NATO. It created and perpetuated NATO myths, and produced the change in the cultural and political realms; the statistics systematically revealed Romanians' aspiration to be part of the West and of NATO. It was this audience that adopted a new vocabulary of democracy that NATO myths present, and it is this audience, the Romanian people, who set the public agenda of the transition period, media being only an echo of the audience's rhetorical preferences.

A rhetorical act cannot occur without an audience, a "people." From a rhetorical standpoint, "Romanians," this "audience," and the "people" are both "real and a fiction simultaneously," constructed by a rhetor who wants to persuade them to act in a certain direction (McGee, "In Search of 'The People'" 344). As it is impossible to recompose a reality from a million individual realities, one should use the rhetorical compound, "people," to show a trend of thought at a certain moment in time, the collective fantasy.

The modern audience, including that of Romania, is no longer perceived as one homogenized mass of passive receivers of information, but rather as fragmented entities that are tightly interrelated and able to influence each other. Today this audience is no longer seen as an animal whose desires are driven by instincts. It has been recreated and given the powers it once had, captured by the Latin proverb *Vox populi, vox Dei* (The voice of the people is the voice of God.) The power of the people is fascinating to researchers, but also difficult to channel in a certain direction and to measure, define and analyze. All attempts to do so will end either in rough generalizations, simple reductions or, luckily, sometimes happy speculations. Just because people cannot be caught in a snare, they cannot be sent to the lab and minutely examined in an outburst of academician enthusiasm in search for "the scientific truth." We are thus far away from the "hypodermic needle theory," which considers that mass media has a direct, immediate and powerful effect on its audiences. Imaginary assaults people from all directions and insinuates in people's minds in a very subtle way to make them act. However, one should not underestimate the deliberative power of the people and their capacity for critical thinking.

The search for "the people," or "the audience" of Romania should start with what is most characteristic to humans, i.e., their symbolicity and their ability to invent, use, misuse and overuse language. In this vein, researchers should start their studies from an "organic conception of human existence presupposed in nearly all rhetorical documents" (McGee, "The Ideograph" 341).

Romanians, until recently subject to historical rhetorical documents, have now become producers of discourse and, through en enthymematic (enthymeme is a syllogism

in which one of the premises or the conclusion are implicit) understanding of the discourse, agents of change. The Romanian audience as an agent of change is a group of individuals capable of acting in a certain direction suggested by a rhetor—in this case, by the media or by leaders that create the mediatic agenda. The Romanian audience is the imagined audience addressed by the rhetor—political leaders, by the media or by advocates of democratic change. It becomes a real audience from the moment it carries the rhetor's beliefs into the public sphere to make them reality.

After 1989, Romanians were offered a palette of myths from which to choose the ones able to give them a sense of identity. It was the rhetor who presented them a choice of saviors or enemies to embody their beliefs. In other words, the Romanian "people" are a second persona that participate "in that dramatic vision, to *become* 'the people' described by the advocate" (McGee, "In Search of 'The People'" 343). This second persona is an imagined audience that is shaped by the discourses of a rhetor. "The critic can see in the auditor implied by a discourse a model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor become" (Black 335).

Romanians are a second persona in the sense that they comply with the messages sent to them, messages that present NATO embodying different myths, in a different light. What is even more paradoxical in the creation of different manifestations of NATO myths is that a fantasy, "the people," imagines a mythical alliance with supreme virtues able to save them. This paradox makes one ask, rhetorically: what is imagination and what is reality? The French scholar Jean Baudrillard believes that we live in a world of simulacra, where it is "*impossible to isolate the process of the real*, or to prove the real"

(21). It is just this shared imagination (or set of myths) that makes people create identity

through the means of rhetorical devices used and perpetuated mainly by the media.

B. Historical Perspectives of NATO in Romania

NATO's mission during the Cold War was to ensure that the East-West military

balance provided a peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and communist worlds.

During this era, NATO represented the security and ideological concerns of keeping the

communist world away in Western states such as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,

Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and

the United States. The East had its own protective shield against the capitalist

imperialistic tendencies of Western states, insured by the Warsaw Pact that included

Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the

Soviet Union).

For the duration of the Cold War, NATO meant for Romanians either a carrier of

Western values or an alliance representing their enemies' interests, particularly those of

the United States. In *The Promise of Alliance*, Thomas argues that NATO is conceived

> as a showcase for the forces of freedom: its role was to shape the future
> through an appeal to the 'uncommitted' nations of the world and a
> demonstration, through words and deeds, of the strength and rightness of
> its cause. These tactics were justified by reference to a conceptual
> framework within which the Cold War was seen as a struggle between
> opposing civilizations that held opposing concepts about the nature and
> worth of the individual. NATO, as the primer defender of the West, was
> therefore viewed as the organizational embodiment of Western 'humanist'
> concepts. (83)

The Warsaw Pact, or the East, also had different cultural interpretations during the Cold

War in Romania. It represented either a protection from attempted American imperialism,

or a pact that posed a threat to the independence of member states (e.g., during Spring

Prague events, when Warsaw countries invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968).[19] In the Cold

War period, Romanians situated themselves either at the East (mostly imposed by

communist propaganda) or at the West (through the lens of their history). The Western

cultural alignment of Romanians during communism as a trait of their cultural heritage

led them to embrace western values during the transition period and subsequently search

for NATO and E.U. integration.

Although initially NATO was aimed as a shield against the Soviet aggression, the

alliance was also an organization of liberal democracies, especially after the Cold War,

when it changed into a more consultative organization on matters of security. NATO's

geographic and strategic importance, together with political and ideological

qualifications, guided the politics and dynamics of the alliance's enlargement during the

Cold War. The Soviet threat, the European order and ideology all influenced the issue of

membership. The political and cultural parameters set by the Cold War did not

necessarily end along with the era. Culturally, NATO perception in Romania went along

with the international image the alliance tried to establish, as a carrier of Western values,

democracy and deliberative dialogue. In countries like Romania, after the fall of

---

[19] Prague Spring was a brief period of liberalization in Czechoslovakia under Alexander Dubček in 1968. Soon after he became first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on Jan. 5, 1968, Dubček granted the press greater freedom of expression; he also rehabilitated victims of political purges during the Joseph Stalin era. Dubček claimed that he was offering "socialism with a human face." The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries viewed the developments as tantamount to counterrevolution. On the evening of Aug. 20, Soviet armed forces invaded the country and quickly occupied it. Williams, Kieran. *The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968-1970.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997: 5.

communism, NATO was perceived as more of cultural and political organization than a military alliance.

C. NATO during Cold War: West vs. East

In times of crisis, people tend to orientate their motives toward known conditions, being very suspicious and reluctant to change, says Drakulić:

> In turbulent times, times of dramatic social and political change, people tend to fall back on what they know. Before, the only identification one was allowed was with the working class, yet, underneath that lid there was one's own nationality, language, religion and culture to identify with. (105)

If one generalizes the words of Drakulić (and many Eastern European scholars), Romanians were supposed to choose an Eastward orientation after 1989. However, how a people reconstruct a sense of identity during periods of crisis is a convoluted process. In the case of Romanians, the Cold War and communism left bad reminiscences that cannot be erased from the public memory with the snap of a finger.

The discourse about the Cold War gained in recent times a new momentum, and is resurrected by the media when new military strategies are re/negotiated.[20] World's territories continue to be shaped under the same representative terminologies: West vs. East. The Cold War is for me an unending war, for it is a war of words, a rhetorical war. Also known as World War III or the Nuclear War, the Cold War is a fault of style, but

---

[20] During the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania (April 2-4, 2008), the participants were at odds over expansion to the East. The United States was backed by the new entrants, urging Georgian and Ukrainian membership against the public doubts of Germany and the vehement opposition of Russia. The members were at odds over their individual contributions to the war in Afghanistan. Even on what should be a relatively uncontroversial issue, that of bringing Macedonia into NATO, the Greeks were threatening to veto the move unless the new member changed its country's name.

one that still exerts rhetorical appeal. NATO is a reminder of the Cold War era and, for

Romanians, is often associated with the untouchable, yet desirable, West.

Today, Cold War ideology is still present in the Romanian collective memory

(and in the Eastern and Central Europe collective memory, in general), and difficult to

surpass. For example, Drakulić explains in an essay why she never visits Moscow:

> It is not easy to identify the source of my anxiety. It stems from my whole
> life experience in communist Yugoslavia, from my past, my education and
> the ideology I was surrounded by. When I think back now, I can perceive
> a strange impulse to visit what it used to be USSR. In my mind the USSR
> was some kind of huge cement block representing only one thing: a threat.
> (26)

The term *USSR* stirs in Drakulić's mind a bad image, that of "cement block," which

makes her act (or not act) in a certain direction, not to visit Moscow. Words can become

materialized, can induce people into action. *Moscow* is an example of such

materialization.

The idea of the Cold War was materialized as the two involved parts established

their own Mecca: Moscow for the East, and Washington, D.C. for the West. Germany's

capital, Berlin, materialized the two opposed forces in one place. As the symbol of the

East, the city of Moscow aroused a mythical vibrancy in the mind of Eastern Europeans.

Washington, an even stronger myth in Romanians' and Easterners' minds, represented a

hope, a dream, an imagined "promised land."

Berlin was then split in two by a material construction, a wall that created West

Berlin (controlled by Westerners, especially the United States) and East Berlin

(controlled by the Soviets). Another materialization was the establishment of two military

alliances charged with protecting the interest of these superpowers: NATO for the United

States and the Western European countries, and the Warsaw Pact for Eastern and Central European countries.

Washington and Moscow, as the materialization of the two superpowers, still have strong connotations related to power-control, so strong that they have become a myth. Despite the rise of the European Union as a corrective force at a political level on the world stage, the dice still seem to be played between Russia and the U.S.

The dichotomist mythologies nurtured by the Cold War (East vs. West, communism vs. capitalism, NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact, salvation and conspiracy) have had a negative impact on Romanians' capacity for critical thinking, and have interchanged at different times. During the Cold War, NATO represented for Romanians a carrier of Western values or an alliance that opposed the Warsaw Pact, in which Romania was a member. NATO was seen as salvation immediately after the revolution of 1989, when Romanians fervently searched for a way to belong to the West, while the same alliance came to signify evil when it bombarded Serbian cities and villages in 1999. However, these dialectical mythologies and their high capacity to influence human behavior is probably what allowed communist control in the first place, says Tismaneanu: "These mythologies minimize individual rights and emphasize, instead, the need to maintain an organic supraindividual ethos. Catering to mass frustrations, they speak in terms of collective guilt and collective punishment" ("Fantasies of Salvation" 7). Cold war vocabulary—nuclear threats, national threats, "red threat," imperialistic threat and more recently terrorist threat—gives legitimacy to technological progress, which can be translated into progress in weapon technology as a way to protect the security of the West from potential Eastern threats. Through a permanent rhetoric of memoralization, these

31

myths (technology, communism, capitalism, Cold War) continue to form the collective memory of Romanians. NATO is one such myth that defies time to settle into Romanian political imaginary as a carrier of Western values.

The closest perception that Romanians have for NATO is the West and the United States. For Romanians, East vs. West positioning represents operative terms in the vocabularies of national identity as well as a reality: the geographical location of Romania at the east of Europe. The historical background on how Romanians see themselves regarding East or West also offers a perspective on the cultural predispositions that Romanians display in mythologizing NATO as a salvation coming from the West or a conspiracy against the East.

Romanians felt discriminated against by the Yalta treaty of 1945, when Europe was divided in two (with the Berlin wall as materialization of this separation) and covered with a stigmatic, metaphoric Iron Curtain.[21] After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the East was often regarded as being weaker and as developing nationalistic feelings to compensate for this imagined discrimination. Konrad writes, "The West has proved stronger than the East. If there is no war, the West is stronger, the West being a civil society, the East—a feudal one" (23).

The East and West (two parts of the whole "Cold War") developed a twofold sense of belonging. At a national level, people from Eastern countries identified themselves with the Soviet way of living and those from Western countries, with the

---

[21] The Yalta Conference (Feb. 4–11, 1945) was a major World War II conference of the three chief Allied leaders—President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain and Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union—which met at Yalta in the Crimea to plan the final defeat and occupation of Nazi Germany. It had already been decided that Germany would be divided into two occupied zones administered by the U.S., British and French on one side and by Soviet forces on the other side. Fenno, Richard F. *The Yalta Conference*. Boston: Heath, 1955: 6-7.

democratic way of living. At an international level, people created a fear of an imagined powerful enemy: the Soviets for the Americans and vice versa. A psychology of fear and distress gained more and more territory while economic progress became a justification for technological discoveries in weaponry.

During the Cold War, under the umbrella of the United States, the West experienced an economy based on the rule of free market and competition, and the individual was educated to manage his own life. The East, under a Soviet umbrella, experienced a controlled economy where the communal spirit prevailed and the individual was taught to wait to be told what to do. Without any doubt, individuals "in collectivity behave and think differently than human beings in isolation" (McGee, "The Ideograph" 425). The more powerful the rhetorical devices used to perpetuate Cold War ideology, the more real is the prophecy, a self-fulfilling prophecy in which people live in daily fear of the rage of the other.[22] Even if Cold War propaganda called for a rhetoric of prosperity and competition in the name of progress, the people of Romania and other communist countries could not tolerate the means to achieve this ideal, most often by being starved. This situation perhaps led to the 1989 events in formerly communist countries.

Unhappy with their way of life, people from ex-Soviet countries fantasized about what they did not have, and that was supposedly available in the West. The same was true for the Westerners, who sometimes exhibited a fascination for the communist doctrine

---

[22] Sociologist Robert K. Merton is credited with coining the expression "self-fulfilling prophecy." It is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior, which makes the original false conception come true. Merton, Robert K (1968). *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press: 477.

(e.g., the French Communist Party, le *Parti communiste français* experienced a boom in the 1960s).

The term *Cold War* as a social tool became internalized differently in the East and West, after its adoption in both vocabularies. *War* implies the construction of an enemy, and the process of defining and materializing the image of the enemy became a way of identification for the people. The common enemy needed to be worthy of hate and to have unique character traits. Adding more features to the definition of the common foe became everybody's struggle.

The East established as enemy the imperialist, capitalist American, while the West associated this common foe as the communist, the Soviet of Eastern Europe. For the capitalist, the communist is the perfect illustration of a victim suffering violations of his basic rights, while for the communist, the capitalist is a Babel of discordant voices, a perfect example of anarchy in which there is no ideal worth fighting for. Even for Western Europe, America did not always have a positive image; it became an even greater threat than the Soviet Union in the first years of the Cold War, for it intended to culturally insinuate its symbols in Europe and thus colonize the Old Continent people's minds. Judt writes,

> The crassness of American culture, from films to beverages, and the self-interest and imperialist ambitions behind the US presence in Europe were commonplaces for many Europeans of Left and Right. The Soviet Union might pose an immediate threat to Europe but it was America that presented the more insidious long-term challenge. ("Postwar" 221)

Today, America exerts a fascination for Romanians, not only for the democratic values it promises, but for the cultural symbols it represents.

D. Romanian Dialectics of East and West

The West represented for Romanians a dream of change after many years of a tough dictatorship; and NATO was one carrier of Western values. As Romanians aspired to integrate into NATO, their desires were oriented toward the West—toward the United States and Europe. NATO successfully gathered under the same terms, both the U.S. and the Old Continent.

Romanians did not interact with Western culture for many years; American culture was almost unnoticeable in Romania. NATO was seen as the illustrator of American interests in Europe, but at different moments in the Romanian history, NATO did not represent only America—it represented the West, for which Romanians displayed a continuous cultural fascination.

The years between the two world wars (1918-1939) are opened to a French myth of the West, and this inclination to adopt French culture as a model of excellence set the cultural prerequisites for a salvation myth that involved NATO. France was one of the first states to join NATO in 1949. This period between the wars continued to be remembered by Romanian scholars, each trying to recreate the cultural atmosphere of that period. Was this the golden age of Romania, of Romanian culture, of Romanian democracy? One image transpires from both personal accounts and scholars' studies: Romania at the time was a very contradictory society. On the one hand, there was an elite of European character—French-oriented (not completely free of indigenous reflexes and prejudices) and a modern cultural and institutional framework. On the other hand was "an indisputable historical time lag in the deeper reaches of the country in spite of a relatively

sustained rhythm of modernization. . . . This 'primitivism' of deeper Romania was what

justified and permitted the authoritarian deviations" (Boia 6).

During the interwar years, Romanians lived the French myth of the West. There

was a second Latinization of the Romanian language (39 percent of current Romanian

vocabulary was borrowed from French) and the Romanian capital, Bucharest became

"little Paris" with buildings designed in Paris-style architecture, and intellectuals went to

study in Paris. At this point, there was no clear delimitation of Eastern and Western

Europe; there were countries in Europe that were more developed economically and

culturally and that exerted a bigger cultural influence than the others, but there was no

strict border to separate them (as later with the Berlin wall, for example). However, later

on, during communism, France represented the West and was closer culturally and even

ideologically to Romania. France was a socialist country, as was Romania as publicized

by Ceausescu.

The French myth followed Romanians into the communist period, but as the

country gradually closed its cultural borders, exposure to French values became shallow,

Judt observes:

> In contrast to other satellite states Romania allowed no space for any
> internal opposition- Bucharest intellectuals in the Sixties, cut off from
> their own society, played no part in domestic debates (there were none)
> and had to be satisfied with reading the latest *nouveaux romans* from Paris
> and participating vicariously in a cosmopolitan French culture for which
> educated Romanians had always claimed a special affinity. ("Postwar"
> 431)

The vanishing of the old elite and the opening after 1989 to a world politically and

culturally dominated by America eroded the French myth and the French reference

points. However, the French myth is important in contemporary Romanian history; it

shows how Romanians created cultural myths around countries that surrounded them and how these myths contributed to the resurrection of discursive myths today.

Although less present than French reference points, during Ceausescu's rule, America had its different cultural interpretations, going from a country that promised a helping hand against the Soviet evil rule to an imperialistic threat. Romanians were taught by communist propaganda that the United States had a different economic system—capitalism—and it was bad. Officially, Ceausescu was critiquing capitalism and not America, and at least at the beginning of the dictator's rule, his foreign policy was oriented toward the West.

Ceausescu's regime was very different from those of most countries in the former Soviet Bloc. The communist rule of Ceausescu was the harshest in Eastern Europe, causing scholars to call it "the most irrational dictatorship Eastern Europe had known since Stalin's time" (Tismaneanu, "Reinventing Politics" x). The "national Stalinism" Ceausescu practiced was a mélange of a centrally planned economy, an ideology of national uniqueness and, toward the end of Ceausescu's years, the cult of a supreme leader.

Ceausescu's dictatorship was so difficult to bear and so disastrous that the dictator, his institutions and his acolytes became part of the most brutal ending in the group of ex-Soviet countries (Tismaneanu, "Stalinism for all Seasons" 215). Romania experienced in 1989 a real revolution with the lynching of the dictator and hundreds of civilian deaths, not the "velvet revolution" (a non-violent revolution) that other communist states from Eastern and Central Europe have known.

Historians agree that there were three periods during Ceausescu's reign, each one

bearing idiosyncratic particularities. (1) From 1965 to 1971 was characterized by

economic growth and an improvement in the standard of living, social welfare and a

certain liberalization of spiritual life. In matters of foreign policy, Ceausescu continued

the policy of independence from the Soviet Union started by his predecessor Gheorghe

Gheorghiu-Dej[23] and of opening toward the West (Boia 9; Deletant 14). Ceausescu

received diplomatic visits from Western leaders, including President Charles de Gaulle of

France and President Richard Nixon of the United States, who both praised their

Romanian counterpart for his policies. Rhetorically, Ceausescu's discourses (most of

them part of the *epideictic* genre) eulogized the state of the economy, the Romanian

people for their dedication to the party, America for the technological progress and

France for her socialist political orientation.[24] As a consequence of these Western

inclinations, Ceausescu was named in August 1966 by the journal *The Economist*, "the de

Gaulle of Eastern Europe."[25] During this opening toward the West, NATO was perceived

as the opposite of the Warsaw Pact, but its existence was more an abstract representation

of America's interests than a military alliance.

Once again oriented toward the West, it was only in August 1968 that Ceausescu

officially condemned the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact for their military

intervention in Czechoslovakia, remaining true to his incipient policy to resist the

---

[23] Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was head of the Romanian Communist Party, prime minister of Romania (1952–1955), and president of Romania's State Council (1961–1965).

[24] Epideictic rhetoric, or praise and blame rhetoric, is one of the three genres of rhetoric defined by Aristotle. The others are forensic and deliberative rhetoric. *Rhetoric.* Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Vol. 2 of *Complete Works: the Revised Oxford Translation*. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. 2 Vols. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984: Book I, Ch. 3, 1358b.

[25] General Charles de Gaulle (president of France 1959-69) is known among other things for having led the writing of a new constitution founding the Fifth Republic. During his presidency, a new currency was issued, inflation was controlled and industry grew in the difficult year of 1968 when France passed through a crisis. Sulzberger, C L. *The Last of the Giants*. New York: Macmillan, 1970: 14-20.

supremacy of the Soviet Union in Romania.[26] During this period, NATO was perceived

as a friend while the Warsaw Pact was the enemy (even though Romanians were part of

the pact). The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries and violation of

its independence might have created precedence for a similar treatment of Romania. This

time, in Ceausescu's view, the West represents the United States. In early 1969, President

Nixon paid an official visit to Romania, strengthening Ceausescu's orientation toward the

West; the visit was of crucial importance for Romania. Several years later, in 1975, after

long debates in the U.S. Congress, a three-year agreement made Romania the first East

European country to receive special trade status from the United States, and in 1981

bilateral trade reached one billion U.S. dollars. Western leaders believed that Ceausescu

had "the germs of a new Tito: stable, biddable and more interested in local power than

international disruption" (Judt, "Postwar" 431). In reality, Ceausescu was more interested

in gaining absolute power in Romania. He accomplished this by all means in the

following years through intense propaganda, psychological and physical coercion.

Ceausescu's positive image abroad did not last long. Because of continuous reports of

human rights violations in Romania, the U.S. Congress hesitated to renew its most-

favored-nation status.

The second period, from 1971 to 1982 was characterized by an accentuation of

the totalitarian regime with high surveillance of the population by the *Securitate*, a

politization of social life, a centralization of economy and penury of food.[27] Romania

---

[26] Romania did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, even though it was under the Warsaw Pact.

[27] The *Securitate* (Romanian for *Security*) was the secret service of communist Romania that served as the machinery to carry out party decisions and sanctioned whoever opposed Nicolae Ceausescu's rule. Deletant, Dennis. *Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989*. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1995: 20-23.

promoted and strengthened its relations with a new group of countries, including the

People's Republic of China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The prestige of the

communist leader increased, both in the interior and internationally (in these countries),

and contributed to the development of an exacerbated cult of personality. Ceausescu's

domestic policy was marked by the construction of mastodon buildings to nourish this

personality, while the population was starving. People opposing the regime (mainly

intellectuals) were sent to political prisons, where conditions were inhuman and from

where few escaped alive. This time, Ceausescu's rhetoric gravitated around a *langue de

bois* (wooden language) that caused people to either read between the lines of what was

officially written (an enthymematic decipherment of messages) or to distance themselves

from reality.[28] During this period, Ceausescu distanced himself from the West.

The third and last period of Ceausescu's ruling, from 1982 to 1989, was

characterized by drastic restrictions in human rights and freedoms. The economy slowed

down for lack of efficiency, while Ceausescu wanted to exhaust his large foreign debt.

The people were deprived of food and heat during the hard Romanian winters, but forced

to pay ovation to their leader and his wife. While before, Ceausescu intended to orient his

foreign policy toward the Occident, trying to put Romanian security under the American

umbrella, in the 1980s Ceausescu became uncertain about what policy to adopt, which

worsened his relationships with both the USSR and the West. From a rhetorical

standpoint, Ceausescu's official interventions on media and conferences moved farther

from reality. The people trusted no one, as the *Securitate* succeeded in recruiting more

and more informers.

---

[28] A *langue de bois* (French for *wooden language*) is a highly idealistic language that has nothing to do
with reality and artificially promotes a message that is intentionally disguised. The wooden language has
been overused by tyrants worldwide to divert people from the cruel reality they live in (Delporte 15-28).

Romanians' discontent with Ceausescu's late domestic and international policies culminated with the Romanian revolution in December 1989, when Ceausescu and his wife were judged by an ad hoc law-court and sentenced to death. The video of their execution on December 25, 1989 made the tour of the entire world. Ceausescu's dictatorship left a sad legacy to the Romanian people: a profound cultural, political and identity crisis and a poor relationship with both East and West.

E. NATO's Transition toward East

After the end of the Cold War, NATO, whose *raison d'être* was contested once the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, added to its agenda the function of cooperation. Not only did the organization not disappear, as some scholars predicted, but it was resurrected with renewed political and cultural powers that appealed to many Eastern Europeans, and Romanians in particular (Mearsheimer 12-16; Waltz 50-55; Harries 41). NATO's intention to accept new countries from the East (Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe) coincided with Romanians' aspirations to become part of the West. NATO survived and thrived as the "winner's club," the desirability of membership confirmed by a long line of waiting applicant countries. In fact, the various forums of cooperation with its former adversaries from the East (former members of the Warsaw Pact) became NATO's strongest hallmarks in the post-Cold War era (Aybet 68).

In May 1989, at the Brussels summit, just a few months before the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, NATO took its first step toward cooperation with the East, exploring a policy of eastward enlargement to include some new democratic states.

The rush in enlarging its protective shield toward the East was two-sided. First, Benjamin Schwartz argues, NATO's continued existence was due to the fact that the United States, the alliance's indisputable leader, retained a fundamental interest in NATO; it was an instrument exerting the U.S. leadership and influence (71). Second, due to the multiplication of ethnic conflicts in the Balkan region, both the U.S. and Europe were interested in keeping an eye on these conflicting areas; it became more and more important for the big powers to have democratic allies and prosperous business partners.[29]

Advocates of enlargement argued that NATO's enlargement to the East bolstered stability and democracy in Europe and made NATO stronger and better able to address Europe's security challenges (Kissinger 27; Asmus and al. 28-40) and erase Stalin's artificial dividing lines. Opponents of enlargement argued that the enlargement diluted alliance's effectiveness, was too costly, and provoked Russia unnecessarily (Mandelbaum 23).

The transition period that the Eastern European countries have known from 1989 to the present also marked NATO's interest in the East. The definitions of NATO's core functions, as listed in paragraph 20 in its *New Strategic Concept*, were ideologically oriented: (1) to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and the commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes; (2) to serve as a trans-Atlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital allied interests; (3) to deter and

---

[29] Balkan, a synonym for Southern Europe, encompasses "Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and European Turkey." Todorova, Nikolaeva. *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997: 29.

defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state and (4) to preserve the strategic balance in Europe.[30]

In order to promote dialogue and cooperation between NATO and the member states of former Warsaw Pact, NATO also launched new initiatives: (1) the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which is the predecessor of today's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) (2) the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, (3) the NATO-Ukraine Commission, (4) the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and (5) "the open door" policy of enlargement.

NATO added in the London declaration that it would "reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship."[31] Officials from the Clinton administration believed that consolidating democracy and peace in Europe was not only an important strategic interest, but also a broader consequence for America's position in the world; America's interests in Europe and its security transcended communism.

In a speech delivered in September 1993, Anthony Lake declares that in the post-communist Cold War world, America should not only remain engaged but it should lead. In Lake's view, "the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies" (8). Like Lake, former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright argues that the fundamental goal of NATO expansion is to "build for the very first time a *peaceful, democratic and*

---

[30] The text of the new NATO's Strategic Concept was adopted in July 1990, in London. "North Atlantic Council" *NATO's Strategic Concept.* 1990. Web. 15 Mar. 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.
[31] The *London Declaration* was adopted in Paris in November 1990, less than eight months before the Warsaw Pact s formally disbanded in July 1991. "North Atlantic Council". *London Declaration*. July 5-6, 1990, par. 6-8.

undivided transatlantic community" [emphasis added] (19). For most of the Eastern Europeans, and more specifically for Romanians, these renewed NATO functions after the Cold War coincided with their desire to join powerful organizations that would provide for them security and a promise of economic development. At the same time, America's interests in Europe, in New Europe in particular, as illustrated by new NATO concepts, go hand-in-hand with the desire of ex-communist countries for democracy and for a distancing from the communist/Soviet way of living.

F. NATO during the Transition Period in Romania – Imagining the West

In the Romanian society in transition, where history was retold, old myths were resurrected to give a sense of order to the society in crisis and a sense of identity to its people. The Romanians resurrected the myth of salvation to give it new meanings when applied to NATO. Protected by a mythological alliance, Romanians began to feel safe in an unsafe world. With this in mind, they created the image of a new Romania; they began to imagine it, to plan it, to organize it. In this way they gained a sense of order, knowing who was a friend and who was not. They also gained a sense of identity, if only by the sheer fact of being exposed to the same public agenda, NATO: NATO candidacy, NATO integration, NATO salvation, NATO troops' presence in Romania, etc. All these discursive and cultural changes were made possible by a complex process of imaginary.

The feeling of unrest that Romanians had in the transition period is illustrated in the new public discourse characterized as a "non-settled mode to engage history" (Marin,

44

"Introduction" 218). Romanians often go back in the past to find models of heroes and villains they like to identify with or to blame for all the evils and models of societies they would like to live in. As their recent history was a history of dictatorship and there were no viable models to come to light in the present to incarnate their salvation hopes, they looked even farther back in time, to the interwar period (1918-1939) or the Cold War period (1945-1991). However, Romanians' search for heroic figures during the transition period did not resume only to the far history, for Romanians were able to pardon those who had done wrong during the recent dictatorship; they were conscious that everybody was somehow constrained to do what was asked by the rulers. But with all these, Romanians had a difficult time in finding legitimate figures to rule them after the revolution, figures able to offer them real solutions to their problems and not only demagogues that condemned Ceausescu's dictatorship for all the present evils.

It is specifically this rhetoric of transition that allowed the formation of contemporary myths, as they were the symptoms of the crisis in the Romanian society:

> Romanian public sphere offers a symptomatic example of *transition rhetoric*, since its relationship with history collapses open-end questions and episodic rhetorical interjections into historical narratives of legitimation. Revealing unsettled frameworks for rhetoric and history alike, *transition rhetoric* incites multiple and fragmented narratives to engage with rhetorical crisis as seen in current Romanian public sphere. (Marin, "The Other Side(s) of History" 214)

Rhetoric is "the use of language as a symbolic means of *inducing cooperation in beings* that by nature respond to symbols" [emphasis added] (Burke, "A Rhetoric of Motives" 43). Briefly, rhetoric is identification, and in the transition period in Romania, where the sense of national identity was lost, rhetoric found a perfect ground to unfold its discursive values. To this characteristic of identification, Karlyn Campbell and Thomas

Burkholder add five other characteristics that can be found in this thesis when applied to NATO discursive myths: (1) rhetoric is propositional (it is formed of complete sentences), (2) it is problem solving (it invites the audience to feel about an issue and to take action), (3) it is public (because the rhetorical discourse is addressed, it usually concerns social cultural and political questions), (4) it is pragmatic (its intent is to influence behavior) and (5) it is poetic (it influences by "vivid description, figurative language and narrative" the intensity of the response evoked) (4-6). All these characteristics are applied when rhetoric helps in the writing of history and imaginary and vice versa, in a language that addresses people in their contemporaneous concerns.

The role of imaginary in today's political and cultural life is too often underestimated; it is also difficult to draw a line between the real and the not real; real and imaginary mix together endlessly to produce a new reality. In the Romanian transition period imaginary became the favorite ground for people to take their discursive inspiration from, since the reality did not provide any appealing figure. NATO was a mythical construction—the alliance was given roles and virtues that it did not possess in reality. It could not provide solutions for all Romanians issues and it was not an alliance that acted according to religious beliefs (as was thought during Kosovo war). Yet, coming from the past with new meanings, NATO became a mythical figure (of a hero or a villain) that became representative for Romanians post-1989.

Scholars agree that the imaginary has its roots in history and mythology (Boia 31-83; Burke "Ideology and Myth" 195-205; Flood 27-94; Tismanenau, "Fantasies of Salvation" 3-23; Wander 110-111) and that it is filled with different myths—carriers of different, sometimes opposing, ideologies (Kramer 539-576; Burke, "Ideology and Myth"

195-205; Tismaneanu, "Fantasies of Salvation" 3-23). The rhetoric in post-1989 Romania was a complex locus of imbrications of "history, memory, discourse, and collective identity" as a result of a conjunction of rhetoric and politics, of private and public and of time and space (Tismaneanu, "Fantasies of Salvation" 13). This rhetoric called for a "re-invention of arguments from history and collective memory, on the fragile notion of legitimacy for heroes and villains alike" (Marin, "Introduction" 210). In other words, the newly freed Romanian society began the search for new values and a new social contract, and NATO myths came to satisfy this search. Romanians who wanted to believe in a savior found a common vocabulary around the NATO myth of salvation; those who wanted to identify with the image of a common enemy could see NATO as a conspirator, guilty of all evils. The more moderate ones could "objectively" notice what NATO could do for Romania as well as what Romania could do for the alliance.

For Romanians, the issue of NATO membership has, alongside political and economic dimensions, a psychological dimension rooted in Romania's history and multiple experiences. Since Yalta (1945), have Romanians waited "for the Americans to come" and save them from communism and perhaps all evils. Thus, admission to NATO after the end of Cold War was perceived as one of the proofs of America's arrival and its good intentions. America, and the stories that circulated about it, created in Romanians' imaginary a myth, a fascination, a hope—the hope of "the promised land." While Romanians had a hard time reaching the promised land, the Americans could come to Romania and teach the locals and their leaders how to transform the country into a land of hope. The opening towards other countries that came with the end of communism was

the best occasion to get to know the Americans, and NATO's interest in Romania in the 1990s was the perfect opportunity to make their hopes come true.

Despite Romania's position as the second largest country of Central and Eastern Europe (after Poland), in territory, population and military potential, Romanians suffer from a myriad of history-induced anxieties and phobias due to their country's positioning at the crossroads of Western, Slavic (Eastern), and Middle Eastern cultures. Two of the most recent phobias are the fear (although declining) of Russia, perceived as a constant threat, and of the Hungarian attempts to regain Transylvania. To these fears Romanians have added a constant feeling of victimization, of being played as a pawn by the great powers beginning with Yalta treaty. For Romanians, a way to surpass these fears was to enter the big European and Atlantic families. Integration into Europe and NATO was for them a promise of external and internal security.

Above all, Romanians expressed an enormous desire to be considered an equal partner by Western nations (Europe and America)—as civilized, advanced and "good" as they were. These expectations were derived perhaps to some degree from the memories of Romania's prosperity during the period of the French myth between the two world wars. Romanians also believed they played an important role in maintaining the Latinism and civilization among Slavic and Turkish barbarians.

Europe, like NATO, was for post-revolution Romanians more of a myth than a reality—a projected image of their minds. Europe was "not so much a place as an idea, a peaceful, prosperous, international community of shared interests and collaborating parts; a 'Europe of the mind,' of human rights, of the free movement of goods, ideas and persons, of ever-greater cooperation and unity" (Judt, "A Grand Illusion?" 3). A western

48

identity became a cultural creed for Romanians—and one should not neglect the power of culture in the identification process of a nation for "[w]e are, in sum, incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish ourselves through culture" (Geertz 49).

To move towards the West meant for Romanians to choose a path different than other Balkan countries, [32] for "as a whole, Balkanness is a deprecatory category to which Romanians rarely allude" (Todorova 49). The perception of the Balkan countries in the West was not one that favored Romanians' desire for accession to the civilized world (Europe and America):

> Because the geographic east of Europe and the world situated to the east was lagging behind Europe primarily in economic performance, East came to be identified more often, and often exclusively, with industrial backwardness, lack of advanced social relations and institutions typical for the developed capitalist West, irrational and superstitious cultures unmarked by Western Enlightenment. (Todorova 11)

To be a Westerner meant for Romanians a certain cultural and economic superiority to the Balkans, even though these beliefs were created through a mythological process during the communist years of cultural isolationism: "It was us, the Eastern Europeans, who invented 'Europe,' constructed it, dreamed about it, called upon it. This Europe is a myth created by us, not only Bosnians, but other Eastern Europeans, too—unfortunate outsiders, poor relatives, the infantile nations of our continent" (Drakulić 212). As they were isolated for so long within the borders of their country, Romanians could only invent or "imagine" Europe; Drakulić's account is revelatory:

> So, what does Europe mean in the Eastern European imagination? . . . It is something distant, something to be attained, to be deserved. It is also something expensive and fine: good cloths, the certain look and smell of

---

[32] Todorova suggests that some Romanian intellectuals versed in Romanian history do not agree with the categorization of Romania in the family of Balkan country due to some pejorative connotations given to the term Balkanization (a culture of laziness, of fragmentation and division, of hostility and non-cooperativeness between regions and of institutionalized corruption (47).

> its people. Europe is plenitude: food, cars, light, everything – a kind of festival colours, diversity, opulence, beauty. It offers choice: from shampoo to political parties. It represents freedom of expression. It is a promised land, a new Utopia, a lollipop. (12)

For Romanians as for other Eastern Europeans, Western Europe was a sheer imagined community where everything was superior to what they knew. The West was more about cultural traditions than anything else; it promised choice when the communist East did not.

Drakulić's emotional book, *Café Europa,* shares this author's feelings about being "the poor relative" of Western Europe. It is a poetic declaration of Drakulić's desire to belong to the West, an imagined West, because the real one did not seem to always be the best place to live for an Easterner. Apparently Romanians, like Bulgarians, Serbs and other Eastern Europeans, had "good reasons to believe that 'core' Europe sees them as outsiders (when it sees them at all)—alternate between defensively asserting their ur-European characteristics (in literature, architecture, topography, etc.) or else acknowledging the hopelessness of their cause and fleeing West" (Judt, "Postwar" 754).

The discriminatory way Western Europe treated immigrants coming from Eastern Europe caused them a lot of frustration. Not finding the promised land in Western Europe, people from the East began to dream about other models of society they would like to live in, and the most appealing one became America. In addition, integration into European Union soon after the revolution seemed almost impossible for Eastern European countries with "their fragile legal and financial institutions" or "their convalescent economies" under the strict fiscal rules and regulations imposed by the Union (Judt, "Postwar" 716). In these conditions, Europe became an inaccessible reality

for Romanians, even if after the fall of communism, the Old Continent remained still a fascinating lure.

Eventually, the American cultural and political values prevailed over the European ones. If communism perpetuated the French myth because the access to French culture was one of the few openings toward West that Romanians were allowed, today it is difficult to resist "the massive infusion of American mythology (which can be found at all levels, including everyday life, from American music and films to Coca-Cola and McDonalds restaurants)" (Boia 169).

Increasingly the young generation expressed itself more fluently in English than in French. A questionnaire on the countries the Romanians appreciated most in 1999 gives the following percentages: USA 26.9, Germany 18.8, France 8.8, Italy 6.8, Switzerland 5.2, Britain 3.2.[33] The United States was starting to overtake France in terms of what it offered the Romanians by way of cultural model, and in terms of its effective presence in the Romanian space.

The United States showed interest in the newly liberated countries, while Europe treated them with superiority. The Maastricht treaty, [34] the basis for the formation of European Union has at least one significant side-effect:

> the unforeseen boost it gave to NATO. Under the restrictive terms of the Treaty it was clear (as the French at least had intended) that the newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe could not possibly join the European Union in the immediate future. . . . Instead, it was suggested in the corridors of Brussels that Poland, Hungary and their neighbors might be offered early membership of NATO as a sort of compensation: an interim

---

[33] The results of the polls conducted by Metro Media Transylvania, one of Romania's major survey institutes, are published in the magazine *Oameni in Top*, no. 4. October 1999: 93-97.

[34] The Maastricht Treaty, formally the Treaty on European Union, is an international agreement approved by the heads of government of the states of the European Community (EC) in Maastricht, Netherlands, in December 1991. Ratified by all EC member states, the treaty was signed on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993 and established a European Union (EU), with EU citizenship granted to every person who was a citizen of a member state (Baun 4-6).

prize. The symbolic value of extending NATO in this way was obviously considerable, which is why it was immediately welcomed in the new candidate member-states. (Judt, "Postwar" 716)

Being in a crisis, Romania needed the kind of "symbolic values" Judt talks about, because for Romanians the interest shown by a big power became a symbolic promise for salvation. Integration into NATO was part of the American dream for Romanians, at least immediately after the revolution of 1989 when the European myth seemed too far away. America proved more astute in foreseeing the cultural and political role of New Europe in the world in general and in Old Europe in particular; as a consequence it rushed to give these countries a metaphorical helping hand by acceptance into NATO when Europe considered them too risky to invest in. This gesture was much appreciated by Eastern Europeans, and Romanians specifically, in the difficult period of transition.

a) The Mythical Mobilization of Romanian People

Communism left Romanians with pell-mell cultures, ideologies and interpretations of history, which gave them a feeling of insecurity. The conditions for the settlement of a new ideology were there: Romanians were ready to adopt the new Western ideology that included a democratic cultural and political orientation with a developing civil society, the rule of law and a new meritocratic social system.[35]

One generation of ideology will have to start from *processes of change in the structure of a given society and in its relationships to its natural environment and to*

---

[35] Burke defines ideology as "the system of ideas that constitute a political or a social doctrine and inspire the acts of a government or party" ("Ideology and Myth" 195).

other societies. It is *these changes* that *constitute the material determination of the rise of ideologies.*" [emphasis in the original] (Therborn 43). The way a people know people from other societies, and Romanians are no different in this regard, is very often through the lens of ideology, "a specious way of relating to the world. It offers human beings the illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality while making it easier for them to *part* with them" (Havel, "The Power of the Powerless" 28). Ideology's function is to present the individual with the illusion that the system is in harmony with the human order, but is in fact "a veil behind which human beings can hide their own 'fallen existence,' their trivialization, and their adaptation to the *status quo*" (Havel, "The Power of the Powerless" 29).

As vicious as the ideology is that gives an individual the impression that his/her ideas (or the ideas of the ideology they follow) is the best, it is capable of offering individuals a sense of belonging. Burke suggests that ideology, like rhetoric, gravitates to the side of ideas, while myth, like poetry, gravitates to the side of image ("Ideology and Myth" 195). The image and the idea (ideology) juxtapose to form a whole that has even more rhetorical powers over the people than the two elements taken apart. Kenneth Burke asks, rhetorically:

> But we can see the overlap between idea and image quickly enough, if we think, for instance, of the invitation to treat of international affairs in terms of life-lines, soft underbellies, iron curtains, and power vacuums. Are such expressions 'ideas' or 'images', rhetoric or poetry? Are they ideological or mythic? ("Ideology and Myth" 195)

From Burke's account, one can conclude that the matters of international politics are highly ideological and mythic, for they align image and idea to create discursive rhetorical devices that make people move in a certain political/cultural direction.

Romanians' frustration for being placed on the wrong side of Europe at Yalta—and the image of an impenetrable iron curtain that covers their country and does not allow them to see what is behind it—are very suggestive in showing how profound these ideological projections are and how they function.

Burke suggests two ways of aligning the political (ideological) with the non-political (mythical). The political often uses the mythical as its "pre-political" source, where unconscious motives unfold (e.g., Caesar was the figure of a Roman savior, like NATO is a savior figure for Romanians) and the non-political, in order to be the ideal myth, "must give us the new vision, and not merely in its purity . . . but in its ideological implications as well" ("Ideology and Myth" 203). The unconscious motives around the "fabrication" of a new vision, of NATO myths, stems from Romanians' need to regain a sense of identity through new, shared ideals.

Burke declares that for a myth to become the ideal myth of today and to legitimize present ideologies, it needs to meet a few characteristics ("Ideology and Myth" 203-204). The ideal myth of today (1) must establish and support the cult of the region—Romania is involved in a permanent mythological construction of her West/East regional orientation, with NATO myths West being the winner; (2) must establish vital interconnection between the modern world and the past—the NATO ideograph takes its roots in Romania from the mythical figures of saviors; (3) must celebrate the great deeds of heroes in battle, and council, and government—NATO is a Cold War winner and the Americans have already saved Europe once; (4) must connect its figures with larger and more august issues (human destiny)—NATO is an alliance that promises peace in the world; (5) must look towards a new regime of peace, justice, development and

reconstruction—NATO is a carrier of the American democracy values and (6) must offer the features of an ideal citizen—NATO promises freedom of the individual and the formation of a civil society that has the power to change the status quo. These characteristics apply to NATO myth, and one can say without any doubt that NATO has become the ideal myth of today's Romania.

People are linked to ideology through ideological carriers such as political elites, education and the media, by which they accept to be guided, and whom they follow in their ideological decisions. Ideology addresses an audience, a "[mass] consciousness" that is always false, because "'truth' in politics [and in culture], no matter how firmly we believe, is always an illusion. The falsity of an ideology is specifically rhetorical, for the illusion of truth and falsity with regards to normative commitments is the product of persuasion" (McGee, "The Ideograph" 427). The Romanian post-revolutionary society needs to ideologically mobilize in order to change what Romanians consider to be an outdated ideology instilled by the Stalinist views of Ceausescu. This mobilization aims at the adoption of NATO discursive myths that help Romanians to form a civil society capable of bringing change in a democratic way.

Therborn talks about different kinds of cultural/ideological mobilizations that can be applied to Romanian society after 1989, and more specifically to NATO myths (121-123). First, Romanians experienced a "mobilization by revival" with values and beliefs of the past that enter into the order of the day. The myth of besieged fortress called for external salvation, the myth of salvation materialized into NATO integration, and the myth of conspiracy called for an ideological alignment with the neighbor Yugoslav.

Second, Romanians mobilized their cultural forces "by anticipatory fear" of a potential Russian threat and a Hungarian population willing to separate from Romania and ask for its autonomy. NATO was seen as a salvation in both cases. Romanians' mobilization aimed at a force that was strong enough to protect them from these menaces, and NATO was such a force.

Finally, Romanian population knew an ideological "mobilization by example," where America and NATO presented a different example of society than the known ones. These ideological/cultural mobilizations made Romanians gather under the same interests, under the same cause, and it was through identification with a cause that ideology contributed to the individual's sense of identity. That unique cause was to find someone or something coming from the past that could offer a solution to the potential Russian threat, to the potential separation of the Hungarians from the mother country and to other still unknown perils. While history and myth give people a sense of identity through a coherent narrative of the past, culture does it through the belief in shared values. Ideology, history, myth and culture are all rhetorical strategies using the persuasive functions of the language.

Neither the interwar years, nor the communist and Cold War periods can be represented in a single, coherent image in Romania. In an attempt to bring more light on how Romanians created identity in the unsettled period of transition and to comprehend how the creation of a myth like NATO was possible in the first place, one should expose the importance of myths and show which of the myths that pass the test of history are successfully reactivated in post-revolutionary Romania.

As far as Romanian history in the transition period is concerned, the cultural orientations of Romanians have played out, and will probably continue to be played out for a while, around two opposite "myths" that have their roots in the past: salvation and conspiracy with autochthonous nuances and combinations. History and myth are closely related and they both present a fluent narrative that comes to present and legitimize different cultural and political attitudes. "What we usually call history is our discourse about history, the image, inevitably incomplete, simplified and distorted, of the past, which the present never ceases to recompose" (Boia 27). The recomposed and distorted image of the past should not be analyzed by the degree of objectivity or subjectivity that it contains. Rather, one should look at the process of the history that becomes a solid ground for people to find ideal models or myths that can help a society to overcome a crisis.

For most Romanians after communism, going back and forth into history became a freedom game; history was no longer imposed on them, it was more an open book offered by the ancestors to be modified, completed and transformed at will. They did not know to what degree communism modified history to transform it into a tool for propaganda. Now, after 1989, Romanians are able to view history as "history-as-nostalgia" that can provide them idyllic images about their youth, about the good old times and the Golden Age of their country (Judt, "Postwar" 768).

Due to the cultural diversification that Romania knows today (and the world in general), the interpretation of the past, too, has become multiple and diversified. In Romania, like in the rest of the Central and Eastern Europe, history seems to be "merely raw material to be recycled to produce daily myths. It is rewritten over and over again—

indeed, in the last decade by the very same people" (Drakulić 185). Romanians seem to easily allow themselves to be subjugated by history, or "rather by the mythologies constructed upon imaginary," and this seems to be a characteristic of societies in transition (Boia 238).

After 1989 Romanians were in a fervent search for "a superior picture, something they could pledge their loyalty to, serve, obey like good children," an ideal picture that only myth could provide, for myth has the capacity to offer the reality one wants to believe in (Konrad 101- 102). Throughout the Romanian transformation period, people relinquished hope for external salvation. The Romanian leaders and media often offered solutions by digging in the history for old mythologies able to give people hope.

The junction of story and myth is one of the constitutive conditions of history, "not in the sense of one of possible narratives about the past but as a people's lived, shared, and felt sense of meaningful temporal existence as a, certain kind of, 'congregation'" (Ornatowski 193). In post-communist Romania, the myth, with its capacity of offering people a fluent and credible narrative of history, succeeded in reuniting Romanians around the same gestalt (gestalt theory emphasizes that the whole is greater than its parts).

The myth is "an ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essentials by a social group" (Flood 44). Myth is a form of ideological discourse, for it offers its believers (a myth has its believers, unbelievers, and those who remain indifferent) a credible representation of perceived realities that people accept as permanent fixed knowledge of reality forgetting they create this reality in the first place.

NATO was the imaginary creation of Romanian people that stood for reality for a long time, and at some moments was the only "reality" that counted for them (for example, when they were striving to integrate the alliance).

Myths are permanent features of the human spirit, organizations and interpretations of the reality that are historically determined, and their form never changes. They have always the same carrier of symbolism; only the times and the places where they reactivate give them specificity (Flood 14; Lévi-Strauss 40). Having a universal meaning, in the sense that they are common to any type of human community, they mix with each other continually and their content adjusts to the changing society. In transition-period Romania, two myths have mixed around NATO—salvation and conspiracy. Their constitutive discursive form came from history to give a sense of order to the present, i.e., to offer a coherent vocabulary of concepts shared by the majority of population.

Myth came to compensate for the need for order and coherence in the Romanians' space of transition, for cultural and political identification. From the fading cultural landmarks and mythologies inherited from the past, some of them held the rhetorical strength to be resurrected imbued with new meanings. Among the old myths, some transgressed communism in order to give a sense of relief and order to a disoriented society of transition.

To further define the myth and its social function, one should follow the story the myth conveys:

> The story told by a myth – in this case, the political myth – is rooted in beliefs, aspirations, deep expectations, hopes, frustrations, illusions and disillusions. All ideologies have a mythological core, but in addition they build up conceptual edifices . . . to endow the individual with a *sense of*

identity and an orientation in the disjointed world" [emphasis added] (Tismaneanu, "Fantasies of Salvation").

Myth plays a major role in connecting people, in a "social reinsertion" of individuals, and plays a role of "psychological shake-up," touching people emotionally more than rationally (Girardet 95). However, myth cannot be described as bare emotion because it is the expression of an emotion. The expression of a feeling is not the feeling itself—it is emotion turned into an image making "what hitherto was dimly and vaguely felt [to] assume a definite shape; what was a passive state becomes an active process" (Cassirer 43). The emotion as an active force is stirred by the imaginary more easily than by reality; "great masses are much easily moved by the force of imagination than by sheer physical force" (Cassirer 289).

Myth induces action by transcribing "the irrational in the language of the intelligible" and by helping the permanent re/construction of reality (Girardet 23). Reality is, above all, a "scarce resource," and as such "it is there to be struggled over, allocated to various purposes and projects, endowed with given meanings and potential, spent and conserved, rationalized and distributed. The fundamental form of power is the power to define, allocate and display this resource" (Carey, "Media, Myths" 87). Following this logic, myth then becomes a powerful resource, where reality and imaginary intermingle, making the narrative it proposes all the more appealing to the people.

What myths can also do, is to make people feel less guilty for the possible problems a society confronts, to bring them a sense of relief in difficult times. Talking about time, myth offers its believer a means of relating to the passage of time, giving the feeling that what they want to keep in memory can be eternal for "the future will remain

faithful to the present and to the past" (Lévi-Strauss, "Myth and Meaning" 43). Myth then

is a promise to eternity, and time is only a mere guidance in the maze-like structure of it;

this function of myth makes it last forever in the minds of people. Myth that apparently

has a past-oriented structure is especially anchored in the present. "Often focused on the

past, the new mythologies are actually discourses about the present and especially the

future of post-communist societies" (Tismaneanu, "Fantasies of Salvation" 15).

Romanians are *par excellence* people that have a "time-binding culture," with interests in

time as history, as continuity, as permanence and contraction (Carey, "Media, Myths"

160). Myth and history overlap to a certain degree as both offer accounts that are believed

by the majority of people and that give a sense of identity (individual, cultural, national,

etc).

The history Romanians know is a multifaceted one, since everybody has a

different interpretation of events and since communism is reinterpreting the history in a

way to help the leaders to keep the people submitted. From the large palette of

mythological narratives, three resurged from the past to help Romanians organize their

present and to accept or reject NATO as a salvation figure: the besieged fortress, the

savior, and the conspiracy.

b) Local Myths and NATO

Romania's geographical position between the developed Western Europe, the

bellicose Slavic and poor Balkans countries, all with different cultures and languages,

influences a great deal the country's history. Romanians always believed there was an

outside enemy ready to attack, they always feared losing their sovereignty to some barbarians and developed an obsession with the myth of the besieged fortress. "The pressure of foreigners from outside and from within, real up to a point but hyperbolized in the national imaginary, generated the complex of the *besieged fortress* which is so typical of the Romanian mentality of the last two centuries" (Boia 155). There was always an enemy within and outside of the society that was concocting evil plots to destroy the country, especially the Hungarians who had a visible cultural and political minority in Romania. But the country heroically resisted all attempts to undermine its independence and more than that, stopped the evil within its borders.

Furthermore, Romanians think, thorough the lens of their historical sacrifices (especially referring to the Ottoman invasion that was stopped at Romanian borders) that the West is what it is today because of their sacrifice. The image of the West protected thanks to Romanian sacrifice has another underlying image of a Romanian society held back because it fulfilled the function of defender of European civilization. Thus, the West has a debt which it has not yet repaid. "The Romanians should receive, not give. In view of this debt, any failing of the West is perceived as betrayal" (Boia 156). NATO, representing the West, should then speed up Romania's admission, since Romanians should receive help from outside as a natural reward for their historical efforts.

Romania needs external salvation, yet the image of what the savior looks like was very blurred in the first years of freedom. This image became clearer immediately after the word "integration" (into NATO or the E.U.) invaded the public vocabulary in the 1990s and was carried on by both media and elites to divert the attention from a stagnant, unproductive political and cultural situation. Integration into NATO and Europe became

a salvation for Romanians because the failure of communism generated a new process of the mythologizing of the West and the whole non-communist world (now Romanians had access to the West indirectly by the media). After 1989, Romanians could invent stories at will, and one story that was particularly appealing was the one about the West (represented by NATO and the E.U.) as a possible salvation.

For Romanians, the transition period offered few models of salvation figures at a local level. If Romanians put their hopes in the first government after the revolution, grouping members from the National Salvation Front party (*Frontul Salvării Naționale*) led by Ion Iliescu, they soon became disappointed. NSF and President Iliescu kept practically authoritarian actions, despite an official rhetorical commitment to democratic principles.[36]

For a short period of time, Romanians put their hopes of a better life in King Michael the First (from the Hohenzollern family), who could offer an alternative type of government, the monarchy. On December 24, 1990, the king was officially allowed to visit Romania (for a private visit on the occasion of winter holidays), but the government ruled by Iliescu[37] and the NSF organized an ambuscade on the highway from the airport to Bucharest, had the police escort the king back to the airport, and asked him to leave the country. On April 23, 1992, the king returned for the Orthodox Easter and was enthusiastically received by a large segment of the population. Following this triumphant visit, due to a fear of the rise in popularity of the democratic opposition that was supporting the royal house, and of monarchy, the king was denied another visit by the

---

[36] Tismaneanu calls Ion Iliescu in *Stalinism for all Seasons* a "neo-communist" who had different leading positions under Ceausescu, as minister of youth and secretary of the Romanian Communist Party in charge of ideology (242).

[37] Ion Iliescu was the president of Romania from 1990-1996 and 2000-2004.

same government. However, after King Michael was allowed to enter freely Romania and to have a Romanian passport a few years later (1997), people's interest in the monarchy declined and so did the myth. It was believed that the king came to Romania only to take back his properties.

Another salvation figure coming from inside Romania was the democratic government elected in 1996 and its leaders, but because of the economic effects on the population, who had been called to tighten their belts for a short term, this alternative lasts for only four years. Afterwards Romanians returned their votes toward the same government ruled by Ion Iliescu.

As a consequence of this lack of internal hero-figures, Romanians looked for most serious and long lasting salvation alternatives outside their country. At this time, Euro-Atlantic integration offered the most promising salvation for Romania, but of course, not all Romanians considered it that way. Some thought NATO and Europe interests in Romania were part of the big powers' plans to subjugate little countries, to control their resources and their people. This sends us to another myth dear to Romanians: the conspiracy myth.

The myth of conspiracy is very present in the political-historical imaginary, and all the more in the context of Romanian transition society, given the already mentioned complex of the citadel under siege. More recently, the impact of communist ideology and behavior has made Romanians particularly "sensitive to the theme of the plot from outside or within" (Boia 175).

Some of the inside conspirators during the transition period in Romania were: the invisible terrorist of December 1989 (there is no proof of the existence of exterior forces

that participate in the Romanian events of 1989, less of potential terrorists on Romanian territory), and the "hooligans" of the demonstrations in the University Square and those manipulating them.[38] Other internal conspirators included the ever-present former *Securitate*, the Hungarians who wanted to claim their independence and create a state within the state, the king who wanted to regain Romania for his personal interests, the gypsies (unable to "adjust" to the Romanian culture) and the Jews (that were ruling Romania from the shadows).

Exterior conspirators for Romanians after 1989 included the great powers Yalta and Malta,[39] the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its Soviet correspondent, the KGB. (Boia 237). In such a complex ideological context, the savior becomes a necessity to purge the society of all these scourges. The savior generally comes only after the Conspirator is lynched (Ceausescu was one such a figure, a conspirator that destroyed a nation for personal purposes), so the society finds its rest. However, in societies in transition the mutation of a savior into a conspirator is possible, making the myth (and ideology) even stronger. The myth of conspiracy had continuity in the Romanian imaginary after 1989, and it applied to NATO during the Kosovo war. A NATO conspiracy myth encompasses part of these previously mentioned mythologies, but because NATO meant also salvation and integration was not yet completed, NATO's image was very quickly rehabilitated.

---

[38] The demonstrations between April 22 and June 1990 in University Square, Bucharest, were initiated as a result of a popular discontent with the post-revolutionary political evolution and were directed toward the government led by Iliescu. The demonstrations were violently stopped by the miners called by the president in the capital of Romania. Nicolau, I. *Piata Universitatii.* Bucarest: Edit Nemira, 1997: 5-12.
[39] In 1989 Malta hosted a summit between U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which was supposed to signal the end of the Cold War. Maynes, Charles William. "America without the Cold War." *Foreign Policy* No. 78 (Spring, 1990): 3.

Chapter 3: Romania and Girardet's Political Myths

This chapter analyzes the myth of salvation and conspiracy using Raoul
Girardet's methodology developed in his book, *Mythe et Mythologies Politiques*
(Political Myth and Mythologies). There are four mythological categories of
contemporary political myths with a very persuasive force, Girardet argues: the
Conspiracy, the Salvation, the Golden Age, and the Unity (12). Each of them reactivates
in different periods in time.

Chapter Three also presents NATO myths and the characteristic of the myths of
salvation and conspiracy as theorized by Girardet, who believes that there are different
periods of time in which the myths reactivates, lives and then fades into history to be
resurrected when needed again. The chapter also examines the roles of myth in general
and the role of media in the mythmaking process. It presents the different times of the
myth that evolves from hope, longing, despair, disappointment to satisfaction, thrill and
ecstasy as the integration succeeds; but the deepest the disappointment, the more
delicious the success.

The NATO discursive myths of salvation and conspiracy are rhetorically possible
because of specific cultural interpretations of the organization of societies in transition
(not only as a military alliance, but as a cultural organization bearing mythological

loading). NATO—perceived as a repository and defender of security against a potential

Soviet threat, as an organization of shared political ideals, of growth toward unity, a

West-East political forum, an instrument of human rights and diplomacy, a bearer of

prosperity and democracy—gave Romanians a sense of order and relief in a moment of

deep social, cultural and political distress.

In the fragmented society after 1989, NATO myths provided Romanians with the

same agenda and gathered their forces in the name of the same ideal: NATO acceptance

and Western recognition. In other words, the NATO myths offered Romanians a new

shared sense of identity, even if sometimes they had different perceptions of the alliance.

If some Romanians saw NATO as a salvation for Romania, others portrayed the alliance

as a villain that had evil interest in the country. Identification works in both directions: in

the construction of a hero as well as in the construction of a common foe (Burke, "A

Grammar of Motives" 6). In both cases, people have a deformed image of the reality (or

the perceived reality), and they tend to invent stories that will confirm their belief.

NATO myths can only have opposing meanings (in a short period of time—from

1989 to 1999 when the Kosovo war started) in a society in transition, where the villain

can become overnight a hero and vice versa because of the cultural versatility of such

societies. Lacking a stable figure to identify with, and confused about the puzzling

messages media sends them, Romanians were in a constant process of hero and villain

fabrication through a process of mythologizing the past.

The analysis of NATO discursive myths of salvation and conspiracy focuses on

certain speeches and texts (such as presidential addresses, official declarations, and

NATO official press releases) and print media articles that had the greatest social impact

during the transition period. [40] These texts stirred controversy when they appeared and were the subject of deliberation, making them act as a unifying force. The media articles studied in this thesis appear in some of the most prominent daily Romanian newspapers with large national circulation, such as *Evenimentul Zilei* (The Event of the Day),150,000 copies, and *Adevarul* (The Truth) with 87,000 copies.[41] However, the purpose of this study is not to offer a quantitative analysis of the articles that appear in these journals; the method of analysis consists of a close textual analysis (by looking at how the text impacts the audience) using print media articles and the discourses above-mentioned, in order to create a mapping of NATO myths and meanings in Romania.

The nearest approach to "reality" available for most of us in modern times is through media. When we talk about countries and their cultures we cannot approach them in terms of living; that is why we use "ideological" when thinking of other nations, groups, organizations, etc. (Burke, "Ideology and Myth"195). In this perspective, we only form ideas about a country, we cannot know how it is to live there; we only give meanings to symbols that are maneuvered by the media. We are thus exposed to myths and ideologies that circulate in media discourses; some of these myths are completely fabricated by the media.

Romania's post-revolutionary years have been characterized by a slow, convoluted and uneven process of adopting democratic values tied to historical patterns. "It is not simply a matter of lifting censorship and holding competitive elections, but

---

[40] The use of the Internet as a medium for information by private users made its way in the Romanian society only recently, starting in 1993-1994, and booming after 1996. Buraga, Sabin. *Web Technologies*. 2007. November 1, 2010, <http://thor.info.uaic.ro/~lavinia/SUPORTURI%20DE%20CURS%20IDD/SEMESTRUL%20II/AN%20II/SabinBuraga-TehnologiiWeb.pdf.>

[41] These circulation rates are based on a current estimation, but I consider that after 1989, these journals had an even higher circulation rate, with the Internet being at its debut as a source of information.

involves the transformation of many political institutions—including the mass media—and of the relationship among political, social and economic institutions" (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 184). While a lot of scholars admit the role of the media in propagating important information for a people, the scholars of societies in transition recognize the centrality of print media role in "educating and informing the citizenry" (Stark 32).

During the dictatorship era in Romania, the unique party and the media formed the unique propagandistic vehicle that controlled people. Romanians' trust in politics and media only diminished through the years to culminate years before the revolution of 1989, when people's distrust touched paroxysm. Before 1989, a major daily journal presented the news related to the party and the public television, which ran for only a few hours daily, praising the father and mother of the nation. Consequently, there is no surprise that during Ceausescu's leadership, Romanian media had no active role in perpetuating culture or offering identification models. During the Revolution of 1989, we witness the formation of a new image of the Romanian media in the public sphere, beginning with the live media broadcast of the revolution and the execution of the communist couple (Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife). Since 1989 the public has formed opinions and attitudes on the basis of information offered by a media entity that gradually increases in viewership and outreach, filling in the role of a mythmaker.

Together with the intellectual elite, the media plays a tremendous role in creating and maintaining the myths alive and active. In transition countries, the media plays a role of mythmaker and people tend to trust media messages more than ever, as the press, television and radio are viewed as the only distributors and creators of information

(Coman "Media Bourgeoisie" 15-28; Hallin and Papathanasopoulos 175-195; Cornfield 180-204; Stark 28-44).

In the fragmented world after the fall of communism in the countries comprising Central and Eastern Europe, people had a selective memory of events. Used for so many years to a discourse of domination, it took time for the public to adjust to a new reality, that of being able to have a voice in the public sphere. Not very different from the discourse before 1989, domination occurred through "the construction and maintenance of a particular order of discourse . . . [and] the deployment of non-discursive affirmations and sanctions," but this is true for democratic societies too (Therborn 82). This order of discourse was imposed after the revolution by the media (especially by the print media) that became a loyal delegate of the audience. The Romanian public had for the first time freedom of speech and freedom of choice in regard to access to the media (to choose from hundreds of newspapers, for example).[42] The politicians in this scenario needed to adjust their agenda on the public agenda imposed by a demanding audience.

In the rush of gaining popularity, both media and politicians engaged in a race for finding competing solutions to satisfy a nauseated yet hopeful society; they often offered solutions that combined elements from both the past and the present under the form of myths, hence becoming the redoubtable mythmakers of the transition period.

---

[42] In 1989 there were 36 daily newspapers and 459 newspapers with lower frequency. In 1990 there were 65 daily newspapers and 1379 other publications, in 1993 there were 100 daily newspapers and 987 periodical publications, and in 1995 there were 73 daily newspapers and 1059 periodical publications. *Anuarul Statistic al Romaniei* (The Statistics Yearbook*)*, The National Statistic Institute. 1996. Web. 10 Mar. 2011. http://www.insse.ro/cms/rw/pages/index.ro.do.

A. NATO the Savior - The Romanian Candidacy

to NATO Integration

For the Romanian society, after 1989, the imminent danger was a comeback of communism. The communist rulers who took power in December 1989 preferred the solution of a slow and incomplete reform and continued to rely on nationalist reflexes, opening only little by little the country towards the West, leaving the population even more confused than before the revolution.

Impoverished and angry by a defective reform submitted to mythological nostalgia, the majority of Romanians dreamed of exterior solutions, waiting for a savior. They needed a father figure to gather around, to reconstruct an identity lost in the dark years of dictatorship. Romanians realized that it was a prime time for them to change their lives and culture, to aspire to freedom and to a new identity of which they could be proud. They looked for salvation in their recent history, and for a short time they thought they had found the corresponding image, but this finding was just a form of sanctioning the rulers. [43]

They eventually found a hero from outside that could match their elevated expectations—the Americans that once saved the Old Continent could now save a small country like Romania. Romanians needed someone active, with modern ideas, a powerful figure that could materialize their hopes. America/NATO represented just that: "The

---

[43] Romanians' support for the returning king, Michael the First, can be interpreted more as a reaction to the violation of the king's right to visit his country than a real backup of him as a salvation figure. Popescu, Daniela. *Le Mythe Du Bouc Emissaire Dans La Presse D'Extreme Droite Roumaine*. Germany: Editions Universitaires Europeennes, 2011: 25.

vigor, the force and prosperity of America are reference points. Many Romanians would like their country to be the same."[44]

NATO and the European Union have been perceived differently by different countries through the lenses of their own cultures (and hence interpretations). For Eastern Europeans, they are a pretext for imagination, a beautiful dream, more of an idea than the projection of a certain reality. This is, Americans know that NATO is not the military organization that Romanians fantasize about; it is an idea in permanent creation in which the people put their hopes and try to incarnate their dreams. NATO is a projection of a savior that comes when no pertinent solution to their problems is to be found.

It is essential to understand how the passage from the historical to a mythical state is done—this mysterious process of savior fabrication that succeeds the transmutation of the real and its absorption in imaginary. This process, as Raoul Girardet informs us, is laid out in three successive periods, different in affective tone. First there is the time of waiting and of calling; a time when the image of a savior "forms and is diffused, crystallizing around it the collective expression of a whole, often blurred—of hopes, nostalgia and dreams" (Girardet 82). The first time corresponds in this research with the period Romania strove to integrate into NATO, until the proper integration—from 1989 to 2004, with a focus on 2002 when Romania received a formal invitation to join the alliance.

A second time is the time of the presence, of a savior, finally in blood and bones, with which the course of the history is about to be accomplished. At this stage, the "volitional manipulation weighs heavy in the process of mythical elaboration"; in other

[44] Traian Basescu has been president of Romania from 2004 to the present. Basescu, Traian. Speech. *229th Commemoration of the Independence Day*. United States Embassy. Bucharest, 5 July 2005.

words, Romanians expected to be manipulated and even wanted to be manipulated in the direction of NATO mythical construction (Girardet 82).

The third time, the memory time, expels the image of the savior back in the past, where his perception "will be modified through the agency of the ambiguous games of the memory, of its selective mechanisms, of its pushback and amplifications" (Girardet 82). This time can completely transform the perception of the savior and make it add up the traits of a villain. This can be a period when the savior becomes a conspirator. It is also possible at this stage that the image of the savior falls into oblivion and is resurrected when needed (in our case, when NATO becomes the big fighter of the war on terror). This third time, people's rhetorical enthusiasm tempers down and a more "realistic" image of the savior is portrayed.

As a part of the NATO salvation myth, the memory time contains three different periods, each with a different kind of rhetorical intensity. First, in 1999, with the occasion of the Kosovo war, NATO was still perceived as a salvation figure for Romanians, but the alliance's messianic functions diminished for it proved to be capable of human errors.

Second, in 2001, with the occasion of 9/11 events, NATO was seen again as a savior, under the form of a heroic solder believed to be able to destroy the evil plot of terrorists that wanted to subjugate the world and impose their ideas to it, and to reestablish peace and calm in Romania and in the rest of the world. Romania supported the American invasion of Iraq despite some of the European countries' disagreement.

Third, in 2007, the rhetorical orientation shifted once again with the installation of NATO troops on Romanian territory; the media coverage of NATO described the costs, the advantages and disadvantages of being a NATO member.

a) Waiting for the Savior

To support his theory of the political myth of salvation, Girardet presents four figures of heroes, from which Alexander the Great (the Macedonian/Greek historical hero) occupies a central place, and is the model of a young man of action who constructs legitimacy on immediate action.[45] The process of salvation implies a certain match between the personality of the potential savior and the needs of a society at a specific moment. The heroic appearance of the American society, here NATO being the carrier, did not come at once; it was a long process of transformation into a myth.

A part of the Romanian people remember that Americans saved Europe in the Second World War. Some American symbols penetrate in Romania through cinema, literature and other forms of art, and they are present every time Romanians are longing for something special to them: freedom. Romanians seem to pardon that Americans bombed their capital and other Romanian cities during the Second World War, because the bombing was directed against the Germans and not against them. This part of the history is later used in the conspiracy rhetoric.

Praising words, invented actions, dreamed solutions, emotional arguments; a multitude of language speculations give media rhetoric an essential role in the fabrication of myth. Official speeches follow the same route. It is easy to make a myth arise when the public opinion is involved in its creation. NATO entices in Romanians the nostalgia of freedom and security, of brotherhood with the strongest power, even if such a power continues to fascinate and intrigue them at the same time "Romania gets a security status

---

[45] The other three models are Cincinnatus, the wise old man; Solon, the providential man; and Mosses, the prophet (Girardet 73-78).

guaranteed by the world's *most powerful political and military alliance.*" [emphasis

added] ("The Watchtower," 22 Nov 2002)

Romanians' motivation in seeking to join NATO remained undiminished through

time: Romania wished to join an organization based on the shared values of democracy,

individual liberty and the rule of law, as well as to be part of a region of stability and

security which only NATO could guarantee. In the words of Emil Constantinescu,

"Together we created a climate that made it possible for us to work and build, hoping that

the future will be safer." It was believed that as a NATO member, Romania would

benefit not only from a military alliance with the strongest, but also from a cultural

resurrection through the "removal of fear":

> One of NATO's absolute benefits of Romania's functioning in NATO will
> be the *removal of fear*. Not so much the fear of foreign invaders, though a
> nation lives thousands of years with this collective anxiety, its character,
> resistance and its way of being undergo big transformation. I am talking
> about *the fear of ourselves* as we are faced with the new, the unknown, the
> impatience, the permanent state of nervousness in the prolonged transition
> daily life. ("The Watchtower," 22 Nov 2002)

The editorialist captures very astutely the struggle of the Romanian society in the

transition period, referring to external anxieties, as well as internal ones for which the

solution should come from within the individual. However, if the process of being free

starts from within, NATO was there to make sure that this process could be completed

and with it the salvation of the entire nation. A spiritual resurrection through the adoption

of a new identity can be accomplished this way. Alienated from their own very selves

during years of communism and dictatorship, Romanians lost their identity as a people

and as a nation and became estranged to themselves. Now they risked showing the same

distrust to themselves as they would show to a foreigner, as Julia Kristeva warns:

> The foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity flounder. By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him. A symptom that precisely turns "we" into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible. The foreigner comes in when the consciousness of my difference arises, and he disappears when we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, unamenable to bonds and communities. ("Strangers to Ourselves" 1)

The only way to escape this state of nervousness that this estrangement created was to put the hopes into NATO, for it was something to trust in this uncertain and unknown transition. Given its credentials and the "absolute value of democracy *in freedom and security*" that it offered, NATO could incarnate the Savior; it had the prerequisites for salvation. [46]

In the Romanian transitional period, perhaps the most difficult task that people, political leaders, civil society and media had to face was to reconcile with each other and with themselves as the only way to be able to continue in a democratic way. To be worthy of NATO salvation, Romanians needed to give, and not only receive. But in the end, the country was to regain a new identity, to resurrect from old ashes and become one with NATO itself, being able to offer a salvaging hand to others. The myth of NATO as savior has a cyclical configuration that portrays in the future an image of the Romanian people as potential agents of salvation in the tormented Balkan area. In this vein, they needed to change and to pass through a process of purification to be able to receive the savior.

This process began with making peace with their neighbors. For this, Romania needed to make the other countries aware of her cultural and geo-strategic position in

---

[46] "The Watchtower: a New Romania." Editorial. *Evenimentul Zilei*. 22 Nov. 2002. Web. 10 Jan. 2011. [emphasis added]. http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=104037.

Eastern Europe, and this constituted the most important advantage Romania had in the

negotiations process for NATO integration:

> We developed privileged relations with Hungary, - to the West, with
> Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova – to the East; we established a
> system of tripartite agreements – with Ukraine, with Bulgaria and Turkey,
> with Bulgaria and Greece, with Hungary and Austria – which are meant to
> consolidate the stability of our region. (Constantinescu, 25 April 1999)

Moreover, integration into NATO became a popular issue in Romania and was approved

by the overwhelming majority of the population.

NATO enlargement policy to the East comprised two different periods: During

the first wave of enlargement (Madrid, 1997), the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary

were invited to join the alliance; they were subsequently admitted in March 1999. In the

second wave (Prague, 2002), seven other states, including Romania, were invited and

accepted in March 2004. Each of these periods is known in Romania as an active

mythologizing process.[47]

Since December 1989, Romanian foreign policy has been focused on a "return to

Europe," meaning integration in both NATO and the EU, and the regaining of an old

cultural identity. It was now or never for those "in the Cold War's 'forgotten' part of

Europe" (Melescanu 12) to begin to claim a right to be treated equal to the other half—

the bigger brother, Western Europe. A return to Europe meant for Romanians a

reestablishment of political, economic and cultural links with Western Europe, as former

president Emil Constantinescu declares in June 1997: "Romanian society does not regard

ascension to NATO as a form of protection against a threat, but rather as a way to *regain

identity* that was unjustly denied to it for five decades. For us, NATO is not a shelter but a

---

[47] The other six countries are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. This was the
largest wave of enlargement in NATO's history. In July 2008, Albania and Croatia signed accession
protocols; they became official members of the Alliance in April 2009.

community based on shared values, now regained." Joining NATO was not only his highest foreign policy priority, but also a matter of "dignity" and "national pride," claims that were highly symbolic and part of the larger NATO myth. (Constantinescu, 21-25 June 1997)

Romania's principal reason to join NATO was to preserve its identity as a member of the Western world (and NATO officials always proclaimed the alliance's intention to erase the dividing lines in Europe), "a world from which it was forcibly separated as a result of hostile political arrangements," according to Victor Babiuc, minister of defense from 1996 to 2000 (1997). Romanian officials considered Romania's candidacy to NATO linked to country's efforts to join the EU. The post-1989 governments continuously argued that was equally important for the country's future to join both structures and that admission in each organization would bring stability and economic prosperity. Others, more skeptical to the mythical lure, knew that NATO was a beautiful promise indeed, but once the dream was realized, the reality might bring into the forefront old and painful memories. "And as every eastern European knows, the mere fact of being accorded membership in a Western club will not wipe away the effects of fifty-plus years of terror, dictatorship, repression, and stagnation." (Judt, 1996, p. 71) However, Romanians were convinced that the unprecedented cultural changes could send old pains and frustrations to the dusty shelves of history. The Soviet orbit was to be abandoned for the Euro-Atlantic one. Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase declared in 2002, "We have come back to our (European) family" after "an abnormal and very painful half century in the Soviet orbit." (in Kaiser, 27 October 2002) The Romanian embassy in Teheran stated that joining NATO was "just the beginning of our integration

in the community of Western values and practices; it is about joining the group we belong to." ("Romania's Integration," November 2002)

Since 1990, Romanian authorities have been conscious about the necessity to break with the isolation of the communist period and join the Euro-Atlantic structures. Consequently, NATO membership has been the goal of domestic and foreign policy of all post-1989 governments. Besides the high public support, almost all Romanian politicians across the political spectrum wanted to join NATO—even Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the virulent nationalistic leader of opposition's *Romania Mare*/Greater Romanian Party, which won 33 percent of the votes in the 2000 presidential runoff against ex-president Ion Iliescu. Romania's 1999 (and 2001) National Security Strategy states among the national security interests the following:

> Meeting the conditions for Romania's integration as a NATO and EU member, Romania must become a component with full obligations and rights of the two organizations, the only capable of guaranteeing its *independence and sovereignty* and enable an *economic, political, and social development* similar to that of the *democratic countries*. [emphasis added]

There was continuity in the Romanian leaders' arguments for the necessity of membership in both rounds of NATO enlargement. Contrary to common U.S. beliefs that Central and Eastern European countries wanted to join NATO primarily for security against Russia, the Romanian leaders expressed a different argument in 1996-97 and after the Madrid summit. They pointed out that NATO membership was not driven by a specific military threat (from Russia, in particular) and was not seen only as a security umbrella, but in some cases, first and foremost "as a tool for modernization of the entire society, meaning in fact brotherhood with the most developed countries in the world." (Roman, 21 October 1996) "Most developed" was to be translated for Romanians in

terms of economic development and democratic values (civil rights, pluralism, opening toward the West, etc.)

As a highly abstract word and part of the mythological vocabulary of salvation, *democracy* is very problematic to define, especially in the context of a society in transition. After 1989, democracy meant freedom to Romanians. It meant freedom of the individual: freedom of speech, freedom to travel, freedom to organize—freedoms that were banned during Ceausescu's rule. But democracy has other meanings too: creation of a civil society, America, capitalism; in a word, it means prosperity. It also encompasses the idea of a multiparty, constitutional, parliamentary society. Democracy, says Drakulić, "is still a dream, a new Utopian concept, a panacea, a tool for solving all our problems, from poverty to corruption, nationalism and war, in some unspecified way" (37).

Romania's "war" to gain democracy was to be first consummated at home. The National Security Strategy states that Romania was not and would not be confronted with major threats of classic military types against its national security. Rather, the risks to the country's security were mainly non-military, especially of a domestic type (particularly in the economic, financial, social and environmental fields). When asked what they preferred in matters of national security, 59 percent of Romanians replied military alliance with the U.S. and NATO in 2000, 60 percent replied the same in 2001, and 72 percent in 2002. In contrast, military alliance with Western European countries alone was considered a viable alternative by only 21 percent in 2001, falling to 12 percent in 2002.[48]

From the perspective of future NATO missions, Romanians agreed not only with the prospects of foreign troops stationed in their territory (68 percent in mid-2002), but

---

[48] Metro Media Transylvania (MMT) polls for October 2000, May 2001 and May 2002. NATO Survey. *Metro Media Transylvania*. Bucharest. 2000. Web. 15 Feb. 2011. < http://www.mmt.ro/en/main.html>.

also with Romanian troop participation in peacekeeping operations (81 percent), and even with fighting in defense of other NATO countries (70 percent in 2002).[49] This strong pro-NATO current of Romanian public opinion partially explains the ability of Romanian authorities to declare their country a *de facto* military ally of NATO and the U.S. and then to manifest this in significant deployments of troops in Afghanistan and cooperative undertakings elsewhere in the fight against terrorism.

Despite public officials' symbolic declarations that integration into NATO represented a national pride—a search for identity through a democratic lens—the population's search into joining the alliance proved to be sometimes different. For some Romanians, entry into NATO represented a security issue since they were really fearful of Russia, unlike their leaders. The New Democracies Barometer (NDB), which conducted a series of surveys in 1992, 1996 and 1998 in ten post-communist countries, reveals that Romanians and Slovaks felt the most threatened by Russia. In the case of Romania alone, Russia was perceived as the largest threat (by 62 percent, 55 percent, and 42 percent). Although it has declined since 1996, the tendency of perceiving Russia as the largest threat has remained and is confirmed in the 2002 survey conducted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).[50]

NATO membership was also considered an important economic benefit for Romania. Romanian officials expected that the membership would send a signal that the country was secure and had a stable democracy. This, in turn, would bring an influx of

---

[49] Idem.
[50] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Survey. Web. 10 Jan. 2011. < http://www.idea.int/Balkans/survey_summary_intl_inst.htm>.

foreign investments that would help the Romanian economy and the Romanian accession into the European Union, an idea that resulted from public opinion surveys.[51]

b) The Call for the Savior

The Romanian officials began courting NATO in July 1990, when then-Prime Minister Petre Roman invited the organization's secretary-general, Manfred Wörner, to visit Romania and discuss "the problems of cooperation between Romania and NATO" (59). Romania was assured that the West was willing to accept the country into NATO. It received, one year later, an invitation to participate in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) forum of discussion, during which nothing was said about a potential integration of Romania.

The foreign minister in 1992, Teodor Melescanu, drew attention to the fact that Romania was a part of Central Europe, and as a "central European country close to the Balkans" (not in the Balkans), had the potential to provide security on NATO's southern flank. Melescanu also showed that relations with neighboring Hungary had improved (after they disputed the territory of Transylvania) and that Romania's commitment in different cooperation agreements (such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation) was proof of the country's capacity to cooperate ("Security in Central Europe").

In February 1993, President Ion Iliescu visited NATO headquarters and declared that Romania's ultimate goal was integration into the alliance as a full member. In 1994

---

[51] MMT February 2001 surveys show that 69 percent of the respondents believe that Romania's economic situation will change for the better once Romania joins NATO; 64 percent of the population consider that the country will be better in general if it becomes a NATO member. NATO Survey. *Metro Media Transylvania*. Bucharest. 2001. Web. 15 Feb. 2011. < http://www.mmt.ro/en/main.html>.

NATO launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP), designed to promote cooperation between members through military exercises. PfP was seen by some as a mechanism of postponing NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe. As Goldgeier argues, the PfP was a compromise solution aimed at satisfying bureaucrats in the Clinton administration who wanted to enlarge NATO immediately, and those who did not want to enlarge it at all (18).

Romania's eagerness to join NATO began to materialize on January 26, 1994, when the country became the first Central-Eastern European state to sign for the Partnership. In the beginning of April 1996, Romania sent a formal application for membership, but its chances to join a first wave of enlargement were limited. In 1996 Romania elected its first democratic government and president (Emil Constantinescu) since the fall of communism, showing the world that Romanians had now a stable democracy and hence displaying new arguments in their aspirations for integration.

Romania persistently asked to be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement because it feared Russia's diplomatic position would postpone or even prevent further enlargements of the alliance. (In fact, this is what did happen during the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, when Ukraine and Georgia were refused membership). Romanians also feared that being left for the second wave, they could be subject to a possible veto submitted by Hungary, a country that entered the first wave and with whom Romania had a long list of divergences throughout time (Roman, "The Spirit of Democracy").

Romanians wanted to integrate NATO mostly for the idealistic image they had about the organization; neither the public officials nor the media seemed to present the

83

organization for what it was: a military alliance. They sometimes briefly presented the advantages of such integration, but very few media articles show what the Alliance expected from its future members, focusing instead on the domestic reforms and the economic aspect. Otherwise, rhetorically, NATO was an idea about equality, partnership, democracy, salvation, and prosperity—briefly, a Utopia. While the media began this process of myth creation, people gave it unprecedented proportions.

Many Romanians (especially in the countryside) did not know much about NATO, but this did not prevent them from imagining what it was. And they all heard that it was a good thing to belong to NATO. NATO very quickly became a coalescent force for the Romanian people; even the ritual of reading the news regarding NATO helped them to form that so-desired new identity. For example, an article in *Evenimentul Zilei* presented NATO's perception by the people on the street. Some Romanians believed that NATO increased their life annuity; others thought that NATO would provide them with tractors, cattle and poultry ("Is NATO a Good Guy?" 22 Nov. 2002) The majority of the people interviewed agreed that NATO integration would bring a positive change in Romanians' standard of living. Some people heard that NATO would help them financially, and others were even sure that NATO would offer jobs for everybody. "NATO guys are good guys, they have beautiful clothing and they look well fed. Do you know how I can contact NATO? Maybe they can hire my sons?" asks one rural citizen, rhetorically. NATO represented prosperity and for the Romanian people after the revolution, this it was a first step in the long journey toward democratic change.

The media liked to personify NATO. NATO was there, even if timidly present in their conscience, and its legitimacy increased as they came closer to the negotiations for

integration. The plethora of media articles praising the advantages of integrating into NATO lacked rational solutions to the immediate problems the Romanian population was facing in a difficult cultural environment dominated by an identity crisis and leaders who were not always trustworthy. Therefore, promises that NATO brought, such as American investors, infrastructure—in short, wealth—quickly became legitimate. But the most important advantage seemed to be the additional credibility Romania would gain in the international arena. Romanians, for so long deprived of visibility, now needed worldwide presence and recognition. NATO integration advantages were "obvious"; partnership meant more "stability," "transfer of expertise" and "Romania's security" ("In the First Line" 19 Mar. 2006).

c) Salvation Does Not Come with the First Wave

Although the Romanian officials deployed an aggressive diplomatic strategy for admission into a first round, focusing on the geo-strategic role their country played in strengthening the southern flank of the alliance and in helping to stabilize the Balkans, American officials focused on the economic and political criteria for admission. Although Romania showed good relations with its neighbors, peacefully changed the government in the 1996 elections, and participated in many NATO and UN missions, the U.S. denied Romania's membership at the Madrid summit in July 1997. The grounds were that its economic performances and political reforms lagged behind those of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; Romania, they concluded, could not measure up to the progress

that the Visegrad countries had made, and admission would be too costly for the alliance.[52]

At the summit, NATO recognized, however, "with great interest . . . the positive developments toward democracy and the rule of law in . . . especially Romania," meaning that Romania, along with Slovenia, was next in line for membership (*Madrid Declaration*). For many Romanian analysts, however, it seemed that the promise of the second round entry to NATO kept Romania's reform on track.

Among the more realistic public officials, some were convinced that Romania was not ready to integrate the alliance, and NATO's decision was justified. Other reactions[53] were more accusatory in rhetorical tone, stating that the Romanians had been "lied and robbed" and that the "harsh rejection" gave the population a sense of "second-class citizenship in Europe." The rejection was perceived by some as "another Yalta," "discrimination," and "betrayal and the result of a secret Russian-American pact" (Gross and Tismaneanu 26-31).

The media had different opinions on why Romania was left out. It was believed that Romania was still seen to traditionally gravitate toward Russia and that except for France, the country had no close cultural or historical links to other European states (Grilli 15). However, the support shown by France and other countries diminished these fears. France started to support Romania's inclusion in the first round of NATO enlargement in the fall of 1996. French officials insisted that Romania was a

---

[52] The Visegrad Group (also known as the "Visegrad Four" or "V4") is composed of The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, which declare to have always been part of a single civilization sharing cultural and intellectual values and common roots in diverse religious traditions, which they wish to preserve and further strengthen. "Visegrad Group 1991-2011 Years." 2011. Web. 12 Feb. 2011. <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=858>.
[53] Specifically the reaction coming from the nationalist right party, *Romania Mare* (Great Romania)

Francophone country—one traditionally close culturally and politically to Paris—and that, considering Romanian-Hungarian minority issues in Transylvania and the prospects of Hungary entering the NATO before Romania, it was imprudent to accept these two countries one by one. France also considered Romania more pro-France, which would have balanced the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic influences and compensated for the pro-American sentiments of countries like Poland (Yost 28; Asmus 83).

Along with France, other southern European NATO members such as Italy, Turkey, Spain and Portugal expressed their concern that the alliance was not paying sufficient attention to the southern flank, and reinforced their support for Romania's candidacy. For these countries, the fact that the candidate countries were less developed and not ready for membership was secondary to the need to stabilize the region.

Romania is located in a very insecure region. Since 1990, a lot of conflicts have shaken the south of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo and other parts of Serbia. There has also been a great potential for economic instability due to the fragility of regional economies, such as Moldova and the Ukraine. As a result, the possibility of military conflict in the region has constantly ranked among the top three fears of Romanians over the past decade. Yet only a quarter of the population conceived this threat in terms of military attack against the country.[54]

It was also believed that the U.S. let Romanians again become the victims of an indifferent, patronizing attitude from the more prosperous and powerful nations of the West. Many were surprised as to how the U.S. and NATO could reject Romania, when more than 90 percent of its population expressed strong support for joining the alliance; in the Czech Republic, less than half of the citizens endorsed their country's candidacy.

---

[54] Metro Media Transylvania. Polls from October 2000, May, 2001, and May 2002.

Surveys conducted in 1995, 1996 and 1997 by the Central Eastern European Barometer (CEEB) reveal that, while support for NATO reached approximately 30 percent on average for all Central and Eastern European countries, it showed the largest range in Romania: 95, 76 and 67 percent respectively.[55] In addition, Romanians were well aware that none of the three previously admitted countries had met all the criteria for membership established by the alliance.

Other Romanian journalists and policy analysts were concerned that the rejection could damage the newly elected (democratic) government's efforts toward economic and political reforms, and that the country would remain behind its more advanced neighbors. Some even predicted the country's disintegration under the influence of xenophobic or nationalistic leaders and movements. These predictions proved not very far from reality, since the nationalist leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor came very close to winning the 2000 election ("Closer to the Truth").

The rejection of Romanian candidacy for the first wave of NATO enlargement caused a lot of frustration in part of the population. Romanians felt abandoned by NATO once again, and when the Kosovo war started, a large part of the population showed support for their Eastern brother. However, Romanian public officials followed their policy of integration, providing logistical and political support for NATO in the Kosovo crisis, despite the fact the government risked popular disapproval in supporting the alliance's actions in Serbia. The parliament approved NATO's request for unlimited use of Romanian airspace several weeks prior to the Washington summit in April 1999, when Romania was not invited to join the alliance. Romanian President Emil Constantinescu

---

[55] "Public Opinion Analysis". Central and Eastern Eurobarometer. 1996. Web. 15 Oct. 1996. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ceeb/ceeb6/ceeb6_en.htm.

criticized NATO and the EU for treating Romania unfairly, given the big financial loss

the country suffered during the oil embargo with Yugoslavia ("President Discontent"). In

April 1999, Romania was shown appreciation for her support of the war in Kosovo, and

the EU opened accession negotiations with Romania despite the country's unresolved

economic issues. Even if not received in the first wave, Romania was promised salvation

in the second wave. The Romanians' patience and determination could not remain

unpaid.

d) Cheers Integration! The Savior Is Here!

After September 11, 2001 (9/11), U.S. international policy changed, as well as the

criteria for evaluating candidates and for extending NATO. The U.S. became more

interested in countries from "New Europe" which supported unconditionally the U.S.

position. This meant less emphasis on the "Old Europe" (France, Germany and Belgium,

which all opposed the U.S. war in Iraq). For the U.S., installing troops in Central and

Eastern Europe meant having forces closer to the new centers of potential conflict in the

Caucasus and in the Middle East. The economic criteria that the American officials

considered vital for NATO integration in a first round of enlargement were left behind in

these new conditions of geo-strategic and military criteria. As a result, Romania was

rewarded with a NATO invitation at the Prague summit in November 21-22, 2002, with

stronger-than-ever support from its population (polls indicated 83 percent support of

NATO integration in 2002).

This formal acceptance of Romania into NATO at the Prague summit represented "a historical moment" and a "complete breaking-off with the past." It fulfilled one of the most significant aspirations of the country since the fall of communism in 1989— "Romania's permanent anchorage in the euro-atlantic space," said Iliescu, and a return to its rightful place in Europe. The approval also represented a "vote of confidence to the contribution Romania can make, as a NATO member, to the objectives, missions, and capabilities of the alliance" ("Romania's Integration into NATO").

Romania joined the Alliance only two years after this summit, in 2004. Its acceptance was not only a confirmation that Romania had made tremendous progress toward democracy and free market, but was also opening a new chapter in the country's history toward integration into a world that would provide Romania with "the necessary support" to continue "the internal reform." (Nastase 9 Jan. 2004)

For some journalists, the completed integration immediately became a propitious occasion for mockery and sarcasm, even while the beneficial effects of the integration were recognized. However, to perpetuate the myth through the use of a rhetoric of mystification, they said integration was successful only "because [of] the effort of white magic witches to lobby Romania's interests" ("Cheers-integration!" 30 Sep. 2002). Or more interestingly, integration was the result of a change in strategy that astute Romanians would have realized after pondering the international situation: "If at the previous summit we presented ourselves as Latins and relied on French support, with nothing having been left of our integration hopes, this time Romania has made excessive efforts to arrange Uncle Sam's hat, who, everybody knows, rules the roost in NATO!" A little bit of Machiavellian attitudes in the Romanians' behavior did not seem to bother

anybody, as long as the aim was attained. The flattery was not unpardonable for such a big result that everybody was waiting for: "The 50-year long dream of Romanians has almost come true: grandparents can lighten up now, the Americans are almost here!" ("Cheers-integration!" 30 Sep. 2002). The journalists insisted on the fact that the Americans were "almost" here, letting an enthymematic audience understand what the process of NATO installation troops would look like.

The journalists did seem to be bothered by the political decision to support America in the war against Iraq. "And since Uncle Sam has a big problem when it comes to Iraqis, the Romanian polenta has also started to explode when it hears Saddam's name" ("Cheers-integration!" 30 Sep. 2002). Romania supported the U.S. campaign in Iraq over the objections of some European states; the decision to hold America's hat could become the apple of discord between Romania and Europe. And Romania still needed Europe and to be part of it (to integrate into the European Union):

> If at the previous summit it was the Americans who couldn't see the use of inviting Romania to join NATO, this time it will be Europeans who will turn up their noses when it comes to Romani's fate, because when giants have a fight it's better not to stay around! And thus, in our haste towards integration, we might stumble over our panties and break our . . . credibility! ("Cheers-integration!" 30 Sep. 2002)

Favoring a "giant" over the other could have made Romanians suffer a loss of credibility and cost them in the long run more than what they would have already gained. This editorial tries to diminish the overwhelming enthusiasm that other articles showed during this period.

In the rest of the most prominent media, a generous epideictic rhetoric praised the Romanian nation for the successful integration.[56] The word "new" became a leitmotiv in the media and symbolized a beginning, not only for Romania—"a new Romania"—but also for NATO as "a new NATO." The prophecy was now accomplished and Romania was born "anew," with so many things to be yet accomplished. Even the world in which Romania had been resurrected was "new." Romania's integration had a cathartic effect, proving to the world that it was still possible to overcome tensions of all sorts. "But from these *new*, unexpected a decade ago tensions, a *new Romania* will be born, in a *new world*. Happy anniversary!" [emphasis added] ("Cheers-integration!" 30 Sep. 2002). The integration was perceived by the media as the occasion of a national celebration as the Romanians achieved their most ardent goal after the revolution of 1989—that of returning home to the so longed-for Euro-Atlantic family that would save them from all evils. Being emotionally involved in the ideographical/mythological construction of NATO, they forgot to focus on what NATO was in reality (a military and political alliance) and what the alliance asked from its members. Once they knew that there were obligations too, after the initial enthusiasm over integration, Romanians began to adopt a more tempered rhetorical tone.

The most paradoxical aspect of Romanian integration into NATO is that in 2002 the country was invited to integrate the alliance using the same considerations that the 1996 government had unsuccessfully tried to use to support the country's first wave of admission: the geo-strategic-position, the important role Romania could play for NATO's

---

[56] Aristotle considers the main characteristic of the epideictic genre to be the present time: "In epideictic, the present is the most important; for all speakers praise and blame in regard to existing qualities, but they often also make use of other things, both reminding [the audience] of the past and projecting the course of the future" (*Rhetoric* Book I, Ch. 3, 1358b).

southern European flank, the pro-American attitude, enormous popular support for

NATO, and strong political will to behave as a trusted U.S./NATO ally. Romania was

one of the staunchest supporters of the West, particularly the United States and NATO,

for reasons previously mentioned herein. From the beginning of negotiations with the

alliance to Romania's acceptance, Romanians were endlessly creating fantasies of

salvation.[57]

e) NATO and the War on Terror

Another turn in NATO perception came with 9/11, when NATO became the

image of the war against terrorism. In Romanian perception, NATO was once again a

savior, saving the world (not only Romania) from an evil enemy, the terrorist. But the

prospect of a war was not very welcoming for Romanians, especially because for the first

time, Romania needed to show what it could do for NATO. This period was a period of

memory (from the Girardet mythological scheme), and it had the role of tempering the

initial enthusiastic tone of the beginning of the myth.

In Romanian imagery, the terrorist has had very strong symbolic meanings since

the revolution of 1989; it was the evil terrorist who was responsible for Romanian deaths

and causalities during the revolution. The terrorist has no mercy and is capable of

inhumane acts. During the revolution there were horrifying rumors that circulated, such

as that the "terrorists" poisoned the water, and cut one pregnant woman's womb, killed

the baby, took the baby off and stitched back the woman's belly with barbed wire.

---

[57] I borrow the title of the book *Fantasies of Salvation* written by the Romanian-born political science analyst, Vladimir Tismaneanu.

Terrorists were responsible for "thousands and thousands" of civilian deaths. What is especially frustrating is that they cannot locate the provenance of the terrorist. Romanians could not put a face or a nationality to the terrorist, but his image was to haunt the public throughout the transition period. The terrorist is definitely somebody from outside; an insider could not show so much indifference for the poor civilian population. The terrorist could be the Soviets, the secret forces, the big powers.

Now that even the strongest country in the world, the United States, had become a victim of the monstrous terrorist, Romania was ready to give unconditional support to NATO. America was considered the only force capable of facing and conquering this evil; being bound by an alliance with NATO (with the strongest) was all the more a privilege. For Romanians, fighting the terrorist became a mythical revenge on the unknown terrorist of 1989. These mythological perceptions materialized in the parliament's decision that Romania, as a strategic partner of the U.S. and member of the PfP, had to take part as a *de facto ally* of NATO "in fighting international terrorism by all means, including military" (Nistorescu). From both the media and the official position, 9/11 called up a rhetoric of necessity of a war against terrorism.

While political leaders were perpetuating the myth by all means, considering NATO as a savior of the world against the evil terrorist, a part of the public opinion was inclined to reject the official decision to support the NATO war in Iraq. But once you enter the dance, you have to dance, says an old Romanian proverb. "What seemed almost impossible even in the most tormenting nightmares is only a step away from becoming a reality" cites an editorial in *Evenimentul Zilei* (Nistorescu).

Romania was to be involved in a war that was not necessarily her war, but NATO was an organization in which she had not only rights, but also obligations. Cornel Nistorescu writes, "Politically, informatively or at an expert level, we are very close to a state of war. For the first time since the World War II, our country is very close to getting the status of combatant." The arsenal of war terminology was soon enriched with a variety of strategic terms: "crucial point," "security risk," "state of hostility," "common threats," "non-conventional threats," "combat the scourge of terrorism" and other asymmetric risks.[58]

The tangible threat to the global security and the magnitude of damage done to innocent Americans are considered enough elements to create a rhetoric of war, arising in Romanian's conscience an image of "partners in war". Romania is "[o]n the first line of the war with terrorists," announces the title of article.[59] The war against terrorism becomes Romanian's war. "Somewhere a war will begin. Theoretically, Romania will be part of it. But the fiercest war has yet to be started at home" (Nistorescu). Romania turns into a "security deliverer": "Our soldiers are shoulder to shoulder with the American militaries in […] Iraq", says the president (Basescu "229th Commemoration").

For the first time, the press called for reality from the political leadership that had decided to support NATO. Little by little, following the population's state of mind, the media began to concentrate their attention on the risks implied by Romania's participation in war and be less and less unconditionally supportive towards the U.S. However, journalists, supporting their leaders' agenda, continued to encourage the people

---

[58] Pascu, Ioan, Mircea. Address at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. 19 December 2001. Ioan Mircea Pascu is a former Minister of National Defense of Romania from 2000-2004.
[59] "In the First Line of the War with the Terrorists." *Evenimentul Zilei*. 19 Mar. 2006. Web. 19 Mar. 2006. http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=253633.

to resist their potential indifference to the issue. Writes Nistorescu, "It has to be aimed at prejudices, a narrow and selfish perspective on things, a cheap reaction like 'What has this got to do with us?'" Romania is now "on the list of countries targeted by terrorists." The alliance with NATO still represents "a guarantee of high security, but it implies a lot of risks too" ("First Degree Alarm" 8 Oct. 2001).

Romanians do not have a bellicose nature, the media kept saying—even if history showed a slightly different position—in an attempt to justify the public's lack of support towards the war in Iraq:

> We are a country that has not participated directly in a military conflict since 1945. The alliance with the Soviet Union was a strictly political option, which did not require the support of the people. *De facto ally of NATO*, for a resigned population, indolent enough, and full of prejudices, is a formula that will not be accepted from the very beginning. (Nistorescu)

Many Romanians took a step back after the initial enthusiasm triggered by an alliance with NATO: "Why do we need this? We'd better be poor and in trouble than at war!" (Nistorescu). The media shaped their position on the public attitudes and vice versa. An ongoing interdependence between the media and the people's opinion evolved, from the most fervent support coming from sympathy for the American people, to a continuous questioning about the gain and the loss the alliance caused. Until now, the rhetorical meanings of NATO had gravitated around the idea of the biggest supplier of security in the world. After 9/11, Romanian NATO rhetoric contained words of doubt and fear, of a "state of alert," and of Romania being "on the list of countries targeted by terrorists" ("First Degree Alarm"; Nistorescu).

f) The Landing of the Americans

After the 9/11 events, the U.S. redefined the role of its military in the twenty-first century. Its officials insisted on the importance of developing a vast network of U.S. bases to confront cross-border terrorism and other regional threats. Along with Bulgaria, Romania became an interesting location for NATO troops. Romania offered a number of attractive large-scale facilities, such as ports on the Black Sea, airfields and training ranges. These bases in Romania not only helped safeguard U.S. security interests in the Black Sea region, but also served as important staging grounds for operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. The NATO presence in Romania could bring more security to this part of Europe in a world marked by new threats—international terrorism, illegal migration, drugs, weapons and human trafficking.

Announced at the end of 2006, "the landing" of the Americans generated certain speculations about the Romanian role in a possible war between the U.S. and Iran, a very frightening possibility not only for the country, but for the future of the world as well. Now the rhetoric changed its form, shaping a discourse of blame or praise. Publications from Bulgaria and Switzerland stated that the U.S. might intend to attack Iran from Romanian bases. "In addition, there are some rumors regarding the possibility that the U.S. places a counter missile shield on Romanian territory in order to reinforce its power in a region that is near Russia" ("Coming Soon!" 27 Feb. 2007).

The media were confronted with many unknowns. They suddenly realized that while involved in the process of myth creation, they had neglected their first role, that of providing information. They tried to cover this deficiency with scattered statements

coming from various political figures. It is not known what the treaty with NATO and the other accords stipulated from a legal standpoint, and the politicians did not provide logical explanations for the contract between Romania and NATO. One paper wrote, "Another vagueness of the agreement consists of the fact that the treaty doesn't mention any consultation with Romania in case the U.S.A. decides to launch military actions against a third country" ("In the First Line" 19 Mar. 2006). Media coverage of NATO events became more focused on the cost of the integration and on technical information about the settlement of its troops.

The price Romania paid for its partnership with NATO was considerable, as described by one editor. "The fitting out of the four bases will comprise the building of apartments, of modern areas of training, of commercial and entertainment areas. The cost of the project is estimated at approximately 30 million dollars" ("Coming Soon!" 27 Feb. 2007). Another 200 millions was spent in 2006 for the Romanians soldiers sent in Iraq, half the year's budget for the Ministry of Health. It was easy to understand that this money created a better infrastructure on Romanian territory, but the media could not digest the big price Romania paid for the wars. "Romanian troops in Afghanistan and Iraq cost Romania 58 million euros [~$76,000,000] until the past year" ("Coming Soon!" 27 Feb. 2007).

When considering the disadvantages of having NATO troops in Romania, the media carried a different type of expert's voices: "The possible transgression of the law by the Americans and the possible conflicts that might occur with the local population could be some examples of disadvantages," said former Romanian Defense Minister Ioan Mircea Pascu ("In the First Line" 19 Mar. 2006). In reality, American soldiers found very

friendly people and received a very enthusiastic reception. Many journalistic reports about the Americans' adjustment to Romanian life were published, which offered more details about the soldiers' lives than the possible conflicts between the two parts. "Indisputably, the signing of the agreement of settlement of American bases in Romania is a gain for the country, from political, military, security and economical points of view" ("In the First Line" 19 Mar. 2006), despite some articles that accounted for rights violations of Romanian citizens by American soldiers who were granted civil immunity in Romania.[60]

During 2007, when the NATO troops settled in three military bases in Romania, fewer articles appeared than in the previous year or the NATO integration year, 2004. These articles presented NATO, especially NATO troops, as part of everyday life and focused on Romanian causalities in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One possible explanation for this decreasing public attention toward NATO is that in 2007, Romania was accepted into the European Union, and the mythological turmoil moved its direction toward Europe.

B. The Conspiracy Myth of NATO

The conspiracy myth of NATO followed the same path toward the creation of an identification process as the myth of salvation. The conspiracy myth's unifying force is even higher, for fear is as big of an emotion as hope is. To cite Francois de la

---

[60] "The family of the old man killed in Constanta by an American soldier wants to form civil party in his trial in America," cites the Romanian news agency Mediafax on February 3, 2006. The 79-year-old man was killed in a car accident caused by an American NATO soldier. The family was not informed about the course of the investigation and was given the reason of solder's immunity stipulated by an accord between Romania and the U.S.

Rochefoucauld, "We promise according to our hopes, and perform according to our fears" ("Reflections or Sentences and Moral Maxims").

A major turn of events that changed NATO perception happened during the Kosovo conflict in 1999, where the proximity and the cultural neighborhood with the Serbians generated a negative public opinion towards the American intervention in the area. When the Kosovo war started in late March, 1999, NATO intervention was considered illegitimate in Romania; it violated the independence of a sovereign state. The intervention was also seen to pose a serious religious menace to the Orthodox world feeding the old disparity West—Catholicism and Protestantism vs. the East—mainly Orthodox. In Romania the conflict was perceived in its religious meanings that opposed the Orthodox Yugoslavia (the Serbian Kosovars) for the Muslim one (the Albanian Kosovars). The intervention was also considered to set a precedence for the Hungarian population to ask for its independence.

a) Kosovo War and NATO: Romanian Perception

There were two types of conflict referred to as the Kosovo war: (1) an internal ethnic armed conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo from February 1998 to June 1999, "in which military strategy took the form of widespread and systematic human rights violations" and (2) an international conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia from March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999 ("Kosovo Report" 30).

In a nutshell, the history of the first (internal) conflict is that although Kosovo was populated mainly by Albanians, it was a symbol of "nationalist aspirations for both

100

Albanians and Serbs" ("Kosovo Report" 33). Albanian nationalism erupted in Kosovo in 1981, leading to bloody clashes.

In the 1980s, Slobodan Milošević [61] used the Serbs' sense of injustice that their ancestral land was now dominated by Muslim Albanians to come to power in Serbia. By 1989, he abolished Kosovo's autonomy, fired thousands of Albanians from their jobs, suppressed Albanian language education and controlled the territory with a heavy police presence.

Milosevic's federal forces fought the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army and the violence escalated in the province. NATO intervened in a 1999 bombing campaign, causing hundreds of thousands of Albanians and Serbs to flee. The official reason for the bombing of Yugoslavia was to employ military power against the government of Milošević, responsible for crimes against humanity and massive human rights abuse against the Kosovar civilian population.

NATO intervention in Yugoslavia was very controversial, for it violated the doctrine of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states—the ethnic conflict being one such domestic issue (Latawski and Smith 11). An estimated 10,000 civilians were killed in the 1998-99 conflict, many of them Albanians, while 1,500 Serbs died in the revenge killings that followed.

In 2008 Kosovo declared independence, against opposition from different European countries. For the ethnic Albanians who made up 95 percent of Kosovo's population, independence marked a new beginning. On the contrary, the European

---

[61] Slobodan Milošević was a politician and administrator, who, as Serbia's party leader and president (1989–97), pursued Serbian nationalist policies that contributed to the breakup of the socialist Yugoslav federation. He subsequently embroiled Serbia in a series of conflicts with the successor Balkan states. From 1997 to 2000 he served as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Cohen 21).

countries of Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania (and other non-European countries) opposed recognizing Kosovo because they feared encouraging secessionist movements within their own borders.

During the Kosovo bombardment in April-May 1999, Romanians' support of NATO dropped slightly below that of Poland (57 percent vs. 60 percent)[62] but rose immediately (to over 60 percent) after the air campaign as Romanian troops were deployed with KFOR (NATO Kosovo Force) forces at the beginning of 2000 (Watts 7), indicating that disapproval was directed at the operation rather that the institution. These results do not seem to really illustrate Romanians' attitudes towards NATO intervention, for the majority of media institutions (following population's attitudes) took a stance against the war. Polls conducted at the beginning of the intervention showed 75 percent of the population against the intervention, with hostility growing as the intervention progressed ("Kosovo Report" 244).

This attitude toward NATO's intervention occasioned speculations from different interested parties. Because NATO bombarded Serbian civilian targets during the sacred days of Easter, the nationalists took a clear stance against the intervention as being an attack against the Orthodox world. In Romania there was a widespread perception of the intervention in Kosovo as "big power imposing their might on small countries." ("Kosovo Report" 244). The nationalists and the opposition were afraid of a separatist precedence that Kosovo independence (as a consequence of the intervention) might create. Despite all these fears, the first democratic Romanian government after 1989 (under Emil Constantinescu), with pro-Western orientations, granted NATO fly-over permission, aware that the decision could "erode their social base" but hoping, due to this

---

[62] MMT polls from 1999 and 2001.

support, for an enhancement of the country's chances to join NATO ("Kosovo Report" 245).

b) The Orthodox Order under Threat

NATO's intervention in Kosovo was part of a bigger plan of a systematical disintegration of social traditions and moral values, urging the destruction of the old Christian order. Mitzura Arghezi told the Romanian Parliament: "I should remind you that on the 15th of April, 1943, on Easter's Eve, Bucharest was under American bombs that killed hundreds of Romanians. Neither then nor now the saint day of the Catholic or Orthodox Easter was respected."

During Ceausescu's rule, "religious topics and ecumenical vocabulary [were] banned, celebrations and festivities of religious signification moved from the public into the private realm, all in the name of an atheist arena for the 'new man' of communist times" (Marin, 2007, p. 32-33). After the revolution, because of this imposed transformation of the Romanian people (even though Romanians kept their faith and manifested it during big holidays, such as Easter and Christmas, as a way to spiritually resist a harsh dictatorship), the rhetoric used by public officials and presidents "reintroduce[d] words of the sacred into the secularized political discourse of transition" with the overt scope of creating "civic ethos" or public credibility (Marin, "From Banned Rhetoric" 32). What Mitzura Arghezi tried to do with her declaration in Parliament was to create public credibility by tying religion and history together "as powerful rhetorical allies for public legitimation" (Marin, "From Banned Rhetoric" 41).

Like Romanians, Serbs are Orthodox, and Easter is one of the biggest holidays in the Orthodox calendar. To attack an independent Orthodox country during Easter is a sacrilege and is seen as part of an evil plan. The conspirator, being the only one to know the inevitable end of his actions, handles the events according to a plan thought in the minutest details. "We assist powerless at the harshest barbarity in Europe since World War Two: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been attacked and bombed. Nothing justifies NATO's intervention and the explanations of the American president Clinton, that this war is not against the Serb population, are ridiculous and cynic to say the least," argues Mitzura Arghezi. So, NATO meant America and if someone was to be blamed, the president was the first one responsible. Compared to World War II, the intervention seemed to be a barbarity even if it came from a civilized nation.

Arghezi did not use only religion to create public ethos as she addressed the Parliament. The invocation of law (forensic rhetoric[63]) also created in her speech an argument of resistance. Raising concerns about the sovereignty of Romania, Arghezi was sure of touching the sensible issue of "sovereignty," trying to make more people adhere to the ideas exposed in her discourse:

> We don't understand why the Government or the Parliament doesn't have the courage to say that an intervention of this kind, without the consent of the Security Council, is an arbitrary and immoral act and that we assist at the rewrite of new International Laws in which the principle of national sovereignty is cancelled. The intervention of NATO in ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia creates an extremely dangerous precedent in dealing with such situations.

Romania could be part of such an "extremely dangerous precedent," the attacking of a sovereign state by Kosovo in a big plan of reordering the world. It was not enough that

---

[63] Forensic speaking, one of the three genres of rhetoric, is defined by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* as a speech that either attacks or defends somebody in the court of law (Book I, Ch. 3, 1358b).

Americans once attacked and killed Romanians; the history seemed to repeat itself with

Serbia and consequently followed a cyclical pattern. Serbs and Romanians are friends

and have a common culture, traditions and religion, so a war against Serbs (and a

violation of their sovereignty) can be interpreted as a potentiality of war against

Romanians.

Situated in a frame of rejection (when pertinent explanations for the intervention

are totally ignored), this discourse has rhetorical effect as some Romanians feel empathy

with the Serbians. Some articles talk about the Serbs being exhausted by the NATO

bombings of power stations and water plants that caused electricity and water shortages

on more than 80 percent of the territory, while others talk about NATO bombing "by

mistake" on civilian places like hospitals (where they supposedly kill people on the

operating table) or old people's homes. The articles present a very sad reality, where

Yugoslav soldiers go to the Albanian border and ask Albanians for food or exchange their

watches for food or cigarettes.[64]

Even President Constantinescu was not happy with the way Romania was treated

by the West after the Kosovo conflict. The president says that, compared to other

countries in the area, the treatment applied to Romania was disadvantageous to his

country; he gives the example of Poland's flourishing economic situation in contrast with

Romania's, implying that Romania is experiencing a form of economic colonialism.[65]

"Poland enjoyed a cut in the foreign debt while Romania has to take out loans from the

---

[64] "The Serbs Are Struck Down by NATO Bombardments." *Evenimentul Zilei*. 25 May 1999. Web. 10 Jan. 2011. http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/sirbii-sint-cu-nervii-la-pamint-din-cauza-bombardamentelor-nato-569905.html.
"Yugoslavia is Paralyzed by Lack of Water and Electricity." *Evenimentul Zilei*. 25 May 1999. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.
http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/iugoslavia-paralizata-de-lipsa-apei-si-a-curentului-electric-569906.html.
[65] Colonialism is a political-economic phenomenon whereby various European nations explored, conquered, settled, and exploited large areas of the world (Russell and Hall 16).

international capital market despite having paid in due time each installment of the foreign debt," said Constantinescu ("President Discontent" 14 Jul. 1999). Speaking of the foreign investments in Romania, the president stated that the American investments in our country were nonexistent, taking into account the American economic possibilities and capacities.

Romania's support in the Kosovo crises had a scope, that of urging integration. The tone of the media considering the integration changed after 1999. If before the war Romanians had to make efforts to be accepted into NATO, after the war they should have been rewarded for their position on the American side. Romania should now integrate NATO as "a logical consequence of our solidarity with the alliance's actions to find a long-term solution for the problems in Kosovo and to secure peace in the Balkans," declared the president. Romania was no longer satisfied with the "open door" policy and wanted NATO to specify clear integration terms; Romania needed a firm answer as well as a deadline, criteria and terms of NATO integration. In the end, integration came and the cultural meanings of NATO myths fulfilled their purposes of identification.

c) The Magyar Menace and the World's New Order

In the conspiracy mythology (in Girardet's view), the conspirator disposes of events according to a pre-established plan, being the only one to know the inexorable end. The conspiracy myth in Romania had a multitude of actors and was used by all political orientations to justify their rhetoric.

In the case of the NATO conspiracy myth, members of the opposition were the most verbose and critical about NATO intervention in Kosovo, placing the alliance in a

106

frame of *rejection.* If Kosovars were to gain their independence, they could create

precedence in all the countries that deal/strive/fight with religious or with ethnic

minorities. Romania was one of four European countries to refuse to recognize Kosovo's

independence in February 2008 out of fear that the Magyar population from Transylvania

could ask for their independence.[66]

For example, in May 1999, the congress held by the Democratic Union of

Hungarians in Romania (*Uniunea democrată a maghiarilor din Romania*) caused some

officials to believe that Kosovo became a model for the Hungarian minority to ask for

autonomy as the Albanian ethnics did. In one official's opinion, at the congress there

were "noisy declarations" that defied "the political common sense and the truth," as they

used Kosovo as precedent for requesting the negotiation of Transylvania's autonomy. [67]

At the same gathering, claims were made about the ethic purge of Magyars and the denial

of the unitary character of Romania. However, if these claims came from "radicals," the

spokesman of the congress reassured that the Magyar ethnics rejoiced all the rights and

they recognized the obligation to be faithful to Romania, as the Constitution asked for it.

The Romanian people were very sensitive to the Hungarian issue. One of their

biggest fears was a possible truncation of their national territory (Hungarians represented

6.6 percent of the entire Romanian population; the Hungarian political representatives are

very visible in the Romanian political spectrum).[68] So, for some Romanians, this fear

added up to the biggest fear: that NATO, the so dreamt-for alliance, was not only

[66] The other three countries were: Cyprus, Slovakia and Spain.
[67] Remus Opris was a member of the Chamber of Deputies for Prahova County (South East of Romania) from 1992 and 2000. "Opris Wants Explanations about 'the Strategic Partnership' in Transylvania." *Evenimentul Zilei*. 18 May 1999. Web. 18 Dec. 2010. <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/opris-vrea-lamuriri-despre-parteneriatul-strategic-din-transilvania-570230.html>.
[68] The data were retrieved from the last census of the Romanian population in 2002. "Census 2002". *The National Institute of Statistics*. Bucharest. 2002. Web. 15 March 2011. <www.insse.ro>.

conspiring for a new world order in which small countries were considered just an insignificant pawn on the big international chessboard, but was also supporting the raise of minorities to split with their mother country.

Despite divisions within the parliament and among the people, Romania supported NATO in the Kosovo campaign and granted approval for NATO to fly over Romanian airspace. Praised for its decision, within five years, Romania became a NATO member.

Back to NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, the voices against the alliance's actions were rather isolated both in the media and in the political arena. The media were populated by discourses that unfolded arguments sustaining a conspiracy atmosphere. Between a segment of the population against the intervention and a politics pro-intervention, the media found themselves in a delicate situation and chose the easiest way to conciliate both parties—allowing the expression of personal, isolated voices that could create only short reactions but not significant ones that could cause mass manifestations.

The myth of the conspiracy, in Girardet's view, reigned in an insecure world, a world in which some big power, sometimes kept secret for a long time, tried to take advantage of this state of facts. When the conspirator is discovered and punished, all one people's anxieties fly away and the society finds its equilibrium again. For the conspirator to be worthy of hatred, it needs to act in an unthinkable evil way, using all people as its slaves in its malefic concoctions.

In an article entitled "Romania should not poke her nose into Kosovo conflict," the Timis County deputy (Timis is a county that borders Serbia), Ovidiu Draganescu, argued that Romanians "are not a NATO or EU trailer," and they "shouldn't become

108

obedient and obsequious" ("Romania Should Not Poke" 11 Oct. 1999). For hundreds of years Yugoslavia had been a friend nation and Romanians, said Draganescu, should support their friends: "Timisoara [a city in western Romania bordering Yugoslavia] has nothing to do in this conflict." He implies that Romania, deploying a slavish attitude, let herself be dragged into an unjust conflict that was not hers. Moreover, Romania should have been on the side of her friends and brothers because one should prefer a friend to somebody we barely know (like NATO and America).

In the conspiracy theory, the conspirator always thinks big. The plotter always acts in conformity with a big plan. The big powers (the U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy) planned the invasion of Yugoslavia with 150,000 soldiers, cites the title of an article in *Evenimentul Zilei* ("The Big Powers" 31 May 1999). How hypocritical must these powers have been to even think to recruit medical stuff to be sent over after the military intervention, rhetorically asks the journalist. They must have been aware of the disastrous repercussions of their acts on the population if they thought in advance to send medical troops on the field.

The intervention in Kosovo was part of a new global order where small countries' fates are decided in "all sorts of offices." On the basis of the creed *divide et impera* (divide and rule), America planned to conquer little by little all the small countries. Was Romania perhaps the next in the line? One thing is sure, the Serbian population has suffered because it opposed NATO/America's pre-established plans. According to former Olt County (Romania) Deputy Mitzura Arghezi, "it is obvious even for the most ordinary citizen of this planet that this conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia does not mean anything else than an attempt to impose a new global order; the Serb nation is punished

because it did not consent to the shrinking of their country, planned in all kinds of offices." In the conspiracy myth, the plotter(s) meets in hidden, obsolete, dark, secret places, in "offices" where malefic decisions are made.

The NATO conspiracy myth was the occasion of the production of the movie *California Dreamin'* directed by Cristian Nemescu.[69] The movie presents a first contact between American soldiers and the Romanian population in a remote village in the southeast part of Romania. The movie story is inspired from a true event: a railway chief delayed for a few days a NATO train transporting military equipment in Kosovo during the war (despite the prime-minister's verbal authorization), which created an opportunity for the solders to interact with the local population. The railway chief considered the repercussions of NATO intervention and wanted to show that a simple Romanian citizen could give a lesson to the big NATO officials. The soldiers established friendships with the people that tried everything to make the soldiers' stay more enjoyable (and the mayor tries to use the presence of the Americans as a way to legitimize his desired reelection). The movie was distinguished with "Un Certain Regard Award" at the French Cannes festival in 2007.

---

[69] Cristian Nemescu died on August 24th, 2006 at age 27 in a car accident, leaving the film unedited. The film was made public in 2007. Nemescu, Cristian. *California Dreaming*. Internet Movie Database. Web. 10 Jan. 2011. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0449573/.

Chapter 4: Rhetorical Effects of NATO Myths

The discursive implications of NATO myths can be analyzed in four different steps, each using a different rhetorical theory. First, it is important to show why Romanians chose NATO to mythologize about from among a variety of Western values, personal figures or organizations. This first step uses the rhetoric of "terministic screens" developed by Kenneth Burke in *Language as Symbolic Action* (45-46). Second, one of the rhetorical implications of NATO discursive myths is the Romanians' attitudes toward the alliance that are analyzed using the Burkean study of "frames of acceptance" and "frames of rejection" in *Attitudes Toward History* (5-10). Third, the acceptance or rejection of NATO offered grounds for identification among Romanians on the basis of a public shared attitude. Fourth, NATO discursive myths contributed to the democratization of the Romanian public sphere by teaching Romanians a lesson of responsibility through a change in their vocabulary, replacing the first person plural "we" with the first person singular "I." This responsibility lesson is studied using Drakulić's insights in the book *Café Europa*.

A. NATO as Rhetorical Situation and Ideograph

NATO myths in Romania can also be analyzed using different rhetorical theories, such as the rhetorical situation defined by Lyold Bitzer (1-14) or the ideograph theorized by Michael McGee (425-440). However, these theories can only be partially applied to NATO discursive myths, and they leave out the fluidity of the argument that the mythological analysis offers. These theories can be applied to the different situations occasioned by NATO presence in Romania, but they cannot recompose the whole NATO narrative as the mythological analysis does. Girardet's characterization of the political myth has the merit of showing not only how the political myth really functions in a society and what roles it fills, but it also talks about the expectations that the people have from the myth. Even if Girardet proposes a theory of political myth, the way the myth acts creating a ground for identification is enough reason to make the political myth migrate in the realm of the cultural.

Rhetoric, says Bitzer, is situational and has a performative function: it performs a task, it produces some change in the *status quo* of a society; it persuades people to direct their actions in a certain direction. For Bitzer, situations exist independently of rhetoric and are discovered as a result of an appropriate *exigence* – an "imperfection," a "defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done" that can be "corrected" with rhetorical action. Rhetors then fill in situations with "fitting" discourse, which they present before an *audience* that has the potential of being influenced, and is governed by particular *constraints* (6-7).

In order to create a ground for action, the rhetoric needs at least two agents: a rhetor and an audience. In the rhetorical situation defined by Bitzer, the rhetor creates persuasive messages that call for change and the audience has the power to perform that change in the society; it is a second persona imagined by the rhetor that becomes an agent of change. During the transition period there is a multitude of rhetors that address and create the narrative of NATO myths, and these rhetors can interchange roles with the audience: political leaders, civil society, media and even ordinary people become one by one the audience and creators of discourses.

The Romanian transition period called for a rhetorical situation in the sense that the society needed a change. "Let us regard the rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance" (Bitzer 5). The modern Romanian civilization is essentially a civilization of transition characterized by an enthusiastic search for what others can offer and a fear of what might be lost by making contact with others, a transition illustrated by an amalgam of opposing feelings of fascination and rejection. In these conditions, the exigence is marked by a necessity of discussing about the political and cultural difficulties, as well as proposing solutions to deal with them.

NATO myths proposed a change. In the case of the salvation myth, it proposed the resolution of all troubles for Romanians, and in the case of the conspiracy myth, it meant for some part of the population a threat to the orthodox world or a precedence for the Hungarian population to separate from the mother country. During the transition period in Romania, the *exigence* for a rhetorical act was manifested in urgent questions that waited for an answer. NATO helped in finding pertinent responses to these

questions: Are Romanians really free? Are they supposed to belong to the West, who is a model of society worthy to be followed? And who is to help them overcome the difficult times of transition? The nature of the transition period itself offers an exigence, for it was a period of struggle, of obstacles that needed to be surpassed. NATO discursive myths responded to this exigence by offering a salvation rhetoric when the discourses presented NATO as a friend from the West that lent a hand to Romanians, or a conspiracy rhetoric when the alliances carried the blame for the evils of the Romanian society, as in the case of the Kosovo war.

Another constituent of Bitzer's theory of rhetorical situation is "constraints," by which he means those elements that have the power to potentially "constrain [the] decision and action needed to modify exigence. Standard sources of constraint include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives, and the like" (Bitzer 8). In the Romanian transition period, a lot of elements could be understood as rhetorical constraints that could put a hold on the transformation of Romania in the country that Romanians dream to live in. One of these constraints might have been the ideological resistance to change of the old communist elite that governed after 1989 and that makes the process of NATO and EU integration linger more than in other countries. Other constraints concerned Europe's and NATO's reluctance to receive Romania into their big Western family immediately after 1989. There were also religious constrains during the Kosovo war that made some Romanians see NATO in an unfavorable light. There were numerous other constraints that prevented the Romanian people from acting as a real audience capable of producing change. The numerous constraints abovementioned prevented Romanian society from a smoother path to democracy.

However, even though the rhetorical situation can explain in part the shift in

NATO myths and rhetorical devices, it leaves out a certain fluidity of the argument, for

there is no continuity of NATO narrative if this theory is applied. If one is to apply the

rhetorical situation, one should analyze the NATO salvation myth as a different situation

than the conspiracy myth, because each happened in a different period of time, and the

rhetorical situation is all about time. While the rhetorical situation can be useful to

present the context and offer good insights about the constraints, the audience and the

rhetor, Girardet's schema of political/cultural myths proposes a continuous fluid narrative

of NATO in the transition period in Romania, elucidating the complex mechanism of

myth creation. Girardet's views on myth also explain how people created attitudes around

myths that permitted the ground for the formation of a sense of identity. Feeling that they

belonged to a community of beliefs in a myth, people identied with each other, for they

shared the same interest—either in spreading that myth or trying to impose it as a viable

solution for the needs/issues of the moment.

NATO myths have also a tinge of ideograph, which McGee defines as shortcuts to

ideology, with very strong persuasive virtues:

> Though words only (and not claims) such terms as "property," "religion,"
> "right of privacy," "freedom of speech," "rule of law," and "liberty" are
> more pregnant than propositions ever could be. They are the basic
> elements, the building blocks, of ideology. Thus they may be thought of as
> "ideographs," for, like Chinese symbols, they signify and "contain" a
> unique ideological *commitment*; further, they presumptuously suggest that
> each member of a community will see as a gestalt every complex nuance
> in them. ("The Ideograph" 428)

While McGee argues that the ideograph does not change meaning over time, NATO

discursive myths shifted all the time and in completely opposite directions: here it

signified salvation, there it meant conspiracy. In addition, public attitudes toward

ideographs remain always the same, mainly an attitude of acceptance (e.g., "freedom of speech"). NATO could be an ideograph if it meant only salvation for Romanians from the beginning of the myth formation, but NATO also meant conspiracy, as previously shown.

Another common point between NATO myths and NATO as ideograph resides in both rhetorical devices' potential of identification. Ideograph makes people "belong" to a community of ideological orientation. Moreover, ideograph has an exclusive dimension also, because "each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a prerequisite for 'belonging' to the society" (McGee "The Ideograph" 435). Myth proposes the same recipe for identification; myth believers create a community of sense and identify on the basis of a shared vocabulary and shared beliefs. The only difference consists once again in the fact that in the case of the ideograph, the meaning does not change throughout time.

The cultural ideograph (that combines mythology and ideology) invites people to see (perceive) the idea as well as the image beyond the terms (*graphe* in Greek means something written; a diagram; a chart; a picture or image). The image (image) and the idea (ideology) juxtapose to form a whole that has even more rhetorical powers over the people than the two elements taken apart. NATO was from this standpoint only an idea; there was no representative semiotic image of NATO in Romania.

McGee talks about the synchronic and diachronic function of the ideograph and here, too, NATO myths filled in these functions. The public motives behind the formation of NATO myths (such as the cultural and identity crisis Romanians were confronted with after the fall of communism) had a synchronic structure that sometimes ignored the historical antecedents (seeing NATO as the American savior, Romanians forget that they

have been bombarded in 1943 and 1944 by the U.S.). NATO represented two different myths over the period of the Romanian transition (hence its diachronic structure) to encompass not only a promise of salvation, but also a threat of an international plot.

Besides a synchronic and diachronic structure, NATO discursive myths also had an internal and an external one (as Romanians tended to relate to an external other). An ideograph is projected in the present, depending in most of the cases on the meanings it had in the recent past in an overgrowing context. The internal structure of NATO myths was represented by the attitudes the Romanian audience manifested during different periods of times when NATO meaning shifted from acceptance to rejection. The external structure of NATO myths is illustrated by how Romanians related to others, as they saw themselves as being more at the West than at the East, rejecting their positioning in the Balkan area, or their stereotyping as still closely related to Russia. These structures are not mentioned in McGee's theory of ideograph.

In societies in transition, myths weave through the culture and the politics in chaotic directions, morphing frames of acceptance of who is for the public good and frames of rejection as to who is responsible for the bad. For this reason, NATO cannot be analyzed through the lens of the theory of ideographs; it did not have a stable, unique meaning.

Even though NATO myths shifted regularly and often dialectically, they seemed to keep as a permanent feature, the identification potential by a permanent projected spatial relationship between the Romanian people and the others—and an ongoing redefinition of the dichotomist equations good/evil, savior/conspirator. Consequently, the most important discursive implication of NATO myths is the identification power they

exerted on the Romanian population; they identified on the basis of the construction of NATO myths, with the help of the rhetoric that contributed to this creation.

There are three steps in the process of identification on the basis of NATO myths. The first step consists of the selection of the alliance to materialize the myths of salvation and of conspiracy from a variety that are available on the rhetorical scene of the transition period in Romania. Why Romanians chose NATO to mythologize about can be explained using the Burkean theory of terministic screens. The second step consists of creating a myth around the alliance by first accepting it as a salvation or rejecting it as a threat (using Burkean frames of acceptance and of rejection). The third step is creating a vocabulary shared by a large community, a vocabulary that sets the ground for changing attitudes and ideologies (Romanians replaced the first person plural with the first person singular, changing an ideology of communal responsibility for one of personal responsibility).

B. NATO's Terministic Screens

The words select only few things (or "perspectives") to be seen from a multitude of possibilities and therefore reflect some things and push them away from others. In NATO's case, the discursive myths it generated represent a selection from a large palette of myths that reactivated in the transition period through the new adopted vocabulary of democracy. Words, thus, do not reproduce reality, but construct it. Kenneth Burke suggests that our reality is always projected on a "terministic screen," which ignores a lot of details related to the complex nature of human's acts. "Even if any given terminology

is a *reflection* of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a *selection* of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a *deflection* of reality." ("Language as Symbolic Action" 45-46). If the world, or our perception of that world, is shaped rhetorically, then our terministic screen is fundamentally subjective. In Burke's view, power is a form of language that shapes our cultural attitudes.

Why did Romanians choose to align their cultural orientations around NATO and not another organization? From a discursive standpoint, the story about NATO was for them a real hope of change, a promise of Western acceptance; the words used for NATO myths were highly appealing in the years after the revolution for the reasons above mentioned. When Romanians created NATO myths, they were convinced that they acted in the name of a cultural belief (that NATO would bring them a Western orientation, for example) while in reality they were obedient to a language that imprisoned them in a rhetorical/cultural trap.

However, the terministic screens on which NATO myths were projected and that deflected from the reality of the moment helped Romanians to overcome the difficulties of the transition period. If they became prisoners of NATO discursive myths, they did so with their own will. Consequently, the terministic screen of NATO is a screen on which Romanians saw what they needed to see in order to satisfy their aspirations after 1989—even if it was in terms of a projected salvation or a potential enemy. The hopes illustrated in the discursive myths of NATO influenced Romanians' attitudes toward the West; on the terministic screen of the transition period, Romanians saw projected frames of

acceptance and of rejection of the alliance, constituting the second step in the NATO

mythologizing process.[70]

C. NATO: Frames of Acceptance and Rejection

According to Burke, terministic screens act as rhetorical blinders, channeling

human attitudes in certain directions predetermined by the selection of vocabularies.

Romanians' attitudes toward NATO and illustrated in the mentioned discursive myths

shift from acceptance of the alliance—as a promise to be accepted in the West, a promise

of economic development and democratic change and a carrier of the war on terror

(briefly a savior)—to rejection of it (setting the ground for conspiracy myth) during the

Kosovo war, when NATO posed a threat to the Orthodox world and set up the grounds

for a precedence of separatism (Hungarians that took a model from the Kosovars to ask

for their independence).

Burke analyzes the dialectic between "frames of acceptance" and "frames of

rejection," where a frame of acceptance puts an over-emphasis on what is favorable, and

an under-emphasis on any unfavorable consequences. A frame of rejection keeps the

focus on the unfavorable, leaving out the positive repercussions ("Attitudes Toward

History" 3-5). Burke argues that frames are both an attitude and a process: "By 'frames of

acceptance' we mean the more or less organized system of meanings by which a thinking

man gauges the historical situation and adopts a role with relation to it" ("Attitudes

---

[70] In *Attitudes Toward History* Kenneth Burke sees "frame" as a worldview that one can call grand
narratives (5).

Toward History" 5). Such frames are distinguished from those that emphasize "rejection." Burke explains, "[Rejection] takes its color from an attitude towards some reigning symbol of authority, stressing a *shift in the allegiance* to symbols of authority" ("Attitudes Toward History" 21).

In other words, the acceptance frames encourage compliance with a given order, while rejection frames encourage the change of that order. In the case of the candidacy of Romania for NATO integration, the attitude of the people was one of support, Romanians showing allegiance to NATO as an international authority. During the Kosovo war people shifted attitudes to reject NATO bombardment of Serbia. In both cases, there was a lot of exaggeration; an over-emphasis was put on everything that justified the public attitude.

Burke's assumption is that no selection can reproduce the whole of reality. NATO discursive selection stands for reality and opposes two myths (salvation and conspiracy). The synecdoche of NATO was so representative for the Romanian transition period that it was assimilated into ideology, collective memory and myth.[71] These shifts in between meanings given to NATO, each corresponding to a different mythology, constitute a characteristic of the discursive myths of transition, where people, due to an unsettled rhetoric and vocabularies, permanently negotiate the meanings of words.

---

[71] Synecdoche is a figure of speech by which a part is put in for the whole (as fifty sails, for fifty ships), the whole for a part (as society for high society), the species for the genus (as cutthroat for assassin), the genus for the species (as a creature for a man), or the name of the material for the thing made (as boards for stage) "synecdoche." *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.* 2008. Web. 3 Feb. 2011 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/synecdoche .

Accepting NATO as part of their everyday vocabulary, Romanians adopted an

attitude that contributed to the adoption of a Western culture that the alliance represents

during the transition period and that offers grounds for identification.

D. Identity and Identification through NATO Myths

To use a Burkean slogan, the people should be perceived as *bodies* with basic

needs *that learn language*, with entelechial needs, needs for self perfection, *in*

communities—with needs of identification and consubstantiality ("Language as Symbolic

Action" 3-24). One way of creating identity is by an enthymematic understanding,

meaning that the members of an audience consider themselves to be the only ones

knowledgeable enough about a subject, the only ones able to fill in the missing premise.

Romanians reached consensus on the basis of enthymematic knowledge about NATO – if

media presented bits of information about the alliance, Romanians recomposed the whole

message and decided that integration was beneficial, or not. As an enthymematic

audience, they needed to supply the elided assumptions from the syllogism by an

"intertextual network of experiences and associations," by shared beliefs and

vocabularies that strengthened their identity ties (Scenters-Zapico 71).

Romanians displayed three kinds of identities: (1) an individual identity that

contributed to the creation of a national identity (very strongly related to a cultural

identity as it refers to well-established values and beliefs), (2) a regional identity (how

Romanians were in relation to their neighboring cultures), and (3) an international

identity (how they were in relation to remote cultures that they could only "imagine").[72]

The Romanians used the rhetoric around NATO as a way of creating a national identity based on democratic values, an identity that acted "as an overarching discourse of national definition, rather than ethic, nationalistic, or political discourse so prevalent in each and every country of Eastern and Central Europe in the aftermath of communism" (Marin "The Other Side(s) of History" 219). Romanians created identity after 1989 by the use of rhetoric, as they became persuaded in adopting NATO vocabulary. The American scholar Kenneth Burke believes that in identifying with the interests of another person, one becomes consubstantial with that other:

> A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is *identified* with B. Or he may *identify himself* with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes they are, or is persuaded to believe so. . . . In being identified with B, A is "substantially one" with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time, he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another. ("A Rhetoric of Motives" 20-21)

The word *substance* is a Burkean concept used to designate what a thing is (something intrinsic to it), but it derives from a word that designates what a thing is not. Etymologically, the word refers to something outside the thing, exterior, extrinsic to it, a thing's context. "And a thing's *context* being outside, beyond the thing is *something that the thing is not*," whence a paradox [emphasis added] (Burke, "Grammar of Motives" 23). The paradox of substance in the NATO case exists in that the alliance offers grounds for identification through two different, paradoxical myths: salvation vs. conspiracy. To

---

[72] Benedict Anderson defines nation as an imagined community, but not in the sense that it is unreal or false: "It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community. . . . Communities are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuiness, but by the style in which they are imagined." Benedict, Anderson. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1991: 6-7.

"identify with" is to become consubstantial, but, at the same time, as rhetoric shows us, "to begin with 'identification' is, by the same token, though roundabout, to confront the implications of division" (Burke, "Rhetoric of Motives" 22). Identification, Burke says, is "affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim unity" ("Rhetoric of Motives" 22). In this vein, Romanians, even if separated in their views about NATO, continued to create identity because divided (as in the Kosovo case) or united by a same belief (or attitude), they gathered together and constructed a new language, different than the one before 1989. Fabricating a hero, NATO, Romanians became close and had a sense of community and belonging to that community of shared belief. Even in the case of those who considered NATO as a villain, there was a community of those gathered together under the same idea. In both cases, Romanians became consubstantials by sharing a common language or vocabulary, by creating and recreating myths around NATO as the historical contexts changed in the tormented period of transition.

As paradoxically as it may seem, the dialectics around NATO contributed further to the identification of Romanian people, as identification implies not only consubstantiality, but division as well.

E. "I" vs. "We" – The Responsibility Lesson

The Romanian society before 1989 was committed to a communal ideology in which the individual's existence was related to the group and to the others, an ideology in

which everybody was avoiding having to take responsibility. Because everything was collectively owned, says Drakulić in *Café Europa*, no one was really responsible. No one was in charge, no one cared, and every individual was absolved of responsibility; he or she delegated it to a higher level, to an institution, to the Party. In addition, Romanians were exposed to "comparative freedom," meaning they had to compare themselves with those who had less than they did, never with those who had more; "to those who [were] worse off, never the better off" (Drakulić 29).

After 1989 a part of Romanians continued to leave with the communal ideology, while for others taking life in their own hands meant one of the most important gains of democracy. From a communal ideology resulted a specific mechanism of identity creation and consequently, a particular rhetorical expression: the first person plural. "We" represented the rhetoric of Romanian's public officials and media before communism and was intended to bring a sense of community. After 1989, saying "we" was replaced by saying "I": "How does a person who is the product of a totalitarian society learn responsibility, individuality, initiative? By saying 'no.' But this begins by saying 'I,' thinking 'I' and doing 'I'—and in public as well as in private," says Drakulić (3-4). The sources of freedom are sometimes found in simple words such as "I" and "no."

While in Romania everybody avoided speaking under their own name, in Western countries people and rulers both use "I" as a way of empowerment, as a way of gaining ethos (e.g., in the speech president Bush delivered at Ground Zero, three days after 9/11, he says to the workers, "I can hear you, the rest of the world hears you"). The use of pronouns becomes representative for the context of societies in transition, for it speaks a great deal about the identity formation, about people's way of constructing cultural

125

identity. "We" became a demeaning form of addressing that stirred bad connotation, being overused during communist times. "I" meant empowerment; "I" promised a totally new world where the individual counted. These pronouns have distinctive meanings and induce action in different ways from one political system to another. Even in the civilized countries, the pronoun "we" is used to deflect responsibility.

NATO discursive myths were created on the basis of a democratic vocabulary that addressed the individual at first person, singular. The articles about NATO represented either individual voices that uttered an opinion, or editorials that were representative of a journal's position. In both cases, "I" implied responsibility for what was told about NATO. Through a simple syllogism, it meant that talking about NATO and learning how to use the 'I' instead of "we," being aware that the words one said had repercussions, taught Romanians a lesson of responsibility. Terminologies made Romanians adopt an attitude that involved responsibility (Drakulić 3).

Time and again the "we" rhetorically dissimulated a comparison of "us" vs. "them," offering ground for conflict. "That hideous first-person plural troubles me for another reason, too. I saw at firsthand how dangerous it can be, how easily it can become infected by the deadly diseases of nationalism and war" (Drakulić 3). It also reminded Romanians of the period of the Cold War, when they felt frustrated about living isolated in the East. It reminded them of the Warsaw Pact that did not protect its members according to its *raison d'être* (as with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), and of NATO (that represented a promise of change).

The starting point of the democratization of Romanian society dwelled in changing the rhetoric around the use of the pronouns "I" and "we," which moved an

entire ideology based on the dialectical opposition accountability/irresponsibility. The audience adjusted quickly to these new rhetorical conditions imposed by NATO democratic values. It started with the adoption of the term "I," meaning "responsibility" in the Romanians' vocabulary, this being perhaps the starting point of a democratic transformation.

Conclusions

Romania's path to accession into NATO was not one paved with flowers. On the contrary, it was a complex process where imaginary, mythology and history intermingled to create a new sense of belonging for a Romanian people that lose their sense of cultural identity in a difficult period of transition.

The prevailing presence of Western images and myths in the first years after 1989 indicates the power of the democratic fascination exerted by the West. The insistence on the European-American dimension was a general trend in Romania and acted as a culturally de-Russifying (where Russia means the East and Soviet way of living) and de-communization symbols. NATO also meant for Romanians the opposite of the Warsaw Pact and was seen as a winner of the Cold War. But most importantly, NATO was also seen as a security provider for the Romanian people after a dictatorship period that left them in bad relations with both West and East. After the revolution of 1989 Romania remained without a protecting umbrella, fearing that her sovereignty could be lost and imagining all sorts of scenarios, each having its rhetorical correspondence (of salvation or of conspiracy).

The West, represented by NATO, showed Romania that it could provide security guarantees and ways of identification through shared cultural values. These mythological projections occasioned the formation of the discursive myths of NATO, only possible in

the conditions offered by the Romanian situation after 1989. The Romanian audience as an active force of the transition period, together with the public intellectuals and media revive myths from the past, imbued them with renewed meanings and applied them to NATO during different periods of time, through a permanent process of mythological and discursive production.

NATO's opposing cultural meanings as a Western promise of salvation or a potential threat say a great deal about the cultural and political characteristics of the unsettled societies in transition, in which beliefs and values were negotiated and renegotiated on a daily basis. The evolution of NATO narrative into a myth followed the state of spirit of the Romanian populations and witnessed it evolving toward a democratic society. Immediately after 1989, Romanians' enthusiasm in joining the alliance was unprecedented, as was their joy in being free after so many years of harsh dictatorship. Their enthusiasm diminished when NATO did not integrate Romania in the first wave of enlargement and when domestically the conditions of living depreciated. Therefore, 1999 represented a disappointment for Romanians for at least two reasons: Romania was not received in the Western family of NATO, and the Kosovo war demonstrated that NATO was capable of errors. Despite critiques toward NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, Romanians' support for NATO integration (especially that of intellectual elites and political leaders) remained unchanged; they believed their country would benefit in the long run if it joined the alliance.

The NATO myths that shifted throughout the transition period were loyal witnesses to Romania's strenuous path to democracy. The NATO myths encompassed the

narrative of history of post-communist Romania and succeeded where other texts failed, in reuniting people around the same vocabulary.

The ideas around NATO helped Romanians to rediscover their cultural identity on the basis of a shared terminology of democracy, security, stability, and cultural and economic gains. The construction of NATO myths vocabulary became a rhetorical assembly with major discursive consequences on the public sphere of the transition period: (1) It offered Romanians multiple occasions to refer to their history and thus to rewrite it, (2) it offered them a lesson of responsibility (acting as a de-communization rhetorical strategy), (3) it taught them how to make informed decisions (about the acceptance or rejection of NATO acts), and (4) eventually it taught them the democracy language. This was the spirit of the years following the events of 1989: the emergence of what Habermas calls the "public sphere of civil society," so necessary for Romania to overcome her communist past and open new paths to democracy.

As Romania joined NATO and the EU, the country felt it had a word to say in the world's politics. An interesting venue for future studies is the rhetorical analysis of the NATO summit in the Romanian capital Bucharest in April 2008, where important decisions were made concerning the future of the alliance. Romania competed for the organization of this summit with Portugal and received support from the United States to organize the summit. American Secretary of State Nicholas Burns said in December 2006 that Romania deserved the honor to hold this event due to her contribution to the Alliance's common effort in the war in Afghanistan and for providing stability in the Iraq War. The rhetoric of the NATO summit justified once again a process of identification of Romanian people who found a common vocabulary that addressed the need to work on

preparing the summit and realized that there was still more to be done (like redressing the roads and repairing buildings). Perceived as a national celebration, the NATO summit positioned and recognized Romania in the region and in the entire world as a mouthpiece for peace and stability.

Although since 1990, Romania has made great progress in civil liberties, respect for human rights and institutionalizing democratic principles (the 1991 Constitution proclaimed Romania a democracy and market economy), corruption, a budget deficit and high inflation are but a few stigma Romania still confronts these days. In the end, the country successfully convinced the West that it was worthy of trust and integration into the alliance in 2004. In 2007 the European Union was giving reasons to Wolchick to declare that "for most of the modern history, Romanians have usually gotten what they wanted" (317).

Today, as the Euro-Atlantic integration has succeeded and the social structures have been modernized with the emergence of a stronger and stronger civil society, the differences between the Romanians and the Westerners are attenuated, but still existent. One may hope, however, that "the things which bring us closer to each other will prove stronger than those which separate us, or which we think separate us" (Boia 151). One may also hope that the salvation sought by Romanians after the revolution of 1989 has come and that now they are prepared to use it in a positive direction.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aghazarian, Aram and Herbert, Simons. *Form, Genre, and the Study of Political*

    Discourse. 1st ed. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1986. Print.

Albright, Madeleine. "Testimony." *The Senate Armed Service Committee Conference*.

    U.S. Department of State. Washington, DC. April 23, 1997, Dispatch 8: 16-20.

    Print.

Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses." *The Anthropology of the*

    State: A Reader. Eds. Gupta Akhil and Aradhana Sharma. Oxford: Blackwell

    Publishing, 2006. Print.

Antohi, S. and V. Tismaneanu. *Between Past and Future. The Revolutions of 1989 and*

    Their Aftermath. Budapest: CEU Press, 2000. Print.

Arbatov, A. "The Kosovo Crisis: the End of the Post-Cold War Era." Occasional Paper.

    The Atlantic Council of the United States. Washington, DC. March 2000. Print.

Arbuthnot, James. "The Bucharest Summit and the Future of NATO." *The R.U.S.I.*

    Journal 153. 3 (2008): 40- 44. Print.

Arghezi, Mitzura. *Attitude Against the NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia*. The Romanian

    Parliament. Bucharest, 7 April 1999. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Aristotle. *Rhetoric.* Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Vol. 2,

    Complete Works: the Revised Oxford Translation. 2 Vols. Princeton: Princeton

    UP, 1984. Print.

Ash, Timothy. "Conclusions." *Between Past and Future. The Revolutions of 1989 and*

    Their Aftermath. Eds. Sorin Antohi and Vladimir Tismaneanu. Budapest: CEU

    Press, 2000. 325-402. Print.

---. "Eastern Europe: Après le Deluge, Nous." *Writing on the East: Selected Essays on*

    Eastern Europe. New York: The New York Review of Books, 1990. 21-51. Print.

Asmus, Ronald. *Opening NATO's Door*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

    Print.

Asmus, Ronald; Richard Kugler and Stephen Larrabee,. "Building a New NATO?"

    Foreign Affairs 72. 4 (1993): 28-40. SAGE. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Austin, J. L. *How to do Things with Words*. Eds. Urmson J. and Sbisà Marina. 2nd ed.

    Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975. Print

Aybet, Gulnur. "NATO's New Missions." *Journal of International Affairs* 4.1 (March-

    May 1999): 65-75. SAGE. Web. 7 Nov. 2010.

Barany, Zoltan and Ivan Volgyes(eds.). *The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe.*

    Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Print.

Barthes, Roland. *Mythologies*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1972. Print.

Basescu, Traian. Speech. *229th Commemoration of the Independence Day*. United States

    Embassy. Bucharest, 5 July 2005. Web. 5 Sep. 2007. <www. presidency.ro>.

Baudrillard, Jean. *Simulacra and Simulation*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

    1994. Print.

Baun, Michael J. *An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration*. Boulder, Colo. [u.a.: Westview Press, 1996. Print.

Benedict, Anderson. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1991. Print.

Bennett, Lance, W. "Political Sanctification: The Civil Religion and American Politics." *Social Science Information* 14. 6 (December 1975): 79-102. Print.

Bird, Elisabeth. and Robert Dardenne. "Myth, Chronicle and Story. Exploring the Narrative Qualities of News." *Media, Myths, and Narratives : Television and the Press*. Ed. Carey, James W. Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1988. 67-85. Print.

Bitzer, Lloyd. "The Rhetorical Situation". *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 1-14.

Black, Edwin. "The Second Persona." *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader.* Eds. John Louis Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit and Sally Caudill. New York: Guilford Press, 1999. 331 -340. Print.

Blankson, Isaac and Patrick Murphy (eds.) "Negotiating Democracy: Media Transformations in Emerging Democracies." *Global Media Studies.* SUNY series 2007. Print.

Boia, Lucian. *History and Myth in Romanian Conscience*. Humanitas: Bucharest, 1997.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. R. Nice, transl. Volume 16. Print.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Print.

Boyle, Peter. "The Cold War Revisited: Review Article." *Journal of Contemporary History* 35. 3 (July 2000): 479-489. Print.

Braud, Philippe. *Le jardin des délices démocratiques : pour une lecture psychoaffective des régimes pluralistes.* Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques: Paris, 1991. Print.

Brock, Bernard and Robert, Lee Scott (eds.). *Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth-Century Perspective.* 2nd ed. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1980. Print.

Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: England, 1996. Print.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives.* 1st ed. New York: Basic Books, 1997. Print.

Buckley, Mary and Cummings, Sally. *Kosovo. Perceptions of War and Its Aftermath*. London, New York: Continuum, 2001. Print.

Bucsa, Lavinia. *NATO in the Post-Cold War Era - the New York Times' Reaction to the Enlargement and to Romania's Candidacy*. FAU Library. 2004. Print.

Buescher, Derek and Ono, Kent. "Civilized Colonialism: Pocahontas as Neocolonial Rhetoric." *Women's Studies in Communication* 19. 2 (Summer 1996): 127-153.

Buraga, Sabin. *Web Technologies*. 2007. 1 Nov. 2010. Web. 10 February 2011.

Burawoy, Michael and Katherine Verdery. *Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Print

Burgchardt, Carl. *Readings in Rhetorical Criticism*. State College, Pa.: Strata Pub., 1995. Print.

Burke, Kenneth. "Ideology and Myth." *Accent* 7 (Summer 1947): 195-205. Print.

---. *A Grammar of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945. Print.

---. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Print.

---. *Attitudes Toward History*. New York: The New Republic, 1937. Print.

---. *Language as Symbolic Action. Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*. Berkeley:

     University of California Press, 1966. Print.

---. *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961. Print.

Campbell, Karlyn and Thomas Burkholder. *Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric*. 2nd ed.

     Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub, 1997. Print.

Carey, Henry and Rafal Raciborski. "Postcolonialism: A Valid Paradigm for the Former

     Sovietized States and Yugoslavia?" *East European Politics & Societies* 18. 2

     (May 2004): 191-235**.** *SAGE.* Web. 14 January 2011.

Carey, James. *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society*. Boston: Unwin

     Hyman, 1989. Print.

---. *Media, Myths, and Narratives: Television and the Press*. Newbury Park, CA. Sage

     Publications, 1988. Print.

Cassirer, Ernst. *The Myth of the State*. New Haven. London: Yale University Press, 1946.

    Print.

Castoriadis, Cornelius. *Les Carrefours du labyrinthe*. *La Montée de l'insignifiance*. Seuil,

     1996. Print.

Cohen, Lenard J. *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milos   .*

     Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 2001. Print.

Coman, Mihai. "Media Bourgeoisie and Media Proletariat in Post-Communist Romania."

     Journalism Studies 5. 1 (2004): 45-59. Print.

---. "Media Romanian Television and the Challenges of European Integration." *Trends in Communication* 12. 4 (2004): 211-222. Print.

Constantinescu, Emil. "Address at the *Plenary Session of the Council for Euro-Atlantic Partnership*. Washington, DC. 25 Apr. 1999. Web. 10 September 2009.

---. "The Security of Central Europe – Repairing the Division of Central-Europe." *NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making*. Czech Republic: Prague. 21-25 Jun. 1997. Print.

Cooley, Alexander. "Base Politics." *Foreign Affairs* 84 (2005): 79-92. Print.

Cornfield, Michael. "The Watergate Audience. Parsing the Powers of the Press." *Media, Myths, and Narratives: Television and the Press*. Ed. James Carey. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1988. 180-204. Print.

Cornish, Paul. "European Security: The End of Architecture and the new NATO." *International Affairs* 72. 4 (1996): 751-69. Print.

---. "NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation." *International Affairs* 80.1 (2004): 63-74. Print.

Crawford, Beverly and Arend Lijphart. "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms and International Pressures." *Comparative Political Studies* 28. 2 (July 1995): 171-199. Print.

Croan, Melvin. "Lands In-Between: The Politics of Cultural Identity in Contemporary Eastern Europe." *East European Politics and Societies* 3. 2 (Spring 1989): 176-197. Print.

Dardenne, Robert and Elizabeth Bird. "Myth, Chronicle and Story: Exploring the Narrative Qualities of News." Carey, James (ed.), *Media, Myth and Narrative*. Sage: London, 1988. Print.

Debord, Guy. *Society of the Spectacle*. Detroit: Black & Red, 1983. Print.

Deletant, Dennis. *Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989*. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Print.

---. *Romania under Communist Rule*. Iasi, Romania: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999.Web. 24 September 2009.

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. Print.

Delporte, Christian. *Une histoire de la langue de bois*. Paris: Flammarion, 2009. Print.

Dempsey, Gary. *Theater of the Absurd in Kosovo*. Washington. D.C.: CATO Institute, 1991. Print.

Donnelly, Tom. "Rethinking NATO." *NATO Review* Summer 2003. Web. 15 Mar. 2011.

Drakulić, Slavenka. *Café Europa. Life After Communism*. New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1996. Print.

Drommond, L. "Movies and Myth. Theoretical Skirmishes." *American Journal of Semiotics* 3. 2 (1984): 1-32. *SAGE.* Web. 18 Jan. 2011.

Duffield, John S. "NATO's Functions after Cold War." *Political Science Quarterly* 109. 5 (1994-1995): 763-787. *SAGE.* Web. 18 Jan. 2011.

Duignan, Peter. *NATO: Its Past, Present and Future*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000. Print.

Dumhoff, William. *Who Rules America? Power and Politics*. (fourth ed.) Boston: McGraw-Hill

      Companies, 2002. Print.

Duncan, Light and David Phinnemore. *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with*

      Transition. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001.

      Print.

During, Simon. (ed.) *The Cultural Studies Reader*. London and New York: Routledge,

      1993. Print.

Dutu, Alexandru. "National and Regional Identity." *Southeast Europe. Balkans: A Mirror*

      of the New International Order 78. Eds. G. G. Ozdogan and K. Saybasili

      Istanbul: EREN, 1995. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Ekiert, Grzegorz. "Democratisation Processes in East Central Europe." *British Journal of*

      Political Science 21. 3 (July 1991): 285-314. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Eliade, Mircea. *Mythes, reves et mysteres*. Univers Enciclopedic: Bucharest, 1998. Print.

Fenno, Richard F. *The Yalta Conference*. Boston: Heath, 1955. Print.

Flood, Christopher. "Some European Thoughts in the Wake of 9/11." *South Central*

      Review 19. 2/3 (2002): 50-63. *SAGE*. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

---. *Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge,

2002.Foucault, Michel and Colin, Gordon. *Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and*

OtherWritings. 1972-1977. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1980. Print.

Foucault, Michel. "Is it Really Important to Think? An interview." *Philosophical and*

      Social Criticism 9 (1982): 29-40. Web. 15 Jan. 2011.

---. *Archaeology of Knowledge.* London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Print.

Fried, Richard. *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective*. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990. Print.

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Cornell University
Press, 1992. Print.

Gallagher, Tom. "Balkan but Different: Romania and Bulgaria's Contrasting Paths to
NATO Membership, 1994-2002." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition
Politics* 20. 4 (December 2004): 1-19. Print.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays*. New York: Basic
Books, 1973. Print.

Gibler, Douglas M. "East or Further East?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36. 6 (1999): 627-
637. *SAGE*. 20 Dec. 2010.

Girardet, Raoul. *Mythes et Mythologies Politiques*. Editions du Seuil: Paris, 1986. Print.

Goldgeier, James. *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999. Print.

Granville, Johanna. "9-11: A Wakeup Call for NATO and the European Union?" *Global
Society* 16. 4 (2002): 439-446. *SAGE*. 10 Jan. 2010.

Greenfield, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press. 1992. Print.

Grilli, Enzo. *The European Community and the Developing Countries.* Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993. Print.

Gross, Peter and Vladimir Tismaneanu. "No NATO Shelter for Romania". *Transitions*
4.7 (1997): 26-31. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Gupta, Akhil and Aradhana Sharma. *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*. Malden,

    MA. Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2006.

Habermas, Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a*

    Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991. Print.

Hallin D., and S Papathanasopoulos. "Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern

    Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective." *Media, Culture, and*

    Society 24 (2002): 175-195. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Harries, Owen. "The Collapse of 'The West'."*Foreign Affairs* 72. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993):

    41-53. SAGE. Web. 15 Dec. 2010.

Havel Vaclav. "Words on Words." *Writing on the East: Selected Essays on Eastern*

    Europe. New York: The New York Review of Books, 1990. 7-21. Print.

---. *Summer Meditations*. Vintage Books. Random House, Inc.: New York, 1993. Print.

Havel, Vaclav and John Keane. *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in*

    Central-Eastern Europe. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1985. Print.

Hillenbrand, Martin, J. "NATO and Western Security in an Era of Transition".

    International Security 2. 2 (Autumn 1977): 3-24. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Hix, Simon. *The Political System of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave

    Macmillan, 2005. Print.

Iliescu, Ion. Press Release. *Romania's integration into NATO*. 21 November 2002.Web.

    15 Dec. 2010. www.presidency.ro

Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report: Conflict,*

    International Response, Lessons Learned. Oxford. New York: Oxford University

    Press, 2000. Print.

Ionescu, Mihail and Kurt Treptow (eds.) *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration.* Iaşi, Romania. Portland, Or.: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999. Print.

Ishiyama, John and Andras Bozoki. "Adaptation and Change: Characterizing the Survival Strategies of the Communist Successor Parties." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 17. 3 (2001): 32-51. Web. 15 Dec. 2010.

Ivie, Robert. *Democracy and America's War on Terror*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005. Print.

---. *Dissent from War*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2007. Print.

Janos, Andrew. *East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. Print.

Jervis, Robert and Jack Snyder (ed.). *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Print.

Judt, Tony. *A Grand Illusion?: An Essay on Europe*. 1st ed. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996. Print.

---. *Postwar : A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005. Print.

Kaiser, Robert, G. "Romania Digs out from Collapse of Communism/Country Views NATO as Chance for 'New Beginning'". *Washington Post*. 27 Oct. 2002. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Keane, John. *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*. London: University of Westminster, 1998. Print.

Kernbach, Victor. *Mythe, mitogenese, mitosphere*. Casa Scoalelor: Bucharest, 1995.

    Print.

Kissinger, Henry. "Expand NATO Now". *Washington Post*. December 19, 1994. Print.

Koestler, Arthur. *The Urge to Self-Destruction. The Heel of Achilles: Essays 1968-1973*.

    New York: Random House, 1974. Print.

Konrad, George. *The Melancholy of Rebirth: Essays from Post-Communist Central*

    Europe 1989-1994. San Diego: Harcourt Brace &Company, 1995. Print.

Kostadinova, Tatiana. "East European Public Support for NATO Membership: Fears and

    Aspirations." *Journal of Peace Research* 37. 2 (2000): 235-249. *SAGE*. Web. 20

    Dec. 2010.

Kramer, Mark. "Ideology and the Cold War." *Review of International Studies* 25.4

(1999): 539-576. *SAGE*. Web. 20 Dec. 2010. Kristeva, Julia. Crisis of the European

Subject. New York: Other Press, 2000. Print.

---. Strangers to Ourselves. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Print.

Krushcheva, N. "Russia's Rotting Empire." *World Policy Journal* (Fall 2008): 109-117.

    Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Kundera, Milan. "The Tragedy of Central Europe." *New York Review of Books* 41. 4 (26

    April 1984): 33-38*. SAGE*. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Lake Anthony, "From Containment to Enlargement." Lecture. John Hopkins University School

    of Advanced International Studies. Washington, D.C. *U.S. Policy Information and Text*

    97 (23 October 1993): 6-12. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Lansford, Tom. *All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States*. U.K.: Ashgate Publishing,

    2002. Print.

Larson, Deborah. "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?"

    Dominoes and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great power Competition in Eurasian

    Rimland. Eds. Jervis, Robert and Snyder, Jack. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991:

    85-111. Print.

Latawski, Paul and Martin Smith. *The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War*

    European Security. Manchester . New York: Manchester University Press, 2003. Print.

Lavigne, M. *The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy*.

    London: Macmillan, 1995. Print.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *Myth and Meaning*. New York: Schocken Books, 1979. Print.

---. *Structural Anthropology*. New York: Basic Books, 1963. Print.

Light, Duncan and David Phinnemore. *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with*

    Transition. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001. Print.

Linz, J. and A Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,*

    South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins

    University Press, 1996. Print.

Lugar, Richard. "Why Europe Still Matters and Why NATO should Enlarge Again." *European*

    Security Forum. Meeting on NATO Enlargement. Roundtable on Capitol Hill.

    Washington D.C. 13 June 2001. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Lyotard, Jean François. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*.

    Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. Print.

Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation. Madrid: NATO, 8 July

    1997. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Mandelbaum, Michael. "Turbulent Peace: The U.S. Role in a Dynamic World." *Strategic*

      Forum 64. Washington D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies, National

      Defense University, 1996. Print.

Marin, Noemi and Lengel, Laura. "Emerging Media Transformations in the New Europe:

      Past and Future Challenges." *Negotiating Democracy: Media Transformations in*

      Emerging Democracies. Eds. Isaac Blankson and Patrick Murphy. SUNY series

      in Global Media Studies, 2007: 51-74. Print.

Marin, Noemi and Cezar Ornatowski. "Introduction: Rhetoric and History in the Political

      Transformations in Central/Eastern Europe and South Africa." *Advances in the History of*

      Rhetoric 9 (2006): 161-171. Print.

Marin, Noemi. "From Banned Rhetoric to Public Legitimacy: Religion and National." *Forum*

      Artis Rhetoricae. 2007. Print.

---. "The Other Side(s) of History. The Return of Rhetoric." *Advances in the History of Rhetoric*.

      9 (2006): 209-227. Print.

---. *After the Fall: Rhetoric in the Aftermath of Dissent in Post-Communist Times.* Peter Lang:

      New York, 2007. Print.

Mason, John W. *The Cold War, 1945-1991*. London, New York: Routledge, 1996. Print.

Maynes, Charles William. "America without the Cold War." *Foreign Polic.* 78 (Spring,

1990): 3-25.McGee, Michael, Calvin. "In Search of 'The People' A Rhetorical

Alternative." *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader.* Eds. Sally Caudill, Celeste

Condit and John Lucaites. New York: Guilford Press, 1999: 341-356. Print.

---. "Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture." *Western Journal of Speech*

      Communication 54. 3 (1990): 274-89. Print.

---. "The Ideograph a Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology". *Contemporary Rhetorical*

    Theory: A Reader. Eds. Sally Caudill, Celeste Condit and John Lucaites. New

    York: Guilford Press, 1999: 425-440. Print.

McKerrow, Raymie. "Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis." *Readings in Rhetorical Criticism*.

    Ed. Carl Burgchardt. State College, PA: Strata Pub., 1995. Print.

Mearsheimer, John, J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After Cold War."

    International Security 15 (1990): 5-57. Print.

Melescanu, Teodor. "Security in Central Europe: A Positive Sum-Game." *NATO Review*

    41. 5 (1993). Web. 7 Nov. 2010.

Merton, Robert K. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York. London: Free Press.

    Collier Macmillan, 1968. Print.

Mills, Wright. *The Marxists*. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962. Print.

Moore, Rebecca. *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*.

    Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International, 2007. Print.

Mouffe, Chantal. *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso, 2000. Print.

Nastase, Adrian. Interview. The Romanian Public Television (TVR1). 9 Jan., 2004.

    Television.

Nimmo, Dan and James Combs. "Subliminal Politics: Myths and Mythmakers in America."

    Political Science Quarterly 96. 2 (1981): 349-350. *SAGE*. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Nodia, Ghia. "How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions." *Journal of Democracy* 7.

    4 (October 1996): 15-29. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

North Atlantic Council. *London Declaration*. July 5-6, 1990, par. 6-8. Web. 7 Nov. 2010.

O'Dwyer, Conor. *Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic*

Development. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. Print.

Offe, Claus. "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple

Transition in East Central Europe." *Social Research* 71, 3 (2004): 501- 528.

SAGE. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Ornatowski, Cezar. "Rhetoric and the Subject of/In History: Reflections on Political

Transformation." *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 9 (2006): 187-209. Print.

Orwell, George. *1984: A Novel.* New York: New American Library, 1953. Print.

Petcu, M. "Romanian Quality Press Under the Sign of Maturity." *Quality Press in*

Southeast Europe. Ed. Sofia Spassov : Southeast European Media Center, 2004:

236-254. Print.

Pickles, J. and A. Smith (eds). *Theorizing Transition: the Political Economy of Post-Communist*

Transformation. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. Print.

Pittaway, Mark. *Eastern Europe 1939-2000.* London. New York: Oxford University

Press, 2004. Print.

Pridham, Geoffrey and Tatu Vanhanen. *Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic*

and International Perspectives. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Print.

Popescu, Daniela. *Le Mythe Du Bouc Emissaire Dans La Presse D'Extreme Droite*

Roumaine. Germany: Editions Universitaires Europeennes, 2011. Print.

Rady, Martyn. *Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History.* London: I.B. Taurus.

1992. Print.

Reszler, André. *Mythes politiques modernes.* PUF: Paris, 1981. Print.

Roman, Petre. Letter to the NATO Officials. *The White Book on Romania and NATO*.

     Bucharest: Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 1997. Web. 7 Nov. 2010.

     www.mae.ro.

---. *The Spirit of Democracy and the Fabric of NATO-the New-European Democracies*

     and NATO Enlargement. Sub-Committee on NATO Enlargement and the New

     Democracies. 21 Oct. 1996. Web. 7 Nov. 2010.

Romania's integration into NATO. Press Release. Embassy of Romania in Teheran, Nov.

     2002. Web. 20 Dec.2010.

Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Text of National Security Strategy*. Bucharest, 17

     April 2006. Web. 7 Nov. 2010. www.mae.ro.

Rose, Richard and William Mishler. "Mass Reaction to Regime Change in Eastern

     Europe: Polarisation or Leaders and Laggards?" *British Journal of Political Science*

     24 (1994): 159-182. Web. 10 Jan. 2010.

Russell Benjamin and Gregory O. Hall. *Eternal Colonialism*. Lanham, Md: University

     Press of America, 2010. Print.

Said, Edward. *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*. New York: Columbia University

     Press, 2004. Print.

Sarup, Madan. *Post-structuralism and Post-Modernism*. Athens, G: University of

     Georgia Press. 1993. Print.

Scenters-Zapico, J. "The Social Construct of Enthymematic Understanding." *Rhetoric*

     Society Quarterly 24, 3/4 (Summer - Autumn 1994): 71-87. SAGE. Web. 10 Jan.

     2011.

Schopflin, George, and Nancy Wood. *In Search of Central Europe*. Cambridge, UK:

    Polity Press, 1989. Print.

Schopflin, George. "Post-Communism: Constructing New Democracies in Central

    Europe." *International Affairs* 67. 2 (April 1991): 235-250. SAGE. Web. 16 Jan.

    2011.

---. "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe." *Eastern Europe…Central*

    Europe…Europe 119. 1. Ed. Stephen Graubard (Winter 1990): 55-90. SAGE.

    Web. 16 Jan. 2011. Schwartz, Benjamin. "NATO Enlargement and the Inevitable

    Costs of the American Empire." *NATO Enlargement – Illusions and Reality*. Eds.

    Ted Carpenter and Barbara Conry. Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 1998.

Schweller, Randall. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In."

    International Security 19.1 (1994): 77-107. *SAGE*. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Shafir, Michael. "Xenophobic communism – the Case of Bulgaria and Romania." *The*

    World Today 12 (1989): 208-212. Web. 7 Nov. 2010.

Shaw, Tony. "The Politics of Cold War Culture." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3. 3 (Fall

    2001) 59-76. Web. 25 Mar. 2010.

Silverstone, Roger. "Television, Myth and Culture." *Media, Myths, and Narratives:*

    Television and the Press. Ed. James Carey. Newbury Park, Ca: Sage Publications,

    1988: 20-47. Print.

Simon, Jeffrey. *NATO Enlargement Opinions and Options*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense

    University, 1995. Print.

Sloan, Stanley. "NATO's Future in a New Europe: An American Perspective."

    International Affairs 66. 3 (1990): 495-511. SAGE. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Smith, Anthony. "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity." *International Affairs* 68.1 (1992): 55-76. SAGE. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Smith, Mark. *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. Print.

Stan, Lavinia and Lucian Turcescu. *Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.

Stark, K. "Grouping Toward Ethics in Transitioning Press Systems: The Case of Romania." *Journal of Mass Media Ethics* 14. 1 (1999): 28-44. Web. 25 Mar. 2010.

Stokes, Gale. *From Stalinism to Pluralism. A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945*. Second ed. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Print.

---. *The Walls Came Tumbling Down*. Oxford University Press, 1996. Print.

Sulzberger, C L. *The Last of the Giants*. New York: Macmillan, 1970. Print.

Therborn, Göran. *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology*. London: NLB, 1980. Print.

Thomas, Ian. *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997. Print.

Thomson, J. "The end of the Culture." *Commentary* 48. 6 (1969): 46-52. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Tismaneanu, Vladimir. *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. Print.

---. *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel*. New York: Free Press. Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992. Print.

---. *Stalinism for all Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003. Print.

Todorova, Nikolaeva. *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Print.

Verdery, Katherine. *What was Socialism, and what Comes Next?* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Print.

Von Beyme, Klaus. *Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe.* Macmillan Press, 1996. Print.

Walker, Martin. "Post 9/11: The European Dimension." *World Policy Journal* 18. 4 (2001): 1-10. Web. 7 Nov. 2010.

Waltz, Kenneth. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." *International Security* 18. 2 (1993): 44-79. SAGE. Web. 25 Mar. 2010.

Wander, Philip. "The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism." *Readings in Rhetorical Criticism*. Ed. Carl Burgchardt. State College, Pa: Strata Pub., 1995: 96-114. Print.

Wandycz, Piotr. *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present.* London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Print.

Watts, Larry. "Romanian Public Attitudes to Defense and Security Sector Reforms." Vlachova Marie (ed.) *The Public Image of Defense and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe*. The Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Center for Civil-Military Relations. Belgrade, 2003. Print.

Webber, Mark. *The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States*. Manchester University Press, 1996. Print.

Welsh, Helga. "Dealing with the Communist Past: Central and East European Experiences after 1990." *Europe-Asia Studies* 48 (May 1996): 413-428. Web. 20 Dec. 2010.

Whetten, Lawrence L. *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries*. London, 1971. Print.

White, Stephen. *Communism and Its Collapse*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Print.

Williams, Geoffrey and Barkley, Jones. *NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century: The Twenty-Year Crisis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Print.

Williams, Kieran. *The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968-1970*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Print.

Williams, Kieran, Szczerbiak, Aleks and Fowler, Brigid. "Explaining Lustration in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: A 'Post-Communist Politics' Approach." *Democratization* 12. 1 (February 2005): 22-43. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Wolchik, Sharon and Curry, Jane (eds*.) Central and East European Politics: from Communism to Democracy*. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008. Print.

Yost, David. "NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles." *International Security* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998. Print.

Zilberman, Alina and Weber, Stephen. "Public Attitudes Toward NATO Membership in Aspirant Countries." *The Public Image of Defense and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe*. Ed. Vlachova Marie. The Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of

Armed Forces and the Center for Civil-Military Relations. Belgrade, 2003. Web. 20 Dec.

2010.

ROMANIAN NEWS ARTICLES

"Cheers-integration!" Editorial. *Evenimentul Zilei*. 30 Sep. 2002. Web. 12 Jan. 2011

    <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=98645>.

"Closer to the Truth". Editorial. *Evenimentul Zilei*. 9 Jul. 1998. Web. 12 Jan. 2011.

    <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=12224>.

"Coming Soon!" Editorial. *Adevarul*. 27 Feb. 2007. Web. 10 Jan. 2007.

    <http://www.adevarul.ro/arhiva//stiri/despre/coming%20soon>.

"First Degree Alarm." Dispatch. *Evenimentul Zilei*. 8 Oct. 2001. Web. 8 Feb. 2011.

    <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=69206>.

"In the First Line of the War with the Terrorists." *Evenimentul Zilei*. 19 Mar. 2006. Web.

    05 Mar. 2011. <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=253633>.

"In the First Line of the War with the Terrorists." *Evenimentul Zilei*. 19 Mar. 2006. Web.

    05 Mar. 2011. <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=253633>.

"Is NATO a Good Guy?" *Evenimentul Zilei.* 22 Nov. 2002. Web. 2 Mar. 2011.

    <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/o-noua-romanie-515439.html>.

"Opris Wants Explanations about 'the Strategic Partnership' in Transylvania."

    Evenimentul Zilei. 18 May 1999. Web. 18 Dec. 2010.

    <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/opris-vrea-lamuriri-despre-parteneriatul-strategic-

    din-transilvania-570230.html>.

"President Discontent with West Treatment to Romania after Kosovo Conflict."

    Evenimentul Zilei. 14 Jul. 1999. Web. 12 Jan. 2010.

        <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=61051>.

Draganescu, Ovidiu. "Romania Should Not Poke her Nose in Kosovo Conflict."

    Evenimentul Zilei. 11 Oct. 1999. Web. 11 Jan. 2011.

        <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=4002>.

Nistorescu, Cornel. Editorial. *Evenimentul Zilei*. 20 Sep. 2001. Web. 20 Feb. 2011.

        <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=74688>.

"The Serbs Are Struck Down by NATO Bombardments." *Evenimentul Zilei*. 25 May

    1999. Web. 10 Jan. 2011. <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/sirbii-sint-cu-nervii-la-

    pamint-din-cauza-bombardamentelor-nato-569905.html>.

 "The Watchtower: a New Romania." Editorial. *Evenimentul Zilei*. 22 Nov. 2002. Web.

    10 Jan. 2011. <http://evz.ro/articleprint.php?artid=104037>.

"Yugoslavia is Paralyzed by Lack of Water and Electricity." *Evenimentul Zilei*. 25 May

    1999. Web. 10 Jan. 2011. <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/iugoslavia-paralizata-

    de-lipsa-apei-si-a-curentului-electric-569906.html>.