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impact of director monitoring role on ownership

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Date Issued:
2010
Summary:
I investigate the association between independent directors' monitoring roles as distinguished by whether they reside on the audit committee (ACs) or not (NACs) and their respective ownership and whether Section 301 or a proxy for alternative independent monitoring (the percentage of institutional ownership) affects this relation. Specifically, I examine whether the objectivity required of serving as an AC (consistent with their audit function role) or alignment with investors (consistent with agency theory) dominates in determining independent directors' level of share ownership. Using generalized estimations of equations I provide evidence that ACs hold less ownership than NACs that suggests differences with respect to independence in appearance/ alignment with shareholder interests not previously documented amongst independent directors. I also find evidence that Section 301 may contribute to this differential ownership while the presence of institutional ownership moderates this relationship.
Title: The impact of director monitoring role on ownership: the anti-agency theory.
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Name(s): Incardona, John.
College of Business
Accounting
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Electronic Thesis Or Dissertation
Date Issued: 2010
Publisher: Florida Atlantic University
Physical Form: electronic
Extent: ix, 113 p. : ill.
Language(s): English
Summary: I investigate the association between independent directors' monitoring roles as distinguished by whether they reside on the audit committee (ACs) or not (NACs) and their respective ownership and whether Section 301 or a proxy for alternative independent monitoring (the percentage of institutional ownership) affects this relation. Specifically, I examine whether the objectivity required of serving as an AC (consistent with their audit function role) or alignment with investors (consistent with agency theory) dominates in determining independent directors' level of share ownership. Using generalized estimations of equations I provide evidence that ACs hold less ownership than NACs that suggests differences with respect to independence in appearance/ alignment with shareholder interests not previously documented amongst independent directors. I also find evidence that Section 301 may contribute to this differential ownership while the presence of institutional ownership moderates this relationship.
Identifier: 650509386 (oclc), 2683129 (digitool), FADT2683129 (IID), fau:3487 (fedora)
Note(s): by John Incardona.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2010.
Includes bibliography.
Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2010. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Subject(s): United States.
Industrial management
Corporations -- Management
Directors of corporations -- Legal status, laws, etc
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/2683129
Use and Reproduction: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Host Institution: FAU